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Abstract
With the recovery from the recent crisis, countries of the East Asia and Pacific region are rethinking
their financial and social policy, including old-age protection.  Population aging, in combination with
ongoing urbanization and  economic  transformation, will place  increasing pressure  on  traditional
family care arrangements.  Coverage under formal pension systems is generally low, and the absence
of social safety nets for the needy elderly poses risks in the face of breaks in the economic growth
path.  In addition to common systemic challenges, formal old-age income support systems confront
issues specific to their design type:  (i) The national provident fund and social security-style systems
with reserve funds have demonstrated problems with investment policy and performance, governance
and management.  (ii) In the established market economies, social security-type systems are fiscally
unsustainable in the long run and often have a weak benefit-contribution link.  (iii) These types of
systems encounter additional problems in transition economies, including low contribution collection
from previously socialized enterprises and  rising benefit take-up,  partly as a  consequence of the
policy response to labor market disequilibria.  Despite the formidable reform agenda, countries have
abundant opportunities to  address  these  issues, and  the low  level of coverage,  predominance of
retirement schemes still in evolution and existence of funded provisions in many countries provide an
environment conducive to reform.  Options  involve (i) avoiding mistakes (adopting an  integrated
view on retirement income provision, balancing individual equity and social equity with efficiency
considerations, averting fiscal unsustainability and integrating public and private sector pensions); (ii)
being innovative (moving toward a multipillar structure, prudently extending coverage, trying new
approaches to reduce administrative  costs and extending social risk management through informal
support  and  safety  nets);  and  (iii)  fostering  financial  markets  (decentralizing  pension  fund
management; reviewing  governance, regulation  and  supervision; and  creating  or  supporting the
provision of new instruments).
An earlier  version  of this paper served as an input  to the elaboration  of a regional  Social Protection  Sector
Strategy  by the World  Bank's  East  Asia and Pacific  Region.
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Ian W. Mac  Arthur. Operations  Officer,  Social  Protection,  The World Bank (imacarthur@worldbank.org);
Yvonne  Sin.  Sr. Social  Protection  Specialist,  Social  Protection.  The World  Bank  (ysin@worldbank.org).
Mukul  Asher,  National  University  of Singapore;  Christopher  Bender,  Professional  Education  Ventures;  and Pat
Wiese  provided  country  profiles and additional  input. The paper also profited  from various comments  and
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I.  Introduction and Summary of Findings and Recommendations
The financial,  economic  and social crisis that struck many countries  in the East Asia and
Pacific  region in mid-1997  has revealed  the insufficiency  of existing  social risk management
instruments  in general and of those for the elderly population  in particular. To finance old
age consumption,  most elderly in the region rely on intra-family  income support, which is
coming  under pressure  through  population  aging,  urbanization,  reduced  family linkages  and
sociocultural  change  affecting  family  care  patterns. The existing  funded  and unfunded  public
pension programs  in most countries  cover only a small share of the labor force and face
problems of their own, such as  meager rates of return in  funded schemes and fiscal
unsustainability  in unfunded  ones.  This calls for taking stock of current means of old-age
income  provision  and preparing  for the future.
This paper reviews  the most important  challenges  to old age income systems in the region
and examines opportunities  for their design or reform.  While covering all the region's
countries  in principle,  the paper concentrates  on those for which  there is a strong  knowledge
base (China,  Hong Kong, Indonesia,  Korea, Mongolia,  Malaysia, Singapore,  Thailand,  the
Philippines  and Vietnam). The text, tables and annexes  variably  include  partial coverage  of
Brunei  Darussalam,  Papua  New Guinea  and Taiwan ROC,  while they mostly  do not address
some transition economies due to  scarcity of  information (Lao PDR, Cambodia, and
Myanmar). The main concern  of the analysis  is retirement  income provisions,  with only
some  reference  to survivors  and disability  pensions. While  the latter  are important,  space and
information  limitations  impede  a more  comprehensive  treatment  for now.
The paper contains three chapters.  The remainder of Chapter 1 (i) highlights the main
demographic  and economic  characteristics  of the region,  (ii) outlines  the main strategies  and
arrangements  of social risk management  (SRM) for old age, and (iii) provides  preliminary
conclusions  and recommendations  on challenges  and opportunities. Chapter  2 examines  in
some detail the  main challenges to  old-age income support in  the  region, including
demographic  and economic  shifts,  the need to extend  coverage  and systemic  issues  faced by
current retirement  schemes. Chapter  3 deals with opportunities  in the design or reform of
retirement  income  provisions  that involve  avoiding  mistakes,  being innovative,  and fostering
financial  markets. Annexes  A and B provide basic statistical information  and profiles of
retirement income schemes for selected countries, respectively.  The country profiles
summarize information  in  a  standard format in  order to  provide a  uniformn  basis of
assessment.
1.  Demographic and Economic Profile of the Region
The countries  of the region demonstrate  considerable  variation  on certain  demographic  and
economic  indicators but also share several main features,  with consequences  for pension
system  design  and  reforn:Pension Systems in East Asia and the Pacific
*  Population size differs greatly among the countries (Table I.1).  On the one hand, there
are small countries and city-states with populations ranging from a few hundred thousand
(Brunei) to  a  few million  (Singapore and  Hong Kong)'  and  low-density  mid-sized
countries containing populations  under  5  million  (Lao PDR,  Mongolia,  Papua  New
Guinea).  Several mid-sized countries have populations between  10 and  100 million
(Cambodia,  Korea,  Malaysia,  Myanmar,  Philippines  and  Thailand).  At  the  other
extreme, the region holds the countries with the largest and the 5th largest populations in
the world (China and Indonesia).  The size of a country's population influences practical
aspects of  its  old-age income  security system,  such as the universality  of approach,
administrative capacity, and reform implementation (consensus and speed).
*  The countries also differ with regard to income level (Table 1.  1).  Measured in pre-crisis
income (GDP per capita in PPP, 1996), the region contains some of the world's  most
prosperous countries (Hong Kong and Singapore), some of its poorest (Cambodia, Lao
PDR, Mongolia, Myanmar and Vietnam), and various threshold countries whose income
level  is  close to  or  above that  of  low-income  European Union  countries (Thailand,
Malaysia and Korea).  Higher income levels increase the demand for old-age leisure, i.e.
retirement income provisions.
*  The income level is positively related to the percentage of population residing in urban
areas (Table 1.1)  or negatively related to the share of employees in agriculture, with major
differences  among  the  countries.  In  a  few  countries,  agriculture  has  very  little
importance (Brunei, Hong Kong and Singapore), but in many others it still employs well
over  50% of the workforce  (such as  China, the Philippines, Thailand and  Vietnam).
Informal intra-family and community arrangements have traditionally provided old-age
income in the agricultural sector.
*  Various countries in the region are moving from centrally planned to  market-oriented
economic structures (Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Mongolia, Myanmar and Vietnam).  In
comparison  to  market  economies  with  a  similar  income  level,  centrally  planned
economies typically have a higher share of civil servants and public enterprise employees
in the formal sector labor force, with both  groups normally eligible for generous and
unfunded pension provisions.  In  contrast to  the transition  economies in  Europe and
Central  Asia,  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  in  some  countries  of  East  Asia  have
inherited direct responsibility for providing retirement income.
*  The old age dependency ratio (population aged 65 and above to population aged 15 to 64)
is still relatively low in countries of the region (Table I.  1), ranging mostly between 5% to
8%. with the main exception being Hong Kong (13.8%), followed by China (9.6%) and
Singapore (9.0%).  Over the next four decades, however, these ratios are projected to
roughly triple on average, putting a strain on informal and government provided schemes.
*  With few exceptions (Singapore and Malaysia) the coverage of the work force under
some form of public pension scheme (contributors/labor force) is very low (Table 1.1). In
all  countries mandated retirement schemes cover the public sector (including  security
forces).  However, in  the  private  sector extensive  informal  economic  actixities  and
Hong  Kong became  a Special  Administrative  Region of the Peoples'  Republic  of China  in 1997.
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limited participation of formal enterprises in retirement schemes - participation is often
mandated only for medium and large firms - contributes to low overall coverage.
Various countries in the region have established national provident funds (such as Brunei,
Malaysia and Singapore) or public schemes, which are basically unfunded but still non-
mature and bolstered by reserve funds (Korea and Philippines, and also Vietnam in 1995
and Thailand in  1999).  While these countries are in a relatively good position to face
future pension liabilities, in order to do so effectively, they must confront problems in the
design and performance of the schemes.
2.  Strategies  and Arrangements  for Social  Risk Management  in Old Age
Old-age income support, which protects against the reduced earning capacity of the elderly,
takes two main forms:  (i) an explicit or implicit contract in which individuals support current
elderly while young with the understanding that the next generation will do likewise when
they are old, and (ii) savings that individuals acquire during their working lives, which they
can gradually sell when old or convert to a life annuity at retirement to protect against the
uncertainty of death.  While these two principal options  do not differ importantly under
steady state conditions, in reality significant differences do emerge.
Under the ideal setting of a full-information economy, the purchase of an annuity contract is
2 the best instrument of old-age income protection.  Since risks are known and exogenous,
insurance companies can fairly price and offer these products in a non-distortionary manner.
However, in reality asymmetric information gives rise to moral hazard, adverse selection and
incomplete property rights, which lead to unfair pricing, distorted markets and insufficient or
absent financial market institutions.  Thus, societies have developed alternative methods of
dealing with old-age income risk that form part of social risk management (Holzmann and
Jorgensen, 1999 and 2000; Table 1.2).
In rural societies without financial market instruments, individuals relv on informal/personal
arrangements for income  support in  old age.  These consist largely  of intra-generational
contracts within  the  extended  family  or  community  (risk  mitigation)  supplemented by
continued but reduced labor participation by most elderly and conversion of real assets for
the lucky few (risk coping).  Also, sociocultural norms influence the well being of the aged
(through risk reduction).  In East Asia this is evident in the traditions of filial piety and
respect for the elderly.  In this context, Asian cultures sometimes resist Western-style income
transfer schemes because of their potentially negative impact on family networks. However,
the family support system is increasingly vulnerable to demographic shifts, urbanization and
the effects of globalization.
At the other end of the spectrum are publicly mandated and unfunded retirement provisions -
a society-wide inter-generational contract - that reflect perceived myopia of individuals but
also political objectives such as inter- and intra-generational income redistribution. They are
2 In this scenario society would care for the destitute - the deserving poor - via charity or public transfers.
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often present in countries lacking adequate financial market instruments and consist, in basic
form,  of  social  insurance arrangements  for  the  active population  and  social  assistance
arrangements for the elderly deserving poor.  This type of situation exists in the Philippines
(since 1957), reflecting the influence of the United States, in Korea (since 1988), reflecting
the proximity to Japan, and recently in Thailand, reflecting Central European influence by
some  academics and policy  makers.  Moreover,  China  is currently  attempting to  unify
diverse industry- and regionally based  schemes through the social insurance principle in
order to create greater risk pooling and diminish large variation in contribution rates.
Other countries have restricted the unfunded public pension pillar and mandated a funded
component under government regulation and  supervision.  This has taken the  form of  a
provident fund model, but at the national level, likely as a result of the colonial (English)
tradition and an emphasis on saving.  These funds have provisions for either public (Brunei,
Malaysia  and  Singapore) or  private  management  (Hong  Kong  and  Indonesia) 3  Intra-
generational redistribution to the lifetime poor is not possible under the provident funds, and
in most of these countries, social assistance programs are small by western standards.  Thus,
the overall approach to old-age income security generally reflects the relative aversion to
public handouts in these societies among the populations in general.
Financial market-based provisions under  individual choice  have some importance in  the
region  during  the  accumulation  phase,  but  little  during  the  disbursement  phase.
Precautionary saving, tax-favored  retiremnent  saving  plans  and  occupational  schemes for
employees in larger enterprises exist in many countries.  The elderly are typically Lnable to
convert accumulated savings and assets into an annuity during retirement but often engage in
the transfer of assets to the next generation in exchange for intra-family support.
Clearly, the countries in the region face important challenges and choices, inter alia:  What is
the appropriate balance between informal and formal (publicly provided and market-based)
arrangements?  When strengthening the fiscal basis of the unfunded public schemes, how
much emphasis should the mandatory, fully funded pillar and the voluntary savings pillar
receive?  How should the national provident funds be decentralized to improve governance,
investment return and individual choice?
3.  Preliminary  Conclusions  and  Recommendations
The assessment of social and economic trends and  review of current pension provisions
indicates challenges as well as opportunities for the countries of the region, giving rise to the
following main conclusions and recommendations:
1.  While countries in the region are far from uniform in terms of economic development
and retirement income provision, they face several basic common issues, most importantly:
The "private" manaaement in Indonesia in effect appears to be quasi-public.
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*  The countries have rapidly aging populations, resulting from a deep and, in some cases,
continuing fall in fertility and rising life expectancy at all ages.  As a result, the region
has one of the most pronounced aging patterns in the world, and the ratio of elderly to the
working-age population is projected to triple over the next 40 years, reaching almost 27%
by 2040.  This level should be only marginally less than that of Europe and Central Asia
(ECA) and well above that of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), South Asia (SA),
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
*  While extensive urbanization has already taken place in some countries in recent decades,
during the next thirty years  a sustained and often dramatic move toward residence in
urban areas is projected.  By 2030, there will be only a few countries in which the share
of urban population is expected to be less than 50% (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar,
Papua New Guinea, Thailand and Vietnam).  In many other countries it is predicted to
reach 70% or more (including Malaysia and the Philippines).
*  The traditionally strong economic growth path in the region, which efficiently propelled
poverty reduction over several decades, has experienced recent breaks, most notably in
1997 with the financial  crisis that  reversed income  growth in  several  countries and
slowed it in most of the others.
*  Coverage of the private sector labor force under publicly mandated or provided pension
systems is generally very low, reaching above 50% in only 2 countries (Singapore and
Malaysia), while it is below 20% in  most others.  Pension provisions cover an  even
smaller  share  of  the  current  elderly,  and  the  access  of  the  poor  elderly  to  social
assistance-type provisions is mostly limited or non-existent.
While  population  aging,  urbanization,  and  the  effects  of  globalization will  reduce  the
capacity and, perhaps, the willingness of younger generations to cater to a rising number of
elderly within the family compound, under current conditions, the vast majority of future
elderly will have to rely on family and community support for their old-age consumption.
Despite the resilience of informal support mechanisms, they have shown vulnerability in
crisis situations, especially in the absence of safety nets and  widespread coverage under
formal retirement schemes.  This demands a rapid and comprehensive rethinking of old-age
income support in the region, which  will require governments to  direct attention to  the
following areas:
*  Countries must determine their optimal positions in the social risk management matrix.
How much informal income support for the elderly could remain?  How much income
support  can  the  government  provide  directly  or  mandate  through  financial  market
instruments?  The rise of the old-age dependency ratio suggests that governments will
encounter limitations in raising the necessary budgetary resources and should limit their
role to the provision of basic social insurance and social assistance. The vast majority of
old-age income support should derive from pre-funded arrangements.
*  A comprehensive view of old-age income support can help balance informal and formal.
market-based and government-provided, risk-coping and risk-mitigating approaches and
instruments for the benefit of the individual and the society.  Currently, this is largely
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missing  in  the  region.  Different  government  actors  manage  programs  with  little
coordination;  some  government  institutions  address  retirement  income  merely  as  a
financial market issue and others solely from a social policy perspective; tax rules and
saving  vehicles  are diverse and inconsistent;  etc.  An inter-ministerial task  force, a
planning  institution  with  comprehensive participation,  or  a  think-tank  in  the  prime
minister's office could successfully incorporate a broader approach.
*  From a systemic perspective, among the existing formalized pension arrangements there
are important differences between the public and  private sectors.  Civil servants and
public  employees  normally  enjoy generous,  mostly  unfunded  benefits.  Meanwhile,
private  sector workers most  often benefit  from  pension  provisions, either  by  law  or
practice, only when they belong to large firms, and different formulas, eligibility rules
and funding mechanisms determine actual benefits, which are usually inferior to those in
the public sector.  Such differences impede labor mobility between the sectors and also
create obstacles for reform.  Creating a seamless, common pension scheme for public and
private sector employees should be a prominent reform objective.
*  Other common systemic issues include the creation of an efficient administration, raising
the retirement age and bringing the level for women up to equal that of men, providing
annuities and indexation, establishing consistency in tax treatment, and coordinating old-
age benefits for migrants.
2.  Countries in the region must also deal with specific systemic reform issues 4 that vary
according to the nature of their current pension systems, which fall into three main groups:
National Provident Fund Systems (Brunei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New
Guinea  and  Singapore);  Social  Security  Type  Systems  in  market  economies  (Korea,
Philippines and Thailand); and Social Security Type Systems in transition economies (China,
Lao PDR, Cambodia, Myanmar, Mongolia and Vietnam).
The provident fund systems in Brunei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea
and Singapore operate largely at the national level under public administration.  Only the
Mandatory  Provident  Fund  system  in  Hong  Kong,  which  starts  in  2000,  relies  on
decentralized and private  management.  Provident  funds, which  operate on the  basis  of
defined  contribution,  enjoy  full  funding  and,  in  principle,  provide  a  strong  benefit-
contribution link, which allow them to avert the financial unsustainability and distortions in
pay-as-you-go social insurance schemes.  However, the centralized nature of most mandated
funds poses several specific problems:
*  mandates and limitations on investment (e.g., no or limited foreign investment to keep
funds in-country), which result in lack of diversification and, in combination with few
Investment and regulation strategies mentioned here and discussed in Chapter 3 and the pace of reform will
vary  in different  countries according  to the  extent  to which:  (i)  capital markets are  shallow  and  poorly
regulated, and corporate governance is poor, (ii) govemment controlled or guided enterprises predominate on
the stock exchange. and/'or (iii) private pension fund management industry is insufficiently developed.
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domestic  options,  a  low-performance  portfolio  weighted  towards  deposits  and
government bonds;
*  government control of fund use through a governance structure that over-represents its
interests, thus making fund resources hostage to the public sector and budgetary needs;
*  management practices  that  emphasize  social  and  economic  policy  objectives  (e.g.,
financing of  public sector projects, housing,  health, etc.)  other than  old-age income
support, which contributes to low financial returns to investment;
*  an investment regime that does not contribute to the development of financial markets
and instruments, manifested in part in the inadequate supply of annuities (i.e., benefits are
almost always lump-sum) and the mismatch between short-term assets and  long-term
liabilities; and,
*  the risk that investment decisions lack transparency and the sheer size of transactions,
which could promote excessive risk taking while negatively affecting capital markets
development.
As a result of these characteristics of the provident funds, contributions have important tax
and risk components and retirement benefits are consistently inadequate (i.e., replacement
rates are very low). Moreover, labor force coverage under the schemes is generally low, and
in most of the countries, with the possible exception of Hong Kong, safety nets are weak.
This highlights the limitations of the current system for rich and poor alike.
Under these circumstances, the governments should reevaluate the systems and implement
reforms along the following lines:
*  Improve the investment function by easing restrictions and mandates that reduce the rate
of return.
*  Attempt to insulate managers from political pressures and adjust the governance structure
to  increase the representation of  workers in  order to  better  capture  their preferences
regarding the development of the investment portfolio.
*  Acquire  the  necessary  expertise  in-house  and/or  decentralize  management  in  a
competitive environment while establishing appropriate regulatory mechanisms.
*  Conduct an evaluation of benefits provision, giving increased  emphasis to  retirement
needs.  This implies that government should procure additional avenues of financing for
other areas currently handled under mandatory savings, such as housing and health.  It
also means that safety nets deserve more attention in the structuring of a comprehensive
package of old-age protection.
*  Develop financial markets by  ensuring that  adequate regulation, supervision  and tax
treatment  are in  place.  Also,  the  liberation of  the  investment  regime  should help
accomplish this goal, and government can take a proactive stance in terms of creating the
infrastructure necessary to furnish information useful in the provision of products such as
annuities, for instance.
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Several countries established traditional, OECD-style social security systems with  defined
benefits, public management and pay-as-you-go financing at different times (China, 1951,
whose system was replaced during the Cultural Revolution; the Philippines, 1957; Korea,
1988; and Thailand, end-1998), but they face common problems with fiscal sustainability,
benefit design and contribution link, and governance and investment of the reserve fund.
*  All three existing systems are currently immature and in a strong financial position when
measured in cash terms.  Contributions from employers and employees are more than
sufficient to cover expenditure since the number of pensioners is still low (Philippines),
restricted for the time being to disabled and survivors (Korea), and/or non-existent since
the first old-age benefits will be disbursed only in the future (Korea and Thailand).  But
the cash-flow status hides the true long-run costs of the promised pension benefits that
workers expect in return for their contributions - the implicit pension debt (IPD).  This
debt already amounts to some 90% of GDP in the Philippines, 35% in Korea, and 10% in
Thailand with system introduction.  The IPD in these countries will grow to over 500%,
250% and 50%, respectively, by 2050.  Current contribution rates will be insufficient to
pay for benefits in the future, requiring either a rise in the contribution rate, a cut in the
benefits, or mixture of both.
- The  contributions  and  benefits  of  these  systems  are  not  closely  linked.  Current
contributors pay too  little for what  they are  going to  receive as benefits, and future
generations will have to pay more than what their benefits will be worth.  However, even
if contributions were immediately lifted to steady-state level, the benefit structure would
provide little linkage with the individual contribution effort.  This situation makes the
contributions akin to a labor tax with negative implications for labor supply, the choice
for formal/informal labor market participation, and retirement decisions.
- Korea and the Philippines must handle the investment of sizable reserve funds (8% and
5% of GDP respectively, see Table 1.1), and Thailand will soon join them.  The countries
primarily manage these funds in-house and place them predominantly in non-marketable
government securities and quasi-government projects such as public housing, with little
allocation to  liquid and market-priced  assets.  Furthermore,  investment policies may
conflict with the prudent person approach (e.g., Philippines' recent aggressive investment
policy).  As a result, the funds suffer from below-market rates of return and sometimes
excessive risks, which implies higher future contribution rates than would otherwise be
the case.
To address these pitfalls, the authorities should undertake the following steps:
*  Reduce  the  benefit  level  under  the  unfunded  system  while  quickly  increasing  the
contribution rate to  a  steady-state level  and  introducing funded,  defined-contribution
provisions under decentralized and privately managed schemes.  Such an approach would
both  reduce  the  fiscal  problem  and  improve  the  contribution/benefit  link  under  a
mandated system.
*  Improve the investment outcome of the reserve fund through strengthened governance,
more rigorous guidelines to prevent risk concentration or conflicts of interest, investment
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in  liquid  and  market-priced assets  only,  and  outsourcing  of  the  asset  management
function to the private sector.
The move from central planning to more market-based structures poses generic problems for
the social security systems in transition economies (China, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Mongolia,
Myanmar  and  Vietnam).  Additionally,  there  are  important country-specific issues  that
require resolution (such as the unbearable pension debt of SOEs in China caused by their
responsibility for benefit provision).
The generic problems of pension systems before and during transition result, inter alia, from:
*  a  comparatively higher  level  of  labor  force  coverage  due  to  public  ownership  of
essentially all large enterprises, which rendered the enforcement of regulations easier;
*  a more generous benefit level in a pension system that was invariably defined benefit,
unfunded and publicly managed;
*  contributions that were mostly or exclusively paid by the employer/public enterprise; and,
*  a benefit structure that was not closely linked with the past contribution effort, paid little
attention to work incentives and retirement decisions, had a low standard retirement age,
and differentiated groups of workers according to their working conditions.
As a result of the economic transition process, several new difficulties arose, including:
*  exploitation by enterprises and individuals of regulatory and administrative deficiencies,
resulting in rising benefit take-up and lower contribution, thus amplifying arrears;
*  often severe reduction in budgetary subsidies, which required adjustments in the nominal
benefit level, and higher pension expenditure, reflecting the shift from indirect (lower
price level) to direct income support;
*  erosion of socialized enterprises' social functions and shift of corresponding expenditure
to the budget because of privatization and the imposition of a hard budget constraint;
*  introduction or  distortion  of  early  retirement  and  disability  provisions  as  a  policy
response  to  emerging  unemployment  and  government  restructuring,  which  has
exacerbated expenditure problems; and,
*  development of a moral hazard problem in which enterprises perceived a vested interest
and incentive to increase the retirement (or early retirement) benefits of their workers at
the expense of the government or wider social pool.
In  view  of  the  multiplicity  of  reform  requirements  in  transition  economies,  where
administrative capacities and financial market institutions are deficient, the governments may
want to consider the following options:
*  Start out with a reform of the unfunded benefit structure, making it more compatible with
a market-oriented environment.  One approach involves the move toward a  notional,
defined contribution system (as in Mongolia, Latvia and Poland);
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*  Avoid  burdening the  system through  the  provision  of  early retirement  windows  for
employees in public enterprises.  They proved expensive and, in the end, ineffective in
transition economies in central and eastern Europe because early retirees generally add a
large unfunded liability to the system with only modest and short-term savings in salary
costs;
*  Prepare the shift toward funded provisions under private management through the reform
of the financial market and the introduction of well-regulated (including adequate tax
treatment) and supervised provisions on a voluntary basis.
3.  Despite common problems and systemic issues in pension reform, the low level of
coverage, predominance of retirement schemes still in evolution, and  existence of funded
provisions in many countries provide ample opportunity for alternative system design or
reform.  This may permit the region to avoid the pitfalls  encountered by most retirement
schemes in the OECD countries.  Furthermore, it offers the countries a chance to maximize
the contribution of the pension systems to economic and social development within specific
socio-cultural contexts.  The opportunities for the region involve "getting things right" by:
(i) avoiding mistakes made by other countries in the world; (ii) being innovative; and, (iii)
fostering financial markets.
Avoiding mistakes.  The design and implementation of pension systems throughout the world
has allowed for learning by error.  Several main areas, detailed in Chapter 3, require the
attention of policy makers in order to establish equitable and affordable retirement income
provisions with minimal negative effects on the economy:
•  The adoption of an integrated view on retirement income provisions requires a careful
review of current provisions, their usefulness and  consistency,  and the possibility of
introducing new ones:
*  severance payments/retirement allowances under funded individual accounts;
*  unemployment and health insurance provisions (and their integration with pre-funded
pension schemes);
*  access to and financing of housing;
*  tax treatment of all retirement provisions; and,
*  access to actuarially fair annuities in real terms.
*  The  balance  between  individual  and  social  equity  and  efficiency  considerations  is
perhaps the most  difficult aspect of pension system  design and  reform.  Against the
experience of industrialized countries, important lessons for consideration include:
*  averting unsustainably high mandated replacement rates;
*  closely linking benefits and contributions;
*  staying away from expensive special schemes for the self-employed and agricultural
workers; and,
*  carefully designing and implementing safety-net type provisions for the poor elderly.
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The avoidance of fiscally unsustainable schemes is politically difficult yet critical, and
the principal measures to accomplish this objective are:
*  keeping the scope of the unfunded scheme low;
*  insisting on actuarial assessments from an independent actuarial committee; and,
*  securing good governance and management of the reserve fund.
Being innovative.  The need to rethink pension design provides the region with  a unique
opportunity to  be  innovative, to  try  new avenues aligned  with or  independent from the
worldwide reassessment of pension systems and other social protection arrangements.  Some
of the avenues have already been explored, while others may lead into uncharted territories.
Examples of tested and untested innovations include:
*  Moving toward multipillar structure.  Such a reform approach can minimize the political
and economic risks while securing retirement income in an aging population.  It consists
of  establishing a  publicly mandated and  managed,  unfunded, defined benefit  system
supplemented by a privately managed and  funded,  defined contribution scheme, with
additional retirement provisions on a voluntary basis.
*  Enhancing coverage for the labor force.  While the move toward a multipillar system
with a strong funded pillar may induce more workers to join the official and covered
labor market segment, it may not provide sufficient incentives for low-income workers,
the self-employed and agricultural workers.  Amplifying coverage for these groups may
require some subvention or other measures.  Efforts to  increase coverage  have to  be
carefully  considered to  ensure that  they  do  not  also  invite  moral  hazards  whereby
compliance in  the newly  covered populations  becomes  limited to  those  groups that
benefit from participation at the expense of the larger system.
*  Reducing administrative costs of the privately managed pillar.  This may take the form of
a clearing house approach to lower collection, record keeping and communication costs;
constraints on the choice of funded provisions to cut marketing costs; and group annuities
to diminish adverse selection and transaction costs.
*  Extending the social risk management approach beyond multipillar pension reform.  This
involves developing ways to take advantage of resilient and adaptable informal, family
support systems in the region.  Government policies regarding tax incentives, the legal
structure, housing and the targeting of social assistance can complement and strengthen
existing informal support. This is an area with large potential but little actual government
experience.
Fostering financial markets. The introduction of funded pensions or the move from unfunded
to multipillar pension structure in combination with financial market reform can create a win-
win situation in which both the social and the financial sectors benefit.  Socially, funded
retirement arrangements should provide access to higher benefits, may better shield against
political  risk  and  fiscal  unsustainability,  and  have  less  distortionary  economic  effects.
Financially, they can contribute to the development of financial markets, making them more
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liquid, deeper and more sophisticated, which in turn may contribute to economic growth.3
To  achieve  these  financial  market  effects,  however,  requires  specific  arrangements,
including:
*  A decentralized approach to pension fund management.  This is a characteristic of the
Latin American reform (that is largely being repeated in  OECD countries, Central and
Eastern Europe and Central Asia), employer-sponsored occupational pension plans and
individual pension accounts, which are so dominant in OECD countries and not alien to
developing countries.
*  An appropriate governance, regulation and supervision structure.  Rules have to ensure
that the financial market institutions in charge of retirement assets act in the best interest
of contributors, the true principal.  There are sufficient examples of good practice (what
to do) and bad practice (what to avoid).
*  An adequate tax treatment providing contractual savings or long term savings instruments
with consumption tax as opposed to income tax treatment.  That is, to tax these savings
instruments only once, either at the point of contributions or at the time of withdrawals,
while exempting the funds' investment income from taxes.
*  A strategic role for government.  While the market should determine the creation of new
instruments  for  retirement  income  provisions,  there  are  a  few  important  areas  for
government  involvement.  They  include  the  effective  regulation  and  oversight  of
banking, insurance, pension and provident funds and securities transactions; de-velopment
of the government bond markets to provide a term structure of interest rates that serves as
benchmark for the private sector; provision  of price-indexed bonds, to  allow for the
development of price-index annuities, and up-to-date mortality tables.
- Also, they can stimulate improvements in corporate governance practice,  due to the considerable financial
power they wield.
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II.  Challenges to Old-Age Income Security in the Region
1.  Demographic and Economic Shifts
(i)  Population aging
During  the past 40 years  the demographic  characteristics  of the East Asia and Pacific (EAP)
region have changed  significantly,  setting  the stage for the development  of a much different
population  age structure  in the next 40 years and beyond. As in all other regions (except
Sub-Saharan  Africa),  the youth dependency  ratio (population  aged 0-14 to population  aged
15 to 64) has been decreasing as a result of a reduction in the fertility rate.  But the decline in
this ratio in EAP from 70.7% in 1960 to projected  41% in 2000 was the most pronounced
among all regions  (Table 11.1 and Figure II.1).  However, the old-age dependency ratio
(population aged 65 and above-to population aged 15 to  64) showed only a slight increase
over the same period: from 8.0% in 1960 to projected 9.4% in 2000.
Over the next 40 years, the population of the region is expected to age rapidly, albeit not in a
uniform manner for all countries. The youth dependency ratio is projected to fall further, but
at a lower rate, reaching 30.9% percent by 2040 (Table II.1 and Figure II.1). Meanwhile, the
old-age dependency ratio is predicted to nearly triple by the same year, reaching 26.8%, a
level only marginally below that of Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and well above those of
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), South Asia (SA), Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  By 2030, the level will correspond to  the one
experienced by the rich OECD economies in 1995.
This projected  aging is the result of  declining fertility  and rising  life expectancy in  all
countries  in  the  region.  The total  fertility  rate  (TFR) 6 has  already  fallen  below  the
reproduction level in 5 countries (China, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Thailand) (Table
II.2).  The common demographic projection of a TFR around reproduction level (i.e., 2.1) in
2040 is likely to overstate fertility for those countries already below this level as well as
those  still above it.  This assumption indicates that projected population aging is under-
estimated, i.e., the rise in the old age dependency ratio is likely to be greater.  Also, life
expectancy at birth has increased in all countries since 1962, and is projected to rise further
over the next 40 years, even though this growth will be less pronounced (Table II.3).
The demographic history and anticipated changes in  fertility and life expectancy are not
homogeneous for all countries in the region.  As a result, the projected population growth
varies among the countries, from above 1% in  Lao PDR  to negative in Hong Kong and
Singapore by 2040 (Table 11.4). Also, the old-age dependency ratios in 2040 - and their
projected growth courses - differ markedly among the countries, ranging from 7.8% in Lao
PDR to 57.2% in Hong Kong (Table 11.5). The data suggest that aging is closely related to
6 The total fertility rate is the average number of children born per woman in childbearing age.  A rate of around
2.1 is required for a stable population (i.e., one that is neither increasing nor decreasing in size).
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Figure  11.1 Population  Dependency Ratios for Indicated  Age Groups, by Region
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current income level, with notable exceptions: China has an income level below but an aging
level above the average; the reverse seems true for Malaysia.
Life expectancy at age 65 shows much less absolute variation among the countries of the
region in comparison to the old-age dependency ratio and life expectancy at birth, both now
and in the future (Table I1.6). Currently, life expectancy at 65 ranges from 11.2 years to 16.2
years for men and 12.2 years to 19.7 years for women.  The expected increase in the next 40
years is in the range of 2 to 4 years.  Hence, pension payments starting at this age would have
to last, on average, for around 15 years or more.  If pensions were collected from age 60
onward, the average number of years of payment would be at least 19 years.
The projected demographic development in the region suggests three main conclusions:
*  The region is aging rapidly, with major changes starting shortly after 2010.  This aging is
more pronounced than in most other regions in the world. 7
*  The aging is not uniform among the countries of the region.  A few countries, notably
China, may combine low income levels with an old and quickly aging population.
*  The fall in the total dependency ratio (youth plus old-age) is only transitory, lasting until
around 2010 and then surpassing the year-2000 level in 2030.  Decomposing the total
dependency ratio reveals that this  is due  to  a shift in the relative weight of the two
components:  a rising old-age dependency ratio will gradually overtake a declining youth
dependency ratio.
(ii)  From agrarian  to urban societies
In 1960 essentially all countries in the region still had largely agrarian populations, with less
than one-third of the total living in urban areas. Exceptions were the city-states of Singapore
and Hong Kong, and Brunei (Table 11.7). Major societal changes have occurred in the last 40
years, and the percentage of the urban population has increased.  The rise was more dramatic
in countries with market orientation and industrialization (from 27.7% in 1960 to over 80%
in 1995 in Korea) and less pronounced in most countries that relied, or still rely, on planning
mechanisms (from 14.7% in 1960 to merely 20% in 1995 in Vietnam).
During the next 30 years a continued and often dramatic move toward residence in urban
areas is projected.  By 2030, there will be only a few countries in which the share of urban
population is expected to be less than 50% (Cambodia, Loa PDR. Myanmar, Papua New
Guinea, Thailand and Vietnam).  In many other countries it is expected to reach 70% or more
(including Malaysia and the Philippines).
The projected urbanization will go hand in hand with an economic transformation, evident in
changes in the contribution of the three economic sectors (agriculture, industry and services)
to  GDP and employment.  In  1996, the agriculture sector still accounted for a significant
See Heller, 1997 for an excellent overview of the implications of aging in East Asia for fiscal policy.
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share of GDP and an even higher share of employment in many EAP countries (Table 11.8).
In 9 of the 15 countries employees in agriculture accounted for a larger portion of the labor
force than those in the other two sectors combined, reaching some 70% and above in China
and other transition economies.  However, with industrialization and market liberalization,
the share of agricultural employment is likely to drop quickly.
Urbanization  and  the  need  for  formal  pension  provisions  are  closely  link-ed.  In
predominantly agrarian  societies  with  large  families, informnal intergenerational  income
support for the elderly has been the historical norm.  The cultural forces in Asian societies,
emphasizing strong family values, have helped preserve this system to a large degree, even in
the face of urbanization.  However, with both rapid urbanization and fewer  children, the
informal, family-based old-age income support system comes under greater pressure, and the
number of uncovered and vulnerable is bound to increase.  Moreover, industrialization has
reduced the family ties of the  existing  urban population as  workers have become  more
geographically mobile.  It  is no  coincidence that formalized retirement provisions in  the
region are most advanced in countries with a high urban population share.
(iii)  Breaks  in the economic  growth  path
With  some  exceptions,  countries  in  the  region  experienced  an  unprecedented  positive
economic growth path since the 1  970s, or even earlier (Table 11.9). Sustained annual growth
rates of 6% and above over a period of three or more decades lifted the income levels of most
countries well above those of countries in SSA, with which they shared similar profiles in the
1960s.  Measured in  PPP, by  1996 GDP per capita reached high-OECD country level in
Singapore and Hong Kong, was similar to  lower-income EU member countries in Korea,
Malaysia and Thailand, and bypassed the US$ 3,000 threshold in China, Indonesia, and the
Philippines (Table 1.  1).
This income growth translated into an impressive and unprecedented reduction in poverty in
the region and most countries in it (Table II.10).  Within 20 years and in spite of continued
population growth, the number of poor was halved, and the poverty head-count index fell
from 58% in  1975 to 21% by  1995.  However, progress in poverty reduction was uneven
within and among countries, and the incidence of poverty still remained at 40% and above in
Lao PDR, Mongolia and Vietnam.
The financial crisis that hit the region in mid-1997 interrupted this development, I.ading to
significant reversals in income level growth and poverty reduction in the five crisis countries
(Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, plus Hong Kong more recently)
and to  lower than previous  economic growth rates in  essentially all others  (Table  11.9).
Grovwth  has impressively resumed in Korea and is projected to be substantial in many other
countries of the region in 2000 (World Bank, 2000).  However, it is uncertain if the region
will succeed in returning to its pre-crisis high growth path.  While international experience
provides  limited guidance,  economic  considerations  suggest  caution  and  only  moderate
optimism.
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The impact of the crisis and moderate growth rates of perhaps 3% to 6% (which translate into
lower per-capita growth rates) will likely produce the following effects:
*  Many individuals will possess fewer assets for retirement, having used them during the
crisis as a coping mechanism.
*  Unemployment rates (and spells) may decrease in the future, but they will likely remain
above pre-crisis levels.
*  Income levels will increase, but at a much lower pace than in the past.
*  Governnents  will leave the  crisis with  much higher internal and external debt.  To
service interest payments and to repay the debt, the primary budget deficit will have to be
positive for many years to come, limiting the budgetary room for maneuver during this
time (Asher and Heij, 1999; World Bank, 2000).
*  Progress in poverty reduction via economic growth will be much slower, and government
capacity to reduce the poverty gap will be reduced.
*  Since the key variable in any social security system is economic growth, a slow-down
will surely have implications for its financial health.
2.  Extending  Coverage  for Old-Age  Income  Support
(i)  Low share of covered  labor force  under formal  arrangements
At present, labor force coverage under formal retirement income provision throughout the
region  is generally limited.  For several countries - China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, the
Philippines and Thailand - combined coverage under publicly mandated private sector and
government employee schemes is less than 30% (Table 11.1  1).  However, coverage in Korea
(51%), Malaysia (61%), Mongolia (52%) and Singapore (65%) is considerably higher.  Since
many mandated pension schemes for the private sector began only recently, worse coverage
- as low as 10% - often applies to the current elderly  population.
Almost invariably, public sector workers benefit from generous pension schemes unavailable
to  the  rest  of  the  population. 8 There  are  typically  distinct  schemes  for  workers  in
administration, the social sectors (education and health services) and the military and police
force.  In spite of the methodological difficulties inherent to cross-country comparisons of
public sector employment (Kraay and Van Rijckeghem, 1995; Schiavo-Campo et.al., 1997a),
available data indicate that the public sector (excluding state-owned enterprises) 9 comprises
between 4% to  13% of the labor force in countries of the region (Schiavo-Campo et.al..
s To this extent,  they  normallv  are exempt  from participation  in the main publicly  mandated  scheme  for private
sector workers. However,  this is changing  in Brunei, Singapore  and Thailand,  where new provisions  are
requiring  govemment  workers  to enter  the national  provident  fund schemes.
Due to the rapidly changing  panorama  regarding SOEs in the region, where continuing  privatization  is
occurring in several countries,  the data for these enterprises  did not enter the calculations  in Table 1A.11.
However,  in the past public  and socialized  enterprises  have enjoyed  mostlv  formnal  retirement  provisions.
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1997b).  One exception is Brunei, where the government has traditionally been the main
employer (of up to 50% of the labor force).  Still, assuming full coverage of public sector
schemes (i.e., 100%), in most cases they would apply to less than 10% of the total labor force
(Table II. 1  1).
For private sector workers, the situation differs greatly among the countries.  Coverage under
publicly  mandated schemes (social-security style, provident  fund  or  company-sponsored
retirement allowances, in the case of Korea) is only emerging in Hong Kong and Thailand,
where  such schemes are just  getting  started, and  in  Vietnam, where  there  is widespread
evasion of the regulation for participation of firms with 10 or more employees.  On the other
hand,  Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia and  Singapore have  operated mandatory private sector
schemes for years, and coverage rates, in terms of contributors/total labor force. are over
50%. Other countries fall somewhere in between:  China (12.3%), Indonesia (10.6%/O)  and the
Philippines (21.0%).
The structure of the labor market relates directly to coverage rates under mandatory private
sector schemes.  In  countries with large agricultural and  urban  informal  sectors (China,
Indonesia, the Philippines, etc.) coverage tends to be limited to the formal urban sector.  In
China, for example, there are currently no formal provisions for the rural population, which
accounts for around 70% of the total.'0 Often, regulations require participation from only
specific portions of the labor force, indicating possibilities for future expansion at least in
principle.  In Indonesia, contribution to the provident fund is compulsory for firms with at
least ten employees or a monthly payroll of Rp 1 million.  The provident fund in Malaysia is
voluntary  for  domestic workers  and  the  self-employed.  Korea  has  extended  coverage
incrementally under its National Pension Scheme to the rural self-employed, farmners  and
fishermen, and only very recently to the urban self-employed and employees of small firms
(less than five workers) - but not without substantial problems.  However, even in countries
with essentially full mandatory current coverage by law, the typical problems of evasion
exist.  This is especially true for the Philippines, whose social security style scheme covers
nearly the entire private sector labor force in principle but only around 21% in practice.
Private  occupational  plans  and  other  "voluntary"  arrangements  are  mostly  of  limited
importance and benefit mainly those already possessing relatively greater means of old-age
income  support.  In  most  of the  countries only  large domestic  and  multinational firms
sponsor these types of schemes as a means of attracting and/or rewarding high quality labor.
Governments  have  encouraged  the  expansion  of  occupational  schemes  through  tax
incentives, such as concessional tax treatment for employer contribution, with mixed but
mostly modest results."  i  Hong Kong provides an exceptional case in which the absence, until
recently, of mandatory retirement provisions led to the establishment by businesses of more
than  16,000 private pension  schemes, covering around  30% of private  sector employees.
10  China does have a voluntary pension scheme with very low benefits for rural workers, which covers around
8% of the total labor force.
Despite the  availability of  favorable tax  treatment since  1992, Indonesia has  succeeded in  stimulating
extension in coverage to only 10% of formal sector workers.
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This occurred largely due to shortages of skilled labor in Hong Kong's economy, which more
than any other in the region is dominated by the service sector, thus accentuating the need to
create a stimulus to draw and maintain qualified workers.
(ii)  Changes in informal support (family and labor income)
The generally low levels of coverage under formnal,  public income  support arrangements
indicate the relatively important role that informal care systems must play.  These are still
quite  strong in the  region and have  a  deep cultural and  historical basis.  Although the
informal system for income security has many components,1 2 the family support mechanism
(mainly children's support for elderly parents) is the most significant.  Children's support for
elderly  parents  includes  coresidence, performance  of  chores  and  difficult tasks,  social
contact, and financial or material transfers.
Currently, most elderly in the region receive substantial support of various types from their
children.  In the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan ROC, Thailand and Vietnam parent-adult
child coresidence rates in the mid-1990s were over 70% for parents age 60 or older with at
least one adult child (Table II.12).'3  Similarly, more than two-thirds of all Malaysians and
62% of Indonesians age 60 or older lived with an adult child in the early and mid- 1990s,
respectively (DaVanzo and Chan, 1994; Frankenberg et.al., 1999).  More than 80% of non-
coresident adult children in the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam had provided
their elderly parents with either monetary or material support within the previous year.  In
most of these countries social contact between the elderly and their children on at least a
monthly basis was at a rate above 70%.
Policy-makers have voiced concern regarding the effects of stressors - such as urbanization,
education,  longer  life expectancy,  and  fertility  reduction  - on  family  support systems.
Coresidence rates, for which some time-series information is available, appear to have fallen
slightly in  some countries but remain high overall (Table  11.13), and in some cases it is
difficult to  identify  trends  (Philippines).'4 Also,  quasi-coresidence,  when a  child  lives
adjacent  or  in  close  enough  proximity  to  have  daily  contact,  seems  to  have  often
compensated for declines in coresidence (Ofstedal et.al. 1999) and may reflect a tendency to
purchase more privacy with rising incomes.  Thus, even when a form of support changes, its
function may remain intact.  But large shifts in patterns of living arrangements in certain
countries of the region may portend more pronounced declines in future coresidence in the
others:  the percentage of elderly living with any child fell from 78% (1984) to 49% (1994)
in Korea and from 77% (1970) to 60% (1989) in Japan (in Knodel and Debavalya, 1997).
12  For  example,  informal  support may  involve  local communities,  clubs, patrons and  religious and  non-
governmental organizations.
' Only a small fraction of the elderly did not have at least one adult child who represented a potential support
provider (Table 11.  12).
14 In fact, the suggestion of a trend from two data points - for some countries in the table - should be interpreted
with caution.  Moreover, differences in sampling and  data collection methods among the surveys make the
formulation of definitive conclusions more tenuous.
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In addition to relying on their families, the elderly often continue to work (at least before
they  become  too  old  to  do  so) in  order  to  meet  income  needs.'5  For  example,  in  a
representative survey of Thai elderly, 36.2% of respondents considered their own or spouse's
work as the main  source of income,  somewhat less than the portion who cited children
(48.6%) (Knodel et.al., 1999).  For those aged 60-69 years, labor income was actually even
more important than income from children (cited as primary income source by 47.6% and
39.4% of the sample, respectively).  Only 4.4% and 2.3% claimed that savings/interest and
pension/retirement pay, respectively, comprised their main income.  Similarly, the elderly in
two regions of Vietnam cited work as a source of income (41.1% and 35.2%)16  only slightly
less frequently than children (42.4% and 66.0%) (Cuong et.al., 1999). These findings match
earlier data for other countries of the region (China, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines)
in which high proportions of the elderly had to rely on continued work and/or family support
(World Bank, 1994: 63).  This may be less the case for certain countries, such as Singapore,
but even there, coresidence rates are extremely high and the elderly find income from the
public  retirement  scheme  inadequate  and  family  support  vital  (Chan,  1997;  Chan  and
Cheung, 1997).
Clearly, informal support for the elderly in the region will continue to be important in the
future as will the development of favorable and appropriate policies toward it.  In this regard,
the  interaction  and  complementary fit  between  formal  and  informal  mechanisms  is  of
particular interest.  For example, under conditions of household poverty, coresidence may not
be able to ameliorate many of the conditions threatening the well being of the elderly.  The
recent East Asian crisis amplified this phenomenon, making readily apparent the limitations
of informal support networks in the context of lacking or deficient safety nets (and formal
retirement provisions).
(iii)  Absence  of formal  social  safety  nets  for  the  needy  elderly
With a few notable exceptions, the countries in the region do not provide categorical income
support for their elderly. 17 Brunei has a demogrant pension that pays B$ 150 in benefits (not
adjusted in its level since 1984) to around 80% of people over the age of 60 (approximately
10,000 persons).  There are both demogrant (Social Security Allowance) and means-tested
arrangements (Comprehensive Social Security Assistance) in Hong Kong that reached some
750,000 elderly (12% of the total population) in 1997.  Since the new Mandatory Provident
Fund Schemes Ordinance does not contain provisions for the current elderly, the gcvernment
made improvements to these safety net schemes in 1996-97.
Life-cycle household saving may be a further mechanism to prepare for old age, also for the poor.  However,
the formally available evidence is uncertain regarding the extent to which the lowest income group possesses
thi  capacitv. See Attanasio and Szekely, 2000.
r i-ures are for the Red River Delta and Ho Chi Minh City and environs, respectivelv.
One fundamental assumption behind categorical (universal or demogrant) schemes is that the Zlderlv as a
group are automatically at risk of insufficient income (as a result of their age, i.e.. reduced labor caDacity. etc.).
When financed  from  general consumption taxes,  which  are  often regressive  in developing  countries, the
approach may actually result in the redistribution of wealth from the poor to the rich.
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Other  countries rely only  on means-tested or  discretionary schemes.  Korea  has public
assistance - in the form of Livelihood Protection, the Social Welfare Services Program and
the  non-contributory old  age allowance - providing modest  cash  and  in-kind transfers.
However, the programs bear considerable stigma, and only 265,000 persons (less than 10%
of the population above 65) received benefits in 1997 at a cost of less than 0.1% of GDP.
Thailand's  Department of  Public Welfare  operates  a  program,  which  covered  318,000
persons in  1997, that pays monthly subsistence allowances of 200 Baht (currently worth
around US$ 5) to indigent elderly in rural areas.  Such schemes in some countries suffer from
restricted access, mostly opaque regulations (often handled by local authorities in a non-
transparent manner), and limited financial resources.
Traditional safety nets in transition economies have generally been non-existent because the
state attempted to account for the complete welfare of workers through employment in state
enterprises in urban areas or collective agriculture in rural areas and provision of free or
subsidized goods and services.  In any case, inefficiencies left many people outside these
systems. With market reforms, there has been some effort to establish or expand safety nets.
In 1993 Vietnam created a scheme for the distribution of land formerly held by cooperatives
in which the elderly received 50-80% of the land allocated to the non-elderly.  This served as
an important welfare benefit since the able elderly, their families or tenants could farm the
land, which was  capable of producing at  the  subsistence level.  The number of  social
assistance recipients in Mongolia actually declined from 384,400 in 1994 to 138,000 in 1996
- while 800,000 persons (36% of the population) are poor.  Many of the beneficiaries are
elderly, and with its upcoming pension reform, the government may want to attempt better
targeting of the indigent elderly.  Local government in China might be encouraged to follow
suit in the absence of welfare provisions throughout most of the country.
The absence of categorical income support for the needy elderly, i.e. social assistance-type
pensions, with relaxed means-testing procedures for individuals above a certain age, reflects
the deeply ingrained political resistance in the region against handouts.  The general societal
perception is that they are inconsistent with prevailing values and threaten the family and its
informal  support  system.  The recent  financial  crisis,  however,  demonstrated that  the
informal,  family-based system  and  social  cohesion  are in jeopardy  without appropriate
income support for the needy.  Such considerations gain importance in light of globalization,
more variable income and employment situations, and a  persistent high  level of  income
inequality in most countries of the region (reflected in a Gini of 0.4 to 0.55).  With lower
actual and expected economic growth rates, the tolerance for high income-inequality and a
lack of income support for the needy is likely to decrease along with social cohesion.
3.  Addressing  Systemic  Issues
The countries in the region exhibit a diversity of old-age income support systems, differing
inter alia in benefit type, funding mechanism, total  and sectoral coverage, importance of
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occupation schemes, and the date of introduction and maturity.  Table 11.14  highlights the
diversity of schemes within and among countries.
Nevertheless these old-age income schemes share general problems, and sub-sets of countries
exhibit strong similarities.  This section discusses the general issues in the provision of old-
age income support before addressing common issues in sub-sets of countries. Regarding the
latter, the countries are classified in three main groups:  National Provident Fund Systems
(Brunei, Hong  Kong,  Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua  New  Guinea  and  Singapore);  Social
Security Type  Systems  in  Market Economies  (Korea,  Philippines  and  Thailand); and
Social Security Type Systems in Transition Economies  (China, Lao PDR,  Cambodia,
Myanmar, Mongolia and Vietnam).
(i)  General  issues
The main general issues shared by most, if not all countries in the region are the following:
Lack of  an integrated view on old-age income  support.  As  in other parts  of the  world,
income support systems for the elderly in  EAP countries emerged in  a  gradual manner,
incorporating new elements without questioning the existing ones since different ministries
or organizations are likely to administer them.  As a result, severance payments/retirement
allowances continued to exist after the introduction of public pensions; tax privileges are
granted to some but not all retirement income schemes; some government institutions address
retirement income merely as a financial market issue and others merely from a social policy
perspective; and the ministry of finance and the ministry of labor and/or social affairs often
handle different schemes without communicating with each other.
What is missing in essentially all countries is an approach to old-age income support that
moves beyond parochial interests and addresses the main social and economic, fiscal and
regulatory, micro- and macroeconomic questions in a  comprehensive manner.  An inter-
ministerial task force, a planning institution with comprehensive participation, or a think-tank
located within the Prime-Minister's or Presidential office could successfully incorporate this
approach.
Dealing  with  civil  servant/public enterprise  pensions.  In  most  countries  public  sector
employees  enjoy  comparatively  generous  pensions,  if  measured  by  their  own  low
contribution rate to the system, favorable eligibility criteria (such as reduced retirement age
or required service record for full pension) and the promised full-service replacement rate
that often exceeds 75% 18 Until recently. all benefits were of defined tvpe with no or little
funding.
Such a  pension structure implies high current, but  mostly high future public  expenditure,
impedes the mobility between the public and private sectors (due to an employee's desire to
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acquire and maintain the relatively more attractive public pension benefits), and strengthens
resistance to downsizing or privatization (due to  the threat to promised benefits).  These
factors underscore the urgency of reforming and synchronizing public sector schemes with
existing or envisaged private sector schemes. Some countries (such as Brunei, Singapore and
Thailand) have started to address these issues, but much more needs to be done.
Generous pensions in the public sector are often, and not without reason, seen as a means of
making up for the lower wages compared to the private sector, and on a lifetime basis, total
compensation may not be too different. As a result, and in line with international experience,
aligning public and private sector pension arrangements requires a simultaneous reform of
the public wage schedule - although at the lower levels, public sector wages are most often
not too divergent from those of the private sector or may even exceed them.
Creating an  efficient administration.  The effectiveness and  financial  sustainability of a
pension  system depends to  a large degree on the efficiency of its  administration, which
involves its capacity to (i) collect contributions in a timely, non-intrusive, but cost-effective
manner, (ii)  record relevant  information over  a  long  period  of  time  based  on  modem
information technology (e.g., contribution base, contributions, withdrawals - including pre-
retirement withdrawals, family characteristics, etc.); (iii) manage accumulated reserves to the
benefit  of the  contributor (i.e., maximizing risk-adjusted  return);  (iv) communicate with
contributor and beneficiary in a client-oriented manner; (v) disburse retirement benefits in a
secure and efficient manner; (vi) detect, control and sanction misrepresentation and fraud;
(vii) facilitate portability; and (viii) provide a vehicle for dispute resolution.
While some progress has been made, all pension administrations in the region are far from
best practice in at least one of these functions. Failure in even one function impinges on the
overall  credibility of  the  scheme  and  results  in  higher  evasion/lower  coverage,  which
eventually reduces the scope and size of old-age income provided.
Increasing the retirement age and establishing consistency between men and women.  The
retirement age in the region is very low, never exceeding 60 years of age, except in the newly
introduced scheme in Hong Kong.1 9 In various countries it is 55 years (Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia  and  Thailand),  with  even  lower  ages  under  early  retirement  provisions.
Furthermore, retirement age for women  is lower than that  for men in  several countries,
despite their increased labor force participation and longer life expectancy.  Justification for
such low retirement ages lies in the lower life expectancy in the region, but the argument
does not hold:
*  While the average life expectancy at birth in the region is still low when compared to
high-income countries, it differs widely among the countries.  It  is only very low in
countries with few formalized retirement income provisions (such as Cambodia and Lao
'9 Note that in countries such as Singapore and Malaysia, the age at which one can withdraw from the National
Provident Fund does not correspond with age of retirement.
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PDR).  In Brunei, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore, it is not too different
from the high-income countries.  Overall, it is expected to rise quickly throughout the
region over the next decades (Table 11.4).
*  Regarding financial  sustainability of pension  systems, the important  indicator is  life
expectancy at retirement age, not birth. Table II.5 indicates that life expectancv at age 65
is well above 12 years in most countries, reaching almost 20 in some (and higher for
women).  Hence, a retirement at age 60 or even 55 (or under early retirement) leads to the
payment of a pension benefit of 15 plus or even 20 plus years, frequently based on fewer
years  of  contribution.  Such  a  scheme  is  only  financially  sustainable  either  if  the
contribution rates are very high or the benefit levels very low.
Providing annuities and indexation.  Only a few countries in the region provide annuities at
retirement or request that the accumulated funds be  transformed into an annuity  .20  Even
fewer countries provide or demand  price indexation once an  annuity becomes available
(Table 11.  15). Both gaps are at odds with the objectives of retirement income security.
The main rationale for publicly provided or mandated old-age income security is the risk of
outliving accumulated resources due to (i) insufficient individual saving for retirement and
(ii) the uncertainty of death.  Avoidance of the first risk leads to mandatory participation
under either unfunded or funded arrangements.  To avoid the second risk requires not only
annuities in nominal terms under an appropriate pooling mechanism, but also an indexation
mechanism ensuring the maintenance of purchasing power.  While price indexation under an
unfunded system can easily be provided, because the current contributors or the government
can insure against the inflation risk through higher contributions or budgetary transfers, price
indexation  under  a  funded  scheme  requires  the  provision  of  indexed  bonds  and/or
international investment of accumulated funds.
Establishing consistency in tax treatment.  Retirement income schemes throughout the region
are subject to uneven application of the two main alternatives for taxation treatment (income-
type or consumption-type).  This holds implications in terms of the efficiency of resource
allocation and equity.
A few countries apply the consumption-type tax treatment to  mandated pension schemes
(such as Korea) but  different treatment to  other voluntary retirement  savings instruments
(Table II. 15).  Most other countries (such  as China, Hong Kong,  Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore and  Thailand) do  not  tax  mandated  schemes but  do  tax  voluntary  savings.
Exempting pension schemes from taxation is grossly unfair to other citizens, in particular in
countries with a low coverage rate.  It is the wealthier citizens that often contribute and
benefit from a formal pension system while all citizen are subject to taxes, rendering a tax
free pension system effectively regressive.  The result of the application of inconsistent tax
2"  Note that for funded schemes, the benefit should be  in line with the accumulation at retirement.  In other
words, the present  value  of  the  benefit provided in  retirement  (and utilizing  the  best  available mortality
projections) should be the same as the account accumulation.
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systems to different retirement schemes is often savings substitutions with negative effects on
resource allocation.
Coordinating old-age benefits for migrants.  Some countries.  in the region are important net
providers of migrant workers (such as the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam),
and  others  are net  importers  (such  as  Brunei,  Malaysia  and  Singapore).  In  the  labor
importing countries, migrants are often exempt from participation in the pension system or
encounter difficulty in the transfer of the accumulated assets or pension rights once they
leave the host country.  This creates a current and future burden on their countries of origin,
which will have to provide some basic income support once the returned migrant ages.
Funded provisions or arrangements between the countries regarding transfer of accumulated
rights  (as exist in many other parts of the world) would provide fuller access of migrant
workers to mandated pension schemes.
(ii)  National  Provident  Fund Systems
Several countries in the region have emphasized mandatory savings arrangements for old-age
support and opted for provident fund systems at the national level.  Most of these are under
public  management  (Brunei,  Malaysia,  Papua  New  Guinea  and  Singapore),  with  the
exceptions of Indonesia, whose fund has a  private management structure but  in  practice
appears  quasi-public,  and  Hong  Kong,  which  has  legislated  for  decentralized,  private
management starting in 2000.  The provident fund model has the advantages of full funding
and, in principle, provides a strong benefit-contribution link, thereby avoiding the risks of
financial unsustainability and distortions in pay-as-you-go social insurance schemes arising
from  benefit  formula  structure  and  redistribution.  However,  low  rates  of  return  on
investments imply an implicit tax on contributions and future low benefits, and in a context
of reduced labor force coverage and weak or absent safety nets, the weaknesses of the overall
approach to old-age income security become more evident.
Despite  the  differences  among the  countries  and  their  old-age  protection  systems,  the
centralized nature of most of the provident funds21 has given rise to a characteristic set of
problems, including low return on investment of member balances, restricted choice for the
individual in terms of investment and use of savings, lack of contribution to financial market
development,  and  inadequate  benefits  and  benefit  provision  (i.e., lump-sum  provisions
without options for annuities).  This indicates that several issues are of primary importance
on the reform agenda: investment policy  and performance; governance and management;
and, development of market institutions and tools.
21  This  section concentrates mainly  on the  mature  provident  fund  systems (i.e..  Indonesia.  Malaysia and
Singapore) from which members collect benefits upon retirement after a considerable period of contribution.
The funds in some countries started operating relatively recently (Brunei. 1993; Papua New Guinea, 1980; and
Hong Kong, 2000).
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Investment  Policy  and  Performance.  The  countries  generally  limit  the  investment  of
provident fund resources by specifying the types of allowable investment tools and amounts
that can be  allocated to them, ostensibly to address risk concerns but  also in practice to
support other domestic policy goals.  For example, Malaysia's  Employee Provident Fund
(EPF) Act specified that  70%  of total  investments had  to  be  in  Malaysian Government
Securities.  In Singapore, member balances with the Central Provident Fund (CPF) Board
must  be  invested  in  government  bonds.  All  countries  have  traditionally  proscribed
investment in foreign assets in an attempt to keep scarce investment funds at home, which
limits country-risk diversification.  However. Malaysia recently granted permission to the
EPF to invest offshore, and the selection of external fund managers has begun.  Singapore
allows members to invest a small portion of CPF  savings, the pre-retirement withdrawal
funds, in approved mutual funds operating under rules that permit substantial direction of
resources overseas.  A  1997 legislative  change allowed the  main public  scheme  in the
Philippines to invest up to 7.5% abroad, but this has still not occurred (Iglesias and Palacios,
2000).  The most liberal regime exists in Hong Kong, with its Mandatory Provident Fund
(MPF) scheme starting operation in 2000.  In this system, individual investment management
companies (trustees) approved  by  the  MPF  Authority  offer  products  based  on  a  wide
(unrestricted) menu of investment options.
Overall, the regulations on investment of provident fund assets and, in certain cases, paucity
of avenues of diversification in-country have led to  portfolios that are weighted heavily
toward public sector products and bank deposits, partly at the expense of high-performance
equities.  In Singapore, roughly 85-90% of CPF funds are in government bonds.  Brunei,
which does not have a stock market, has most of its funds in fixed deposits with a few locally
operating banks.  Comparable data are available for other countries and confirn  the general
trend (Figure 11.2).
Figure  II.2  Provident  Fund Investment  Allocation,
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The structure of the investment portfolios has normally resulted in low rates of return.  In
1994 real return on Indonesia's fund was zero.  Between 1983 and 1997 a simple average of
the real rate of return to members of Singapore's CPF equaled 1.5%. Malaysia demonstrated
somewhat better performance, registering 3.44% real return from 1961 through 1997 (simple
average of annual values).  This improved to 4.60% for the more recent period of 1987-97.
However, in comparison to alternatives, such as equities (5.61% over the  1971-91 period)
these investments appear somewhat unsatisfactory.  This is true not only in the case of many
provident  fund  systems of  the region  but  also  with  regard to  reserve funds  in  general
throughout the world.  Figure II.3 compares the rate of return with bank deposits - the lowest
financial market rate of return - and with per-capita income growth rates - the implicit rate
of return of  an unfunded  system.  The first comparison  signals that provident  funds in
Malaysia and Singapore have done only marginally better and slightly worse, respectively,
than bank deposits, and the same result is likely to hold for  Brunei and  Indonesia.  The
second comparison with the per-capita income growth rate suggests that contributors may
have been better off in a pay-as-you-go scheme.
Figure 11.3 Differences Between Real Annual Compounded Pension Fund Returns
and Bank Deposit Rates, Real Per-Capita Income Growth, Selected Countries
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Governance and  Management.  In addition to  rigid policy,  some of the  poor results  on
investment owe to fund governance and management practices.  Typically, a board with
representation from  different relevant segments of  society  (i.e., government,  employers,
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employees, financial sector, etc.) sets the parameters for fund operation and an investment
committee or panel handles the routine  technical decisions and procedures.  This  would
seemingly allow for the expression of employee interests (i.e., maximization of return), but
the exact composition and method of selection of the board and committee members results
in the overrepresentation of government.  For example, although Malaysia's  EPF Board
consists of 20 members with fairly proportional  representation among various  groups (5
representatives each from government, employers and employees; 3 professionals; and EPF's
Executive Chairman and Deputy Chairman), the Minister of Finance appoints all of them,
thus essentially creating a mechanism of government control.  Singapore and Brunei have
similar  arrangements,  in  which  the  Minister  of  Labor  and  his  Majesty  the  Sultan,
respectively, choose the Board.  The end result is that the fund resources are captive to the
public sector and its budgetary and policy needs.
There are many indications that  governments have taken advantage of this  situation and
conditions of non-transparency to attend to policy objectives that do not match the funds'
purpose  of old-age income  protection  and  adversely  affect the  efficiency  of  translating
savings into investments. The Malaysian case provides  several examples  in which policy
goals and political pressures have influenced investment action:
*  government use of funds to assist in the recapitalization of distressed banks and acquire
equity in debt-laden enterprises of national interest;
*  development of plans to  finance a national economic recovery package  domestically,
with partial financing from the provident and other pension funds;
*  possible support to selected stocks on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange with provident
fund resources during the initial phase of the economic crisis in 1997;
*  amendment of the EPF Act to allow the EPF to finance housing construction through the
public housing authority (supply side); and,
*  the  participation of the  EPF  in  government initiated  and  directed  privatization  and
infrastructure projects.
Similarly, it appears that the Indonesian government used provident fund assets to support
the exchange value of its currency, ease the passage of bills in Parliament and finance part of
the Indonesian Bank- Restructuring Agency's  takeover of most of the 215 banks operating
there shortly before the crisis.
Quite often government premises its investment mandates on social and economic objectives
other than the task of providing pensions.  It justifies this practice with the argument that it
will improve the lives of scheme members directly (social investment) or indirectly,  through
externalities of  projects that  might  otherwise remain  unfinanced  (economically tariweted
investment).  Despite the earlier examples of investments that may contribute to  na;,onal
development, the most common non-pension objective is housing provision.  In Singapore, in
most years over half of all withdrawals have been for housing, in order to provide financing
from the demand side.  An important secondary objective relates to the financing of health
care.  The final result  of these early withdrawals is reduced  and  frequently  insufficient
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resources at retirement, which indicates the need for careful benefits planning and increased
attention to the rate of return earned on balances not being used for the purpose of facilitating
the implementation of social and economic policy.
At times, the use of pension funds is less transparent and may not bring any recognizable
benefits  to  members.  The  practice  of  setting  rates  of  return  to  member  accounts
administratively while receiving higher return on invested funds has resulted in an implicit
tax in Singapore.  Since 1986 the CPF Board has paid interest on member balances equal to
the simple average of 12-month deposit and month-end savings rates of the four major local
banks.  Meanwhile, it  appears that the  government  (through the  Singapore Government
Investment  Corporation and  other holding  companies)  invests the  funds,  predomninantly
abroad, in  a  context  of  limited  transparency  and  public  accountability.  Although  no
information  is  available  regarding  the  portfolio  composition,  investment  criteria  and
performance, an  estimate - based on  an average  return of  5.5% (over the  last 10 years
according to a statement by the Finance Minister to Parliament), the nominal rate of 3.5% in
1997 and  average member balance that year of  S$ 69.3 billion - is that the implicit tax
amounted to  S$  1,039.5 million, or 6.5% of contributions.  A similar situation seems to
prevail in Brunei, where most investments are in fixed deposits in banks earning around 3%
interest while member accounts earned only 1.5% in 1993 and 1994. It is not clear whether
the uncredited balances are kept in  reserve, returned to  the government or used in  other
unspecified ways.
Development of Market Institutions and Tools.  In spite of the substantial size of provident
fund savings in countries of the region (e.g., 54.5% and 55.7% of GDP in Malaysia and
Singapore, respectively, in  1997), they have contributed little to the  development of the
financial sector, capital markets and their corollary investment instruments. This is primarily
a consequence of the investment policies and governance practices reviewed earlier, in which
government  monopolizes  fund  management  and  confines  resources  in  a  conservative
investment regime.  Centralized fund management has  not  encouraged  the growth of  a
competitive  fund  management  industry,  and  in  fact,  the  provident  funds'  in-house
management capacity and expertise is frequently inferior to market standards.
An example of the deficiencies of market instruments is the lack in all countries of protection
against longevity and inflation risks through the provision of appropriately priced annuities.
The lump-sum benefit negates the main rationale of mandatory savings that individuals are
too shortsighted to save for old age because it allows for quick and unproductive spending.
Furthermore, the absence of annuities helps perpetuate a vicious cycle in which there is less
pressure on government to issue inflation-indexed bonds, which in turn hinders the creation
of bond markets and a sovereign yield curve reflecting varied maturity periods.  Therefore,
there is no reference for the pricing of other bonds and insurance companies find it difficult
to offer their annuities at a reasonable cost.
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(iii)  Social Security Type Systems in market economies
Korea, the Philippines and Thailand adopted publicly mandated and unfunded schemes to
provide old-age retirement income for the eligible labor force.  Some forrn of limited social
assistance for the destitute elderly is also available.  Even though these three systems carne
into effect at different times (1957 in the Philippines, 1988 in Korea and 1999 in Thailand),
they  all  have  to  overcome  difficulties  in  three  basic  areas  (fiscal  sustainability,  benefits
design and contribution link, and reserve fund governance and investment).
Fiscal Sustainability.  The old-age  security  plans in all three countries  are currently  immature
- with  an  effective  system  dependency  ratio  of  around  12.6  for  both  Korea  and  the
Philippines22 - and  in a strong  financial  position.  Contributions  from  the insured  and  their
employers  finance  the systems  without  the need  for transfers  of government  revenue  - but in
Thailand  the  government  does  contribute,  although  at  a reduced  rate  (1%)  in  comparison  to
employers  and  employees  (3%  each  as  of  2001).  However,  this  favorable  short-term
financial  status  (measured  in terms  of  excess  current  contribution  income)2 3 hides  the  true
long-run  cost  of  the  promised  pension  benefits  that  workers  expect  in  return  for  paying
contributions  (whose  present  value  is the implicit  public  pension  debt  [IPD]).  Although  the
IPD  varies  by  country  and  depends  on  an  array  of  factors  (including  coverage,  age
distribution  of workers,  level  of benefits,  and  the  discount  rate  used  in  determining  present
value),  simulations  using  dynamic,  country-specific  assumptions  show  that  in  all  three
countries,  the IPD builds  up as the system  matures  and the population  ages (Figure  11.4). The
IPD,  already  some  80%  of GDP  in the  Philippines  and  almost  40%  of  GDP  in Korea,  will
increase to around  140% and  195%, respectively,  by 2050.
Figure 11.4 Implicit Pension  Debt,  Selected Countries
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22 The system dependency ratio is the portion of total beneficiaries relative to effective contributors.  Thailand's
old-age pension insurance scheme became effective in December  1998, but the first year of benefit pavment
will not fall due until 2015.
23 Expressed as percentage of GDP, this is estimated to be 1.3% for Korea, 0.3% for Thailand, and 0.]1% for the
Philippines.
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Due  to  the  inherent  imbalance  in  the  long-term  relationship  between  benefits  and
contributions, the pension systems in these countries will eventually go bankrupt when the
current value of payouts  surpasses that  of  contributions and after the exhaustion of  any
accumulated reserves.  In order to avoid this situation, countries must adjust the parameters
of system design (i.e., age of eligibility for benefits, contribution rates, benefit levels, etc.) or
arrange for alternative financing mechanisms (i.e., budget transfers).
In Korea's case, the surplus in the current balance will remain until 2037 (see Figure 11.5).
By that time, the demand for benefit payments will exceed the contribution revenue.  Still,
the reserve fund, built up through excess current contribution and investment income, should
bridge the gap for an additional 13 years, until 2050 (Figure II.6).  If the provisions of the
system are not reformed (i.e., by continuing to provide a replacement rate of 60% from age
60 onward after 40 years of contribution), it is projected that the equilibrium contribution
rate 24 will amount to 20%, clearly demonstrating the unsustainability of the current statutory
rate of 9%.
Figure  II.5 Current  Balance  of Pension  Fund, Selected  Countries
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Source: PROST calculations. The World Bank
The outlook for the Philippines'  system is slightly worse.  The first year of negative current
balance will likely occur around year 2010 (Figure II.5), while exhaustion of the reserve fund
is  projected for 2022.  The equilibrium contribution rate required to  support the current
system, which provides an average replacement rate of 40% from age 60 after 20 years of
contributions and generous minimum benefits, is estimated to be  around 15%, more than
double the current statutory rate of 6.4%.
24 This is the rate required for the sum of the net present value of current balances over the projection duration
to equal zero.
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After lengthy debate, Thailand implemented an old-age pension system in early 1999. While
the final benefit provisions have been scaled down (from a replacement rate of 20%  o to  15%,
starting  at  age 55  after  15 years  of  contributions),  the  system  is  still  not  financially
sustainable in the long run.  The equilibrium contribution rate is estimated at 13%. which is
far above the rates of the current contribution schedule:  2% in 1998, 4% in 1999, and 6% in
2000  and  beyond.  The  current balance will turn  negative  in  2027,  29  years  after  the
introduction of the scheme, and the fund reserve will be completely depleted by 2048.
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In addition to the public social security schemes, Korea and the Philippines operate defined
benefit pension  plans  for their  government  employees.25  While  official projections  are
generally unavailable or unreliable, these schemes possess an even more severe pattern of
fiscal imbalance than the public social security programs.  This is a result of the greater
relative age of the government retirement schemes. which are nearing maturation, their more
generous benefit provisions and lower contribution rates.  In all cases, budget subsidies help
finance these schemes.
Benefit  Structure and  Contribution Link.  If  benefits  and  contributions  in  a  mandatory
pension scheme are not linked in an actuarially fair manner or if workers perceive that they
are not receiving a fair rate of return from the system and potentially high risk, they are more
likely  to  attempt  evasion by  not  paying.  Similarly, without  an  actuarially fair linkage
between contributions and benefits, some workers or  retirees may try  to exaggerate their
participation so as to receive disproportionate benefits.  This brings into question design
25 Thailand recently introduced a defined contribution fund (replacing a previous defined benefit program) for
government officials (mandatory for those who joined on or after March 1997 and voluntary for those already in
service prior to March 1997). The financing of the residual defined benefit program remains on a pay-as-you-
go basis through the general budget.
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features of these schemes that privilege the current generation at the expense of future ones
and the rich at the expense of the poor.
Under a pay-as-you-go, unfunded scheme, there will always be intergenerational resource
transfer, whereby  lifetime benefits and  costs  for  successive generations  of retirees  in  a
country will differ.  This is particularly pronounced during the first few decades after the
scheme's establishment.  In all cases, earlier generations will fare better than later ones,
regardless of their earnings level.  In the long run, such intergenerational transfer implies
increased tax burdens or reduced pension promises for future working generations.  This
phenomenon is clearly evident in all three countries in the required contribution rate (RCR)
and the affordable replacement rate (ARR) necessary to keep the systems in balance over the
next 50 years:  the RCR would have to rise from 9% to 24% in Korea, 8.4% to 20% in the
Philippines, and 6% to  15% in Thailand, or alternatively, the ARR would have to decline
from 70% to 13%, 40% to 10% and 15% to 6%, respectively.
In  addition to  this intergenerational redistribution, another source of  inequity in  pension
systems is earnings-related benefit formulas.  Unless carefully designed, these may lead to
perverse redistribution from the poor to the rich.  This  is a consequence of upper-income
individuals' delayed entrance into the labor force (resulting in relatively less contribution),
steeper age-earnings profiles (equating to higher pension entitlements) and greater longevity
(thereby collecting more benefits).  The creation of  closer linkage between  benefits and
contributions can help mitigate the first two of these pitfalls (i.e., shorter contributory service
and steeper age-earning profiles).
All  three  countries  either  currently  experience redistributional  distortions that  stimulate
evasion or will face them shortly. In both the Philippines and Thailand, the benefit formulas
emphasize  the  last  60  months  of  the  individual's  earnings  - a  process  that  yields
disproportionately high benefits to workers with steep age-earnings profiles.  On the other
hand, the Philippines' system also provides a minimum fixed benefit to retiring workers who
have contributed at least 120 months, which is one way to ensure minimum support for the
lifetime poor.  However, the combined effect of these characteristics has  led to  strategic
manipulation by members (through contributing just  enough to  qualify for the minimum
pension), resulting in high evasion rates (in excess of 60% over the last few years).  In the
case of Korea,  whose benefit  formula weighs  equally the  lifetime average  wage  of the
individual and the average economy wage 26 throughout his or her career, evasion rates are
relatively low  (less than  10%).  However, the  country is  unable to  achieve the  desired
redistributive effects (from rich to poor) through the current pension system and must rely
instead  on  social assistance programs to  accomplish this.  At  this  point, there  is  little
evidence on the level of evasion in Thailand, but the implementation of a final-earnings
related formula will make it an issue sooner or later.
26 Prior  to December  1998  the Korea  pension  fornula recognized  only 75%  of a contributor's  own  wage level.
33Pension Systems in East Asia and the Pacific
Governance and Investment of Reserve Funds.  Korea and the Philippines must deal with the
management of sizeable reserve funds (8% and 5% of GDP respectively), and Thailand will
soon confront the same issue (Figure 11.6). The countries primarily manage these funds in-
house  and  invest  them  predominantly  in  government  securities  and  quasi-government
projects such as public housing, with little allocation to liquid, market-priced assets. The end
result is that the funds suffer  from below market rates of return, implying higher future
contribution rates.
Even though  investment  committees  or  fund  operation  committees  exist,  they  are  not
insulated from political pressures.  For example, in the case of Korea, the Committee of
National Pension Fund Operation (CNPF) regulates and supervises the fund.  It is supposedly
a tripartite entity, but the chair and co-chair are the Minister of Finance and Economy and the
Minister of Health and Welfare, respectively.  Furthermore, 10 of the 15 committee members
are from the government, creating a situation in which government essentially controls fund
management.  Moreover, the Public Fund Management Act, which  allowed managers to
invest a small portion of the NPS excess cash flow in market-based securities, automatically
earmarked two-thirds of surpluses to finance other government activities that generally earn
below market rates of return - the rate of return on NPS investments has been roughly the
same as the rate on one-year treasury bills.  Another part of the portfolio consists of non-
traded government securities (in the form of promissory notes) and membership loans that
also give low returns.
In an attempt to improve transparency and efficiency of pension fund management, Korea
has decided to take the following actions:  (i) phase out the direct credits over 10 years while
introducing  the  purchase  of  marketable  government  bonds,27 (ii)  expand  the  asset
management committee from 15 to 20 and include more non-government members, and (iii)
strengthen the  investment department to  determine appropriate benchmarks for  risk and
return as  well as perform ongoing  monitoring  of external fund managers.  While these
measures restrict the availability of cheap resources for the government and limit political
maneuvering, the only assurance that the fund will earn competitive market returns comes
from the success of ongoing reforms in the financial and enterprise sector, complemented by
the strengthening of the portfolio management function.
Similar to Korea, the Philippines must also attempt to improve transparency in governance as
well as the investment guidelines  and practices relating to  its  reserve fund.  The Social
Security Commission manages assets of the Investment Reserve Fund of the Social Security
System (SSS) according to  the  Social Security Law, which sets out details  on allowable
investment categories and limitations.  The President appoints the Chair of the Commission,
and its membership consists of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the SSS president
and seven appointed members - three each from the workers'  and employers' groups, and
one from the general public.  In practice, there are direct and indirect pressures from various
27 The automatic transfer of NPS funds to the central  ,ovemment may still occur on a discretionary basis and
appears to have continued in 1999-2000.
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authorities to  support government projects, including housing, and extend loans  to risky
second tier large enterprises - that banks refuse to provide - at rates that are far too low
compared to the risks.  Furthermore, the SSS has recently undertaken quite an aggressive
investment  policy  in  financial  markets  participating  in  big  block  tradings  and  taking
excessive sector exposures.  Although the 1997 Social Security Law authorized SSS to invest
up to 7.5% of its portfolio in foreign assets, it has not yet invested abroad. Even if SSS were
to diversify its portfolio to  improve investment performance, in reality, this may require a
lengthy phasing-in period due to the rather inflexible composition of its current portfolio - it
holds  up  to  5%  in  non-performing  loans,  nearly  40-45%  in  member  loans  (of  which
significant portions are in housing loans) and another 40% in non-tradable government debts.
While Thailand has not yet accumulated much reserve funding from its newly implemented
old-age pension system, the fund management structure will likely be quite similar to that for
existing components of the social security system (sickness, invalidity, maternity and death
benefits). 28 A  tripartite  investment  subcommittee (with  representation from  employers,
employees, the Bank of Thailand, the Budget Bureau, the Ministry of Finance, the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the academic community) manages assets in accordance with
guidelines issued by  the  Ministry  of  Finance for  provident funds.  However,  there  are
apparent weaknesses in management and a lack of investment policies requiring the analysis
of the nature and duration of liabilities.  Furthermore, specifications in terms of acceptable
risk exposure and diversification are often either absent or seriously deficient.  In general,
there is a heavy bias towards supporting public sector institutions that are illiquid and yield
below market returns.  With the enactment of the new old-age pension law and the potential
growth in asset size (reaching 10% of GDP by 2030), the Social Security Office has indicated
the  desire  to  acquire  international  assistance  in  the  preparation,  coordination  and
implementation of investment policies for the funds.
(iv)  Social Security Type Systems  in transition  economies
Various countries in the region are in transition from  centrally planned to  market-based
allocation of resources, with uneven progress between the countries (China, Cambodia, Lao
PDR,  Mongolia,  Myanmar  and  Vietnam).  Information  about  these  countries  and  the
implications of the transition for their pension systems is mostly sparse and restricted, for the
time being, to China, Mongolia and Vietnam.  However, the better-documented experience of
transition  economies  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  Central  Asia 29 allows  for
generalization before addressing specific issues for these three countries.
General features of pension  systems before and during transition.  Compared to  pension
systems in market economies with similar levels of per capita income and industrialization,
those in the former centrally planned economies were characterized by:
2S Even  though  these funds  are supposed to be kept in separate accounts, they are not individual legal entities
and mix with the general budget.
29  See for example Holzmann (1997a) and Palacios et al. (1999).
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*  a higher level of urban work force coverage, since the government owned essentially all
public  enterprises, rendering  the  enforcement  of  regulations  easier,  and  labor  force
participation, especially for females, was high;
*  a more generous benefit level in a pension system that was invariably defined benefit,
unfunded and publicly managed;
*  contributions paid mostly or exclusively by the employer/public enterprises;
*  a pension benefit structure that bore little linkage to the past contribution effort, paid little
attention to work incentives and retirement decisions, had a low standard retirement age,
and often distinguished among workers according to their working conditions; and,
*  a low wage base for pension contributions due to the provision of essential goods and
services free of  charge  or  with  heavy  subsidies from  the  cash  flows  of  socialized
enterprises, which gave those enterprises social welfare-type functions and conferred an
almost residual character to the cash labor income.
As a result of the transformation process, comprising, inter alia, price and trade liberalization,
subsidy reduction and privatization, and implying (in some but not all countries) inflation
adjustment, a  decline in  output,  structural changes, and the emergence  of (open)  unem-
ployment, several features of the inherited scheme led to problems (Holzmann, 1  997a):
- Enterprises and  individuals have  exploited the  existing regulatory  and  administrative
deficiencies in a context of weakening govermnent control, resulting in rising benefit
take-up and lower contribution payment, thus amplifying growing arrears.
- The often severe reduction in budgetary subsidies required adjustments in the nominal
benefit level, and higher pension expenditure thus reflects the shift from indirect (lower
price level) to direct income support.
*  Moreover, privatization and  the imposition  of a hard  budget constraint  on  socialized
enterprises  have  reduced  their  social  policy  functions  and  shifted  corresponding
expenditure to the budget.
*  Policy actions in response to emerging unemployment and government restructuring have
exacerbated expenditure problems.  Various countries have introduced early retirement
and disability provisions to  cope with  rising labor market disequilibria.  Also, in the
absence  of  elaborate  social  assistance  schemes  and  means-testing  procedures,
governments turn to the provision of less targeted minimum pension benefits.
Mongolia's  pension  system  shared  much  in  common with  those  of pre-transition  ECA
countries, leading the government very recently to adopt a major pension reform plan. Under
the inherited and somewhat altered current system, a contributor receives a pension of 45%
of  his/her highest consecutive  five-year  average  wage  for  20  years  of  service,  and  an
additional  1.5%  of  the  same  wage  base  for  each  additional  year,  leading  to  a  total
replacement rate of 75% for 40 years of service.  The normal retirement ages for men and
women in this social insurance system are 60 and 55, respectively. Additionally, the system
provides a minimum pension at a level of the basic wage.  The contribution rate amounts to
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19% (of which the employer finances 13.5% and the employee the remainder), and the self-
employed  can  voluntarily join  the  system  at  a  contribution  rate  of  9.5%.  The  total
contribution rate  to  insurance  funds  (including  pensions,  social  benefits,  work  injury,
unemployment and health) amounts to 29% to 31% of labor earnings.  As a result of this
structure, the pension system is encountering the following difficulties:
*  It is not self-financing.  In 1997, the pension fund ran a deficit of 0.75% of GDP, with
expenditure of 3.75% and contribution revenue of 3% of GDP.  Budgetary transfers cover
the deficit.
*  Contribution arrears to the pension fund remain large.  At the beginning of September
1998, total  contribution  arrears accumulated  by  budgetary  bodies,  state-owned and
private enterprises reached TUG 5.25 billion (some 0.5% of GDP).
*  Coverage has  dropped.  In  July  1998, pension  fund  contributors from  state-owned
enterprises,  budgetary  bodies,  and  other  enterprises  with  formal  labor  agreements
amounted to only half of total employment (and private sector voluntary contributors are
negligible in number).
In view of the financial unsustainability of the scheme, the government developed a reform
plan3 0 that Parliament recently adopted.  It  consists of  a move toward notional,  defined
contribution (NDC) benefits (similar to those of Latvia, Sweden and Poland)3'  that imitate
the DC contribution-benefit link. 32 This should improve compliance by existing contributors,
increase  voluntary  participation  among  the  self-employed  and  reduce  future  pension
expenditure.  Moving to NDCs can prepare the way for a later introduction of a multipillar
system, consisting of (unfunded) NDCs and funded DCs, plus voluntary savings.  Currently,
the government considers the fiscal requirements for an immediate transition toward funded
provisions as being too high.  However, it envisions the development of well-regulated and
supervised  voluntary  old-age  saving  instruments  (insurance,  pension  funds)  as  an
intermediate measure.  The long-termn  reform package also plans to equalize the retirement
ages of men and women at 60 and eliminate early retirement provisions.
China's pension system and reform agenda share some general characteristics with those of
transition economies but also have unique features and problems.  The initial pension system
of 1951 closely followed the model in other centrally planned economies.  However, during
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), societal changes dictated the dismantling of the system,
and public enterprises had to assume pension planning for their own employees.  With the
economic reforms in 1978, new regulations took effect that reaffirmed certain pension rights
but also granted new and higher benefits (including incentives for early retirement).  As a
result,  the  number  of  pensioners  jumped  and  expenditure  exploded,  requiring  rising
30 USAID assisted the reform, and the World Bank's  Social Protection Sector provided important intellectual
inputs and support.
31  For presentations of these countrv approaches see, respectively, Fox and Palmer (1999), Palmer (2000) and
Chlon et.al. (1999).
32 For a critical view on NDCs, see Disney (1999).
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contribution rates for financing.  Considerable SOE responsibility in establishing pensions
for workers and government experimentation in reform have led to substantial differences in
the basic parameters of the pension system (contribution rates, benefits and regulations) and
reform strategies at the local and provincial levels. Various reform efforts have involved:
*  shifting from enterprise insurance to social insurance by setting up social pooling systems
for industries in urban areas;
*  requiring individual contributions in order to distribute the pension cost burden;
*  establishing voluntary occupational pension  schemes and  individual savings plans  to
supplement pensions; and
*  partially pre-funding future pension debt by setting a higher contribution rate (limited to a
few provinces).
Wrhile there is still no final consensus on how to  unify the disparate local and enterprise
systems, the State Council Circular No. 6 of 1995 proposed two models for the basic benefit
tier (involving individual accounts and social pooling). Localities can choose one of the two
or a combination thereof.  Plan I emphasized individual accounts, while Plan II stressed the
social component (see Annex B).
The 1997 State Council Document 26 draws a  clearer picture  of the key  features of the
envisaged pension system, including:
*  a call for the "four unifications": unified system, unified standards, unified management,
and unified fund usage - applicable to all localities and different types of enterprises;
*  a unified, multipillar system, consisting of a combination of a basic pension resulting
from social pooling and individual accounts (unfunded and funded) - the DB portion
should be reduced from 80% to 20% of wage base; and,
*  a limit on employer contributions that should not exceed 20% of payroll for both pillars,
with a share for employees rising to 8% over a phased-in period.
Still,  the document does  not  specify how to  achieve these results,  and  in  practice, the
unification of the system will require overcoming resistance due to the following conditions:
*  existing differences in system parameters at the local or industry level, such as disparate
benefit formulas as well as payroll taxes (contribution rates) due to variation in numbers
of retirees - enterprises and localities with younger populations would initially lose, and
those with older populations would gain through the pooling created by unification;
*  generally high contribution rates - the enterprise still bears the bulk of the contribution
burden - that make expanding unification to the dynamic non-state sector difficult;
*  dispersion of responsibility among  various government  agencies, each  with a  vested
interest in implementing its own plans at the local level; and,
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*  a history of local control over pension resources, which is clearly contrary to a trend in
centralization and evidenced by the municipalities' attempt to distinguish their systems
from one another in order to maintain control over surplus funds in the short run.
Even if the four-fold unification were to be achieved in the near future, several important
questions would remain:
*  How will the unified fund be managed?  The experience with centralized systems in the
region is not too encouraging.
*  What reforms in the financial system are required to allow individuals to prepare for
retirement with appropriate instruments?
*  How will coverage be extended to the still largely agrarian population?
The  pension  system  in  Vietnam  also  exhibits  features  typical of  systems  in  transition
economies.  A  relatively  generous  formula  determines (wage-indexed)  benefits,  which
provide an average replacement rate of around 70% of covered wage.  Actual retirement age,
at 53 years on average, is about 5 years earlier than the already low age mandated for both
sexes (60 for men and 55 for women).  This results in a long average retirement period of
about 25 years.  Even though the contribution rate appears fairly high (at 15% of wages for
retirement and death benefits and 5% for sickness, maternity and work injury benefits), it
applies only to the basic wage, which amounts to perhaps 50% of total wage and an even
smaller portion of total compensation when considering in-kind payment.3' The ratio of
contributors to old-age pensioners, the system dependency ratio, is rather high, at 36% - 55%
including disability and survivors pensioners, who receive benefits equal to roughly one-half
and  one-third of those  for old-age pensions, respectively - indicating maturation of the
scheme but also revealing low labor force coverage (9.1%).  With the economic transition,
evasion has been on the rise.
Although the system is not self-financing, partly because of these design features, it is able to
accumulate and invest reserve funds because the government made an (accounting) reform
under which it makes budgetary payment for all retirees (and disabled) prior to January 1,
1995.  Contributions to the system pay benefits for retirees and other beneficiaries of rights
accrued since this  date and form a  separate fund under the management of the Vietnam
Social Insurance Organization (VSI).  This reform results, in principle, in repayment of the
implicit debt accrued until  1995 and  the full funding  of new entitlements.  In  order  to
accomplish this, however, requires that the benefits and take-up age are in  line with  the
contribution effort and that the accumulated fund receives sufficient and market-based real
rates of return - this is, however, not the case.
Although payment in-kind and  provision of subsidized goods and  services by socialized enterprises has
decreased over the past 10 years, these practices are still significant today.
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In 1998 pension expenditures as a whole were 6,122 billion Dong while income was 9,384
billion Dong, leaving a balance of 3,262 billion Dong that went to the reserve fund. 34 On
average since 1995, inflows have amounted to over 2,000 billion Dong per year.  The value
of  the  reserve  fund  at  end-1998  was  8,887  billion  Dong,  representing  2.6%  of  GDP.
Projected contributions should exceed benefits awarded after 1995 until around 2015, when
the system will be compelled to begin drawing down the reserve fund.  Currently, investment
policy for reserves limits  the portfolio  options  to  government and  approved commercial
bonds, direct loans to government, and public development projects and enterprises, and the
rate of return has been very poor, substantially below even the interest rate on bank deposits.
Unless investment practice and performance improve, investment revenue's contribution to
the amelioration of the system's long-term financing problem will be diminished.
Assuming no change in the system parameters, population aging will increase pressure on
pension expenditure, underscoring the need for reform, which could involve the following
measures:
- On a basic level
*  carefully regulate the granting of disability and survivors pensions;
*  raise the  actual retirement age  at  least  to  the  legislated  level  (i.e., reduce  early
retirement), or higher, considering the current average lengthy retirement period;
*  adequate benefits to bring them in  line with the whole compensation picture  (i.e.,
subsidized good and services, previous in-kind pay, etc.);
*  expand investment options for the reserve fund to improve rates of return; and,
*  attempt  to  expand coverage,  thereby  increasing  the  number of  contributors  and
improving the short-term financial status of the system. 3 '
- On a more ambitious level
*  implement notional accounts to improve the benefit-contribution link, thus helping to
diminish significant evasion, and approximate a DC structure - a viable option since
Vietnam appears to bear an advantageous starting position compared to Mongolia (in
terms of potential to expand the system), which is currently undertaking this measure:
*  eventually attempt a shift to partial funding through a multipillar structure; and,
*  encourage the  development of  financial markets  through simultaneous reform, as
Mongolia is planning, which will also allow for the creation of private savings and
investment mechanisms.
'  In 1998 VND 13.441.25  = US$ 1.00.
5  Potential for expansion is large, given the current low coverage in the private sector, which accounts for 91%
of  the employed  labor force, and  favorable demographic  conditions.  It  is also appealing from  an  equity
perspective since essentially only the state sector currently participates.  In practice, expansion will depend on
the disposition of private sector firmns,  which could be encouraged to participate by gradually shift.ng more of
the contribution burden to employees.
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III.  Opportunities in the Design or Reform of Retirement Income Provisions
The previous chapter showed that the countries of the region are facing common challenges
in providing appropriate income support for the elderly in their rapidly changing societies.
However, the low level of coverage, predominance of retirement schemes still in evolution,
and  existence  of  funded  provisions  in  many  countries  provide  ample  opportunity  for
alternative  system  design  or  reform.  This  may  allow the  region  to  avoid  the  pitfalls
encountered by most retirement schemes in the OECD countries.  Furthermore, it offers the
countries a chance to maximize the contribution of the pension systems to  economic and
social development within specific socio-cultural contexts.
The opportunities for the region are numerous and involve "getting things right"  in three
main areas:
*  Avoiding mistakes made by other countries in the world.  The region can draw from
increasing experience and information regarding pension systems and their reforms.36
*  Being innovative.  Many new ideas and ample room for innovation and experimentation
exist as part of the rethinking of social protection worldwide.
*  Fostering financial markets.  The recent crisis has dramatically revealed the importance
of sound financial markets and the social consequences when they are absent.  A well-
planned pension reform can benefit both the social and financial sectors.
This chapter deals with each of these topics in turn.
1.  Avoiding Mistakes
The world's  experience with the design  and implementation of pension systems has been
fraught with mistakes, a full account of which is beyond the scope of this paper.  But four
main  issues  require the  attention  of  policy  makers  in  order  to  establish  equitable  and
affordable retirement income provisions with minimal negative effects on the economy:  (i)
adoption of an integrated view on retirement income provisions; (ii) maintenance of balance
among equity (individual and social) and efficiency considerations; (iii) avoidance of fiscally
unsustainable schemes; and (iv) integration of public and private sector provisions.
36 The World Bank has started a Primer on Pension Reform - a sequel to the study Averting the Old-Age Crisis
- that provides up-to-date information on design and implementation issues and continuously updated country
case studies.  The Primer Notes  and  Papers are available on  the Worldwide Web (http://www.worldbank.
org/pensionf) and  in  hard  copy  from  the  Social  Protection  Advisory  Service  (email:  socialprotectiong
worldbank.org).
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(i)  Adopting an integrated view on retirement income provisions
There  are many sources  of retirement  income,  of which  the publicly  provided  support  is often
only a moderate share, if it exists at all.  Besides income from public annuities and the
drawing  down of accumulated  assets  in provident  funds, individuals  variably  are eligible  for
severance  payments/retirement  allowances,  receive  occupational  pensions  or gratuities,  have
accumulated  own savings  during  labor  force  participation,  live in their own housing,  and may
receive  social assistance  benefits  or categorical  subsidies  when old, poor and without  family.
This diversity  of possible  retirement  income sources dictates  the need for a comprehensive
(re)view  of existing  and potential  options:
*  Mandated  severance  payments/retirement  allowances  form a simple  means of providing
some retirement  income  but lose their function with the introduction  of public  pensions
or  mandatory funded occupational  pensions (such as  in  Korea, Thailand, or  the
Philippines). 37 Keeping  them mandatory  increases  the wage costs for the employer,  who
transfers  the burden  to the employee  in the end through  lower  net wages. Furthermore,  in
most countries  they amount  to one month of salary  per year of work, or 8.33%  of annual
wage. 38 An equal amount of contribution  to a funded second pillar can provide  better
retirement  income as a result of better protection against enterprise  bankruptcy  and a
higher rate of return. Voluntary  individual  or group contracts with employers  can still
achieve  the human  resource  function  of severance  payments.
*  The recent crisis has increased the pressure for the introduction  of income support
systems for the unemployed,  in particular  unemployment  insurance. The experience  in
Western economies  with unemployment  insurance has been mixed, and there may be
better schemes  to deal with idiosyncratic  and cyclical  unemployment,  such as individual
unemployment  accounts. Under such an arrangement  individuals  would have to save,
say, 2 weeks of salary per year until 30 weeks have been accumulated  after 15 years.
These savings can then be drawn down during spells of  unemployment  and any
remainders  used for consumption  once retired.  Combining  individual  retirement  and
unemployment  accounts  unambiguously  reduces  adverse  labor market effects  that afflict
traditional  unemployment  income  support  systems  (Orzag  et.al., 1999).
*  Consumption  needs  determine  the demand for retirement  income,  which is increased  by
outlays  during sickness.  Access  to basic  health services  in old age and/or  the provision  of
health insurance  thus bears a strong influence on the amount of necessary  retirement
income.  Rising health care costs, partially driven in some places by the adoption of
improved technology,  have led to partial co-payment  and reimbursement  ceilings for
some procedures  under insurance  plans and to user fees in systems that were public and
free of charge. in principle.  In addition to establishing  public health insurance and
For a review of severence payments as part of labor market policy, see Cox-Edwards and Manning (2000).
3  In Korea employers must now pre-pay 3% of this amount to the National Pension System, which reduces the
amount  to be saved  in the retirement  allowance  scheme  to 5.33%.
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fostering the development of the private health insurance market, governments may be
compelled to scale back or apply means-testing in situations where care for the elderly
remains without charge. Thus, pre-funded health insurance schemes, well-managed basic
health services, and carefully targeted assistance measures must be part and parcel of
public retirement income considerations and policy.
*  Access to own housing is a main component of non-monetary retirement income.  The
monetary equivalent of the consumption stream of owner-occupied housing constitutes an
important share in the total income of elderly households worldwide.  In this sense, the
availability of actuarially fair reverse mortgage is an important instrument to  increase
retirement consumption and allow income smoothing.
Access to housing is also important for young households since the market-based housing
rents typically exceed the annuitized value of owner occupied housing at market interest
rate.  Since young  households  have  to  pay  an  important risk  premium  plus  main
transaction costs on a market interest rate, pension  schemes in the region often allow
borrowing for housing against a share of the accumulated assets (such as in Singapore,
Malaysia and  the Philippines).  However,  borrowing beyond  accumulated individual
assets at below-market interest rates  and in  a  guaranteed manner is an  inappropriate
approach, and governance problems, including corruption, often compound the negative
economic effects.  Thus, limits must apply, and contribution rates at a later stage in life
may have to rise  in order to  achieve a minimum replacement rate.  In  general, such
additional  borrowing  is  better  handled  by  specialized  institutions,  with  pre-saving
requirements and means-tested matching subsidies.
*  Access to actuarially fair annuities in real terms is a crucial element of retirement income
provision.  Mandated  annuities  exist  in  the  region  only  under  social  security-type
schemes, with some, but not complete inflation protection.  National provident funds
concentrate largely on the accumulation phase, but provide only limited security during
the disbursement phase (such as the phased withdrawal in Singapore).  While lump-sum
disbursement  may be  appropriate  in  close-knit,  family-based societies  in  which  the
elderly  engage  in  contracts  with  the  next  generation,  fewer  children  and  stronger
individualized patterns of  behavior  necessitate disbursement procedures that  provide
sufficient income independent  of the time of death and the size of the family.  This is best
provided by actuarially fair annuities in real terms, which, however, do not exist in any
country in the region.
*  Tax treatment at the individual and enterprise level is important in determining the nature
of the retirement income portfolio.  Differential tax treatment leads to adjustments in the
portfolio that are not based on the underlying return, risk and liquidity characteristics,
with negative effects on resource allocation.  As a result, all retirement income (including
housing) should, in principle, be subject to the same principle of taxation.  While most
countries in the world apply the comprehensive income-type tax system, for retirement
income provisions a consumption-type treatment has emerged as the standard.  Of the
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two  main  alternatives EET or  TEE,  most  countries  apply the  first  approach, which
consists of exempting contributions to pension  funds/social security schemes and  the
fund  income  from  taxation  while  taxing  the  pension  benefits  upon  disbursement
(Whitehouse, 1999). But the straightforward application of an EET system depends upon
the tax collection infrastructure to  withhold retirement income  distributions and track
such  withholdings  against  the  combined  income  for  individual  retirees.  After
government has chosen either approach, it must apply it consistently and refrain from
short-term changes for budgetary and political reasons.  Most countries in the Tegion  fall
far short of these standards.
(ii)  Balancing individual and social equity with efficiency considerations
Ideally, publicly mandated or provided retirement income provisions should replace income
that a foresighted individual/household would have decided to save independently and also
provide income at socially determined poverty level for the lifetime poor.  While highly
valued  for their  social policy objectives, both  provisions  create distortions in  individual
decisions  on  labor  supply  and  saving,  which  are  accentuated  if  interpersonal  income
redistribution toward the  lower income  strata enters the benefit  structure.  The resulting
trade-off between equity and efficiency calls for careful balancing of individual and social
equity objectives and attention to the following considerations:
•  Providing or mandating too high replacement rates in public schemes may lead to over-
provisioning and  current  welfare  losses for  individuals  - such  schemes distort  the
consumption  profile  toward  the  future.  Higher  replacement  rates  require  higher
contribution rates to keep the scheme financially sustainable, and the corresponding rise
in payroll taxes stimulates the shift of labor from the formal to the informal sector. There
are no clear and  undisputed guidelines for the optimal level of mandated replacement
rates from unfunded and  funded pillars, but most  pension economists consider a rate
above 60% of active wage excessive.  For developing-type economies, many would set
the threshold at  40% and  below  under  the  proviso that  access to  safe  and  market-
remunerated voluntary saving vehicles do exist.
*  Closely linking contributions  and benefits  can reduce  the unavoidable distortions of
mandated provisions.  Defined contribution schemes with  market-based remuneration
accomplish this most easily, but unfunded notional defined contribution schemes or their
steady state  equivalent defined benefit  schemes (such  as  the  German coefficient  or
French  point  system)  can  also  approximate  the  effect.  De-linking  benefits  from
contributions  through  final  wage  schemes,  soft  eligibility  rules,  or  non-transparent
redistributive features. however, has proven to be very  costly worldwide.  In general,
direct budgetary means (taxes and public goods and services) are much better to attain
income redistribution objectives.  For the  introduction of  special provisions (such as
credits for maternity), a transparent mechanism on a cash basis is best - promise now and
pay now.
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*  Governments should exercise caution with regard to the mandatory inclusion of certain
groups, such as the self-employed and agricultural workers, in earnings-related public
retirement  schemes.  Even  low  contribution  rates  for  mandated  retirement  income
provisions  (of say,  10% and  below), may  still  lead many individuals to  stay in  the
informal sector, at least for some periods during their active life.  The reasons include the
existence of other taxes incurred in the formal economy, a high subjective discount rate
as a result of high minimum consumption needs but reduced capacity to borrow against
the future, low explicit or implicit rates of return on contributions but higher opportunity
costs  as  a  result  of  better  investment possibilities  or  borrowing  needs  (particularly
important for self-employed and small enterprises), and  diminished credibility of the
public scheme due to governance or information problems (see Holzmann et al., 2000).
Strengthened administration, including efficient fines and penalty systems, helps at the
margin but does not solve the underlying problem (that staying outside the system may be
individually rational).  This also indicates the need for a well-targeted safety net scheme
for the poor elderly.
- Efficient social safety-type provisions for  the  elderly  are difficult to  operate  in  any
society, but even more so in low- and middle income countries.  From the perspective of
poverty alleviation, universal provisions, such as a social pension from age 65 onward,
work best  but  are expensive.  Targeting  may reduce  costs but  requires  an  efficient
administrative set-up and  creates moral  hazard  problems.  Experience  indicates that
targeted provisions function best at the local  level with co-financing from the central
government and proxy targeting in countries having low administrative capacity. 39
(iii)  Averting fiscal unsustainability
Pension systems on a pay-as-you-go basis have a major advantage and a major risk.  The
major advantage is that they can disburse benefits immediately through the inflow of current-
period  contributions.  This  situation  is magnified  in  countries with  a  young population
structure and, correspondingly, a relatively small number of beneficiaries, in which a large
number of workers can finance the payment of current high pension benefits at a low rate of
contribution.  This advantage, however, also constitutes the systems' main risk.  Providing
and increasing benefits now is politically expedient since it essentially allows for the transfer
of the bill to  future generations (and politicians) in  a  non-transparent manner.  The risk
becomes  critical for an  aging population, as the pension reform discussion over the last
decade has documented (Holzmann, 1988, World Bank, 1994).  Specific measures to avoid
financial unsustainability are necessary, including:
*  Keeping the scope of the unfunded  scheme low.  A country that  starts an  unfunded
scheme should set a low target replacement rate, essentially for poverty alleviation only,
39 The Social Protection Unit at the World Bank has started a project on "non-contributory pensions," which
investigates the effectiveness and efficiency of alternative schemes such as categorical social assistance, social
pensions, demogrants. etc.  Final results should be available in early 2000.
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and supplement it through mandated and voluntary funded provisions.  This would permit
the immediate disbursement of low benefits to  some part of  the population  formerly
working in the formal sector but also keep the implicit  debt low.  The World Bank
encouraged Thailand to adopt this approach.
*  Using actuarial assessments.  Unfunded pension schemes create an implicit debt, thus
rendering a mere cash  flow (current revenue and  expenditure) analysis inappropriate.
This calls for appraisal on an actuarial basis, i.e., accounting for the present value of
revenue and expenditure and the difference - termed the actuarial deficit, if negative.
Since the actuarial estimates depend on projections regarding fertility, wages or interest
rates, independent actuarial  committees should conduct them  on an  annual basis and
publish  and  discuss the findings  in  a  public  context  (for  example, in  Parliament or
Congress, as currently in the US, Canada and New Zealand, and possibly Mongolia in the
future).  The actuarial projections must have a long horizon - of at least 75 years - to
provide a sound assessment of the actual status of the scheme.
*  Securing the reserve fund.  Pension schemes on pay-as-you-go basis typically accumulate
a  reserve fund during  maturation since contribution revenue exceeds expenditure for
some protracted period of time.  Interest income on this fund should allow the steady
state contribution rate to remain well under the rate needed to cover expenditure. In order
to achieve this objective, there needs to be a strong governance structure for the reserve
fund that isolates it from political pressures to use the available resources for other public
programs that  provide low  interest  income.  Countries in  the region  have not  been
successful in this regard, but there are now good practice examples available, especially
as manifested in the recent Canadian pension reform (Iglesias and Palacios, 2000).
(iv)  Integrating  public and private  sector pensions
Pension schemes for public sector employees have invariably been a country's  first formal
retirement system.  Especially for civil servants, these schemes have been intimately linked
to their wage structure and special status.  The defined benefit structure based on final wage
signals specific  incentive objectives and  relations  with  the public  emplover  (sovereign).
Moreover, the initial lack of contributions by the employee suggests that the retiree is merely
excused from service and remains bound to the prior employer.  While this svstem had a
rationale for high-level civil servants in the past, it expanded gradually to most or all civil
servants and soon to  most  or all public  sector employees.  Nowadays. such a  system is
largely  at  odds with  modem  civil  service  management,  privatization, and  the  need  for
mobility between the public and private sectors. It should be changed in the following ways:
*  The basic scheme should apply equally to public and private sector workers.  Such a
harmonization allows full mobility between the public and private sectors.  Some sub-
groups of the public sector, such as the army and judges, may warrant special schemes,
but they require a careful review and full justification.  Many industrialized countries are
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moving in this direction, including the United States (since 1983) and Australia (since
1993).
*  As with any large enterprise, the government is free to supplement a basic scheme with
another pillar  for its employees.  For reasons of mobility, these supplementary pillars
increasingly take the form of DC plans (including in the World Bank since 1998) that can
be taken along to any new employer.
*  Changing the pension system for public employees invariably requires a review of the
total compensation package, including the wage structure and wage profile, and hence
has to be an integral part of public sector reform.  While such a reform may leave the
present value of compensation constant, the flattening of the wage curve for civil servant
entrants for reasons of competitiveness with the private sector and better incentives inside
the service leads to a cash flow deficit at the beginning of the reform.
2.  Being  Innovative
The need to rethink pension design provides the region with  a unique opportunity to be
innovative, to try new avenues aligned with or independent from the worldwide reassessment
of pension  systems and other social protection arrangements.  Some of the avenues have
already been explored, while others may lead into uncharted territories.  But  since such
experimentation takes place on a global scale and is fostered by rising experience sharing
among the players, the risks are small while the potential gains are large.  This section
highlights areas where actors outside and within the region are undertaking new approaches
that may be useful to various countries considering or implementing pension reform or other
policy intended to strengthen old-age income support.
(i)  Moving  toward  multipillar  structure
To  minimize the  political and  fiscal risk while  securing retirement  income in  an  aging
population, many countries throughout the world are moving toward a multipillar structure
for their pension systems.  This consists of a  mandated, publicly managed and unfunded
defined  benefit  scheme  supplemented  by  a  privately  managed  and  funded  defined
contribution  scheme, with  additional retirement  provisions on  a  voluntary  basis (assets,
annuities. housing, etc.).  This strategy started in Chile (1981) and reached 7 other countries
in Latin America by 1999.  It provided the basis for reforms in the United Kingdom (1985),
Switzerland (1985) and  Australia (1993) and  is under  discussion  in many  other OECD
countries.  The transition  economies in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  have  adopted the
approach (Hungary and Kazakhstan, 1998. and Poland, 1999 - forming the avant guard in the
region), and  many countries worldwide are considering it (Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt,
1999).
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While a move toward a multipillar structure is global and encouraged by the World Bank, it
does not constitute a blueprint for pension reform (Holzmann, 2000).  So far, each country
has  developed its  unique  reforn  approach, determined by  its  starting  position. national
preferences, and macroeconomic and structural constraints, with the result that there are no
two identical systems in the world.  This  diversity of experiences leads to  an  important
learning process in design and implementation, which countries in the EAP region should
review closely.  It should not disallow own approaches, but rather encourage them while
taking account of experience so far.
One of the areas of innovation and progress could be the size and structure of international
diversification  of  accumulated  reserves.  The  benefits  to  international  diversification
(reducing risk  and often increasing  returns)  are a  function  of the  correlation  of returns
between domestic  and  foreign  investments.  For  smaller  countries  with  less  economic
diversification,  the  benefits  to  international  exposure  are  particularly  pronounced.
Traditionally, countries have been reluctant to permit pension funds to invest an important
share of their assets outside the country.  Chile allowed foreign investments  only at the
beginning of the  1990s, gradually expanding the limit to  12% by  1999, while reforms in
some countries, such as Costa Rica, have been more open from the very beginning.  Most
countries in the EAP region also follow a conservative regime.  However, the recent financial
crisis has highlighted the importance of international diversification for reasons of return and
risk.  A study by Solomon Brothers from the mid-1990s for Malaysia reportedly states that
with international diversification the Employee's  Provident Fund could have achieved an
increase in the return by 25% while reducing the risk.  Since the inception of the financial
crisis this assessment has certainly been strengthened.
(ii)  Extending  coverage
Enhancing pension coverage for the labor force is a challenge for governments throughout
the world.  Except for universal systems financed from general budget (such as New Zealand
and Australia), all contributory schemes suffer from less than full coverage of their work
force, and in  some countries coverage is actually falling (including the United States and
Western European countries).  In the transition economies of Eastern Europe and Central
Asia where coverage was essentially 100% under central planning, it has fallen by 30% or
more in most cases.  In the majority of low- and middle-income countries of the world it has
never exceeded 50%.  Most recently, the attempt in Korea to  expand coverage to  small
enterprise  (less than five  workers) and  the urban  self-employed has proven  difficult in
administrative terms and had to be halted.
There has been optimism among many economists that a move toward funded provisions
would increase coverage significantly due to the xtronger contribution-benefit link.  Data
from Chile may indicate an improvement, albeit smaAi,  but other countries have experienced
no change or even a fall in coverage (such as Argentina).  One reason for the fall may be that
the closer contribution-benefit link actually renders the new system less attractive for low-
income groups that often profited from the old redistributive system.  The World Bank is
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currently investigating the exact reasons for the lack of growth in coverage under multipillar
systems, and first results should be available toward the end of the year (see Holzmann et al.,
2000).  If the conjecture were true that diminished participation by the low income groups is
the result of too high opportunity costs, two main avenues could be envisaged:  (i) fostering
means-tested  provisions  to  support  low-income  groups  during  retirement,  with  new
mechanisms  to  reduce the moral hazard  problem  of  saving  insufficiently for  retirement
because  of  these  provisions, or  (ii)  subsidizing the  participation of  low-income groups
through public contribution supplements in the funded scheme (as in Mexico, Colombia or
Uruguay) or other measures.
New approaches also seem necessary to extend coverage to the self-employed and farmers.
While many members of these groups will be  able to  live from their accumulated assets
during retirement or enter into an intergenerational arrangement with their children, others
are likely to leave their profession during their active life as a result of urbanization and
industrialization.  Entering mid-career into an employees' pension scheme will provide only
low benefits when old or may lead to the decision to remain in the informal sector from the
very beginning.  In this case possible options include flat-rate contributions and benefits for
the total labor force (such as in Japan), or access of the informal sector to some new form of
retirement saving.  However, what should be avoided are special schemes for self-employed
and farmers - worldwide they have proved  extremely costly for the budget and politically
impossible to dismantle once established.
(iii)  Taking new approaches to reduce administration costs
Centralized  systems often, but  not  always,  have one  major advantage:  They incur low
administrative costs  for contribution collection, record keeping  and  communication, and
benefit disbursement. Furthermore, since they are monopolies, they face no marketing costs.
This  advantage is  in  almost all  cases  countered by  lack of  choice,  low quality  service,
political risk, and low interest rates on accumulated reserves.  Multipillar pension schemes
likely do better in-some of these areas but have done less well with regard to administration
costs during the accumulation and  disbursement phase  (James and Vittas, 1999; Mitchell
1996).  High  administrative costs  can  eliminate the  rate-of-return advantage of  funded
schemes and consequently lead to a lower replacement rate or require a higher contribution
rate (Thompson, 1998).
A major share of the high costs is due to duplication of administration and/or expensive
marketing.  As a result of the recent experience in Latin America and elsewhere, there are
many attempts to improve this situation, including:
*  Clearing houses for contribution collection, record  keeping and  communication, and
benefit  disbursement for  both  funded  and  unfunded  systems (such  as  in  Argentina,
Mexico, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom).  Physically, the schemes can use the
existing administrative structure, and in terms of governance, they can form a joint-stock
company of public and private pension funds (see Thompson, 1999).
49Pension Systems in East Asia and the Pacific
*  Constraints on the choice of funded provisions, such as more decentralization of asset
management  under  pre-defined portfolios  and  competitive bidding  processes  among
private sector fund managers (such as in Sweden).
*  Group annuities or annuities  for a  whole  pension  cohort under  international bidding
process (in discussion).
(iv)  Extending SRM through informal support and safety nets
Even with improvements in formal mechanisms of old-age income provision, the informal,
family support system will still furnish the bulk of assistance to most elderly.  In this regard,
the region appears to have a  special resource since patterns of family support have deep
cultural  roots  and  have  demonstrated  remarkable  resiliency  in  the  face  of  rapid
socioeconomic change.  Governments should attempt to take advantage of this characteristic
and establish policies to strengthen and complement existing informal support.  Beyond this,
there is a clear need to develop safety nets to protect the limited number of elderly who do
not  have  family  and  respond  to  situations  in  which  informal  systems  experience
unmanageable pressure, as during the recent crisis. 40
Some researchers  have expressed concern  that the  introduction of formal  support might
"crowd out" or negatively alter the family care system.  Indeed, studies in the Philippines and
Singapore (as well as the United States and Peru) have documented an association between
formal income transfers and the reduction of private support (Chan, 1997; Cox and Jimenez,
1992, 1993; Abrams and  Schmitz, 1984).  This type of situation only applies to a  small
percentage of families in most countries of the region, where coverage of formal support is
often quite limited.  At any rate, government can be careful to design policies to foster, or
"crowd in," familial support (World Bank, 1994). both in cases where formal programs exist
- by  complementing, rather than  substituting for them  - and where  they are absent, as
indicated in the following examples:
*  Tax incentives may encourage workers  (at least those  in  the formal  sector) to  offer
support to  their  elderly parents.  Concerned  with smaller  family  size and increasing
female labor force participation, the government of Singapore offers tax deductions to
adult children who care for elderlv parents, and Malaysia provides a tax rebate or small
stipend in such situations.
*  Changing  the  legal  structure  sometimes  presents  opportunities  for  the  creation  of
mechanisms for the elderly to  consolidate family  support.  In  a context of  changing
traditional inheritance patterns in Taiwan and the Republic of Korea, some policy makers
have advocated reductions in  inheritance taxes  so that the  elderly's  patrimony  is not
40 In the absence of complementary formal services. family support can break down more quickly due to the
unrelieved burden it experiences, especially among the poor.
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diminished and  they  are not  impelled to  transfer property  to  children  before death.
Singapore instituted the Maintenance of Parents Act in 1994 and established a tribunal in
1996 to handle cases of parent neglect (Chan, 1997).
*  Housing policies can promote living arrangements - coresidence or quasi-coresidence -
favorable to the elderly.  In countries in which governments play an important role in
housing provision, they can accomplish this through the adaptation of public housing
policies.  For example, Hong Kong  changed former public  housing regulations  that
obligated married children to move out of their parent's unit to allow one married child to
stay when the parents are elderly and need care.  Public housing authorities in Singapore
and Malaysia give priority in assignments to  married children  and their parents who
apply for adjoining apartments.  In countries where the private sector predominates in the
housing  market,  governments  can  provide  lump-sum  payments  for  housing
upgrade/expansion for those willing to accommodate elderly family members.
*  Targeting of social assistance to  destitute elderly or those without family support can
reduce leakage of benefits to those with adequate support arrangements. The government
of the Indian state of Kerala has designed a  social assistance scheme for the elderly
falling  into the following categories:  widowed;  handicapped; childless; low-income
agricultural  worker;  and/or  workers  in  selected  industries  left  out  of  the  national
Provident Fund Scheme (Tracy 1991). Policy-makers in China experimented to a limited
extent with a similar approach in assuming responsibility for the childless elderly, who
comprise a small proportion of the entire elderly population.  They did this in part to
promote the one-child family planning policy, based on the assumption that government
care for the childless elderly would reduce the incentive for large numbers of children.
While these types  of actions likely bear  small individual effects, they may have a  more
significant cumulative impact, especially  in  combination with  other formal interventions
discussed earlier. Most important is the structuring of targeted safety nets for the elderly who
lack family care or whose families have little capacity to  support them, especially under
crisis conditions.
3.  Fostering  Financial  Markets
The introduction of funded pensions  or the  move from unfunded  to  multipillar pension
structure should not  be  undertaken  for  the  sake  of  financial market  reform.  But  well
coordinated pension and financial market reforms can create a win-win situation in which
both  the  social  and  financial  sectors  profit.  On  the  social  side,  funded  retirement
arrangements should provide access to high returns (which implies lower contributions for a
target replacement rate, or a higher replacement rate for a given contribution rate), may better
shield against political risk and fiscal unsustainability in an aging population, and have less
distortionary economic effects.  On the financial side, well-conceived funded arrangements
can contribute to the development of financial markets, making them more liquid, deeper and
more sophisticated, which in turn may contribute to economic growth (see Musalem and
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Catalan,  1999).  The  Chilean  experience  appears  to  support  this  conjecture  (Holzmann,
1997b).  Exercising  financial  leverage  in  the  marketplace  may  also  allow  pension  and
provident  funds  to  stimulate  improvements  in  corporate  governance  practice  (Vittas,  1995),
including  through  strategic  intervention  in  the  stock  market.  To  achieve  these  financial
market  effects,  however,  requires  specific  arrangements:  (i)  a  decentralized  approach  to
pension  fumd  management;  (ii)  an  appropriate  governance,  regulation  and  supervision
structure;  and,  (iii) the  creation/support  of new  market  instruments.
(i)  Decentralizing  pension fund  management
A  main  characteristic  of  the  Latin  American  pension  reform,  largely  echoed  in recent  reforms
in  countries  of  the  OECD,  Eastern  Europe  and  Central  Asia,  has  been  decentralized  pension
fund  management. 4'  In  Latin  American  countries  with  reformed  pension  systems,  the
governments  allocated  the  management  of  pension  fund  assets  to  specialized  institutions
under private  management  in a competitive  setting  (AFP - Administratores  de los Fondos  de
Pensiones)  that  bear  the  sole  objective  of  maximizing  the  rate  of  return  for  their  stakeholders
- i.e.,  the  individual  members  or contributors.  To  avoid  undue  risk  taking,  the  owners  of  the
separate  management  companies  must  follow  investment  guidelines  and  in  some  cases
guarantee  a  rate  of return.  While  pension  and  financial  market  economists  do  not  universally
appreciate  the  usefulness  of  these  investment  and  guarantee  regulations,  the  proposed
alternatives  go  well  beyond  the  current  decentralized  structure,  with  a  view  to  opening  the
provision  of  retirement  income  assets  to  the  entire  financial  sector  (Shah,  1997).
In  contrast  to  this  decentralized  approach,  the  countries  in  the  EAP  region  essentially  favor
centralized  solutions  for  (national)  provident  funds  (Brunei,  Indonesia,  Papua  New  Guinea,
Malaysia  and  Singapore)  or  the  reserve  funds  of  social  security  systems  (China,  Korea,
42 Philippines,  Thailand  and  Vietnam).  The  only  exception  so far  seems  to  be  the  svstem  that
Hong  Kong  is  establishing  under  the  Mandatory  Provident  Fund  Schemes  Ordinance.  The
current  centralized  structure  in most  countries,  however,  has  important  drawbacks,  including:
*  Low  rates  of  return.  While  fully  comparable  data  for  these  countries  are  not  available,
the  existing  evidence  points  to  below  market  rates  of  return  in  all  countries. 4 3  For
example,  legislation  in  Korea  has  required  the  pension  fund  to  loan  two-thirds  of  its
reserves  to  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  which  in  turn  invested  the  funds  in  public  works  and
projects.  The  return  on  this  portion  of  the  portfolio  between  1988  and  1997  wvas about
2.5  percentage  points  less  than  that  earned  by  the  part  invested  in the  financial  markets
4'  Decentralized pension  fund  management was present before these  reforms through  employer-sponsored
occupational pension plans in OECD countries.
42 Note that there are decentralized private, employer-sponsored occupational pension plans in several countries
of the region.
43  It should be noted that, when comparing rates of return between the public and privaLc  sector contexts, the
rate of interest for the private sector is that obtained after including the management fees - i.e., the rate of return
provided  by  the  pension  fund  management companies  and  not  the  "before  fee"  rate  of  return  usually
emphasized.
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(mostly corporate and municipal bonds and some equities).  The national provident fund
in Singapore appears to have credited member accounts with less than the actual return
on  investments (3% less), revealing  an  implicit taxation of  returns  rather than  poor
investments.  In any case, this ultimately translates into lower benefits for members upon
retirement.
*  One main reason for the low returns is that the fund assets are hostage to budgetary needs
and/or politically determined investment decisions.  A major side effect is that a market-
driven government bond market, which can serve as an important benchmark market for
enterprise bonds, has not developed in any of the countries.  Another effect is that the
capital needs of the private sector are under-served as a result of the issue of new shares
and  long  term  corporate bonds  that  in  turn  can  be  bought  by  the  pension  funds.
Consequently, enterprises had and still have to rely on short term bank financing, which
in turn leads to very high leverage ratios and vulnerability as witnessed during the recent
financial crisis.  In addition, the lack of bond and share issue preempts the governance
role both instruments can exert.
- Centralization may have also impeded the development of new  financial instruments.
These typically emerge under a decentralized setting through the demand for specific
assets by private pension funds to fit their liability structure.  or the competitive pressure to
engage in profit-enhancing arbitrage.  Examples include mortgage bonds, developers'
funds, venture capital and other forms of securitization (Davis, 1995, 1998).
Once a centralized structure is in place, the move to a decentralized approach is not an easy
undertaking, and there are no blueprints available.  Some preliminary ideas involve:
*  Opting-out for part of the accumulated assets.  Under such an approach, the central
provident fund allows the selection of outside investment instruments, for example when
the accumulated assets have exceeded a minimum amount.  Singapore recently did this
with mixed results, which may actually be due to the financial crisis and the restricted
availability of investment alternatives.
*  Outsourcing  of  asset  management  to  the  private  sector  under  competitive  bidding
procedures.  Malaysia has undertaken the first attempts in this direction.  The reported
mixed or unsatisfying results may be due to the absence of benchmarking or of a level
playing field in the private sector. The approach, however, can also apply to accumulated
reserves of partially funded schemes and has been proposed for Korea, Thailand and the
Philippines.
*  Outsourcing of asset management and investment to foreign investment companies  such
as  in  an  international index fund.  This  still  requires a  regulatory  and  supervisory
umbrella, but more importantly a fully liberalized capital account.
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*  The  creation  of  private  pension  funds  and  the  granting  of  permnission for
individuals/employers to shift all assets to the private sector.  This is the most ambitious
option and would create important pressure on the national provident fund if the rules
provide for equal treatment.
*  An alternative to the full-fledged decentralization of investment management would be a
401k-type  of  investment  strategy  under  which  the  authorities  select  three  to  four
portfolios  of  differing  risk-return  profiles  and  then  let  the  individual  allocate  its
permissible assets among them.44 The main advantage of this approach would be that the
provident  and  pension  fund authorities could use  their  financial power  to  minimize
investment management fees and to ensure compatibility between the portfolio choices
and retirement objectives. The trade-off is that this would restrict choice.
(ii)  Reviewing  governance,  regulation  and supervision
Whatever approach a country chooses for the management  of its pension fund assets, the
rules have to ensure that management (the agent) acts in the best interest of contributors (the
true principal) and does not follow individual interests or political pressure.45  To secure
these prerogatives requires a rethinking of governance structure, regulation and supervision.
The enhancement of the governance structure of national provident funds and social security
reserve funds necessitates increased transparency and accountability of management and an
effective separation between global portfolio decisions and actual investment management.
Including representatives of all major societal stakeholders in the supervisory and portfolio
decision committee and  making management fully accountable  for  agreed decisions and
benchmarks could increase transparency.  The portfolio decision committee should provide
the  broad  guidelines  for  asset  categories,  selected  benchmarks,  active  or  passive
management, and the scope of outsourcing.  An independent asset management unit should
undertake the actual investment decisions and handle the outsourcing based on the agreed
criteria.
The establishment of privately managed pension  funds and other  financial internediaries
providing  retirement  assets  should  follow  international  best  practice  in  the  areas  of
regutations for licensing; capital, accounting and reporting requirements; custodian services;
and investment regulations.  While differences in  international practice and debate about
specific regulations exist - for example, regarding investment rules (when to moxie from an
initial draconian rule to prudent person principle) - there is largely consensus on minimum
44  If the public management is considered to be  inappropriate, private management could be considered  as
providing  similar  options  to  ine  individ;.  t~s  as in fact  the 401k plans do.  While Singapore's  CPF is moving
somewhat  in that direction  by liberalising  investment  choices  under the CPFIS scheme.  since investnm-nts  are
made  by individuals,  management  fees  and transactions  costs remain  high.
In the East Asia and Pacific  region.  govemments  have demonstrated  a tendency  to provide  guarantees  on
even non-state  directed  loans and investments  by the pension and provident  fund authorities,  which should  be
explicitly  identified  along  with  their accompanying  risks.
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regulations and, more importantly, what should be avoided.  The basics for pension fund
supervision, regardless of the model chosen for fund management, involve oversight of (i)
the entire contribution collection and data management system (whether centralized or not);
(ii) recording  and  maintenance of  data  on  contributions, funds accruals,  disbursements,
employment, wages,  retirement,  disbursements, death  and  survivorship,  etc.;  (iii)  funds
management  (in  association  with  financial  market  regulators);  (iv)  the  receipt  and
dissemination of information to the contributor; (v) benefits disbursement done in a secure
and efficient manner; (vi) detection, control and sanction of misrepresentation and fraud;
(vii) mechanisms to ensure adequate portability; and (viii) a vehicle for dispute resolution.
The existence of a separate supervision mechanism for pension funds has emerged as one
undisputed component of best practice internationally (Demarco and Rofman, 1998).  The
Chilean reform pioneered the principle, and all other reforms adopted it.  Whether pension
fund supervision should be independent or part of a comprehensive supervisory structure for
all financial market institutions (such as FES in the UK) is of secondary importance. What is
most  critical  is  the  supervisory  body's  independent  mandate,  a  transparent  selection
mechanism for  its  head and  staff, access to  adequate  financial resources,  and power to
sanction breaches of regulations.
(iii)  Creating/supporting  the provision  of new instruments
While the market should determine the  creation of new instruments/assets for retirement
income provision, there are a few important areas for a government role.  They include the
provision of market-determined government bonds, price-indexed government bonds, up-to-
date mortality tables and information on key economic variables.
As  discussed,  the  provision  of  market-priced  government  bonds  serves  an  important
benchmark function for the private sector.  Only if those bonds provide a sufficient span of
maturity  (at minimum from  1 to  10 years)  and  efficient secondary markets have  been
established will similar private sector instruments emerge in sufficient size and quality.  Both
public and private bonds are important for pension funds in developing an efficient portfolio
and matching assets and liabilities.  While young members of pension funds may prefer a
largely  share-determined portfolio, older  members  are  likely  to  prefer  a  largely  bond-
determined portfolio to reduce the income risk prior to retirement.  No country in the region
so  far  provides  government bonds  with  market-determined pricing  and  maturity, hence
stifling the rise of a functioning secondary market.  Equally important, government has to set
up and supervise the property right mechanisms associated with bond holding and transferal
including custody, transferal procedures, tax treatment, legal recourse in case of non-payment
and/or fraud.  Many times this implies the removal of cumbersome transfer taxes, stamp
duties and withholding requirements. Efficient registries (with computer systems to facilitate
multiple transfers) are also necessary.  Custodians have to be certified and a tracking system
is needed to follow the custodian. There also has to be a clearing and settlement system with
adequate oversight to  ensure the efficient movement of bonds and cash when bonds are
traded or redeemed at or before maturity.
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In order to issue price-indexed annuities, private insurance companies need access to price-
indexed bonds.  Otherwise, the private sector is not able or willing to bear the inflation risk.
Needless to say, price indexed bonds depend also upon a price index that is:  (i) reliable and
not subject to manipulation; (ii) composed of a proper  basket of price indices;  and  (iii)
updated and published each month and reported in a timely fashion.  With the issue of price-
indexed  government  bonds  of  appropriate  maturation  (ideally  up  to  30  years),  the
government enters into a kind of self-binding mechanism since it would not profit any longer
from surprise inflation to reduce the value of government debt.  Once these are in place, the
private sector will start to  issue price-indexed bonds on its  own.  Chile has  successfully
demonstrated  the  feasibility  of  this  approach  for  developing  countries,  and  various
industrialized countries have started to  issue these indexed bonds (including the UK, US,
Sweden, Argentina and Brazil).  To date no country in the EAP has provided them.
In order to issue annuities at all that are approximately actuarially fair, insurance companies
need up-to-date mortality tables based on mortality history and projections for specific age-
sex groups." 6 A credible government  institution must  issue the  basic data  according to
international  standards.  This  will  not  only  allow  private  insurance  companies  to
appropriately price their products, but  it will also permit the government to  supervise the
pricing as part of its consumer protection function.  Availability of the most comprehensive
set of information would allow insurance companies to price annuities for high mortality risk
groups cheaper than for low mortality risk groups, otherwise there would be cross-subsidies,
and the first group would avoid buying annuities.
Last but not least, the government has to provide series and up-to-date information on key
economic indicators, market transactions and additional demographic indicators, which allow
the financial market to supply and appropriately price instruments, including (i) prices and
quantities of bonds issued and traded; (ii) rates on other financial market references (bank
instruments for example); (iii) wage  data; (iv)  labor force participation; (v) pension fund
contribution compliance data, reserves,  accruals, disbursements etc;  (vi) retiree numbers;
(vii) disability experience data; and (vii) fertility data.
4(' These should incorporate information on the cause of death in order to be able to identify risks associated
with  smoking. alcohol and other drug use, income level, etc.
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61Annex A:  Statistical  TablesTable  1.1  Selected  Demographic  and  Economic  Characteristics,  1996
Population  Old Age  Participation  Rate GDP per capita, Puiblic  Sector  Pension  Provident/Pcnsion  Public  Gross  national
Population,  residing  in  Dependency  Labor Force/  PPP (current  employees/ contributors/  fund assets  expenditure  savings
Country  total ('000)  tirban areas  (%)  Ratio (65+/15-64)  Popuilation  15-64  internationalS)  labor  force  labor force  (% of  GDP)  (%ofGDP)  (%ofGDP)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Brunci  301  69.8  5.5  69.7  ..  48.0  <50.0  >5
Cambodia  10,234  21.0  5.5  95.2  1,310  ..  ..  0  ..  16.6
China  1,215,414  31.0  9.6  88.8  2,910  5.3  12.3  0  8.0  40.5
Hong Kong, China  6,311  95.2  13.8  73.3  23,950  6.4  ..  0  ..  30.7
Indonesia  197,156  36.4  7.0  74.8  3,410  4.9  10.6  5.6D  14.6  29.2
Korea, Rep.  45,545  82.3  8.2  69.0  13,090  4.6  46.5  10.0  18.6  33.6
Lao PDR  4,726  21.3  7.0  ..  1,260  ..  ..  0
Malaysia  21,129  54.3  6.5  66.3  7,780  12.6  50.0  54.5  21.9  36.9
Mongolia  2,498  61.3  6.7  84.3  1,500  ..  50.0  0  21.6  26.6*
Myanmar  43,381  26.2  6.8  82.0  ..  ..  ..  0  10.1  13.1
Papua  New Guinea  4,401  16.3  5.1  85.0  ..  ..  7.3  11.0  ..  26.0
Philippines  71,899  54.9  6.0  70.2  3,440  5.6  21.0  9.2b  18.5  20.1
Singapore  3,044  100  9.0  71.7  27,010  7.9  65.3  55.6  21.0  51.2
Thtailand  60,003  20.3  7.6  87.6  6,840  5.6  18.0  6.7c  16.5  33.6
Vietnam  75,355  19.5  8.2  87.2  1,570  7.9  9.1  2.6..  16.7
Not  available
*1994
a  assets ol JAMSOSTEK, TASPEN, ASABRI and employer-sponsored provident funds (see Annex 134).
inicluides  SSS and GSIS (see Aniex  B9)
'13 314 billion, end- 1998: provident lunds (50%), GPI  (3 1%) and Social Security fund (19%) (Thanompongphan, et.al., 1999 in Asher, 1999).
d Sec  Vietnalam  country profile (Annex B 12): reserves accumtilate only because the government budget pays benefits of persons who retired before January I, 1995.
S'owtice: Statistical Information Management and Analysis System, IThc  World Bank; (6) Schiavo-Campo et al., (1997b) and Annex B; (7) and (8) Annex B and Iglesias and Palacios, 1999.
crATable 1.2 Social Risk Management in Old Age
Arrangements/  Informal/Personal  Formal/Financial  Formal/Publicly-
Strategies  market-based  mandated  or provided
Risk reduction
*  Healthy life-style  *  Information on  *  Macro-economic
for continued  retirement  projections
labor force  income needs,  *  Enhancing
participation  alternative  financial literacy
retirement
e  Change in  provisions,  *  Providing indexed
earnings and  financial market  government bonds
consumption  performance,




*  Investment in  *  Investment  in  *  National provident
human, physical  multiple  funds
and real assets  financial assets  *  Encouraging
Portfolio  (inchusinc  g  *  Provision of  voluntary savings
housing)  occupational  (third pillar)
pension
*  Intra-family and  *  Purchase of  *  Social insurance
community risk  annuities  (unfunded DBs)
Insurance  sharing
arrangements
Hedging  *  Marriage
Risk coping
*  Conversion of  *  Conversion of  *  Means tested social
real assets  financial assets  transfers in cash or
(including reverse  kind
mortgage)  *  General and




NVote: Three risks are considered:  (1) insufficient accumulation of resources for old-age, (2) outliving
accumulated resources due to uncertainty of death, and (3) variability of income stream.
66Table 11.1 Population Dependency Ratios (Indicated Age Group/Pop. 15-64)
Region'/Group  1960  1970  1980  1990  1995  2000  2010  2020  2030  2040
- - ~~~~0-14<  .fi..;i.- 
East  Asia  & Pacific  70.7  73.8  63.2  46.6  43.1  41.0  33.1  31.0  30.6  30.9
Europe & Central Asia  49.4  46.3  40.3  40.6  37.6  32.6  26.6  27.8  28.6  28.8
Latin America & Caribbean  78.5  79.5  70.8  60.8  55.1  50.0  40.9  35.8  33.4  31.8
Middle East&North  Africa  83.1  88.3  83.7  79.1  72.2  61.2  50.1  43.6  37.1  33.8
South Asia  71.7  75.5  70.9  65.7  63.3  58.5  45.9  38.6  36.6  33.2
Sub-Salharan  Africa  81.1  85.6  87.9  87.6  86.5  83.2  75.3  63.9  52.4  43.1
High Income  45.1  42.5  35.2  29.8  28.9  27.7  25.3  25.3  27.5  29.0
East Asia & Pacific  8.0  7.3  7.5  7.9  8.8  9.4  10.1  13.7  19.2  26.8
Europe  & Central Asia  10.3  12.4  14.8  13.9  15.9  15.9  15.8  19.4  25.1  28.4
Latin America & Caribbean  7.3  7.9  8.0  8.0  8.3  8.3  8.9  11.4  15.6  20.4
Middle East & Nortli Africa  6.7  7.5  6.8  6.4  6.9  6.8  6.6  8.3  11.3  14.7
South Asia  6.2  6.5  6.8  7.0  7.3  7.4  7.7  8.9  11.8  15.0
Sub-Saharain  Africa  5.4  5.4  5.6  5.6  5.7  5.3  4.7  4.9  5.7  7.0
High Income  14.4  16.0  17.7  19.0  20.0  20.7  23.1  29.8  38.5  44.1
0-14&65+:
East Asia & Pacific  78.7  81.1  70.8  54.4  51.9  50.4  43.2  44.7  49.8  57.8
Europe & Central Asia  59.7  58.7  55.1  54.5  53.6  48.6  42.4  47.2  53.6  57.2
Latin America & Caribbean  85.8  87.3  78.8  68.7  63.4  58.3  49.8  47.2  49.0  52.2
Middle East & North Africa  89.8  95.8  90.4  85.5  79.1  68.1  56.7  51.9  48.4  48.5
South Asia  78.0  82.0  77.8  72.7  70.6  66.0  53.6  47.6  48.3  48.2
Sub-Saharan Africa  86.5  91.1  93.5  93.3  92.2  88.5  80.1  68.8  58.1  50.2
Highi  Income  59.5  58.5  52.9  48.8  48.9  48.4  48.4  55.1  66.0  73.1
* Specified  regions  containi  data  flo  low-  and  middle-  income  countries  only.
,ou.rce: The  Statistical  Inforiiiation Management  and  Analysis  System  (SIMA), The  World Bank;  Bos  (population  projections)
ON00
Table  11.2 Total  Fertility  Rate  (1962-2040)
Country  1962  1970  1980  1990  1995  1996-00  2006-10  2016-20  2026-30  2036-40
Bruniei  6.72  5.62  4.04  3.28  2.84  2.60  2.08  2.08  2.07  2.07
Cambodia  6.29  5.81  4.68  4.93  4.66  4.50  3.66  2.78  2.29  2.23
China  7.55  5.78  2.54  2.10  1.92  1.90  1.90  1.99  2.08  2.14
Hong Kong, China  5.30  3.34  2.00  1.27  1.23  1.25  1.25  1.60  1.89  2.06
Ind(loiesia  5.42  5.47  4.33  3.04  2.67  2.55  2.17  2.13  2.12  2.11
Korea, Rep.  5.40  4.27  2.56  1.77  1.75  1.70  1.70  1.87  2.02  2.12
Lao PDR  6.15  6.15  6.69  6.34  5.80  5.60  4.40  3.25  2.40  2.23
Malaysia  6.72  5.47  4.21  3.77  3.43  3.30  2.25  2.08  2.08  2.08
Mongolia  6.00  5.84  5.35  4.07  3.39  3.27  2.55  2.14  2.12  2.11
Myanmar  6.00  5.85  5.06  3.86  3.42  3.30  2.44  2.27  2.23  2.18
Papua  New Guinea  6.29  6.13  5.70  5.13  4.81  4.63  3.72  2.74  2.22  2.18
Philippines  6.89  6.39  4.82  4.04  3.71  3.57  2.62  2.12  2.11  2.10
Singapore  5.20  3.09  1.74  1.87  1.71  1.71  1.71  1.85  1.98  2.07
Thailand  6.42  5.46  3.48  2.19  1.82  1.74  1.74  1.88  2.01  2.10
Vietnam  6.05  5.89  4.97  3.56  3.06  2.90  2.24  2.12  2.11  2.10
Note: I'rojections  are  the  average  ol amnnial  values  for indlicated  period.
Soutrce: World Devclopment  Indicators  1998  CD-Roin,  The Worid Bank  (Demographic  Data from Bos  et.al. 1994)Table  11.3 Life Expectancy  at Birth (Years)
Country  1962  1970  1980  1990  1995  1995-99  2005-09  2015-19  2025-29  2035-39
Brunei  63.0  67.0  71.0  74.2  75.3  75.7  76.8  78.9  79.9  81.0
Cambodia  43.4  42.4  40.4  50.5  53.0  54.0  55.8  60.1  62.8  65.7
China  (excl. Taiwan)  54.1  61.7  66.9  68.9  69.4  69.6  71.5  73.1  74.6  76.2
Hong Kong, China  66.5  69.4  74.1  77.6  78.5  78.7  79.5  80.9  81.6  82.4
Indonesia  42.5  47.9  54.8  61.7  64.2  65.1  68.3  70.9  72.6  74.4
Korea,  Rep.  55.2  59.9  66.8  70.3  71.8  72.2  74.9  76.6  77.8  79.0
Lao PDR  40.4  40.4  45.0  50.0  52.5  53.5  57.0  60.2  62.6  65.2
Malaysia  55.8  61.6  66.9  70.5  71.7  72.0  72.6  74.6  76.0  77.5
Mongolia  48.2  52.7  57.7  62.7  64.9  65.8  69.7  72.2  73.8  75.5
Myanmar  45.0  48.9  52.1  56.6  59.1  60.1  59.2  63.7  66.3  69.0
Papua  New Guinea  42.7  46.7  51.1  55.1  57.1  57.9  59.9  62.9  65.3  67.8
Philippines  54.5  57.2  61.1  64.4  65.6  66.3  69.3  71.7  73.3  75.0
Singapore  64.5  67.7  71.5  74.3  76.4  76.0  77.3  78.8  79.8  80.8
Thailand  54.0  58.4  63.5  68.4  69.0  69.1  67.1  70.5  72.4  74.5
Vietnam  46.0  55.3  63.2  66.6  67.7  68.1  69.6  71.8  73.4  75.2
Notc:  Proicctions  are the  average  of aninial  values  for indicated  period.
Source:  World Developmenlt  Indicators 1998  CD-Roin, Thfe  World Bank (Demographic Data froin Bos et.al. 1994)
'0Table 11.4 Population Growth Rates (five-year averages)
Country/Region  1961-65  1966-70  1971-75  1976-80  1981-85  1986-90  1991-95  1995-00  2000-05  2005-10  2010-15  2015-20  2020-25  2025-30  2030-35  2035-40
Brunei  4.56  4.66  4.28  3.63  2.89  2.84  2.69  2.01  1.6  1.31  1.25  1.19  1.04  0.85  0.65  0.49
Cambo(dia  2.45  2.44  0.46  -1.77  2.56  3.17  2.86  2.24  1.76  1.60  1.62  1.42  1.14  1.00  0.93  0.87
China  1.39  2.69  2.26  1.37  1.37  1.54  1.17  0.93  0.72  0.64  0.61  0.54  0.45  0.33  0.22  0.15
IlongIKong,lChina  3.73  1.31  2.02  2.89  1.59  0.89  1.52  2.34  0.66  0.35  0.27  0.19  0.09  -0.01  -0.18  -0.35
Indoncsia  2.14  2.33  2.41  2.24  1.89  1.78  1.69  1.63  1.30  1.16  1.09  0.99  0.89  0.77  0.65  0.55
Korea, Rep.  2.64  2.25  2.00  1.55  1.36  0.99  0.97  0.91  0.77  0.60  0.49  0.38  0.29  0.22  0.13  0.02
Lao PDR  2.22  2.19  2.17  1.16  2.29  2.30  2.65  2.49  2.40  2.30  2.08  1.80  1.52  1.26  1.16  1.11
Malaysia  3.09  2.66  2.43  2.32  2.60  2.99  2.48  2.21  1.80  1.49  1.27  1.15  1.08  0.96  0.82  0.69
Mongolia  2.63  2.76  2.83  2.78  2.76  2.98  2.02  1.62  1.46  1.45  1.43  1.28  1.09  0.92  0.79  0.68
Myanniar  2.11  2.29  2.32  2.11  2.09  1.53  1.13  1.18  1.08  0.91  0.82  0.69  0.61  0.58  0.54  0.47
Papua New Guinea  2.24  2.40  2.39  2.46  2.18  2.18  2.27  2.22  2.08  1.83  1.61  1.36  1.14  1.06  1.01  0.93
Plhilippines  3.01  3.17  2.76  2.28  2.47  2.71  2.31  2.17  2.03  1.82  1.58  1.32  1.19  1.12  1.01  0.87
Singapore  2.87  1.91  1.73  2.27  1.69  1.71  1.98  1.86  1.14  0.63  0.55  0.48  0.38  0.23  0.03  -0.13
lIrailandl  2.99  3.08  2.92  2.44  1.81  1.67  1.32  0.83  0.72  0.66  0.66  0.56  0.45  0.36  0.28  0.20
Vietnam  1.97  2.17  2.34  2.23  1.84  2.36  2.21  1.43  1.26  1.28  1.27  1.17  1.00  0.84  0.71  0.61
East Asia & Pacific  1.68  2.69  2.35  1.60  1.56  1.69  1.37  1.12  0.92  0.82  0.78  0.70  0.60  0.49  0.38  0.30
Nole: projections  use  averages  of mid-year  values
Source: The  Statistical  Information Managemenit  and  Analysis  System  (SIMA), The  World BankTable  11.5 Old  Age Dependency  Ratios*  (1960  - 2040)
Change, %
Country  1960  1970  1980  1990  1995  2000  2010  2020  2030  2040  1960-1995  2000-2040
Brunei  6.8  5.7  4.5  5.0  5.6  6.2  6.7  14.3  24.9  27.7  -18.5  346.0
Cambodia  5.0  5.2  5.0  5.0  5.4  5.4  5.6  7.0  9.1  11.3  9.1  108.4
China  8.6  7.7  7.9  8.4  9.5  10.3  11.1  15.6  21.8  31.3  10.1  202.7
Hong Kong, China  5.0  6.7  9.5  12.0  14.2  15.0  16.1  26.5  47.4  57.2  185.1  282.6
ln(lonesia  5.9  5.6  6.0  6.4  7.0  7.0  8.4  10.3  14.6  19.2  17.8  174.0
Korea, Rep.  6.1  6.0  6.1  7.2  7.9  9.3  13.2  18.0  28.7  38.6  30.4  313.1
Lao PDR  4.5  4.6  5.1  5.6  7.2  6.4  5.7  5.5  6.6  7.8  61.5  20.4
Malaysia  6.7  6.6  6.4  6.4  6.7  6.7  7.6  10.2  14.5  18.6  1.1  176.2
Mongolia  6.0  5.7  5.5  7.4  6.7  6.5  6.3  7.1  11.9  17.2  12.4  165.9
Myanmar  6.1  6.8  7.1  6.8  7.0  7.5  7.3  8.0  11.4  15.7  13.2  109.3
Papua New Guinea  .5.2  5.5  2.8  4.2  5.0  5.4  5.7  6.5  7.7  10.6  -3.8  95.5
Philippines  5.8  5.2  5.0  5.7  5.8  6.0  6.7  8.6  11.8  15.6  0.0  158.9
Singapore  3.9  5.8  7.0  7.6  8.8  9.8  12.4  22.4  38.8  45.6  129.1  365.1
Thailand  5.2  5.9  6.3  6.8  7.5  7.9  8.9  12.1  18.9  27.6  43.0  247.6
Vietnam  7.4  8.3  9.1  8.5  8.2  8.3  7.2  7.9  13.1  17.7  11.3  114.8
East Asia & Pacific  7.9  7.3  7.5  7.9  8.8  9.7  11.0  15.7  19.9  29.7  10.4  205.4
* populationi  aged  65+ years/population  aged  15-64  years
Sottrce: World D)evelopment  In(licators 1998  CI)-Rom,  The World Bank  (Demographic  Data  from Bos  et.al.  1994)
-3Table 11.6 Life Expectancy at Age 65 (Years)
Females
Country  1995-99  2005-09  2015-19  2025-29  2035-39
Brunei  ..  ..
Cambodia  12.5  12.3  13.1  13.9  14.6
China  14.6  15.2  15.9  16.9  17.9
Hong Kong, China  19.7  19.8  20.9  21.5  22.2
Indonesia  13.8  14.3  15.1  16.1  17.1
Korea, Rep.  16.0  17.6  18.7  19.5  20.3
Lao PDR  12.3  12.7  13.2  13.8  14.5
Malaysia  15.2  15.3  16.8  17.7  18.8
Mongolia  14.1  14.8  15.8  16.7  17.?
Myanmar  13.5  12.2  13.2  14.1  15.2
Papua New Guinea  12.2  12.4  13.0  13.8  14.6
Philippines  14.3  15.2  16.3  17.2  18.2
Singapore  17.5  18.5  19.6  20.4  21.1
Thailand  14.9  14.6  15.9  17.0  18.1
Vietnam  14.3  14.4  15.4  16.4  17.5
Males
Country  1995-99  2005-09  2015-19  2025-29  2035-39
Brunei  ..
Cambodia  11.4  11.1  11.6  12.1  12.7
China  13.4  13.7  14.3  14.9  15.7
Hong Kong, China  16.2  16.2  17.2  17.8  18.3
Indonesia  12.5  12.8  13.4  14.1  14.9
Korea, Rep.  12.8  13.8  14.7  15.4  16.2
Lao PDR  11.2  11.3  11.6  12.0  12.4
Malaysia  13.1  13.1  13.8  14.7  15.6
Mongolia  12.9  13.6  14.4  15.0  15.6
Myanmar  12.3  11.3  12.0  12.7  13.4
Papua New Guinea  11.4  11.5  12.0  12.5  13.1
Philippines  12.9  13.6  14.6  15.3  16.0
Singapore  14.7  15.5  16.4  17.0  17.6
Thailand  12.7  12.5  13.1  13.9  14.7
Vietnam  12.6  12.6  13.2  14.0  14.8
.A'ote: The  projections  are the average  of annual  values  in the indicated  period.
Souirce: Bos  et.al. 1994
72Table  11.7 Percentage  of Population  Residing  in Urban  Areas
Country  1960  1970  1980  1990  1995  2000  2010  2020  2030
Brunei  43.4  61.7  59.9  65.8  69.2  72.2  76.9  80.1  82.6
Cambodia  10.3  11.7  12.4  17.5  20.4  23.5  29.7  36.2  42.8
China  16.0  17.4  19.6  26.2  30.2  34.3  42.3  49.1  55.2
Hong Kong, China  85.0  87.7  91.5  94.1  95.0  95.7  96.4  96.8  97.2
Indonesia  14.6  17.1  22.2  30.6  35.4  40.2  48.9  55.4  61.0
Korea, Rep.  27.7  40.7  56.9  73.8  81.3  86.2  91.2  92.7  93.6
Lao PDR  7.9  9.6  13.4  18.1  20.7  23.5  29.5  36.0  42.6
Malaysia  26.6  33.5  42.0  49.7  53.6  57.3  63.6  68.5  72.5
Mongolia  35.7  45.1  52.1  58.0  60.8  63.5  68.4  72.4  76.0
Myanmar  19.2  22.8  24  24.6  25.8  27.7  33.4  40.0  46.6
Papua New Guinea  2.7  9.8  13.0  15.0  16.0  17.4  21.2  26.7  33.0
Philippines  30.3  33.0  37.5  48.8  54.0  58.6  65.5  69.9  73.8
Singapore  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
Thailand  12.5  13.3  17.0  18.7  20.0  21.6  26.2  32.5  39.1
Vietnam  14.7  18.3  19.2  19.7  19.4  19.7  22.1  27.3  33.7
Source: World Development  Indicators  1998  CD-Rom,  The  World Bank; UN World Urbanization Prospects: The 1996 Revision.
U)Table  11.8 GDP and Employment  by Sector  (%),  1996
Value Added (% of GDP)  Employees, Female (% of EAP)  Employees, Male (% of EAP)
(Countr  y  Agriculture  Industry  Services  Agriculture  Industry  Services  Agriculture  Industry  Services
Brmnei  ..  ..  ..  1.6  8.9  89.4  2.2  31.7  66.1
Cambodia  50.4  14.1  35.0  78.3  7.5  14.2  68.7  7.5  23.9
Chiina  20.2  49.0  30.8  76.1  13.4  10.6  69.1  16.5  14.4
Hiong  Kong, Chinia  0.1  15.5  84.4  0.7  33.0  66.3  1.0  39.0  60.0
Inidonesia  16.2  42.4  41.4  56.4  12.5  31.0  54.4  14.3  31.3
Korea, Rep.  6.3  42.9  50.8  20.0  29.5  48.7  16.3  37.6  43.3
Lao PDR  51.9  20.5  27.6  80.9  5.0  14.1  75.7  7.4  16.9
Malaysia  12.8  46.2  41.0  25.6  22.7  51.8  28.3  23.4  48.3
Mongolia  30.9  35.4  33.7  30.3  22.0  47.8  33.5  23.0  43.5
Myanmnar  58.6  10.1  31.2  77.5  8.7  13.7  70.0  10.7  19.3
Papua  New Guinea  26.3  40.4  33.3  88.8  2.8  8.4  72.4  9.1  18.4
Philippines  21.4  31.7  46.9  30.8  13.6  55.6  54.4  16.3  29.3
Singapore  0.2  35.7  64.2  ..  ..  ..
Thailand  11.0  39.5  49.5  62.8  11.9  22.0  61.6  15.2  20.8
Vietnam  27.2  30.7  42.1  73.1  10.9  16.0  69.5  17.1  13.4
East Asia  &  Pacific  19.4  44.8  35.8  ..  ..  ..
Source:  World D)CvClopmCnt  IndicatoIs  1998 CD-RoIn,  Thc World BankTable 11.9 GDP Growth (%),  Constant Prices, 1970-2000
Country  1970-74*  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Brunei  . ..  ..  ..  ..  ..
Cambodia  ..  ..  ..  ..  5.8  7.7  7.0  1.0  1.0  4.01
China  8.9  5.4  9.3  9.9  10.7  10.5  9.6  8.8  7.8  7.1  6.5
Hong Kong, China  8.5  10.2  7.8  6.9  5.3  3.9  4.5  5.3  -5.1  2.9  4.8
Indonesia  8.4  6.9  5.0  5.6  8.0  8.2  8.0  4.5  -13.2  0.2  3.5
Korea, Rep.  8.6  9.0  6.3  9.5  7.6  8.9  6.8  5.0  -6.7  10.7  6.5
Lao PDR  6.1  1.3  7.9  4.2  6.3  7.1  6.9  6.5  5.0  6.5
Malaysia  8.3  7.2  6.9  4.8  8.7  9.8  10.0  7.5  -7.5  5.4  5.8
Mongolia  6.0  6.0  7.0  6.3  -5.0  6.3  2.6  4.0  3.5  3.5  4.5
Myanmar  1.6  5.6  5.9  -2.0  4.9  7.2  7.0  7.0  7.0
Papua  New Guinea  7.4  0.6  0.6  2.6  7.9  -2.9  3.5  -5.4  3.8  6.1
Philippines  5.7  6.6  1.3  2.7  1.9  4.7  5.9  5.2  -0.5  3.2  4.5
Singapore  11.5  7.6  8.6  6.2  8.9  8.0  7.5  8.4  0.4  5.3  6.0
Thailand  6.2  7.8  5.7  9.0  9.0  8.9  5.9  -1.8  -10.4  4.2  5.0
Vietnam  2.9  7.2  5.2  4.9  7.3  9.5  9.3  8.2  3.5  3.5  5.5
* simple  average  for grouped  periods
Souri  ce: 'Ihe  World  Economilic  Outlook  Database,  April 2000,  The  International  Monetary  Fund
-3Table  11.10  Poverty  Reduction  in East Asia,  Summary  Statistics,  1975-95
Economy  People in poverty  Head-count  Index  Poverty  Gap
(million)  (percent)  (percent)
1975  1985  1995  1975  1985  1995  1975  1985  1995
East  Asia'  716.8  524.2  345.7  57.6  37.3  21.2  n.a.  10.9  6.4
East  Asia (exc. China)  147.9  125.9  76.4  51.4  35.6  18.2  ii.a.  11.1  4.6
Chiina  568.9"  398.3  269.3  59.5b  37.9  22.2  i1.a.  l0.9  7.0
Indonesia  87.2  52.8  21.9  64.3  32.2  11.4  23.7  8.5  1.7
Lao PDR"  n.a.  2.2  2.0  n.a.  61.1  41.4  ii.a.  18.0  9.5
Malaysia  2.1  1.7  0.9  17.4  10.8  4.3  5.4  2.5  < 1.0
Mongolia  n.a.  1.6  1.9  n.a.  85.0  81.4  n.a.  42.5  38.6
Papua  New Guinea  n.a.  0.5  1.0  ii.a.  15.7  21.7c  n.a.  3.7  5.6c
Philippines  15.4  17.7  17.6  35.7  32.4  25.5  10.6  9.2  6.5
Thailand  3.4  5.1  <0.5  8.1  10.0  < 1.0  1.2  1.5  < 1.0
Vietnam  ti.a.  44.3e  31.3  n.a.  74.0c  42.2  ii.a.  28.Oe  11  .9
n a.: not available.
Notes: All numbers in this table  (except  for Lao People's  Democratic  Republic)  are based  on the international  poverty  line of US$1  per person  per day at 1985  prices.
a.: includles  only those  coLintries  presented  in the tlablc.
b.: Data  relates  to 1978  and  applies  to rioal China  only.
c.: Data rclates  to 1996.
d.: Available  cdata  on l'uichasing Power  lPality  exchanige  rates  and  various  price deflators  for Lao People's  Democratic  Republic  are not very reliable  and lead  to
anomalous  resolts.  'I'le poverty  numbers  lor the  counitry  in tIhis  table  are  based  on a nationial  poverty  Iine  related  to the level of food consumption  yielding an energy  level
ofi2, 100  calories  per peIsonI  per day and  a non-food  component  equivalenlt  to the  value  of non-food  spending  by households  that  are  just capable  of meeting  their food
requiremilenits.  Thc US$1-a-day  poverty In1e  relates  to characteristic  poverty  lines  in low income  countries  that  have  a comparable  basis  in food and  non-food  consumption
neec(is;  the  poverty  nuinbers  for Lao PD)R  are,  thercfore,  not strictly comparable  to those  for other  countries.
e.: Tlie figures  rcicr to 1984.  "Vietnam I  louseiold Welfare  in Vietnam's  Tranisition'"  in Macroeconomic  Reforn and  Poverty  Reduction,  edited  by D. Dollar, J. Litvack,
anid  1'.  Glewwe.  World Bank Regional  andl  Sectoral  Stidy.  1998.
Source: Eveiyotne's Miracle?, World Bank 1997.Table Il.11  Pension Scheme Coverage (Publicly Mandated and Government Schemes)
Populationi  Labor Force  Public  Sector  Public  Sector  Coverage  (% of Labor Force)
('000),  ('000).  Employment'  as  % of  Public Sectore  Private Sector'  Total
Country  1994  1994  ('000)  Labor  Forced  (Cont./Lab.  Force)
(I)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (3)/(2)  (5)  (6)  (7) =(5)+(6)
Brunei  281  117  ..  48.0  ..  <50.0  <50.0
Chinla  1,190,918  702,540  36,939  5.3  5.3  12.3'  17.6
Hong Kong, China  6,035  3,139  200  6.4  6.4  0.0'  6.4
Indonesia  190,848  86,662  4,225  4.9  4.9  10.6  15.5
Korea, Rep.  44,453  21,205  983b  4.6  4.6  46.5  51.1
Malaysia  19,658  7,820  984  12.6  10.5g  50.0  60.5
Mongolia  2,402  1,153  21  c  1.8  1.8  50.0  51.8
Papua New  Guinea  4,202  2,059  60  1.8  1.8  5.5  7.3
Plhilippines  68,661  28,064  1,570  5.6  7.3g  21.0  28.3
Singapore  2,930  1,425  112  7.9  ..II  65.3  65.3
Thailand  58,718  33,647  2,400  7.1  7.1'  18.0  25.1
Vietnam  72,510  36,980  2,909  7.9  7.9  1.2  9.1
a. carly 1990s;  inciltides  governimlenit  adminiistrationl  (cential and noni-cenitral  government),  social sectors  (education  and health), armed  forces, but not employees  of
state-owinedl  enterprises  (SOEs);  b. does  not include  armed  forces;  c. only includes  armed  forces;  d. values  differ slightly from those  in Schiavo-Campo  et.al. (1997b)
due  to use  of updated  labor  Iorce figures;  e.  coverage  of public  sector  is assumed  to be full (i.e., 100%),  except  where  noted; f. the  Government  Pension  Scheme  is beiig
phased  ouit  whlilc public  employees  begin  contributinig  to the Employees'  Trust lFund;  g. figures are  for 1997;  h. government  employees  are  shifting to the main publicly
mandated  scheinc,  the  Central Provident Fund,  witli  only some  holdovers  and new officers in the designated  pensionable  services  (administrative,  senior police and
intelligeince)  and political appointees  still participating  in the  government  employee  scheme;  i. DB plan replaced  in 1997  by voluntary  government  pension  fuind;  a new
penlsion  ftiud  lor certain  categories  of armed  services  personiiel  will be initiated  soon;  j.  includes  employees  of SOEs,  and  coverage  refers  only to main mandatory  public
schcme  (i.e.. does  not iicilide private/occupational  schemes);  k.China  has  a voluntary  rural pension  system  with very low benefits  that covers  another  8% of the labor
lorce  (60 million) that is not incilided  in this figure; 1.  private  occupational  schemes  are  quite significant.
Sources: (I) and (2) SINIA (LD13  Central)  database,  Thc World Bank;  (3) Schiavo-Campo  et.al., 1997b;  Knodel et.al., 1999  for Thailand;  author  estimate  for Papua  New
Guinca; (4) Brullei Darussalam  Counitiy  Profile (Aninex  B) for Brunei figure; (5) Malaysia,  China and Singapore  - Country Profiles (Annex B); (6) Country Profiles
(Aninex  13);  The World Bank 1996  for China  figure.00
Table  11.12  Prevalence  of Family  Support  for  the Elderly  (60 or older)  in Selected  Countries  (%),  mid  1990s
Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand  Vietnam
Support  'aanictetrs  Chinese  Malay  Indian  Red River  HCMC &
Delta  environs
Demograplhic
wit  nio  living (adtilt) child  4.5  4.1  3.2  7.2  5.0  4.5  2.1  5.6
with nio  noni-coresidenit  chiild  8.4  15.9  17.0  22.4  11.0  9.1
Among respondenits  withi I+ (adult)  child
coresidence  70.6  89.3  91.6  78.2  71.7  72.5  74.0  85.9
Among responidentts  witl  I + noni-
coresident  child
quasi-coresidenice'  53.2  ..  ..  ..  28.3  64.7
monietar-y  supportb
- any amoun1t  86.6  87.5  84.1  57.0  ..  88.1
- substanitial  amounit'  46.4  ..  ..  ..  ..  69.1
material supportb  88.7  86.0  89.8  65.9  ..  89.2  83.9  72.2
social contact'i
- weekly or more  57.8  65.0  65.1  50.5  65.6  75.6
- monithily  or more  72.3  92.9  89.7  79.6  84.0  88.3
not  available;  IIlCMC  - Ilo Chli  Minh  lCity
a. lives ad  jaceint or near enoLigih  to have (laily contact; b. refers to the previous year, except for Singapore (previous six months); material  support refers only to food  in
Singapore and( F-V  '  Iothes in Victinamil;  c. around lJS$  40.00, d. for Plhilippines,  Taiwan and Thailand, social contact refers to visits in either direction; for Singapore,
contact  includcs;  ,honc  calls or letters.
SouIce: Chan, 1997;  C  Uiong  et.al., 1999;  0f:stedal et.al., 1999Table 11.13 Levels and Trends in Living Arrangements Among the Elderly (60 or older)
Country  and year  Nature  of sample  % living with  any child  % living alone  % living only with spouse
(with or without  others)
PlliIippines
1986  Suhbiationial  74  3  5
1988  National  68  4  10
1996  National  69  6  8
S ingapor-e
1988  National  88  2  3
1995  National  85  3  6
Thai land
1986  National  77  4  7
1990  National  77
1994  National  73
1995  National  71  4  12
Vietniam
1994  National  (Inter-cenisal  survey)  77
1996  Red River Delta  74  7  1  3
1997  Ho Chi Miini  City and  82  5  5
ellviironls
inot  available
Soutrce:  Knodel and [)Debavalya,  1997; Cuong et.al., 1999; Knodel and Chayovan, 199700
Table  11.14 Old-Age Income Support  Programs  in Selected Countries  of East Asia and the Pacific,  1999
Coutitry  Basic Iiicomie  Support/Safety  Net  Private Sector Pension  Scheme  Public Sector Pension  Private/Occupational
Social Assistance  DeInogrant  Social Insurance  Provident Fund  Schemes  Schemes
Brtinci  D)iscetionary payments Iro(m  the  Old Age pension  Employee's  Trust Fund  Government  Pension  Scheme  - Some  schemes  provided in
Darussalam  Ministry  ot Welfarc,  Youtht  anid  (ETF,  since  1993)  DB,  NC  addition/as  alternative  to  ETF
('ulture  anid  thc Ministry of'
Religious AlTairs
China  Suibsidics;  cemergenicy  social  relief  Basic  Old Age Pension;  Civil  servanits  Very Imnited  supplementary
rtiral pensioni  Ibr 60mi  occupational  pensions;
throuighi  Civil Affairs  rctiremcnt savings accounts
Departlment
lloing Kong  Comlprelcinsive  Social  Sectirity  Social  Security  Mandatory  Providenit  For civil servants,  teachers  and  Some  enterprise  schemiles,
Assistance  Schemiie  (CSSA)  Allowance  Fund (MPF.  since  judiciary - D3  usuially  DC
Schelime  (SSAS)  2000)
In(loliesia  Fimcrgency assistance  (disaster  JAMSOSTEK  TASIPEN  (public sector);  Large  state  companies  and
relief and social  unlrcst)  ASABRI (military and police) - multinationials
_________  both  DB,  C
Korea,  Rep.  IPublic  Assistance  Program  - National Plesion Scheme  For civil servants,  military and  Mandated  retiremenit
low hlat-rate  benetils  ibr needy  (NPS, siice 1988)  private teachers  - DB, C  allowance/severance  paymenit;
elderly;  other in-kinid assistanice  Some  enterprise  sclhcnies
Malaysia  Minimal provisionis  iromii  the  Employee's  Provident  Pensions  'Irust Fund - >B,  NC;  Some  company  schemes  have
Ministry of National IJn  ity and(  Fund (EPF)  Armied  Forces  Fund - PF (I.S)  retirement  allowance  (LS)
C'omm  unitiiiity  Developmelnt
Mongolia  Supplemental  bencfits  for  Pension  Instirance  Fund,  Pension  Insurance  Fund,  but
peiesioniers,  some  social  assistanice  mandadttory  for formal  government  contributes  at  a rate
to elderly  sector;  switch to niotional  of 17.9%,  while employees
accotinis  anid  partiail  contribute only  1.1%
fuiniding  in 2000
Patipa New Guinea  Saiety net programs  for certain  Natioiial Plrovident  Public  Officers Superannuation  Some  companies  have  gained
vulncrable  groops but nio  specific  Fund  Fund;  Defense  Force  Retirenient  exemption  from NPF arid  have
progruams  for elder  ly  Benefit Fund  set  up their own fuiids
Philippines  No governimlenit  caslh  payisenits,  hut  Social  Security  System  Pag-IBIG  (for hotising  Governienit Service  Insuranlce  Mandated  retirement
in-kiiid assistance  tlhrough  (SSS)  and savings)  Systemii  (GSIS) -social insurance  allowance;  Large  employer
programs  of the l)epartment  of  voluntary plans
Social Welfare  & Developmeicnlt
Singapore  Limited public assistance  to  Central  Provident  FLunid  Government  Employee  Schelme
ulestittite  aged  (with strict means-  (CPF)  arid  Pensioni  Fund;  Armiied  Forces
tesitrig);  Maintenianice  of Parents  "Saver  Scheme"
Law
'Ihailanid  Minimal assistance  throtughi  the  Old Age lPension  Scheme  Provident  Fund  Act of  DB plan replaced  in 1997  by
D)epartnent oil lPublic  Welftre to  (to be  imiplemented  1999)  1987  -ustially foreign  voluntary  Govenrii1eirt  Pension
indligent  elderiv ii  rural areas  owned  autd  large local  FIund
(318,000)  persons)  companies  (voluntary)
Vietnam  In 1993,  redistribhitiori  schcme  lor  Social insurance  schemce,  Mandatory  participation in
cooperatively  beld laid  benefited  manrdatory  for all non-state  IAYGO for state  sector;  special
the eiderly, providing assets/means  cmployees  in enterprises  schcmes  for civil scrvanits,
of production  at subsistence  level  withl 10+  employees  i_military
ANotes:  (for Putbl  ic Sectfor,  Private/Gee.  Scltcenmes):  D)13  - tDefintcd  Beniefit;  DC  - Definied  Comrtribrmtiofu;  NC - Noni-conitributory;  C - Conitribtitory;  PF  - Provident  Funid;  LS - 1-timip  Suim;  Souirce: Anneix  B.Table  11.15 Features  of Main Mandatory  Pension Schemes in Selected Countries  of East Asia and  the Pacific
Country  Design  Performance
Retire-  Lengtll of  Contribution Rates (% of salary)  Indexation  Tax  Benefit  Average  Real Rate of  Admin.
ment  Service  (rates apply to salary level that  of  Treatment  Type  Replace-  Return on  Costs
Age:  for  does not include employer's share  Benefits  ment Rate  Investment
Male/  Pension  of contributions)  (%)
Female  (years)  Employee  Employer  Combined
Brunei  55  (50)  - 5  5  10  EEE  PF(LS)  ..  negative  high
Darussalam n
nominal  6-0
Ch  ina  60/55*  5-15.  4<  15-30  20  (ave.)  wage  (40-  TEE  DB  60-102  Oflen negative  high
______________________  80%  )80  9
Hong  Kong  65  (60)  - 5  5  10  - EEE  PF(LS)  30-40  (proj.)  slefficient
Indonesia  55  - 2  3.7  5.7  ..  EET  PE  (LS)  10  (est.)  poor  higi
Korea,  Rep.  60*  20  4.5  4.5  9  prices  TEE  DB  60 (proj.)  poor
3.44
Malaysia  55  (50)  - 11  12  23  EEE  PF(LS)  20-25  (simple  average  low
1961-97)
Monigolia  60/55  20  s  5.5  13.5  19  nonie  EEE(7)  DB  39
P'aptia  New  s-  5  7  13  ..  ..  DB(LS)  poor
Guiinea 
Philippines  60  10  3.33  5.07  8.4  ad-hoc  EEE  DB  89  poor  high
2
Singapore  62  - 20  t0  30  EEE  aiiF(Ly)  20-30  (sim6-ple  ave.  low annuity)  ~~~~1960  - preseit)
Tliailand  55  Is  2  2  5'  ..  EEE  DB  15  (proj.)  poor
Vietnam  60/55  20  5  15  20  wages  EEE  DB  69  poor  medium
Not Relevanit
Not Availahle
PF- Provident  Fund;  LS -Lump  Skim;DtDB-  delited  bencfit;  ER  - earinigs related;  EEE  - exempt,  xemclpt,  exempt;  EET  - exempt,  exempt,  taxed;  TEE  - taxed,  exempt,  exempt
unspecified  early retiremenit  provision; ( ) age of early retiremenit
Governmenilit  curreintly  contributes 1%. Tripartate  contributionis  to increase  gradually  to 3% each  (total of 9%).
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Brunei  Darussalam*
Overview  of Formal  Old-Age Support
The Employee  Trust Fund  (ETF), a national provident  fund,  is Brunei's  main  program of formal
retirement  income  provision.  As  of January  1,  1993  all  new  and  non-pensionable  government
employees started contributing to the ETF, while all private sector employees began contributing one
year  later.  Participation  in the  ETF  scheme  is  compulsory  citizens  and  permanent  residents  of
Brunei,  but  foreign  workers,  all  security  personnel  and  those  over  age  55  are  exempt.  The
contribution rate is 10% of the wage bill, divided equally between employees and employers.  Since
the scheme is still very young, it is accumulating reserves and has paid out very little in benefits.
The retirement withdrawal age is generally 55 years.  However, one quarter of accumulated savings
may be taken at age 50.  Those who become incapacitated  or emigrate are eligible  to receive their
balances immediately.  All withdrawals are on a lump sum basis.  Additionally, up to a maximum of
45% of the accumulated balances may be withdrawn for purchasing or building a house.
Since  1959, government  employees  have enjoyed  a non-contributory,  defined  benefit scheme,  the
Government  Pension  Scheme (GPS), financed  entirely through  public revenue.  Retirement age  is
normally  55  years,  although  in  some cases,  it  is  age  50  for  males  and  age  45  for  females.
Government  employees  are  either  pensionable  or  not  pensionable.  The latter  category  receives
gratuity, while the former may receive full pension or a combination of reduced pension and gratuity.
The GPS pension formula  is structured  in such a way that the replacement  rate, based  on the  last
drawn salary, rises with the length of service, with a ceiling of 75%.  Eligible employees may choose
to receive a reduced lump-sum pension (usually 75% of the full amount) and a gratuity.  The gratuity
benefit  amounts  for non-pensionable  employees  vary  according  to  the type  of appointment  (e.g.,
temporary vs. permanent), length of service, and either  the average salary for the last three years of
service or the last salary drawn.  In general, replacement rates are on the generous  side, particularly
considering that the retirement age at 55 is quite low in relation to life expectancy at birth of 75 years.
The last type of formal old age support is a safety net.  The government pays a demogrant of B$ 150
per month to citizens and eligible permanent residents.'  Normally, 30 years of residence is required
for eligibility.  The  amount of pension has remained  unaltered  since  1984, which has  resulted  in
significant erosion of its real value.  About  10,000 individuals,  or 80% of the  eligible  population,
receive  it.  The social welfare unit of the  Ministry  of Culture, Youth  and Sports also administers
assistance schemes for blind, mentally ill, and handicapped  persons.  The amount of transfers  and
number of beneficiaries are quite small.  Additionally, 600 people, deemed to be very poor, are paid
additional welfare assistance of B$ 75 per month.
Mukul G. Asher, National University of Singapore (mppasher@nus.edu.sg)  prepared this profile, and  Ian W.
Mac Arthur, The World Bank (imacarthurgworldbank.org)  revised it.
In 1997 BS 1.48 equalled US$ 1.00.
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I.  Background
Brunei Darussalam is located in the northwestern portion of Borneo facing the South China
Sea. In 1998, it had a population of 320,000, the smallest among members of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The country's  economy  is largely dependent upon  the global oil economy - although  the
share of the oil and gas sector in GDP declined from 59.6% in 1986 to 36.0% in  1995 - and
investment income from overseas assets of the state (Market Intelligence Asia,  1996).'  In
1997 Brunei's  GNP was US$ 7.2 billion.  Its per capita GNP is high (US$ 25,090 in 1997);
however, it declined by 1.5% annually during the 1990-96 period, likely as a result of falling
oil and gas prices in world markets (Intemational Finance Corporation, 1998).  The outlook
for the global oil economy is for continuation of the weak prices.  In addition, the Southeast
Asian  economic crisis has  adversely affected Brunei through  weak  demand  for its  major
exports, mainly oil, and lower or negative returns on its investments in the region.
The main  employer  in  Brunei has  traditionally been the  government,  but  it has recently
attempted to increase employment in the private sector.  Total employment in the mid-1990s
was  112,000, with  about half of the total  in "Community,  Social and  Personal  Services"
(which includes government) (Borneo Bulletin Brunei Year Book,  1997).  Although  exact
numbers are not available, it appears that foreign workers constituted more than 40% of the
labor force in the mid-I 990s (Market Intelligence, 1996).
According  to  the  1991 census,  Brunei  had  a  relatively  young  population. 3 Individuals
between 6-15 years of age comprised more than one-third of the population, and the median
age of the female population was about 23 years  (Market Intelligence Asia,  1996).  Those
over  60 years  of age numbered around  11,000, or roughly  4.0%  of the population.  The
population growth rate is approximately 3% per year.  Brunei will soon face rapid population
aging, but it currently possesses exceptional opportunities to harness pension pre-fumding.
11.  Analysis  of the Pension  System
Benefits  Provision
Total cumulative contributions and withdrawals from the ETF's  inception up to November
30,  1997 amounted  to  B$  201.3 million  and  B$  5.5 million  respectively.  The  average
There is no differentiation made between the financial resources of the sultan and his family on the one hand,
and state assets on the other.
Two-thirds of Brunei's  population are Malays, and the rest  include other indigenous peoples (6%), Chinese
(about  19%). and other ethnic groups (9%).  Social indicators are good:  life expectancy at birth was 73 years
for males and 77 vears for females in 1996, and literacy was 88%.
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monthly contribution and withdrawal is around B$ 5 million and B$ 0.2 million respectively.
The withdrawal amount should increase over time as more individuals reach 55 years of age
and as accumulated balances increase.
In 1993, total expenditure under the GPS was B$ 75.1 million, of which B$ 48 million, or
63.9%, of the total was gratuities (Market Intelligence Asia, 1996).  Overall, this represented
77% of the total government expenditure on social security (B$ 97.8 million).  The Universal
Old Age Pension (demogrant scheme) accounted for most of the remainder.
Coverage
As  of  November  30,  1997  (the  latest  period  for  which  the  data  are  available),  total
membership of the ETF was 57,897.  Nearly two-fifths of the members were between 21 and
30 years of age, and only about one-fifth was over 40 years of age, reflecting the relatively
young profile of the labor force.  It is not clear what proportions of the members are active
contributors.  Even if all members were regarded as contributors, the ETF would cover only
around half of the labor force.  The profile of the uncovered workers is not available, but
many are foreign workers who are legally exempt.
Administration,  Investment  Policies  and Performance,  and Taxation
A Board of Directors, appointed bi-annually by his Majesty the Sultan, runs the ETF.  There
are 12 board members, including two from the private sector, and the Minister of Culture,
Youth and Sports chairs the Board.  The Board indicates a Managing Director to execute day-
to-day  duties  associated  with  the  fund's  operation.  The  Ministry  of  Finance  handles
decisions concerning administrative and  financial matters.  Thus, the ETF  is essentially a
governmental organization with little autonomy.
Section  6(1)  of the  Emergency  Order  of  1992 (Tabung Amanah  Pekarja)  provides  the
investment guidelines for the fund.  These limit the allocation of fund monies to  deposits
with banks approved by the Board or investments in property and financial tools authorized
by the government.  Brunei does not have a stock market.  While recent data are unavailable,
most of the investments appear to be  in fixed deposits with a handful of locally operating
banks, including Citibank, Hong Kong Bank and Standard Chartered Bank.  This suggests
little diversification in investment according to type of asset and geographical area.  Little
data  on  investment  returns  or  dividend  (or  interest)  credited  to  member  accounts  are
available.  However, while the return on fixed deposits  averages around 3%, dividends in
1993 and 1994 were at a rate of 1.5%.  Thus, it seems likely that not all returns obtained are
passed on to the members.  It is not clear whether the uncredited balances are kept in reserve
or returned to the government.
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One of  the ETF's  greatest  challenges  is to  increase  the  dividend  on  savings  above  the
inflation rate.  It is likely that  in recent years  the dividend rate has been negative  in real
terms.  If this is indeed the case, then the ETF is unlikely to provide an adequate replacement
rate for its members.  If this trend continues, those required to shift from the GPS to the ETF
are likely  to  be  considerably worse  off.  Not  only  will  they have to  contribute to  their
retirement benefits, but they will also be unable to take advantage of compound interest to
accumulate balances for their retirement.
Brunei  does  not  levy personal  income  tax,  and  contributions  by  the employers  are  tax
deductible.
111.  Reform  Issues  and Options
By  shifting  from  a  non-contributory  pension  (and  gratuities)  system  for  government
employees to a defined contribution (DC) scheme covering both private and  public sector
employees, policymakers have already taken an important step towards creating a sustainable
social security system for Brunei.
The main challenges for the policymakers lie in the following areas:
*  Benefits  Planning.  There  is  a  need  to  review  the  practice  of  providing  lump-sum
payment at age 55.  Some form of periodic payments is likely to be more consistent with
the rationale of mandatory participation in the ETF.  The government should determine
an  array  of options  through  an  empirical  study.  Singapore's  practice  of requiring  a
minimum sum to be set aside at retirement with monthly withdrawals permitted only after
age 60 may merit consideration.
At present, the governnent  provides health care and education services free of charge.
With respect to health care, it might be possible to use the ETF to move to a more mixed
financing system, which could take effect gradually.  However, the govemrnent should be
careful with the introduction of other types of benefits schemes under the ETF.  Not only
could  additional  schemes  increase  complexity,  but  they  could  also  require  higher
contribution  rates,  which  in  turn  could  impinge  on  Brunei's  international
competitiveness.
To improve social adequacy, the government should also consider periodic adjustments
to the nominal amounts under the Old Age Pension and related schemes.  These amounts,
unrevised since 1984, currently do not provide a reasonable replacement rate.
*  Investment  Function.  As  noted,  the  investment  portfolio  of  the  ETF  is  extremely
conservative.  The long-term liabilities of the ETF do not match the relatively short-term
duration of the fixed deposits.  The fact that there is no stock market in Brunei also limits
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its options.  Therefore, it may need to choose between investing the accumulated balances
to  provide  maximum  feasible  returns  to  its  members  (consistent  with  prudential
guidelines)  or  using  them  domestically  to  build  up  the  financial  sector  and  capital
markets.  The trade-offs between the two options need to be recognized, and appropriate
policies  should be  devised.  As  with  the  housekeeping  function,  contracting-out the
investment function, albeit with prudential guidelines and monitoring, may merit careful
consideration of the policymakers.
Housekeeping  Function.  The  ETF,  which  currently  performs  housekeeping,  could
consider  the  following  options  to  improve  performance:  (i)  invest  in  information
technology and human resources to strengthen relevant activities (contribution collection,
record keeping, administration, benefit payments, etc.), or (ii) explore the feasibility of
contracting out the function to a specialized private sector firm.  Without a detailed study
the preferred option is unclear.
It would also be desirable to ensure regular publication of the basic data relating to ETF
operations:  number of members; active contributors; their contributions,  withdrawals,
and balances; investment portfolio on both cost and market basis; returns obtained; etc.
In conclusion, Brunei has taken the most important step of moving from a non-contributory,
rather  generous,  defined  benefit  government  pension  scheme  to  a  defined  contribution
scheme under the ETF.  However, there are several challenges relating to the housekeeping,
benefits planning, and investment functions of the DC scheme that the policymakers need to
address.  Meeting  these  challenges will  require  a  focus  on  managerial  and technocratic
aspects of the ETF and other social security schemes.  If this is done, the prospects appear
good for achieving a socially adequate, economically less distortionary, fiscally sustainable,
and internationally competitive social security system in Brunei.
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People's  Republic  of China*
Overview  of Formal  Old-Age  Support
China  established  its first formal  pension  system  in 1951  under  the Labor  Insurance  Provisions,  The
Cultural  Revolution  (1966-76)  saw  the system  dismantled,  and enterprises  began  to handle  benefits
for their own  employees.  After 1976,  China  began  to reestablish  a social  insurance  system,  gradually
shifting  welfare  obligations  from state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  to government-run  funds  and  to the
workers  themselves. Currently,  the social security  system consists  of social insurance  (funds for
pensions,  medical  treatment, unemployment,  workers' compensation  and housing);  social welfare
(subsidies  for living  expenses,  which  the government  provides  to cushion  the effects  of price  reform);
social  relief (safety  net  programs  for  the poor,  elderly  and handicapped,  as well as disaster  victims).
All urban  enterprises  must contribute  to a social  insurance  fund  once  the local people's  congress  has
passed  appropriate  plans. Substantial  differences  in the basic  parameters  of the pension  system  at the
local and provincial levels have resulted from government experimentation  in  reform and
considerable  SOE responsibility  in establishing  pensions. In practice there is large variation  in
contribution  rates among the provinces  (ranging  from 15-30%  for the employer contribution  -
employee  contribution  normally  does not exceed  4%),  minimum  length  of service  for eligibility  (5-15
years),  and replacement  rates (65-102%).  However,  the retirement  age stands  uniformly  at 60 years
for men  (65 at executive  level)  and 55  years  for women  (50 for  blue-collar  workers).
Currently,  the principal  reform goal is to substitute  the old system that requires individual  urban
enterprises  to provide  all welfare  benefits  to their  employees  with a three-pillar  system  that distributes
the burden  more equitably  among  enterprises  and workers. State Council  Document  26 reaffirms
previous decisions  to establish  a unified mandatory  pension system by the year 2000 that would
replace  pilot programs  in individual  provinces  and eliminate  the corresponding  variation.  In fact, the
program  calls  for the "four unifications"  - in the system,  standards,  management,  and fund usage -
applicable  to all types of enterprises  and workers. The system will combine social pooling  and
individual  accounts (both mandatory and private).  Social pooling will allow for redistribution
through  a basic  old-age  pension  preventing  retirees  from falling  below  the poverty  line. At the same
time, fund accumulations  in the mandatory individual  accounts will be converted  to a  10-vear
annuity,  but the social  pool will  continue  to pay pensions  for people  who  live longer  than  this.
All provisions  will be standardized,  formulated  and stipulated  under the social insurance  law.  A
central  administrative  agency  will  have  clearly  identified  responsibilities  with respect  to each level of
government,  and a legal framework  for managing  the pension  system  will separate  the administrative
and investment  management  functions. Enterprise  contributions  are not to exceed 20% of the wage
payroll  for  the pay-as-you-go  and funded  pillars  combined.  Individual  employee  contributions  (to the
funded  pillar only) had to be at least 4% of wages  in 1997,  increasing  by 1% in 1998,  and then 1%
every two years thereafter until the contribution  rate reaches 8%.  As individual  contributions
increase  to 8%. enterprise  contributions  will gradually  decrease  to 3%.
Yvonne  Sin,  The  World  Bank,  HDNSP  (ysin.worldbank.org)  prepared  this  profile,  and Ian  W.  Mac  Arthur.
The World  Bank  (imacarthurCworldbank.org)  revised  it.
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1.  Background
Over the past two decades China has moved from an economy based on central planning
within a communist  political framework  to a socialist market economy with a large state-
owned sector.  China's economic reforms since 1978 have resulted in sustained positive
performance. From 1979 to 1997, the country's GDP quadrupled,  with the annual growth
rate averaging  9.8%.  Growth has been particularly pronounced  in coastal areas near Hong
Kong and across  from Taiwan,  where foreign  investment  has helped  stimulate  the production
of domestic  and export goods. Its inflation rate has averaged  less than 10% a year, although
a high of 25% was recorded in one year.  The incomes of both urban and rural residents
increased steadily,'  and  living  standards  continued to  improve.  Povertv  declined
substantially,  by more than half between 1975 and 1995, from 569 million to 269 million
persons.  With a savings rate of more than 40% of GDP, an export growth rate exceeding
15%  a year in current dollars,  and foreign  exchange  reserves  of over $  100  billion, China is in
a strong economic  position. This economic  advantage  is expected  to help it bear the costs of
transition,  including  those of pension  reform.
Over the past three decades,  China's fertility experienced  a sharp decline. The total fertility
rate decreased from 5.72 in  1970 to  1.91 in  1996.  This decline was very significant
compared to the experience of some developed economies  with low fertility.  The rapid
decline in fertility owes to strict family planning  policies  and the one-child  policy of the late
1970s  and 80s.
Better living conditions and improved  availability  of medical services have contributed  to a
reduction  in mortality  and extension  of life expectancy  in both rural and urban areas. Similar
to many of the developed countries, China has enjoyed a continuous improvement in life
expectancy  over the past two decades. The reduction  in age-sex-specific  mortality rates has
resulted in an increase  in life expectancy  at birth from 61 years in 1970  to over 69 in 1995.
Decreased  fertility and the rise in longevity have contributed  to the "old age problem." The
percentage  of older persons  in the total population  has been increasing  continuously,  at a time
when the median age of the population  is also rising steadily. Moreover,  the aging process is
expected to accelerate in the coming decades as the large numbers of baby boomers born
between the early 60s and mid-70s  approach  retirement  age around 2030.  This aging trend,
combined with the effects of the one-child policy from the 70s and 80s, is producing a
population  structure  with an uncomfortably  high elderly dependency  ratio, which is expected
to rise from 9.5% in 1995  to over 30% in 2040.
'GDP  per capita (in ppp) reached USS2,800 in 1996.
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China's  labor force in 1995 numbered around 622 million, representing 77% of those aged 15
to 64.2  Various government organizations, public institutions, state-owned enterprises, and
collective and private enterprises in urban areas employed  173.5 million of these workers.
Prior to the enterprise reforms, SOEs provided cradle-to-grave security (the "iron rice bowl")
for millions of urban Chinese by granting privileged access to housing, healthcare, education
and pensions.  The lack of a mature market and the privileged status of benefit entitlements
for public  enterprise employees  served  as disincentives for workers  to  seek  employment
outside the state sector.  After the introduction of enterprise reforns,  employment in non-
state sectors began to grow rapidly throughout the 1980s.  In 1995, the figures representing
urban employment  in  foreign-funded, private,  and  individual enterprises  grew to  over 25
million.  However,  most  of these  non-state  sectors  previously  had  small  or  no  old  age
security benefits.
Between 1990 and  1994 the proportion of the labor force engaged in  agriculture declined
from 60% to 54.3%.  This trend is projected to continue - the share of labor in agriculture is
estimated to fall to 17% by 2030 and to  10.5% by 2050 - accompanied by growth in non-
agricultural  employment  in  rural  areas.  Hence,  the  term  "rural"  no  longer  translates
automatically to "self-employed  and dependent on agriculture."  Nowadays,  in many rural
counties in the coastal region, wage employment is prevalent, and agriculture yields only a
small share of income.
About 20 years ago, before the introduction of reforms and open door policies, China held
one  quarter of  the world's  population  living in  abject poverty.  Now  that proportion  has
diminished to  less than a twentieth.  Nonetheless, despite the impressive gains  in poverty
alleviation, China has experienced significant gaps in economic development across different
regions.  The majority  of  China's  poverty-stricken  population  is  highly  concentrated  in
central and western rural areas where natural conditions present difficulties for human living
as well as livestock and crop production.  In fact, there is great disparity between the national
average  annual  per-capita  household  disposable  incomes  of  urban  and  rural  dwellers -
ranging from  highs of 8,440 yuan  for Shanghai and 8,600 yuan  for Guandong to  lows of
3,592 yuan for Gansu and 4,001 yuan for Shaanxi. 3
The National  Poverty-Relief Program,  established in  1993, has the purpose  of mobilizing
central  and  local  governments  to  eradicate  poverty  nationwide  by  shifting  from  mere
provision  of relief  to  economic  development  - e.g.,  via  improvement  of  the  ecological
environment and production conditions, technical promotion and training. 4 Nine provinces
A labor force participation of this magnitude is considered high by international standards.
The exchange rate for the US$ was 8.28 in 1998.
4For  instance, farmers cultivating corn in high plateaus with cold climates received training in the technique of
mulching, which resulted in a doubling or tripling of per-unit yield and increased their annual income by 200-
300 yuan.  Also as a result of technical training, farmers in the Dabie Mountain areas in Xinvan and in Henan
Province became experts in growing tea, peanuts and fruits, as well as breeding fish and poultry.
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and municipalities participated in the inter-provincial assistance program that sponsored one-
to-one projects in which the wealthier member from  each paired unit invested money and
technology  in  projects  located  in  its  poorer  counterpart,  in  order  to  utilize  local  natural
resources and labor.  The benefits of such a program are twofold.  First, the excessive focus
on cities  and urban  areas is bypassed,  thus  minimizing  the negative  byproducts  of  over-
urbanization.  Second, poor townships/villages  are given a chance to move out of poverty-
stricken conditions and develop into small and medium-sized towns with income generating
potential, thus narrowing the income disparity between regions.
Historically, the family bore an important role as a unit of production and consumption, and
it held sole responsibility for support of the elderly.  This was a reasonable expectation in the
past when family size was larger and several generations  often cohabited to pool  resources
and share risks.  But modernization  is changing these traditional  arrangements.  The strict
family planning policy and the one-child policy both tend to lower the ratio of wage earners
to the elderly.  Furthermore, reductions in family size, the shift toward nuclear households,
and increasing population migration all contribute to the erosion  of family  support for the
elderly.  The  dramatic "1-2-4"  structure  (families with  one  child,  two parents.  and  four
grandparents) will have profound consequences - the elderly  will receive less attention as
well as fewer yuans as the dependency ratio increases.  The fact that only a small minority of
the  elderly  (most  of  whom  live  in the  cities)  receive  pensions  serves to  aggravate this
situation.  Those elderly who receive little or no family  support and are not entitled to any
secure source of income will be at high risk of fulfilling their basic needs.
China escaped the turmoil that affected Southeast Asian currency markets in  1997-98 partly
because the renminbi (China's unit of currency) is not fully convertable, and China's  foreign
exchange reserves swelled to US$ 131.6 billion in September 1997.
1.  Analysis  of the Pension  System
Background
China first formulated pension provisions under the National Labor Insurance Regulation in
1951 for enterprises with more than  100 workers, which it extended to enterprises with less
than 100 workers in 1958.  The system had defined benefits, providing old age pensions that
represented 50% to 70% of workers' wages.  Funding  came exclusively from contributions
by enterprises at a rate of 3% of the wage bill.  Seventy percent  of contributions  financed
pensions while 30% contributed to a national master pool as a form of prefunding.
In 1969. during the Cultural Revolution, the government disbanded the trade unions, which
had  administered  the  pension  schemes,  and  the  Ministry  of  Labo.  It  transferred
responsibility  for pension  supervision  to  local  labor bureaus  and  for  the management  of
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payments to the respective enterprises, to be paid from their current revenues. 5 Hence the
practice  of  social  pooling  was  terminated.  Furthermore,  the  pension  funds  that  had
accumulated were used for other purposes, effectively eliminating any prefunding reserves
that had built up.
With the economic reforms in  1978, the State Council issued new pension regulations and
reaffirmned certain  pension  rights.  It  also  granted  new  and  higher  benefits  - with  a
replacement rate of 60% for 10 years of service, 70% for 15 years, and 75% for 20 or more
years of service - and introduced incentives for early retirement.  The number of pensioners
jumped  from  3.14  million  to  22  million  in  ten  years,  and  expenditures  grew  rapidly,
increasing almost 19 times during the same period.  As a result, contribution rates rose from
2.8% to 10.6% of urban wages.
Throughout the 80s and the 90s, the Chinese Government allowed certain provinces to test
various  pension reform initiatives as experiments/pilots.  These focused primarily on:  (i)
shifting from enterprise insurance to social insurance by setting up social pooling systems for
industries in  urban areas; 6 (ii) requiring  individual contributions  in  order to  distribute the
pension  cost  burden;'  (iii)  establishing  voluntary  occupational  pension  schemes  and
individual savings plans to supplement pensions; and (iv) partially pre-funding future pension
debt by setting a higher contribution rate.  While a final consensus has not yet been reached
on how to unify the system, the State Council Document 6 of 1995 proposed two models for
the basic benefit tier (involving individual accounts and  social pooling), and localities can
choose one of the two or a combination thereof.  Plan I emphasized individual accounts while
Plan II emphasized the social component.!
Currently the pension system operates under the norms of State Council Document 26, issued
in  July  1997, which  specifies  the  social  pooling  and  individual  account  arrangements.
Provinces pool funds from enterprises (no more than 20% of payroll) and individual workers
(4% of wages, gradually increasing to 8%).  The pay-as-you-go pillar is financed entirely by
13% of  the  enterprise  contribution  and  intends to  offer  a  20%  replacement  rate.  The
individual acounts are funded by the remaining 7% of the enterprise contribution plus the
worker contribution.
'This  was considered acceptable since all enterprises were state-owned and the government assigned workers.
Thus, in effect all workers were government workers, for whom the State set wages and benefits.
6 According to a speech made by a Chinese official, since 1984, as many as 96.6% of SOEs, 56% of collective
enterprises  and  32%  of  private  and  foreign  joint  ventures  joined  the  system  of  social  pooling  at  the
county/provincial level.
The  1991  State  Council  Decision  introduced  the  concept  of  individual  accounts  as  an  experiment  to
supplement enterprise contributions.
8 The State Commission for the Restructuring of Economic Systems and the Ministry of Labor developed Plan I
and Plan II, respectively.
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Coverage
By the  end of  1996, 87.7  million urban  workers had joined  the basic pension  insurance
scheme and  24.5 million  retired  persons were  receiving benefits  from  the  social pooling
pension scheme. 9 Overall coverage is around 20% of the labor force.
China's  formal pension system is largely urban-based.  Not surprisingly, even in urban areas,
pension system coverage has focused largely on the state sector, while the nonstate sector is
inadequately covered.  Around 70% of the country's  population of 1.259 billion (end-1996)
live  in  the  countryside  and  do  not  participate  in  the  system.  Instead  they  have  relied
primarily  on the  extended  family  for  old  age support.  Recognizing the  implications  of
smaller  families  and  increasingly  mobile  workers,  the  Ministry  of  Civil  Affairs  has
experimented with  a voluntary  pension insurance  system for farmers and workers in town
and village enterprises. 10 Extending coverage to them would not only provide for their old
age security but would also ease the transition to the new pension system by providing more
funding.  However,  the  enterprises  with  low  coverage  are  also  the  most  dynarnic,  and
extended  coverage  may  translate  to  a  substantial  increase  in  labor  costs  and  must  be
approached cautiously.
Fiscal Sustainability
Projections conducted by the government of China's  Research Group for the Social Security
System (China RGSSS 1995) concluded that the current system is unsustainable.  In order to
maintain the pay-as-you-go  arrangement,  i.e., use  current contributions  to  pay  for current
expenditures, a 39.27% contribution rate would be required by 2033.  Contribution rates of
such magnitude would dampen  the effect  of  China's  growth  on  wages and  employment,
encourage contribution evasion and labor shifts to the informal sector, and invariably lead to
large intergenerational redistribution.
While the combination of social pooling and individual accounts could smooth this increase,
a total contribution rate of 28% would still be necessary to maintain fiscal balance, with the
assumption of no borrowing.  Higher dependency ratios in some localities would require even
greater increases in the contribution rate - similar enterprises in different provinces may have
to  pay  widely divergent payroll  taxes, with  a differential  of 20% - 30%."  Clearly,  such
regional disparities in contribution rates would not be acceptable, economically or socially.
9Provincial  pooling has occurred, at least on paper, in 27 of the 32 provinces (although some pooling is only
partial). but enterprises remain responsible for record keeping and the actual delivery of pension benefits.
10  This scheme covers only about 60 million rural residents, mainly in the developed eastern provinces Jiangsu
and Shandong
Average  contribution  rates  in  state  enterprises  in  1994 were  23.5%  for  the  provinces  and  25.9%  for
municipalities, with values as low as 19% in Guangdon to as high as 28% in Henan.
6 of IIAnnex B2: Country Profilefor  China
Provincial pension pools, for the most part, are encountering serious funding problems.  In
1998, 22 provincial pools were in deficit, with  state enterprises owing the government  38
billion yuan of arrears.  Local governments have been using contributions to the individual
accounts to pay current retirees, leading to notional or empty accounts in a context in which
the source of financing of the transition cost remains unclear.  They have also used local tax
revenue to bolster the system, and the Ministry of Finance transferred 17 billion yuan to 25
provinces to  cover shortfalls in  1999.  Even while most  provinces ran pension  deficits in
1998, 10 provinces - mainly in the coastal region - had 2.7 billion yuan in surplus, but due to
the lack of national pooling, the central government cannot use these reserves to smooth the
other provinces'  deficits.  By the end  of  1998, total  reserves in the basic pension system
amounted to 58.7 billion yuan, less than 1% of GDP.
There is consensus about the need to reduce the pension burden, but no agreement has been
reached  on how  to  do  so effectively.  While  increasing  retirement  age,  lowering wage
replacement rates and using appropriate pension indexation' 2 can help, in China's  case, none
of these measures alone can effectively bridge the deficit.  Extending coverage may prolong
the occurrence of current deficits, but this  is only  a short-term palliative.  Unless pension
assets from fumded  accounts are properly invested to maximize return and build real capital,
the benefits of workers in the newly covered cohort will still have to be paid on a pay-as-you-
go basis from future contributions at a much higher rate.
Administration,  Regulation,  Investments  and  Tax  Treatment
China has no social insurance law, and there is wide  dispersion of authority  over pension
policy  regulation  and  administrative  matters.  The  highly  decentralized  social  insurance
system  lends  itself  readily  to  inconsistent  enforcement.'3 Many  localities  intentionally
differentiate  their  schemes from  others  and  introduce  nontransparency  in  order  to  retain
authority  over their programs.  The lack of a legal  framework and the weak enforcement
power of local social insurance agencies make the tasks  of collecting payments or levying
penalties difficult.  Enterprises are still inundated with the tasks of keeping records, paying
pensions and taking care of pensioners'  needs, including housing and health.  Because of the
highly fragmented system and the absence of a regulatory  framework, administration  costs
are high, and compliance rates are falling," 4 which will ultimately increase the burden on state
12  Municipalities have partially  indexed pensions  to nominal wages  in the past.  The indexation  coefficient
ranges from 40% to 80% of nominal wages, depending on the province and city. with no explicit relationship to
inflation.  But this approach has been uncertain and nontransparent  and allowed for an increase or decrease in
the real value of pensions depending on the rate of inflation.  In the future, it may be most prudent to index
benefits according to the average growth rate of prices.
13  By mid-1994, every province and large city had set up its own social insurance department to handle policy
matters as well as its own labor insurance bureau to administer social insurance funds.
14 Compliance rates are currently around 90%.
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enterprises.  The existence of the two models for the basic tier has also contributed to further
fragmentation of the system and local variation.
According to regulations,  80% of the reserve funds must be invested in government bonds
and the rest in bank balances.  Since interest rates set by the govermnent have been below
inflation rates in recent years, these reserves have lost value over time.  Of late, localities are
ignoring the  regulations  and  investing  these  funds in  local  projects,  sometimes  yielding
higher rates of return.  Thus, it is to the advantage of the localities to make the investment
portfolio as nontransparent as possible in order to maintain control over the resources.
The  tax  treatment  of  pension  plans  is  based  on  the  "tax-exempt-exempt"  regime  for
contribution, accumulation and benefit  payout.  While this  treatment  is  acceptable, it will
always be subject to the risk that the government might decide to tax benefits in the future.
Also, the exemption  of benefit payments  from  taxes has the  effect  of  increasing the  net
replacement rate as a percentage of the pre-retirement income.
III.  Reform  Issues  and Options
In the past public enterprises have provided cradle-to-grave security, or the "iron rice bowl,"
to millions of urban Chinese.  With the structural transformation of China's  economy, it has
become apparent that the pay-as-you-go  financing  of the enterprise-based pension  system
cannot adequately meet the challenges posed by the aging population in the next millennium.
For more than 15 years, various reforms of the pension system have been conducted on a trial
basis.  Considerable progress has occurred with the enactment of State Council Document 26,
which laid down the key principles and broad  framework on China's  transition  towards a
more stable old age security system.  However, many important issues deserves continued
attention, including:
Unification.  The reform measures articulated in  State Council Document  26 require a
major redirection of financial flows and asset entitlements and can affect young and old
populations  alike.  Inevitably,  there  will  be  major  winners  and  losers.  Geographic
disparity in contribution rates may continue for the foreseeable future.  Difficulties in
reconciling  inter-provincial  interests  will persist  for  some  time  and  may  impede  the
likelihood of a nationally unified system with a harmonization of contribution rates.  The
nonstate sectors and some industrial sectors with a relatively young workforce may resist
participation and hence delay unification.
The success of the pension reform is dependent on how the poorly  funded SOEs can be
restructured without putting extra financial burden on the State.  If the pension system
were to be unified and coverage were to be extended to the non-state  sector i including
village and  township  enterprises),  the  government  would  have  to  convince  the  new
contributors to participate in order to have a sufficient transfer of resources to liquidate
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the deficits of the pre-reform programs.  At the same time, contributors and beneficiaries
alike must buy into the reformed system.  For in essence, the replacement rate is being
reduced  from  an  80%  defined  benefit  pension  supposedly  guaranteed  by  the  SOE
enterprises  to  a  20%  defined  benefit  pension  now  implicitly  guaranteed  by  the
government, to be supplemented by a combination of notional defined contribution style
pensions plus voluntary savings.
*  Investment function for reserve funds.  It is important that while the population is still
relatively  young the excess cash flow be accumulated to build  up real capital.  These
reserves, together with all accrued investment income, must be preserved solely for the
benefit of current and future retirees.  However, under the current circumstances - with
local  government  control, the requirement to  invest in  central  government bonds that
yield negative real interest rates, the absence of suitable financial instruments, and limited
mobility of capital within the country - pension funds may actually decline in value, thus
diminishing the likelihood of the delivery of promised benefits.  In fact, funded individual
accounts will yield acceptable wage replacement rates only if the long-term rate of return
on pension funds is at least equal to the growth rate of wages and inflation.  Eventually,
inefficient  investing will result in  the need  for  even higher  future contribution rates,
thereby compromising the financial stability of the system.
Many opportunities to  put pension capital to  the most  productive  use have been lost.
Although China has enormous needs for infrastructure and other long-term investments,
the fact that most household  savings are in short- and medium-term  deposits does not
provide a  good match  for long-term lending.  The lack of reliable long-term financial
instruments  means foreign financial resources  have  to be  mobilized  for  infrastructure
investment  (often  at  high  guaranteed  rates  of  return),  while  domestic  savings  are
inefficiently utilized.
*  Labor mobility.  For China to benefit fully from the socialist  market economy and the
restructuring  of its  state enterprises, factors of production  must  be readily transferable
between sectors and regions.  Upon the liquidation of a SOE in one city, laid-off workers
need  to  have  the  option  to  secure  employment  by  moving  to  areas  where  similar
industries might be expanding.  In order for this to happen, pension benefits of workers
must be portable - departing workers have to be able to take their individual accounts
with  them  wherever they  go.  The  fragmentation  of  the  national  system  into  many
separate unfunded municipal pools makes portability difficult, if not impossible, and will
become  an increasingly serious impediment to  labor mobility.  The situation is made
worse by the fact that individual accounts are largely notional.  The reform should plan to
address these concerns in practice.
. Institutional  development.  The  successful  implementation  of  the  proposed  pension
reform  depends  critically  on  accompanying reforms  in  the  legal,  administrative, and
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financial systems.  While  coverage  expansion and  increased  compliance  are vital  for
making  the  proposed  system  viable,  the  existence  of  a  strong  legal  framework,
appropriate administrative  capabilities  and  a competitive  financial sector  is  critical  to
safeguard pension funds.  The regulatory framework in China has yet to  be completed,
and the capacity to implement and enforce prudential regulations needs to be enhanced.
The development of self-governing professions can also improve practice and keep them
on  par  with  international  standards.  Management  and  financial  control  systems  are
necessary to ensure accurate record keeping and prompt payments, maximize compliance
and detect or even penalize fraud and evasion.  These tasks should be carried out by a
separate  social  insurance  agency  with  the  authority  to  enforce  the  law  and  define
responsibilities of government at each level.
Chinese policy analysts and international experts have studied the Chinese pension  system
for many years.  It  is now  time  to  consolidate the  learning  experiences from  numerous
experiments and pilots and come to closure on as many of the unresolved issues as possible.
Admittedly, pension reform impinges on many political considerations.  However, the sooner
China implements a Social Insurance Law creating a unified system, the sooner it will be able
to achieve a sustainable pension  system that provides old-age security to its  rapidly aging
population  while  strengthening  national  savings  and expanding  the market  for enterprise
securities.
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Hong  Kong,  People's  Republic  of China*
Overview of Formal Old-Age Support
Hong Kong's  vigorous economy, high relative  wealth and savings, and strong family networks have
traditionally belied the establishment of a universal public old-age income support scheme.  At best,
the  govemment has addressed social  security for the elderly through a  system of non-contributory
safety nets under the Social Welfare Department:
*  The Comprehensive  Social Security Assistance (CSSA) Scheme - This is a means-tested scheme
designed to raise the income of elderly individuals and others in need.
*  The Social Security Allowance Scheme (SSAS) - The SSAS is a non-means-tested scheme that
provides  flat-rate  allowances  for  all  elderly  individuals'  and  people  with  severe  disabilities.
Monthly benefits amount to HK$ 675 for those aged 70 and over and HK$ 595 for those aged 65-
69.  This scheme and the CSSA are mutually exclusive.
*  Other  Schemes - Three  non-means-tested  schemes (Criminal  and  Law  Enforcement  Injuries
Compensation Scheme, the Traffic Accident Victims Assistance Scheme and Emergency Relief)
provide cash and material assistance to victims of injuries from various causes.
Some  employers  have  voluntarily  established  retirement  schemes  as  a  means  of  attracting  and
retaining employees,  but these reach only  a little over a third of the workforce.  In addition, three
government pension schemes cover some 200,000 civil servants, teachers and judicial  officers.  The
Civil Service Pension Plan is a defined benefit scheme, which provides benefits as early as age 50 at
the rate of 1.78% of highest annual salaries for each year  of service,  subject to a maximum annual
pension of 2/3 of the highest salaries.  The British Government Actuary conducted the last actuarial
valuation of the plan some eight years ago; the funded status of the plan is currently not known.
Following a lengthy debate on the nature of desired formal old-age income support, the government
declared its intention to avoid the establishment of a government-run central provident fund.  Instead,
it  proposed  to  create  incentives, for  the  private  sector  to  establish  retirement  schemes  while
maintaining the appropriate regulatory powers.  In August  1995, it enacted the Mandatory Provident
Fund Schemes (MPF) Ordinance to establish a formal system of retirement protection.  Completion
and passage of the subsidiary legislation and amendments to the primary ordinance occurred in April
1998, with implementation to begin around July 2000.
Yvonne Sin, The World Bank, HDNSP (ysin@worldbank.org) prepared this profile, and Ian W. Mac Arthur,
The World Bank (imacarthur@worldbank.org) revised it.
Eligible applicants must have resided in Hong Kong for at least five years.  Those  aged 65-69 must possess
assets of less than  HK$ 169,000 for a single person (HK$ 254,000 for a married couple) and monthly  income
not exceeding HK$ 5,910 (HK$ 9,740  for a married couple).  There are no asset  and  income tests for those
aged 70 or above.  In 1997, HKS 7.74 equaled US$ 1.00.
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1.  Background
Hong Kong became a  Special Administrative Region  (SAR)  of the People's  Republic  of
China on July 1, 1997, after a century and a half of British administration.  Under the 1984
Sino-British Joint Declaration, the government in Beijing has agreed to maintain a principle
of "one  country, two systems" in the Hong Kong  SAR.  To this  end, China's  leaders are
committed to providing Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy (except in foreign and
defense affairs) for at least 50 years after 1997, during which period China's  socialist policies
will not be implemented.
Hong Kong has  a bustling  free market  economy  with  few tariffs.  Natural resources  are
limited, and  food and  raw materials must  be  imported.  Over the past  two  decades, the
economy has more than tripled in size.  The country's  GDP has been growing at an average
annual rate of about 7% in real terms, twice as fast as the world's  economy and faster than
the OECD economies.  In 1997 per capita GDP reached US$ 26,400, surpassing some OECD
economies including the United Kingdom,  Australia  and  Canada and,  in Asia,  remaining
second only to Japan and Singapore.  Hong Kong residents benefited from this remarkable
economic performance and enjoyed an unprecedented rise in living standards and income in
both nominal and real terms.
During the last several decades, Hong Kong's  fertility experienced a dramatic decline.  The
total fertility rate (TFR) decreased by almost 70%, from 3.50 in  1970 to 1.15 in 1996, which
is lower than rates in Japan and the Netherlands.  The rapid decline owes to prevailing norms
in favor of better education, higher female labor force participation and late marriage with
few or no children.  The net effect of these developments has been the shift of childbearing
among women to a narrower age band later in life.  While demographers anticipate that the
TFR might increase slightly (to 1.55 in 2016) as a result of the "catching-up"  effect, it will
still be significantly lower than the rate of 2.10 necessary to maintain a stable population.
Hong Kong is enjoying continuous improvements in life expectancy.  The reduction in age-
sex-specific mortality rates will lead to a rise in life expectancy at birth from just  below 70
two decades ago to a projected life expectancy of over 79 for men in 2036, and female life
expectancy at birth is projected to increase from 76 to over 83 during the same period.  Such
high life expectancy rates at birth approximate those  of low mortality economies like Japan,
Switzerland and Sweden.
Low fertility and improved life expectancy are causing the population to age rapidly.  The
proportion  of the  population  aged  65 and  over  rose  from  8% in  1987 to  10%/0  in  1997
(compared to an average of around 4% in other Asian countries) and is expected to exceed
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20% in 2036.  The overall result of these demographic trends is a high elderly dependency
ratio and rising median age. 2
Hong Kong's  labor force in  1997 numbered  3.2 million (out of a total  population  of 6.62
million), of which 61% were male and 39% were female.  This represented 61.8% of the total
population  aged  15 and  over.  Labor force participation  rates are high.  During  the past
decade, there has been a  structural  shift  in  employment patterns  from  the manufacturing
sector to the service sector. 3 Although the principle of laissez-faire has guided Hong Kong's
employment practices for decades, a clear trend towards improved employee protection and
benefits has emerged. 4 Due in part to its extended economic boom, Hong Kong continues to
experience a labor shortage, which has translated into upward pressure on prices and the cost
of living.  Many companies have responded by implementing improvements in real benefits
in  a  bid  to  retain  staff.  This  has  led  to  increased  expectations  of  company-sponsored
employee  benefit  plans,  especially  in  the  case  of  British  and  American  companies,
multinationals and other international finns.
Hong Kong is mainly urban and has a very high population density per  square foot.  The
rural/urban differential in income and social conditions is not  as prominent  an issue as in
some other Asian countries. Although some rural settlements remain, they are few, and high-
rise living is the norm throughout the territory.  Today, public rental housing accommodates
39% of the population (2.5 million people).  Subsidized home ownership schemes, in which
"graduating"  families  can purchase  properties  in  exchange  for  surrendering  rental  flats,
supplement the public housing system.  The joint  efforts of the government and the private
sector have lifted the overall home ownership rate to 52%, compared to 42% ten years ago.
The  government  is  gradually  moving  people  out  of  cottage  areas  and  (urban)  squatter
settlements.  There are now only five cottage areas remaining in Hong Kong, housing some
3,000  people, and the squatter population has been reduced to about 233,300.
Owing  to  the  strong  influence  of  Confucian  philosophy,  sociocultural  norms  obligate
children to care for their parents in old age and society at large to assume some responsibility
for the well being of its senior citizens.  While the family remains the primary provider for
the elderly, the government, under the auspices of the Health and Welfare Bureau and the
Social Welfare Department, strives to offer a wide range of community services to help the
elderly remain at home or stay in the community.  However, the fact remains that the old-age
allowance, which is subject to prescribed income and asset tests, is inadequate for supporting
an independent lifestyle without supplements.
2 The elderly dependency ratio is projected to increase from  141 in 1996 to over 200 in 2036.  Meanwhile. the
median age of the population rose from 29 in 1987 to 35 in 1997 and should reach 45 in 2036.
3Of  those  employed in  1997, 79.1% were engaged  in the  service sectors,  and  about  10.1% worked  in the
manufacturing sector.  Goods and services exports account for about 50% of Hong Kong's GDP.
The 1990-97 period witnessed the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation, the Occupational Retirement
Schemes Ordinance (ORSO). and the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Ordinance (MFPSO).
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The government is aware of the implications for old age income  securitv presented by its
rapidly aging population.  Hong Kong now has the second highest percentage of old people
in Asia, after Japan.  Moreover, evidence of poverty among the aged and weakening family
supports make old  age income security a prominent  social policy  issue.  Even though  the
current old age allowance pays only a nominal benefit of up to one-third of median earnings,
as the numbers of elderly grow, such a conimitment could become a huge burden on society.
Hence, for a number of years, the government has been seeking a sustainable solution to the
country's  need to ensure adequate retirement income  for its  workforce before the old-age
crisis peaks.
II.  Analysis of the Pension System
Fiscal Considerations  and Benefits  Provision
The government  funds its assistance programs  (through  the Social  Welfare Department -
SWD) from general revenue.  In  1997 over 750,000 persons (12% of the total population)
benefited from the various schemes.  Payments for CSSA and the Old Age Allowance under
SSAS increased from US$3 billion in  1992 to over US$10 billion in  1997.  This rapid rise
will continue, since the dependency ratio should roughly triple by 2050.  The government
recognized some time ago that this aging trend would present an unsustainable fiscal burden
in the long-term.  It opted to reform the system by using a multi-pillar approach that will
retain  the  first  pillar  of the  safety net  administered  by  SWD  and  supplement  it with  a
mandatory, privately managed second pillar, the MPF, which is designed to provide ample
room for additional voluntary savings.
The MPF requires both employers and employees to contribute 5% of eamings - for a total of
10% - to provident fund schemes managed by private  sector trustees.  It calls for individual
capitalization  accounts,  providing  a  direct  benefit-contribution  link.  There  will  be  no
guarantees by the government for minimum pension or investment return, thus eliminating
future implicit or explicit costs.  Government projections assume that career accruals of 10%
per  annum will  result  in  a  retirement  pension  of  30%  to  40%  of final  earnings.  If  all
members of the workforce were to be covered by the MPF, the resulting capital accumulation
would eventually imply a reduction in the number of elderly eligible to collect benefits from
either the CSSA  or the Old Age Allowance,  lowering the government's  social assistance
burden over the long term.  Therefore, the addition of the second pillar is the key element to
ensure fiscal sustainability of the overall system.
Since the accumulated balance will be paid upon termination of participation, no replacement
rate is guaranteed.  A key issue is whether the long term rates of return can generate adequate
growth to provide the projected retirement income (i.e., 30% to 40% of final earnings).  Of
course, this does not simply depend on rates of return, but rather on the differential between
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wage  growth  and  investment  return.  Hong  Kong  has  enjoyed  extraordinary  economic
growth.  One study showed that over the last 15 years, even the lowest return generated by a
universe of 327 surveyed funds outperformed salary inflation by 90 b.p., whereas the median
fund outperformed salary inflation by as much as 300 b.p. (Annex 1).  Still, the attainment of
results compatible with wage growth assumes that participants have the requisite knowledge
to  direct  their  contributions  to  appropriate  investment  options  that  pay  adequate  risk
premiums to sustain long-term capital appreciation.
Coverage,  Contribution-Benefit  Link and Redistribution
The MPF will attempt to cover essentially the entire workforce, including the self-employed
(see Annex 2 for key features of the scheme). 5 Full and immediate vesting ensures that job
mobility will not be hampered,  a desirable feature in  a mobile labor market  in which  the
average duration in a job is less than five years.  Furthermore, recognizing that it will create
certain  administrative  and  financial  burdens  for  some  highly  mobile  industries,  the
government will provide relief for construction and catering, the two largest and most mobile
industries, by allowing  employees  to  switch employers  while remaining  within the  same
master trust scheme, thus avoiding termination or transfer charges against their MPF benefits.
The issue of evasion will be addressed through ex-post audits, via cross checking between
business registrations and Internal Revenue records, and random audits.  However, the fact
remains that less than 20% of Hong Kong's  population pay income tax, and in the absence of
a strong collection  enforcement infrastructure, it will be difficult to track  those who  shift
towards informal labor market activities to avoid making contributions.
Under the current public system, the CSSA and Old Age Allowance under SSAS act as safety
nets  to ensure that the entire population  can have access to  some old-age income.  Even
though the means- and asset-tested provisions of the CSSA may achieve some redistribution
of income, the universal Old Age Allowance actually benefits the rich more than the poor
because  of  longevity  differences  between  higher  and  lower  economic  classes.  In  the
privately managed MPF, as far as possible, the defined contribution provisions link benefits
directly to the participants'  work records and contribution effort.  The MPF is therefore not
concerned with distributive effects, which are left entirely in the hands of the public schemes.
Regulation,  Taxation,  Administration  and Investment  Policies
The  MPF  Authority,  a  quasi-governmental  body,  has  been  established  to  monitor  and
regulate the MPF.  Its roles and responsibilities include:
'Members  of ORSO (Occupational Retirement  Schemes Ordinance) schemes may remain exempt from  MPF
participation provided that the ORSO scheme is governed under a registered trust and provides  benefits of at
least equal value to the MPF Minimum Equivalent Benefit.  Current and future employees must be presented
with the option of joining either an MPF or ORSO scheme.
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*  establishing rules governing the operation and regulation of MPF schemes;
*  registering MPF schemes;
*  approving, suspending and removing trustees;
*  ensuring  compliance with  the MPF Ordinance by making  inquiries and  inspections of
retirement schemes;
*  regulating and supervising trustees, including through the examination of employer and
trustee procedures; and
*  prosecuting serious breaches of MPF regulations.
The  Authority  will  administer  the  Compensation  Fund 6 and  advise  the  government  on
retirement and  future policy  matters.  It will also  collect and  maintain retirement  scheme
statistics,  resolve disputes  and  bear responsibility  for educating  the public  on  retirement
savings.  In addition, with the establishment of the industry  schemes for construction  and
catering, the  Authority will  handle  the  tendering  exercise  for  the  selection  of  two  fund
managers (with five-year contracts) on behalf of the respective industries. 7
Hong  Kong  adopted  relatively  modem  provisions  regarding  the  regulation  and  asset
allocation of the MPF schemes.  For supervision, the MPF relies on current authorities (that
reputedly  measure  up  to  international  standards)  to  exercise  their historical  integrity  in
regulating the financial service sectors.  For asset  allocation, the MPF uses a proscriptive
approach with qualitative and quantitative restrictions on permissible investments in order to
attain greater assurance of  investment grade  quality, risk  management  and  diversification
(Annex 3).  Each MPF scheme  must  formulate and  maintain  a "statement  of  policy  and
objectives"  for  each  investment  fund  selection  offered  by  the  scheme.  Although  fund
managers have greater flexibility to cope with dynamic market conditions under the MPF, the
required  concomitant  monitoring  may  prove  to  be  more  onerous  for  the  supervisory
authorities than expected.
Hong Kong is one of the few countries that has adopted the "exempt-exempt-exempt" regime
for taxation of contributions, accumulations and benefits under the MPF Ordinance, with the
exception of employer funded non-mandatory benefits, which are subject to taxation at the
time of payment.  This treatment may appear generous by many country's  standards, but in
the context of  Hong Kong's  liberal tax  system  - there  is no  existing tax  on  investment
income or capital gains and only a small percentage of the population (estimated to be less
than 20%) pays income tax - the "EEE" regime may well be the only logical one.
6 This is a fund established to indemnif  r  n:rticipants  against losses incurred as a result of misfeasance or illegal
conduct by the trustees or any of their legally employed service providers.
It is not clear at this point what  limitations and  liabilities the Authority will assume through this  tendering
process and how it will indemnify itself against any conflict of interest charges.
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Responsibilities pertaining to administration and investment rest with the private sector, with
the  MPF Authority  acting  only  as  a  supervisory  and  monitoring  agency.  The trustees'
responsibilities  include, but  are not  limited to,  ensuring  that employers  make proper  and
timely contributions on behalf of their employees.  In broad terms, the trustee is a fiduciary of
the trust  and bears responsibility  for the compliance  of all service providers  (i.e., scheme
administrators, asset managers and asset custodians) associated with scheme operation.
Trustees may cover reasonable expenses associated with the operation of the schemes (such
as  establishment  costs,  trusteeship,  custody  of  assets,  asset  management,  administration,
professional fees and statutory fees) by way of contribution and asset charges that they must
disclose to members. Alternatively, an employer can elect to meet the MPF expenses outside
of the trust.  On the other hand, there is no discretion over allocation of investment income,
all of which must be passed on directly to the participants.
There are no specific guidelines on permissible minimum and maximum expenses to be paid
from the trust.  Ultimately, the efficacy of a pension scheme depends greatly on the level of
administrative  expenses.  Other  things  being  equal,  high  costs  mean  lower  benefits  in
retirement, and it is the responsibility of the trustee to find the optimal balance between costs
and benefits, thus ensuring the highest net growth for the pension scheme.  Some managerial
and investment arrangements may incur higher costs than others.  It is therefore  critical to
simplify  record  keeping  and  other  administrative  tasks  and  to  monitor  the  overall
competitiveness of fee schedules closely.
While  the main  beneficiaries of the  MPF  system will be  members of the workforce,  the
introduction of a fully funded system will generally have a positive impact on the economy.
Annual MPF contributions should amount to more than HK$ 10 billion in the initial years of
operation.  The amount of  annual contributions  will increase to about 4% to  5% of GDP
when the system matures after 30 years.  Cumulative assets under the MPF could well exceed
60% of GDP eventually.  This significant amount of retirement assets will add impetus to the
further development of the financial markets.  MPF  is a  long-term investment, and  it will
generate demand for quality bonds meeting minimum investment grade ratings as well as
equities and other investment products.
111.  Reform  Issues  and Options
The government's objective is to adopt a multi-pillar system for providing old-age retirement
income.  Understandably, because it is the newer of the two pillars, most of the government's
efforts have been channeled towards establishing the private-sector oriented MPF.  To date
little has been done in terms of redesigning the publicly funded SWD programs in light of the
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second pillar. 8 Hence, in order to achieve a truly integrated multi-pillar pension svstem there
are still several important issues to consider:
*  Providing for the long-term viability of the safety nets.  While it does not constitute an
explicit  promise  to  future  generations  of  elderly,  retaining  the  CSSA  and  Old  Age
Allowance as the first pillar implies a certain level of ideological commitment on the part
of the government to protect the aged.  Despite the fact that these programs still account
for less than 5% of public expenditure, the recent tripling  of costs clearly demonstrates
the  effects  of  the  continuous  aging  trend.  The  government  will  have  to  consider
politically unpleasant policy options to control the increasing expenditures  of the SWD
schemes, including:  (i) reducing the value  of the monthly  allowance  from its current
level  of  one-third  of  median  earnings;  (ii)  raising  the  means-tested  threshold  and
reconsidering the demogrant scheme in order to improve targeting; and (iii) increasing the
age of eligibility to reflect rising life expectancy.  The ultimate sustainability of the entire
system depends on the harmonization of these choices with the operation of the MPF.
*  Integrating public  sector pension  schemes with  the MPF.  Special treatment  of certain
groups of public  sector employees (civil servants, teachers  and judicial  officers) under
schemes  using  final-earnings  related  formulas  may  warrant  reevaluation  with  the
implementation  of the MPF.  If the schemes were  to  be phased  out,  a review  of the
overall compensation package would be necessary.
*  Improving benefits planning.  The prudent use of risk diversification is crucial for helping
the  MPF  achieve maximum  retirement  protection.  However,  there  are two  areas of
concern in risk diversification - investment risks and longevity  risks.  In an attempt to
alleviate the first, i.e., investment risk, inherent to all defined contribution plans, the MPF
Ordinance requires all MPF schemes to offer a capital preservation  fund 9 as a low-risk
investment  option.  But  if  participants  directed MPF holdings  solely to  this  low-risk
investment option instead of diversifying, the probability of translating the accumulation
into an income stream of 30% final earnings would be very low.  As regards the second,
i.e., longevity risk, the current design ignores the issue by paying participants their lump
sum entitlements upon termination or retirement.  It is not clear whether the prevalence of
the lump sum feature is prompted by the lack of an annuity market or is due to the fact
that it is the preferred choice of participants.  Nevertheless, the absence of a life income
A review  of the  provisions of the  CSSA in the  summer  of  1998 resulted in recommendations  focused on
reducing fraud, enhancing employability and tightening eligibility.  There was no review of either eligibility or
benefits under the Old Age Allowance scheme.
Investments have to be in bank deposits and high-quality money market instruments.  This was a compromise
solution to the unions'  request for a minimum guarantee fund that yields a net real return of 4% per annum to
be credited on a year-by-year basis.
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option exposes participants to the risk of outliving their capital accumulations despite full
career contributions.
*  Ensuring  compliance.  A  central  concern  regarding  the  system's  success  involves
evasion, for which there needs to be a more complete approach in terms of monitoring
and administration.  Random audits and levying heavy fines  can only serve as passive
temporary measures.  If indeed the government  is serious about achieving near 100%
coverage of the workforce, it is imperative that it devise a more elaborate scheme for
tracking  compliance.  Otherwise, a high  proportion of the workforce will still end  up
retiring  poor  and  in  need  of  social  assistance  in  the  future,  thus  undermining  the
credibility of the reform efforts.
*  Protecting the MPF from political pressures.  It is important to keep in mind that the MPF
system will not mature for another 30 years, when the first participant retires with full
accumulation over his/her entire working life.  Member balances need to be guaranteed
protection.  Since the MPF is destined to be a fully funded, privately managed scheme,
theoretically it is barred  from public  use except  when  the fund  chooses to  invest in
government  backed  securities.  So  the  risk  of  it  being  diverted  for  use  in  other
public/social  projects  is,  in  principle,  absent.  Yet  the  experience  of  neighboring
countries, such as Indonesia, has shown that government can pressure fund managers to
invest according to policy goals other than maximizing investment return.
*  Building ownership.  Despite the  lengthy  debate  and wide  consultations  prior  to  the
enactment of the MPF Ordinance, it was passed by a narrow differential of four votes.
Therefore, it may not reflect the preferences of a number of stakeholders and may in fact
not have the  full support of the population  at  large.  It  will be  critical for the  MPF
Authority to complete the marketing process in order to promote buy-in.  A prerequisite
for success is that politicians, professionals and ordinary citizens all embrace the ideology
of an integrated system providing both income-redistribution and savings.
Most employers and  service providers  have begun to  facilitate the establishment of  MPF
schemes.  The government needs to  ensure that there  is ample time  for all stakeholders to
become comfortably acquainted with the new vision of a multi-pillar system.  It is therefore
critical that the Authority launch a series of educational and publicity campaigns to promote
public  awareness  and  acceptance  of  the  MPF  system.  In  particular,  the  successful
implementation of the MPF depends on active participation and  informed decision-making
on  the  part  of  members  of  the  workforce,  which  in  turn  is  contingent  upon  their
understanding of how the new retirement  savings alternatives  and investment options can
work for them.  Ultimately, the only way the government  can reduce its social assistance
burden is by achieving target retirement benefits through superior investment returns.  To this
end, the adequacy of capital accumulation under the MPF has to be assessed in the light of
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entitlements under the SWD programs, so that different sources of retirement protection can
be integrated into a coherent whole.
Hong  Kong is  the first  among East Asian  countries  to  introduce  a  mandatory,  privately
managed  second pillar  pension  system.  As  other  countries in  the East Asia  and  Pacific
Region begin to embark on their own pension  reform process, they will certainly  look to
Hong Kong's  experience for lessons learned.  What happens  in Hong Kong over the next
several years in the area of old age income  security reform will inevitably have enormous
impact on how other Asian countries choose to approach their  own reform mandates.  It is
imperative that the Bank monitor the developments in Hong Kong closely so that it can draw
lessons from this "sentinel" reform process.
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Annex 1. Salary, Inflation and Investment Returns
Cumulative  Annualized  Returns (% p.a.)
83/97  88/97  89/97  90/97  91/97  92/97  93/97  94/97  95/97  96/97 11997
Highest  16.0  13.8  14.5  14.4  16.7  17.1  18.9  10.1  15.1  18.7  16.9
Median  14.6  10.2  9.9  8.8  10.7  9.9  10.6  1.7  7.8  3.9  -7.3
Lowest  12.7  7.2  6.7  4.3  5.1  4.4  4.2  -9.5  -8.2  -15.3  -37.8
Hang  8.5  9.3  9.4  9.2  8.9  8.5  8.3  8.0  7.3  6.2  5.8
Seng  CPI
Salary  11.6  11.8  11.8  11.4  11.0  10.6  10.1  9.5  9.1  8.4  7.6
Inflation  I
Source: Annual Report 1997, Measurement  of Investment  Performance  Survey for Hong Kong Retirement
Schemes  (Watson  Wyatt  Worldwide).
Annex 2.  Summary of Main Features of the MPF
The government  enacted  the Mandatory  Provident  Fund Schemes  Ordinance  (MPFSO)  in July 1995.
It established  an employment-related,  privately  managed,  provident  fund system that covers the entire
workforce,  and its key features  are as follows:
*  Coverage:  All  employees  and  self-employed  persons  between  the  age  of  18 and  65  must
participate  unless  specifically  exempt under the MPFSO  or employed  for less than 60 days.
i  Contributions:  Both the employer and employee  contribute  5% of the employee's monthly  cash
income. An employee  earning  less than the minimum  level of income  (HK$ 4,000 per month)  is
not required to  contribute but may elect to  do so.  However, regardless of the employee's
decision,  the employer  must contribute  5% of the employee's income. Contributions  in excess of
the maximum  level of income  (HK$ 20,000  per month)  are voluntary.
*  Vesting: All contributions  to the MPF must be fully and immediately  vested with the employee's
account.
*  Preservation  of Benefits: All benefits derived from MPF contributions  must be preserved  until
the employee  attains the retirement  age of 65 or ceases  employment  and attains the age of 60.
*  Portability  of Benefits: All benefits are portable from one MPF scheme  to another on change or
termination  of employment. However, an employee  can opt to leave the accrued benefits with
the trustee of the previous master  trust scheme.
*  Security of Assets: All contributions  to the MPF are secured  through strict investment  and trust
controls  and are subject to the provision  of a compensation  fund in case of losses due to fraud or
misfeasance.
*  Administration: The  MPF schemes  are administered  by private sector firms.
*  Exemption: Employees covered by statutory pension schemes, such as civil servants,  judicial
officers, and teachers in subsidized  or grant schools,  are exempt from the MPFSO. Employees
who are covered by registered schemes  under the Occupational  Retirement Schemes  Ordinance
(ORSO)  are offered  the option  of  joining a MPF scheme  or remaining  in the ORSO.
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Annex 3.  Guidelines for Asset Investment under an MPF Scheme
Only  investment  professionals  registered  with  the  Securities  and  Futures  Commission  may  manage  an
investment portfolio of a MPF scheme.  Portfolios may not:  (i) hold more than 10% of any class of security of
a single issuer; (ii) have more than  10% of assets in the securities of a single issuer; (iii) make short sales; (iv)
borrow for investment purposes; and (v) have more than 70% of scheme assets with foreign currency exposure.
The acceptability and limits of the various asset classes are as follows:
Bonds
*  Subject  to acceptable  credit  ratings.
*  May have  up to 30%  of assets  placed  with  any single  Government  issue.
*  May have up to 100%  of assets  in Government  bond issues  (spread  over at least 6 separate  issues).
Equities
*  Must be fully paid-up shares, listed on MPFA approved stock exchanges.
*  10% of scheme assets may be equities listed on non-MPFA approved stock exchanges.
Convertibles
*  Subject to bonds and equity guidelines as applicable.
Warrants
*  May have up to 5% of assets in warrants.
Unit Trusts
*  Subject to the MPF investment, trust and custody regulations in its own right.
*  Unit trust must be SFC and MPFA approved.
*  No limit on asset exposure to a unit trust by an MPF scheme.
Money Market/Cash Management Funds
*  Permissible subject to SFC approval.
Bank Deposits
*  Must be authorized institutions under the Banking Ordinance.
*  Limits of  10% of scheme assets with any single banking  institution and 25% with any group  of banking
institutions.  The limit of 10% is extended to 25% for schemes with less than HK$8 million in assets.
*  Amount of an MPF scheme holding must not exceed 5% of a banking institution's  capital base.
Restricted Investments
*  Applies to derivatives, securities lending and repurchase agreements.
*  Under limited circumstances and strict guidelines.
Disallowed Investments
*  Geared investment vehicles.
*  Commodities or commodity based investments.
*  Direct investment in property.
*  Loans, mortgages and debts.
*  Jewelry, works of art and collectibles.
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Indonesia*
Overview  of Formal  Old-Age  Support
Indonesia's  main  source of formal retirement income support  is a provident  fund, Jaminan  Sosial
Tenaga Kerja (JAMSOSTEK), which in 1992 replaced a fund known as ASTEK that had operated
since  1977.  Participation  is  compulsory  for  private  sector  workers  in  firms  with  at  least  ten
employees or with a monthly payroll of Rp$  I million.'  The fund provides  employment  accident,
death and  health  insurance in addition to  lump-sum retirement  benefits  at  age 55.  Private sector
employees also may benefit to a limited extent from voluntary employer-sponsored pensions.
Employers and/or employees fund JAMSOSTEK's  various components from contributions.  The rate
of contribution  to the  provident fund  is 5.7%  of salary, with  the  employer  paying  3.7%  and the
employee 2%.  Employers are entirely responsible for contributing to the employment  accident (0.24
- 1.74% of salary depending on the level of risk) and death benefit (0.3% of salary) schemes.
In the public sector, there are two special social insurance-style schemes, one for civil servants (under
Tabungan dan Asuransi Pegawai Negeri, TASPEN, or The Government Civilian Employees'  Saving
and Insurance Scheme) and the other for military personnel (Asuransi Social ABRI, ASABRI, or the
Anned Forces Social Insurance Plan).  These schemes are far more comprehensive and generous than
those under JAMSOSTEK.
TASPEN was established  in  1963 to  provide  lump-sum benefits  at retirement  (56 years)  or upon
death during employment.  It began to offer life insurance in  1981 through the Jaminan  Hari  Tua
(JHT) scheme.  Members contribute 3.25% of their monthly salary and in return receive a lump sum
roughly equivalent to nineteen times the final monthly salary in the event of retirement or death.  The
pension  scheme under TASPEN  started in  1969.  The government  initially provided  sole funding
from general revenues, but civil servants  have been required to contribute 4.75% of their monthly
earnings since 1994.  Employees are eligible for pensions at age 50 and after 20 years of government
service.  The plan  is  not portable  and  the  worker  loses all  entitlements  in  the  event  of leaving
government service.  The monthly pension equals 1.875% of the final annual salary times the number
of years of service - producing a replacement  rate of around 75% of final monthly salary after 20
years.  The pension and lump sum benefits under TASPEN provide benefits equal to about 100% of
final salary after 35 years of service.
ASABRI, founded in 1971, covers military personnel, civilian employees of the Ministry of Defense,
and  the  police  force.  While  the  pension  scheme's  rate of  contribution  is  similar  to  TASPEN's,
retirement age for military personnel is lower (50 years) and benefits depend on rank.  Generally, the
monthly pension is 2.5% of the last basic monthly salary multiplied by years of service.
Mukul G. Asher, National University of Singapore (mppasher@nus.edu.sg) prepared this profile, and Ian W.
Mac Arthur, The World Bank (imacarthur@worldbank.org) revised it.
US$ I equaled Rp$ 2,909 in 1997, while in 1998, it hovered around Rp$ 10,000.
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1.  Background
Indonesia,  with a population of 197 million and a per capita income of US$ 1,080 (US$
3,310 in ppp terms),  was among  the most rapidly  growing  developing  economies  in the world
until the recent East Asian economic  crisis. From 1990  through 1996,  average annual GNP
growth per capita was 5.9% (World Bank, 1998).
The country's population  is growing at slower rates and aging.  Annual average  population
growth is projected  to be 1.5% for the 1990-2000  period, 1% for the 2000-2030  period, and
only 0.5% for the 2030-2050  period.  The total fertility rate is expected to decline from an
average  of  2.93  during  the  1990-95 period  to  2.16  during  the  2025-30  period.
Correspondingly,  the proportion  of the population  above age 60 years  is predicted  to increase
from 6.4% in 1990 to 14.1% in 2030. This will equate to a rise in the elderly dependency
ratio from 11.3  in 1990  to 19.3  by the year  2025.
Even as Indonesia becomes more industrialized  and urbanized, 2 most  of its  growing work
force, whose average annual growth rate should remain almost one percentage point above
that of the general population for several decades, continues to be employed  in agriculture
and the urban informal sector.  This implies that the vast majority of Indonesians are likely to
continue to rely on family and community support for old age security.  Nevertheless,  the
role of formal social security institutions  will grow over time in terms of the provision  of
adequate and sustainable retirement protection to those in the formal sector, the mobilization
of long-term savings and the development of financial and capital markets.
The East Asian crisis hit Indonesia especially hard.  Its pre-crisis GDP of US$  213 billion
dropped to US$ 92 billion in 1998, leaving a 1998 per capita income of merely US$ 449 (SG
Securities, March  22,  1999).  This  was due to  a combination of the decline in  real GDP,
which fell by  14.5% in 1998, and a sharp depreciation in the value of its currency.  Also,
Indonesia's  stock market  capitalization declined from  US$ 91 billion  in  1996 to  US$  15
billion  by  end-1998.  Much  of  the  corporate  sector  suffered,  and  many  bank-s became
effectively  illiquid or  insolvent.  Indonesia has  been slow to  recover  from  the  crisis  in
comparison to its neighbors (World Bank, 2000).
In  addition  to  the  legacy  of  the  economic  crisis,  Indonesia  currently  faces  a  political
transition from authoritarian rule to a more polycentric polity, which is proving difficult since
development  of  the  institutions  of  governance,  both  political  and  corporate.  received
inadequate  attention  during  the  decades  of  rapid  economic  growth.  Given  the  time
consu--aing  nature of institution building, rapid resumption of high and sustained economic
growth is unlikely.
2  In 1997 the share of industry in GDP was 42%, and in 1995 34% of the population lived in urban areas.
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11.  Analysis  of the Pension  System
Benefits  Provision
The actual benefits provided under JAMSOSTEK  are entirely inadequate,  as an average
retiree under  the  plan  will receive only  10% salary  replacement after  35  years of
contributions  (based  on current  contribution  and past investment  performance)  (World  Bank,
1996).  The low benefits are a function not only of low contribution  rates but also high
administration  costs and poor returns on investment.' In fact, it would appear  that members
would do better by simply depositing  their entire contributions  in a normal savings account
with a bank.
In  terms of expenditure, JAMSOSTEK paid out Rp$ 6.38 billion in  benefits in  1995,
compared  to Rp$ 2.2 billion in 1991. Close to 90% of the total covered provident  fund and
death benefits - the remainder  went towards employment  accidents. At end-1996  provident
fund balances  per member  were Rp$ 353,738  (US$ 41) while the total assets were only Rp$
4,361 billion (US$ 501  million).
In contrast to JAMSOSTEK,  the contribution-benefit  link of TASPEN's pension scheme is
very weak, and benefits are extraordinarily  generous, especially compared to the modest
contributions  received from members. The total amount  of pension  paid out increased  from
Rp$ 1.99 trillion in 1989 to Rp$ 3.37 trillion in 1995, equating  to a rise in average  pension
from Rp$ 106,116  to Rp$ 183,036  per month (TASPEN,  1995). The scheme's contributions
and other income cover only 22.5% of the costs of benefits, leaving the government to
finance  the remaining  77.5% from its general revenues. In 1994  the pension  plan had assets
worth Rp$ 6.3 trillion and accrued liabilities amounting  to Rp$ 21.4 trillion, leaving the
government  with huge unfunded  liabilities  (World  Bank, 1996). The government's  payment
towards civil servants' pensions amounted to 22% of its total wage bill in  1995; this is
projected  to increase  to 66% by the year 2020. This is unsustainable  from the fiscal as well
as social and economic  perspective. Resolving  the problem of the contingent  liabilities  has
become even more urgent in view of the reduced revenue base and increased expenditure
obligations  of the government  arising from the economic  crisis (Asher  and Heij, 1999;  World
Bank, 2000).
The Indonesian  government  justifies generous  benefits for state employees on the grounds
that their wages are considerably  lower than their counterparts  in the private sector. There is
some merit to this argument, as public sector Grade 2 salary is 2.7 times less than the
equivalent-level  private sector salary; the differential is almost fives times at  Grade 4
(Wirutomo,  1991).
3JAMSOSTEK's  contribution rates are  low most  probably  because of  the  political opposition  they  would
otherwise raise from employers.
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While TASPEN's  JHT scheme (life insurance, lump sum benefits) is supposed to be self-
funding, the  contributions  are  insufficient to  meet  the  commitments  because  of  the  low
contribution  rate,  low  returns  on  investment  and  high  administrative  costs.  In  1995,
TASPEN  paid  out  lump  sum  benefits  totaling  Rp$  393  billion  to  100,837  members,
compared to payouts of Rp$ 80.5 billion to 70,800 members in 1989. The average size of the
payment was Rp$ 3.9 million in  1995, which was three times  larger than the  amount six
years  earlier (TASPEN,  1995).  The share of total benefits as a  portion of total  revenues
increased from 78.9% in  1991 to 92.5% in 1995.  The increase in size of benefits payment
partially reflects a rise in members' wages.
ASABRI paid average benefits of Rp$ 2.1 million in 1994, a substantial increase from Rp$
1.34 million five years earlier.  There  is a  high degree of confidentiality  surrounding the
scheme, and as a result, little data is available.
Coverage
The  number  of  employers  participating  in  the  JAMSOSTEK  program  almost  doubled
between 1991 and 1995, rising from 33,500 to 60,600.  Still, in 1995, only 9 million workers
(10.6% percent of the labor force) belonged to the scheme, compared to 4.7 million (6.0%) in
1991 (Purwoko, 1994; TASPEN, 1995).  This equates to only one-quarter of all paid workers
in the country.  Moreover, of those covered, only 25% are in compliance with  contribution
requirements.  The size of the formal sector is growing faster than JAMSOSTEK's  coverage
- the number of paid workers not covered by the scheme increased from 16.4 million in 1981
to 22.5 million in 1994.  However, inflation and growth in firm size should expand coverage
in the future without any change in participation requirements  (i.e., relating to number  of
employees and amount of payroll).  Government efforts so far appear to have concentrated on
extending  coverage  to  casual  workers  by  encouraging  employer  participation  in  the
employment accident and death benefits schemes but not the provident fund or health care
components.  Seasonal and unskilled  workers are particularly  vulnerable  to  non-coverage
because they tend to return to their villages after working in urban areas, which makes the
task of record keeping very difficult.
Realizing  that  the  JAMSOSTEK's  provident  fund  is  insufficient,  the  government  has
encouraged  private  firms  to  voluntarily  establish  provident  fund-type  plans  for  their
employees for several decades now.  The number of firms that had plans increased from 4 in
1974 to 160 (out of the total of 165,000 employers in the formal sector) in  1994.  Such plans
cover only about 10% of formal sector workers despite the availability  of concessional tax
treatment for employer contribution since 1992 (World Bank,  1996). Most of these firms are
large state owned enterprises, which is not surprising because small and medium-sized firms
find it cumbersome and costly to comply with the requirements.  While many of the large
companies, including state-owned firms, have been moving towards funding pension plans in
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an  actuarially sound manner  (at least until  the economic crisis  broke),  many other firms
whose plans are not approved by the regulators have unfunded pension liabilities.
Meanwhile, civil servants and military personnel account for a large portion of the population
covered  by  social  security  programs  in  Indonesia,  consuming  much  of  the  total  public
spending on the item (Vittas and Skully,  1991).  TASPEN had 4 million members in  1996,
which represented a small increase from 3.74 million in 1989, and the number of pensioners
grew from  1.14 million to 1.54 million during the same period.  In early 1996 membership
for ASABRI stood at 0.5 million.
Investment  Policies  and  Performance,  Administration, Regulation and
Taxation
Total assets of all pension plans at end-1994 were Rp$ 21.1 trillion (5.6% of GDP and US$
9.6 billion). 4 The voluntary employer-sponsored pension plans had the largest share of the
total  assets (45%),  followed by the  civil  servants'  pension  program  administered by  PT
TASPEN (39%), the JAMSOSTEK program (12%) and ASABRI and others (4%).
The aggregate asset allocation at end-1994 of all pension funds was as follows:  stocks, 8%;
bonds,  11%; bank  deposits, 41%;  short-term government paper, 30%; and, properties  and
others,  10%.  There was little variation in  asset allocation among different pension funds.
The Social Security Law  (Republic of Indonesia Act No. 3  1992) excludes investment in
foreign assets, and as a result, country risk diversification is absent.  Much of the investment
is also short term, while pension liabilities are long term, which creates a mismatch between
assets and liabilities.  This is also evident  from the distribution  of JAMSOSTEK's  assets,
which are dominated by deposits (Annex 1).
While no detailed data on the rates of return are available, Leechor (1996) estimated that
during  the  1988-1995 period,  the  real  rate  of return  on  employer-sponsored  plans  was
between 6% and 8%, a fairly attractive rate.  Many of these plans are managed in-house, and
only a small proportion of assets have been entrusted to professional investment companies
(Koo, 1997). According to a 1996 survey of 450 Indonesian pension funds, 54% of the assets
were in time deposits, while only 10% each were in local equities and bonds, with the rest in
property  and  other  assets.  Tam  (1997)  reported  that  this  situation  might  change  as
investment patterns of pension funds shift in favor of equities.
In contrast to the employer-sponsored plans, in  1994, real investment return by PT ASTEK
and PT TASPEN was zero and 1.3% percent, respectively.  This compares quite unfavorably
with the real rate of return on time deposits of 9.4% during the 1988-1995 period.
4 Unless otherwise noted, the infornation  on investments is from Leechor. 1996.
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Both PT TASPEN and PT ASTEK incur extremely high administrative costs.  This is in spite
of  the  fact that  the  housekeeping  function  (i.e.,  maintaining  records,  processing  claims,
collecting contributions, levying penalties on defaulters, disbursing benefits  and providing
user friendly informnation  and service) performed by these two organizations is of fairly low
quality.  In 1994 administrative costs as a percentage of contributions amounted to 7.0% for
PT TASPEN and  11.7% for PT ASTEK.  In  comparison, for Malaysia the corresponding
figure for 1997 was 1.6%.
The JAMSOSTEK provident fund for private  sector employees is effectively unregulated. 5
Regulation of other funds does not  appear to  be systemized or rigorous.  Even before the
extent  of  the  deep  economic  crisis  became  evident,  according  to  press  reports,  the
government asked some of the pension  funds to  shift their assets to the country's  Central
Bank. 6 It  is also  probable that the  Indonesian  Bank  Restructuring  Agency  has  used the
pension funds to finance part of the take over of most of the 215 banks currently operating in
Indonesia.  The govermnent likely used JAMSOSTEK funds to support the exchange value
of the Rupiah (JAMSOSTEK  Factbook,  1996) and  for certain political  purposes,  such as
passing  bills  in the  Parliament  (Business  Times,  Singapore, December  4,  1997).  Thus,
JAMSOSTEK does not enjoy functional autonomy.
In terms of taxation, the regime is partial EET, i.e., exempt (contributions), partially exempt
(investment earnings) and partially taxed  (benefits).  For the employer-sponsored  pension
plans, income is not subject to taxation if it is in the form of:  (i) interest and discounts from
deposits,  certificates of time deposits  and  savings from banks located in  Indonesia (or the
Bank of Indonesia), (ii) interest from  bonds traded on the Indonesian stock exchange,  and
(iii) dividends from  stocks of  companies  listed on the Indonesian stock  exchange.  Under
these circumstances, pension fund resources arising from some securities, property and direct
investment represent taxable income.  The lump sum benefit is taxable on a graduated basis
above  a  certain  threshold.  Furthermore,  JAMSOSTEK  is  a  limited  liability  company,
meaning  that it must  operate on  a  commercial basis.  Therefore,  it is  subject to  income
taxation, which is quite unusual for a social security organization (Purwoko. 1996).
III.  Reform  Issues  and Options
The main problems  in the  formal  social  security  system in  Indonesia.  which  have  been
accentuated by the recent economic crisis, include the following:
Ostensibly, the fund is under the purview of the Manpower Ministry.
6 About 40% of the assets under management are not posted to individual accounts (World Bank, 1996), which
is vital for a scheme based on individual savings.
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*  Limited coverage.  At most, about 10% of the population, or around one-fifth of the labor
force, are covered by the formal social security arrangements.  Most of the participants
are civil servants, armed forces personnel, and employees of large corporations.
*  Large contingent liabilities in the public sector schemes.  The civil servants and  armed
forces personnel receive very high replacement rates not covered by the contributions or
the investment income.  The government pays for the unfunded portion from its current
revenue.  Moreover, some of the pension benefits, such as the health benefits, are in the
form of services to be provided rather than monetary amounts.  This makes the situation
even more precarious  since health  care costs usually  rise at a  faster rate than overall
inflation.  Moreover, the high import  dependence of Indonesia's  health care system  is
likely to significantly increase the budgetary burden of fulfilling health care obligations
due  to  sharp  depreciation  of  the  currency.  At  the  same  time,  the  economic  crisis
significantly eroded the revenue base  of the government.  As a result, the urgency for
tackling this issue has become much greater.
*  Private-public sector inequity.  JAMSOSTEK's  retirement provision is a provident fund,
in  which  benefits  are directly  linked  to  contributions.  In  contrast, the  public  sector
pension  schemes  use  benefits formulas  related  to  final  earnings.  This  can result  in
strategic  manipulation  of  the  system  to  secure high  final  salary  (and,  thus,  higher
benefits)  and  even  regressive  redistribution.  Moreover,  the  defined-benefit  public
pension  plans  are non-vested and  non-portable,  which  adversely affects  labor market
efficiency.  Improving the benefit-contribution  link at the  very least  through  a  move
toward  fuller  funding  of  the  system  and  the  creation  of  transfer  mechanisms  of
accumulated pension rights would help reduce these distortions.
High administrative costs.  The costs  of administering social security in  Indonesia are
generally out  of line with  the quality of services provided and in comparison to social
;  security  organizations  in  neighboring  countries.  Inefficiencies  in  the  housekeeping
_  function also dilute the advantages expected from the defined contribution, fully funded
JAMSOSTEK system.
. Inefficient investment policies and performance.  Indonesia has granted monopoly to PT
JAMSOSTEK  for  investment  of  publicly  mandated  private  sector  pension  funds.
Furthermore, most voluntary plans are managed in-house.  As a result, a competitive fund
management industry has yet to develop.  Indonesia's  balanced budget law (under which
the  receipts  including  foreign  project  and  program  aid  must  equal  total  budgetary
expenditure) has meant that a government debt market has not evolved in any significant
manner.  The lack of suitable investment instruments and geographical diversification due
to  statutory restrictions has contributed to the poor  investment performance.  Another
factor has been the lack of professional expertise available to the pension fund authorities.
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Both the private and public sector social security arrangements need to undergo significant
reform to  address these  limitations.  Improvement  in  the efficiency  of  the housekeeping
function would offer a relatively quick and achievable first step.  The government may also
consider providing appropriate long term investment instruments for the pension funds and
permitting  diversification  among  assets  and  across  countries,  albeit  under  enhanced
regulation and supervision.  At this stage of Indonesia's  development, any effort to permit
individual  choice  over  investment  portfolios  must  be  considered  very  carefully.  In
conclusion, there are some reform options currently within the existing capacity of the social
security institutions, but it would be unrealistic to expect rapid progress, given the scope and
the magnitude of the problems facing policy makers during the economic and political crisis.
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(Billions of Rupiah)
Total Funds  Deposits  Equity  Bonds  CBIa  Stocks  Property
Year  Participation
Amount  Share  Amounit  Share  Amount  Share  Amount  Share  Amount  Share  Amount  Share  Amount  Share
1991  1,074  100.0  204  19.0  38  3.5  123  11.5  421  39.2  203  18.9  24  2.2
1992  1,408  100.0  410  29.1  26  1.8  194  13.8  490  34.8  257  18.3  30  2.1
1993  1,842  100.0  783  42.5  61  3.3  302  16.4  472  25.6  191  10.4  32  1.7
1994  2,481  100.0  1,466  59.1  61  2.5  259  10.4  521  21.0  141  5.7  33  1.3
1995  3,218  100.0  2,003  62.2  84  2.6  365  11.3  630  19.6  198  6.2  22  0.7
1996  4,361  100.0  2,912  66.8  83  1.9  388  8.9  637  14.6  297  6.8  43  1.0
D  CBI: Certificates of Bank Indonesia, which is the Central Bank.
So.5-rce: Calculated from Indonesia, JAMSOSTEK, 1996 Factbook, Table 15, p. 35.
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Republic  of Korea  (South  Korea)*
Overview of Formal Old-Age Support
Korea implemented a social insurance system - the National Pension  Scheme (NPS) - with old-age
benefits  in  1988.  It  is  a  publicly  managed,  defined  benefit  scheme  available  to  all  citizens.
Participation is mandatory for employees of firms with 5 or more workers,  farmers,  fishermen  and
rural self-employed aged 18-59.  In April  1999 the government required  employees of small firms
(less than 5 workers) and the self-employed in urban areas to join the scheme.
Unreduced old-age pension benefits are available at age 60 to those with 20 or more years of service.
Several other categories of workers, including those aged 45-59 when the scheme began and insured
for  5 years after that time, qualify for reduced pensions.  Currently the system is paying primarily
death  and  disability  pensions  and  some  reduced  old-age  pensions.  It  will  only  provide  regular
pensions when the first cohort of individuals becomes eligible  in 2008 after having fulfilled the 20
year service requirement.  I
The retirement benefit is price-indexed and derived  from two components - the average economy-
wide  wage and  the  workers'  own  indexed  earnings - to whose  sum  an  accrual  rate  of  1.5%  is
applied.'  The target replacement rate is 60% after 40 years of service.
Contributions from the insured (4.5% of earnings) and employers (4.5% of payroll) finance the NPS.
Farmers, fishermen,  self-employed  and employees  of small firms pay at a rate  of 3% of earnings,
which  will rise gradually to  9% by 2005.  Since benefit payouts  are currently small  in relation  to
incoming contributions, the system has built up a substantial reserve fund (around 10% of GDP).
In addition to the NPS, the Labor Laws require employers to pay  lump-sum retirement allowances
equivalent to 30 days (8.33%) of the average wage per working year to employees with at least one
year  of service.  Other  formal  sources  of old-age  income support  include tax-favored  individual
savings, employer-sponsored retirement plans and safety nets for the poor elderly.  In 1997, the latter
provided means-tested  cash and  in-kind  assistance  with  an  average monthly  cash  value  of about
120,000 won  (US$  126)2 but, because of considerable stigma, reached only 265,000 persons  (less
than  10% of those over 65).
Three  special occupational  schemes,  which  are more  mature  than  the NPS,  cover  civil  servants,
military personnel and private school teachers (since 1960, 1963 and 1975, respectively).  They have
relatively higher benefits and contribution  rates.  Partly because of this, there  is no mechanism for
transferring accumulated pension rights among the schemes and the NPS, which limits labor mobility.
Yvonne Sin, The World Bank, HDNSP (ysin@worldbank.org)  and  Ian W. Mac Arthur,  The World Bank
(imacarthurgworldbank.org)  prepared this profile.
For service prior to 1999,  the accrual rate was 1.75%, applied to 100% of the average economy-wide wage but
only 75% of workers' own indexed earnings.
- In 1997, 951 won equaled US$ 1.00.
I of 12Pension  Systems  in East  Asia  and the Pacif  ic
1.  Background
Korea has experienced high economic growth over the past four decades and novA  possesses
the world's  1  Ith  largest economy, accounting for 7% of East Asia's GDP.  Between 1965 and
1995, real per capita income grew at an average rate of 7.5%, one of the highest rates in East
Asia. 3 This  success was due  in part to  the  unique combination  of  a  strong  government
steering role and an entrepreneurial approach.  For example, the government sponsored large-
scale adoption of technology and management expertise from Japan and other industrialized
nations.  It also acceleTated  the development of export industries and encouraged the import
of machinery and raw materials over consumer goods.  In the late 1980s Korea used public
works programs to transfer income and improve infrastructure.  Under these conditions the
economy shifted rapidly from an agricultural to an industrial base. 4
With  steady  economic  growth,  the  overall  standard  of  living  in  Korea  has  improved,
evidenced by good performance on social indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality
and secondary school enrolment.  The poverty rate among urban households fell from 20.4%
in 1975 to 7.4% in 1995.  However, industrialization and urbanization have changed income
distribution  and  family-care patterns,  creating  vulnerable groups  in  the  process.  By the
eighties new policy efforts focussed on improving equity, promoting more balanced growth
(among industrial sectors and between rural and urban areas), and dealing with social welfare
issues, including care for the needy.
Korea's  population is aging rapidly due to declining fertility and increasing life expectancy.
The total fertility rate fell from 4.27 in 1970 to  1.75 in  1995, a decline of nearly 60%.  The
wider use of contraception - currently at 80.5% compared to 44.2% two decades ago - and
higher female educational attainment and  labor force participation explain this  rapid drop.
Male life expectancy at birth was over 70 years in 1995, up from 59 in 1970, and female life
expectancy rose from 64 to 76.4 during the same period.  As a result of these trends, the
proportion of the population aged 65 and over currently stands at 5.6% (slightly higher than
regional  average, around 4%) and is expected to reach 23% in 2040.  The average  age is
expected to rise from 31.9 years in  1997 to 43 in 2040, while the elderly dependency ratio
will increase from 7.9 in 1995 to over 38.6 in 2040.
Korea's  labor force has become highly skilled and educated as the economy has shifted from
agriculture to industry and services.  Of the total labor force, about 87.4% (of whom about
60% were male and 40% female) were from non-farming households in 1996.5 Over 73% of
the adult workforce, approximately 20 million people, were graduates of middle school, and
3GDP  per capita (in ppp terms) equals about US$10,550, which is among the highest in Asia - lower only than
Hong  Kong and Singapore and comparable with the smaller economies of the European Union.
4The  share of agriculture in GDP declined from around 24% in the mid-seventies to less than 6% in 1997.
'The  labor force in 1996 numbered around 21.1 million, 62% of the total population aged 15 and over.
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nearly 58% were high  school graduates.  Until the recent economic downturn overall
unemployment  had been very low, averaging around 2.3% throughout the early to mid-
nineties. As demand  for skilled  workers grew, the resulting  labor shortage,  coupled  with the
prevailing  low unemployment  at the time, led to large wage increases  - wages  in Korea  have
been  rising faster  than in other rapidly industrializing  countries. As a result, many low-wage
operations  shifted  to China and Southeast  Asia, while Korean  manufacturers  now concentrate
on higher value-added,  medium  to high technology  commodities,  products  and services.
Along with industrialization,  Korea has experienced rapid urbanization and some of its
characteristic  drawbacks. Currently,  over 30 million Koreans,  or about three-quarters  of the
total population,  live in the major urban areas,  which occupy  only about 3% of the land. As a
result, urban Korea has serious problems concerning  housing, transportation,  and pollution.
On the other hand, rural Korea - containing only 5% arable land - suffers from a lack of
social services  and public utilities related  to education,  health and sanitation. Data from the
Economic  Planning  Board indicate  that the difference  in income levels between  farming and
non-farming  households widened throughout the  eighties and into the nineties, thereby
contributing  to greater disparities  in living standards  between  rural  and urban  communities.
Despite rapid socioeconomic  change, the influence of Confucian philosophy on Korean
society  still renders its elderly  members  less dependent  on formal  social safety nets. In fact,
recent statistics show that only 3% of the population believe that social welfare should
provide for the elderly and that 62% of elderly parents receive financial support from their
children,  although  this is more prevalent  in rural than urban areas. As such, the government
encourages  family-based  support  through tax privileges,  housing loans and special monthly
allowances  to family  members  who  support  their elderly  parents. 6
Korea's economy  began  to slump in 1996, and the East  Asian crisis  added to its decline. The
economic  downturn and accompanying  corporate  bankruptcies  and credit squeezes caused
lay-offs,  real wage declines,  weak demand  for new labor market entrants  and falling margins
in the informal  sector. GDP shrunk  by 5.8% in 1998, and unemployment  jumped from 2.5%
just before the crisis to 8.7% in February 1999, before dropping back to 4.6% in October,
1999  (World  Bank,  2000). Growth  has impressively  resumed,  and Korea is leading  the other
economies  of the region in the recovery  from the crisis.
The effects  of the crisis on Korea's elderly are still not clear. Nonetheless,  there is evidence
that poverty rates were higher among the old even before it began.  According  to a 1990
study by the Korean Rural Economics  Institute,  the incidence  of poverty among the elderly
was more  than three times greater  than among  those under 30. A disproportionate  number  of
households  headed  by persons (especially  females)  over 60 fall into the low-income  category
in urban areas.  It is probably valid to assume that because of the tradition of filial piety,
6 Based on the Social Statistics Survey, 1997.
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children  still  feel obligated to  support  elderly  parents.  However, the unemployment  and
wage  cuts during the crisis likely  subjected  the relationship between the elderly and  their
extended families to greater stress.
11.  Analysis  of the Pension  System
Benefit  Design  (Contribution-Benefit  Link),  Redistribution  and  Coverage
The four publicly mandated and managed social insurance pension schemes (for the private
sector - NPS, civil servants, private school teachers and the military) all present distortions in
benefit design.  In the case of the NPS, the benefits formula equally weighs an employee's
average monthly wage during the 40-year contribution period (revalued for wage growth) and
the average monthly wage of all insured during the previous year, which disrupts the benefit-
contribution link and creates a redistributive  replacement rate schedule in  which previous
income level relates inversely to the benefit rate.  Although this is a policy mechanism for the
government to create income transfer from lifetime high-income to low-income workers, it
introduces distortions into the labor market,  such  as evasion and worker movement to  the
informal sector.
In contrast to the NPS, the benefit formula of the occupational  schemes (for civil servants,
private school teachers and the military) applies an accrual rate of 2.25% per annum for each
year of service to the final monthly wage, which results in very generous replacement rates
on the order  of 75% of final wage - the  average  target  replacement rate  for the NPS  is
currently  60%' (see Annex  1 for general characteristics of the four contributory  schemes).
This type of arrangement also disrupts the benefit-contribution link, but in  a different way
than the NPS does.  High-income individuals may benefit from the soft contribution-benefit
link  through  their  delayed  entrance  into  the  labor  force  (resulting  in  relatively  less
contribution)  and  steeper age-earnings  profiles  (equating  to  higher pension  entitlements),
which can lead to regressive redistribution.
The overall result is a situation in which distortions exist throughout the retirement income
system  and  different types  of redistribution  regimes  and  benefit  levels apply  to  different
classes of workers (i.e., those under the NPS vs. the public sector schemes).  Moreover, wage
indexing of benefits reinforces the generosity of the occupational schemes, while, irn  contrast,
price-indexation applies to the NPS pension.
7 Together the NPS and mandatory retirement allowance will provide replacement rates of up to 85% of final
salary, which is extremely high by international standards.
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The NPS has provided coverage to firms with five or more employees since 1988.8 In 1995
participation in the NPS became obligatory for the self-employed in rural areas, farmers and
fishermen.  As seen earlier, in April 1999, the government expanded coverage to include the
urban self-employed and small firms.  After the latest round of expansion, the NPS covered
about 47% of the labor force (also see Annex  1 for effective coverage rates), a significant
margin  below  the ambitious  target  of about  68% of  the labor  market,  and  far  short  of
universal coverage.  Approximately 5 million workers will remain outside the system - they
include  part-time  workers, household  servants,  the  unemployed  and  those  self-employed
persons who do not declare income.  Also, the previous policy of allowing workers with less
than a full year of insured status to collect their contributions with interest in a lump sum has
effectively reduced coverage. 9 Finally, due to the lack of portability of pension rights, those
under the three special occupational  schemes (around 1.3 million) will also remain outside
the NPS system, even though they receive richer entitlements from their own plans.
Fiscal  Sustainability
All of the four social insurance pension schemes will eventually operate on a pay-as-you-go
basis  as they mature.  Since the NPS  is  relatively  immature (i.e., it has  a  high  ratio  of
contributors to pensioners), it generates a current surplus (i.e., incoming contributions exceed
outgoing payments) of nearly 2% GDP per annum.'° Reserves equal almost 10% of GDP and
are  growing.  Despite  the  NPS's  seemingly  healthy  position,  the  system  is  fiscally
unsustainable in the medium to long term.  Coverage expansion to small firms and the self-
employed will add to the short run surpluses and delay maturation, but the World Bank's
financial projections indicate that the implicit pension debt was already 30% of GDP in 1995
and  will  increase  to  195%  by  2050."  Reserve  finds  will  be  depleted  by  2050.  The
equilibrium contribution rate (i.e., a rate that makes the present value of the current balance
equal zero) amounts to around 20%, while the contribution rate required to keep the current
balance from  going negative could reach as  high as 35% by  2075.  If contribution rates
cannot be raised, any resulting deficits will have to be passed onto the government budget, to
be paid for by future generations.  Alternatively, the govermnent could cut benefits or finance
the system through budget transfer.
The retirement allowance program covers the same group of workers.  However, it does not reach the  self-
employed and workers in small firms that recently began to participate in the NPS.
9 Although the new pension law has removed this provision, the fundamental goal of old-age income insurance
for a considerable number of contributors has already been distorted.
10  Only  113,000 persons over the age of 60 received benefits from the NPS in 1998.  Meanwhile, there were
10.1 million contributors.
"  The calculations assumed that direct credits to public projects will be phased out (as scheduled)  and that
pension reserves will accrue at market rates of return  (much higher than the rate of average wage growth).  In
the event that these assumptions do not materialize, the deficit situation could be worse.
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Although official projections are not available for all of the occupational schemes, they are
already  running  or  will  soon run  deficits.  For  example, the  government  already  made
transfers  equivalent  to  0.2%  of  GDP  to  the  military  pension  scheme  in  1997.  The
government employee scheme has used up its reserves and began to run a deficit in  1999.
World Bank projections indicate that this deficit could grow to around 3% of GDP by 2030.
The retirement allowance scheme now also represents a non-funded source of liability to both
the private sector and the government.  Profitable  firms have paid these allowances  from
current reserves  and were not obligated to establish  pre-flmding.  In  1999 externally  held
assets likely backed up only around 10% of gross liability; companies either had not set aside
the rest  of the  resources  required to  finance  the  scheme  or placed  them  with  insurance
companies  in  order  to  gain tax advantages  but  then  received the funds  back on  loan  as
working capital.  As a result of this situation, during the crisis, many firms were unable to
meet their  commitments  in  a  context  of decreased  liquidity and  bankruptcy.  Moreover,
government  has  essentially assumed  a  portion  of  the  liability  - for  which  estimates  are
unavailable - through the creation of the Wage Claim Guarantee Fund.  The fund is financed
by a  0.2% tax  on the wage  bill but  creates  an  implicit  public  debt in  the  event that  its
resources are insufficient to cover claims.
Administration,  Investments  and Tax Treatment
The NPF  management  system  is  quite  complex  and  subject to  political  pressures.  The
Committee  of  National  Pension  Fund  Operation  (CNPF),  which  is  co-chaired  by  the
Ministers from the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and the Ministry  of Health
and Welfare (MOHW), regulates  and supervises the fund.  The committee membership  is
supposedly tripartite,  but  given its  composition  (10 from the  government  and  5  member
representatives),  the government  has  predominant  power.  For  instance,  the  MOHW,  in
consultation with MOFE and the State Council, prepares guidelines on fund operation  for
approval by the President.  Hence, there is little chance for the non-governmental members to
influence the process.  One of  the purposes of the  regulatory  guidelines is  to  define  the
investment policy, including the distribution of investments by sector (e.g., public. financial
and welfare) and by product (e.g., equity and bonds).  As a result of the protocol that controls
investment decisions, the NPF is more prone to end up with low performance products.
The Public  Fund  Management Act  (PFMA),  which  allowed  managers  to  invest  a  small
portion of  the NPS  excess cash  flow in  market-based securities,  automatically  earmarked
two-thirds  of  surpluses to  finance  other  government  activities  that  generally earn  below
market rates of return - the rate of return on NPS investments has been roughly the same as
the  rate  on one-year treasury bills.  Another part  of the  portfolio  consists  of non-traded
government securities (in the form of promissory notes) and membership loans that also give
low returns.  Although  changes to  the PFMA in  1998 are phasing  out the mechanism  of
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automatic transfer of NPS funds to the central government, the practice may still occur on a
discretionary basis and appears to have continued in 1999-2000.
Regulations  that  govern  Korea's  pension  funds  and  insurance products  rest  with  various
authorities - Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC),  CNPF and MOL.  In general, the
regulations  are not dynamic, products are not  competitive, and information concerning the
funds and the respective accounts are not readily available.  Requirements to meet solvency
and liquidity standards are weak by international standards, and investment managers seldom
engage  in  asset/liability  management.  Rating  agencies  have  a  limited  role  and  lack
credibility, thereby facing limitations as watchdogs of different securities issuers.
By  and  large, the Korean  tax system  treats  pension  plans  according  to  the  partial "tax-
exempt-exempt"  of  contributions,  accumulations  and  benefits  - or  pre-paid  expenditure
regime  (Annex  2).  It  deals with  different  retirement  savings  instruments  in  a  roughly
equivalent  manner,  thus  establishing  some  fairness  between  those  who  are  able  take
advantage of voluntary savings vehicles and those who are unable to do so.  For example,
individual pension savings accounts (IPSAs) 12 offered by banks, investment trust companies
and insurance companies receive the same tax treatment as the NPS.  In the case of retirement
allowances, special exemptions produce an effective tax rate of around 2% of benefits for
most workers.  However, the practice of only partial taxation of contributions - employers
are exempt under the NPS and public sector schemes - can lead to an overall regressive tax
structure  since  it  results  in  a  shift  in  emphasis  to  flat-rate,  consumption-based  taxes
(regressive), which everyone pays, while effectively reducing the amount of taxable income
in the formal sector, where the higher-income earners are likely to be found.
111.  Reform Issues and Options
Up  until  the early  1980s, Korea's  welfare  policy  focused  on  poverty  reduction  through
growth-oriented economic policies.  Although  in the  1990s there was greater awareness of
the need for social programs  and services, the country still lacks a  comprehensive social
security system that would harmonize economic growth with social welfare.  Generally, there
is a need to review old age retirement income provisions and strengthen the safety net.
The World Bank advocates the use of the multi-pillar model by the Korean government and
the  development  of  a  comprehensive  reform  strategy.  As  a  result  of  the  Structural
12  Qualification  is contingent  upon a commitment  of a stream of contributions  of at least ten years, and funds
cannot be withdrawn  before  age 55. Typical  contributions  amount  to around  2-5%  of salary,  and in June 1996
the total value  of these  accounts  was 10.8  trillion won (3% of GDP).
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Adjustment Loan (SAL) II negotiations, the new Pension Reform Task Force'3 will prepare a
White Paper outlining a reform proposal addressing issues such as:
Sustainable financing and integration of the NPS and other retirement provisions.  The
government established the NPS as well as the three public schemes when the population
was still relatively young.  All of the schemes promise high replacement rates (60% with
40 years' 4 and 76% with 33 years respectively).  As the schemes mature, they will require
adjustment in order to approximate long-term financial stability.
In  determining  how  to  best  handle  the  schemes'  underlying  financial  problems,
policymakers  should also  address  equity considerations  and  the  relative  emphasis on
savings versus redistribution.  While the NPS has a clear redistributive goal, the public
schemes use  earnings-related  formulas to  determine  benefits, which  can result in  the
regressive lifetime transfer of income from lower to higher income workers.  One reform
option is to require new civil  servants, teachers and military personnel to join  the NPS
and gradually phase out the old individual schemes.
Reform planning should also consider other provisions  such as the retirement allowance
mandate and voluntary personal plans.  Under current economic conditions, the mandate
represents a dangerous unfunded liability to companies and the government.  It could be
phased out, with existing obligations paid by corporations and the Wage Guarantee Fund.
Alternatively, the employer contribution could be entirely incorporated into the NPS or a
private pension system.  Also, estimating the effects of changes in the parameters of the
mandatory savings system on voluntary savings could help avoid the crowding-out of this
important complementary mechanism of retirement support.
*  Expanding coverage.  Only recently, coverage under the NPS expanded to encompass the
urban self-employed and small firms.  However, the Korean  Internal Revenue Service
held  income  data  for  only  23%  of  the  urban  self-employed  in  1998.  Under  these
circumstances, it will be very  difficult for the National  Pension Corporation to collect
proper  contributions  and  enforce  coverage.  When  farmers  and  fishermen  began  to
participate in 1995, their reported income on average turned out to be less than half their
actual income.  It is likely that a similar phenomenon  will occur with the levying of a
payroll tax of 3% against the urban self-employed and small firms.
Since much of the labor force remains outside the NPS, the government might improve
the efficiency and equity of old-age income protection by restructuring the system.  One
option  involves  strengthening  and  expanding  the  safety net  (i.e., a  general  tax-based
1  Members of the Task Force include representatives from  each of  the three special occupational schemes.
academicians,  research  institutions,  the financial  sector,  trade unions and officials  from MOHW.
14"Replacement rate for the NPS was 70% up to January 1, 1999 and 60% for service thereafter.
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means  of redistribution) while moving  to  a  flat-rate pension, which  would  provide  a
broader basis of security to the elderly population and reduce the rationale for staying out
of  the system.  This could even facilitate the  process of expansion to  the urban  self-
employed and small firms.
*  Improving  investment  and  administration  practices.  The  NPF's  investment  policy
requires amendment in order to provide higher returns.  The government recently began
phasing out direct credits to public projects.  However, optimal portfolio allocation can
only be achieved if the pension fund management process is made more transparent and
efficient.  CNPF should receive more autonomy, with little or no government interference
and without the presence of MOHW  as an  intermediary.  It will also be  important to
establish a governance structure that can protect the NPF from any political directives or
pressures  (e.g., not phasing  out  direct  credits for  public investments according  to the
timetable).  In this case, an independent "Office of the Actuary" that reports directly to
the President could be an effective means of managing contingent pension liabilities and
the related political risks while ensuring disclosure of consistent information concerning
the funded status of the old-age pension system.
Stimulating the growth of financial markets.  Korea's  NPS scheme, if maintained in its
current state, will eventually operate on a pay-as-you-go  or partially funded basis  after
payouts have begun.  As demonstrated by financial projections, a higher contribution rate
would be necessary to sustain it.  Such an increase in  forced savings through the NPS
could  crowd  out  private  savings,  in  turn  affecting  the  marketability  of  pension  and
insurance products and, by extension,  capital markets development.  The allocation of
accumulated savings to public investments with low productivity, as opposed to private
markets with growth potential, can also negatively affect capital markets.  On the other
hand,  if the NPS's  significant reserves  were directed towards market-based securities,
they would stimulate the financial markets.  The accrual of pension assets also increases
the proportion of long-term national savings, thereby lengthening the maturity of debts,
which in turn generates more equity-based financing enterprises.  However, when a single
fund  is very  large,  special considerations  must  be  given to  the possibility  of  market
dominance and conflicts of interest.
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Annex 1. Key Parameters  of Four Publicly-Managed Pension Schemes
Scheme  Financinig  Benefits  Benefit  Reserves  Contributors  Beneficiaries  System  Coverage
Spending  (% of GDP)  3/  Dependency  (Cont./Labor
(% of GDP)  Ratio (%)  Force)4 (%)
NPS  9% payroll tax' (4.5%  rr = 60%  of litetinic  0.4  10.0  10,113,000  201,950  2.0  46.5
cmploycc,  4.5%  average  wagc;
employer); govermilenit  redistrihtutive
pays admI(lniistrative
costs and contribuitionis
lbr somile  low-inicone
groLIps
Civil  l5% pmyroll  tax  r  -76% rtiall  molitlly  0.8  0  952,154  81,991  8.6  4.4
Ser vants  (7.5%  each,  employcr  wage  f(or  33 ycars;
and cmployce)  cariings-related
Private  15%  payroll tax
2 rr = 76% final monitlily  0.0  0.8  206,278  14,068  6.8  1.0
Schlool  (7.5%  each,  employer  wagc  for 33 years;
Teacliers  I  (l cmployec)  carnings-related
Military  13%  payroll  tax;  rr = 90%  final  monthily  0.2  0  153,071  50,801  33.2  0.7
governmiicit  trafisfcrs  wage;  cariiings-related
rr-  replaceinent rate
' cuirrently  varies by covered group; 2  government pays part of employer's  contribution;  excludes lump-sum beneficiaries under retirement age; 4 labor
force figure in calculations is 21,476,000.
Note:  data fromii  late 1  990s.Annex 2.  Tax Treatment of Pension Schemes
Scheme  Contribution  Returns  Benefit Payment
National Pension Scheme  employer - exempt  exempt  exempt
employee - taxed
self-employed -40% exempt
up to 720,000 won per annum
Occupational  Schemes  employer - exempt  exempt  exempt
employee -taxed
Retirement Allowance  50% exempt;'  not applicable  taxed at a low rate
(Corporate Pensions)  100% insured is exempt  exempt  varies by amount
Individual  Pension  Savings  40% exempt up to 720,000  exempt  exempt
Account2 won per annum
i The  50%  refers  to book  reserves  limited  to 10%  of total  wage  bill. The  100%  refers  to insurance  premium.
2 Penalties  apply for withdrawal  before  age 55 and/or 10  years  of contribution.
So()urce: Palacios, 1998.
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Malaysia*
Overview of Formal Old-Age Support
Malaysia  has  several  social  security  programs  for  various  types  of  workers.  The  Employees
Provident  Fund  (EPF),  established  in  1951 (and  now  under  the  1991  EPF  Act),  is a  mandatory
retirement  savings  scheme  for the  private  sector.  It  also permits  pre-retirement  withdrawals  for
housing and health care.
The Federal  Constitution guarantees  special pension benefits  for public  employees.  The Pensions
Trust Fund Act 1991 set up the Pensions Trust Fund (PTF), which is the second largest component of
the provident and pension  funds system (PPF), behind  to the EPF.  Financing  for the  PTF comes
entirely  from  the government  budget  and  employer  contributions  (i.e.,  it is  non-contributory  for
employees).  Pension  benefits are based on a formula of 7.5% multiplied by months of service, to a
maximum of 25 years of service.  The normal pensionable age is 55, quite low in comparison to life
expectancy at birth  of around 70 years.  After  10 years of service an employee  can take  gratuity
benefits, but the pension is frozen until retirement.  No severance pay is given if an employee resigns.
Widows continue to draw a pension after the beneficiary dies.  The Fund also provides health benefits
for employees  and their  dependants;  however, the  government  effectively  rations  health  care  for
pensioners through queuing.
The third most important PPF institution is the  Social Security Organization (SOCSO).  In  1971 it
began to enforce the Employees'  Social Security Act of 1969 and became a  Statutory Authority  in
1985. Unlike the EPF, SOCSO is funded on the basis of the social insurance principle and offers an
Employment Insurance Scheme, covering accidents at work and occupational diseases (to a degree),
and an Invalidity Pension Scheme, providing invalidity or death coverage.  While there  is no wage
ceiling for the EPF contributors, the wage ceiling for SOCSO is RM 2,000 per month.'  Employers
contribute 1.25% of wages for the Employment Injury Scheme, while the Invalidity Pensions Scheme
has a contribution rate of 1.0% shared equally between employers and employees.
The Arrned Forces Fund (AFF), based on the Armed Forces Act of 1973, applies to servicemen who
enlisted on or after August  1972 and who are not eligible for pensions.  This implies that it covers
only the rank and file.  The scheme is similar to the EPF, but its total contribution rate is somewhat
higher, 10% for employees and 15% for the employer.
Other provident funds exist for teachers and estate workers (these are being phased out) and for the
national  oil  company,  Petronas  (which  has  the  largest  fund).  If  efforts  to  provide  benefits
supplementary to those of the government dominated provident and pension funds are successful, the
importance of these funds may increase in the future.  Among the organizations not included in the
PPF, the Pilgrims Fund Board (PFB) or Tabung Haji, designed to enable Muslim Malaysians to go on
a Haaj, is the most notable.
Mukul G. Asher, National University of Singapore (mppasher@nus.edu.sg) prepared this profile, and Ian W.
Mac Arthur, The World Bank (imacarthurgworldbank.org)  revised it.
'In  1996, RM 2.52 equaled USS 1.00. and after the crisis in 1998, RM 3.97 equaled USS 1.00.
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1.  Background
Malaysia is a middle-income country with a population  of 21 million.  It experienced high
average real GDP growth of 5.2% during the 1990-97 period.  With the economic crisis in
South  East  Asia,  in  1998,  the  country's  GDP  shrank  by  7.5%.  However.  Malaysia
experienced a quick recovery, with estimated'real GDP growth of 5.4% in 1999.
The Malaysian economy has undergone significant structural transformation in recent years.
Between 1980 and 1998 agriculture's  share of GDP declined from 22% to 13%.  Meanwhile,
the share of services grew slightly from 40% to 43% and the share of industry increased from
from  38%  to  44%  (World Development  Report  Indicators,  1999).  Much  investment in
manufacturing, particularly  in  electronics, is by  multinational  corporations  and  is heavily
export  oriented.  The  structural  transformation  has  led  to  rapid  increases  in  wage
employment,  mainly  among females.  Labor  force participation  in  1998 was  46.8%  for
females and 86.7% for males, giving a total participation rate of 64.3%.  The total labor force
of  8.56  million  was  distributed  as  follows:  agriculture,  mining  and  related,  17.1%;
manufacturing,  27.1%;  construction,  8.8%;  non-governmental  services,  36.9%;  and,
governmental services, 10.2% (Malaysia, 1997).
An analysis of Malaysia's demographics indicate the following trends:
*  For the  1990-2030 period the annual population  growth rate will still be less than the
annual labor force growth rate, but a reversal is projected for the 2030-50 period.
*  The total fertility rate, which was much higher than the replacement rate during the 1990-
95 period, is likely to reach the replacement level during the 2025-30 period.
*  The proportion of population above 60 is expected to increase from 5.7% of the total in
1990 to 14.5% by the year 2030, and the elderly dependency ratio should double.
*  Given life expectancy at birth of 69.6 years for males and 74.5 years for females in 1997
(Malaysia, 1997), the proportion of old-old (i.e., those above age 75) is also expected to
rise  rapidly,  particularly  among  females.  Since  females  have  lower  labor  force
participation rates and average income than males, social security arrangements will need
to accommodate their financing needs.
11.  Analysis  of the Pension  System
Assets
At the end of  1998, total assets of all provident and pension funds (PPF) amounted to RM
172.8 billion (USS 45.5 billion at the current fixed exchange rate of US$  1.00 = RM 3.80).
This was equivalent to 62.0% of GDP, 16% of total funds of the financial system. and 46%
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of  market  capitalization. 2 The  sizeable  and  growing  assets  of  pension  savings  are
concentrated almost  wholly  among the  government  funds, with  the  EPF being the  most
dominant among them (85.8% of total assets), followed by the PTF (6.4%) (see Annex 1).
Although SOSCO is a social insurance-style scheme, it currently possesses a reserve fund.
Coverage
Active contributors to the EPF account for about half of the total labor force - in  1997 EPF
contributors numbered 4.31 million, out of 8.27 million members. 3 Since August 1, 1998 all
foreign workers have been included  in the  EPF scheme. 4 As  a result,  authorities expect
around 0.6 to 0.8 million additional contributors.  However, foreign workers have shorter
labor force attachment on average, making their participation more difficult to administer.
This implies a significant increase in the administrative workload of the EPF, a factor that did
not appear to receive adequate attention in the decision making process.  As of the end of
1997, there  were  296,299  employers registered  with  the EPF,  of  which  11,954 were  in
default.  The number of EPF members affected by this  situation is unknown.  During the
1990s the peak default rate occurred in 1993 (20%, or 45,344 out of 223,142 employers).
The PTF's  total  membership is  around 0.8 million.  Eighteen thousand  to  22,000 public
employees retire every year, and there were around 325,000 retirees (equal to about one-third
of civil service) in mid-1998.  The average age of service for retirees is 27 years.
SOCSO covers all employers.  At end-1996, 305,500 employers were registered, with a total
membership of 7.6 million.  The actual contributors however, were 217,524 and 4.1 million,
respectively.  Thus, as in the case of EPF, SOSCO effectively covers only around half of the
labor force.
The AFF had 105,040 registered members at end-June 1997. Active contributors are likely to
be less, but the relevant data are not available.
Contributions, Withdrawals and Member Balances
Since the EPF's  establishment, the mandatory contribution  rates have more than doubled
from 10% in 1974 to 23% in 1996 (Annex 2).  This is much higher than the 10-  15% normally
found in similar schemes in Latin America and elsewhere (Queisser, 1998a) but lower than
2  One of the effects of the economic  crisis in Malaysia was the significant increase in the importance  of
provident  and pension  funds in the nation's stock markets. A sharp increase  for the stock market  capitalization
ratio in 1997/98  compared  to 1996  was due to the sharp fall in market capitalization  (International  Financial
Corporation,  1998). This in  turn greatly  heightens  the urgency of undertaking  reforms  in corporate  governance
and  financial  and capital  markets  in order  to achieve  the goal of adequate  retirement  protection.
3 The labor  force in Malaysia  was 8.61 million  in 1997.
4 Estimates  of total foreign  workers in Malaysia  vary, with  a high of two  million.
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the 40% rate (reduced to 30% in January  1999) in Singapore.  There is no wage ceiling to
which the rate applies, suggesting that possibilities for increasing the contribution rate or the
wage base are limited.
Since November  1, 1994 total balances of each EPF member have been divided into three
accounts.  Sixty percent of the balances are in Account I, 30% in Account II, and  10% in
Account III.  Accounts II and III are for housing and medical expenses for critical illnesses,
respectively, while  Account I is for retirement.  Members may withdraw one-third  of the
balances at age 50 and the rest at age 55 in lump sums.  The EPF has explored the option of
annuities, but appropriate annuity products at affordable prices have been difficult to obtain
from the market.
Annex 3 provides data on EPF contributions, withdrawals and changes in member balances.
Contributions have increased rapidly from 3.6% of GDP in 1990 to  5.2% of GDP in 1997.
EPF contributions as a percent  of GNS (Gross National  Savings) have fluctuated between
11%  and  14%  during  this  period.  Withdrawals  have  ranged  from  30%  to  40%  of
contributions.
The members'  pre-retirement  investment scheme,  which  began in  1996, attracted  42,193
members by the end of 1997 who withdrew RM 626.7 million (RM 14,853 per participating
member).  The quantitative importance of the scheme is very small, and  so is the amount
invested per member.  Moreover,  the scheme  is only two  years old,  and  rapid growth  is
unlikely soon.  This is because the fund management industry in Malaysia is oligopolistic in
nature.  In conjunction with low amounts of investments per member, this  could result in
high transaction costs..
Early withdrawals include  two additional types  of benefits  (for death and  incapacitation).
These amounted to RM 99.6 million in  1997, only  1.8% of the total.  Both these benefits
however, are unfunded (a departure from the EPF's  philosophy), and have the potential to
increase  significantly.  Moreover, these benefits duplicate those  provided by the  SOCSO.
Therefore, they need to be reviewed and perhaps ended.
EPF members'  ability to finance retirement is reflected in changes in the account balances.
Until  1995, changes  in  these  balances,  which  include  the  interest  (called  dividends  in
Malaysia) paid, exceeded contributions, but this pattern was reversed in  1996 and 1997 (see
Annex 3 and 4).  The EPF and Bank Negara have provided no explanation for this reversal.
If however, the Bank Negara figures for members'  balances reflect market rather than book
values of EPF investments. then  a reasonable  deduction is that market  value has  become
lower than book value, reducing retirement financing.'
The  1997 Annual  report lends  support to  this  interpretation.  According to the  Report, while  in  1996 the
market value of quotes shares and investments with portfolio managers was higher than the book value (RM
58.1 billion vs. RM 55.8 billion), in 1997 there was a sharp reversal.  The book value of the quoted shares and
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The PTF began with an initial contribution of RM 500 million, and each year the federal
government  sets aside 5% of its payroll for its financing.  It also receives funds from the
monthly  contributions  made  by  employers  under  the  Statutory  and  Local  Authorities
Pensions Act 1980 (set at a rate of 17.5% of the salary of their pensionable officers), refunds
of employer's contributions to the EPF and other approved funds established for the retired
public  officials.  The fund's  objective  is  to  ultimately  account for  its  pension  liabilities
through a combination of annual (employer) contributions and investment income.
In 1994 - the most recent year for which figures are available - total expenditure on pensions
and  gratuities was RM  2  billion,  while the  total  number  of pensioners,  including  those
receiving  survivors',  disability,  and  dependants'  pensions  was 294,213.  Because  of  the
increase  in  government  employment  during  the  1970's,  liabilities  are  expected  to  grow
rapidly, reaching around RM 9 billion by 2010 according to government estimates.
SOCSO's  financial status is healthy, with  contributions comfortably exceeding benefits so
far.  A low wage base and low contribution rates explain the small volume of contributions -
only  RM  757.5 million  in  1996 (RM  185 per  contributor).  But  the number  of  benefit
recipients in 1996 was just  174,957, with average benefit of RM 1,807.2.
Governance  Structure  and Investment  Policies  and Performance
Due to the composition of the publicly mandated funds' governing bodies and the means of
selecting representatives, the funds remain under strong government influence, which holds
implications for investment practice.
A  board  of  20  members  (5  representatives  each  from  the  government,  employers,  and
employees;  3  professional  representatives;  EPF's  Executive  Chairman  and  a  Deputy
Chairman) governs the EPF.  Its  investment panel is composed of a representative  of the
Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia,  a representative  from the Ministry  of Finance, three
professionals and a Chairman.  The Minister of Finance appoints all members of the board
and  panel.  In the case of the  PTF, management  is the responsibility  of the  Accountant
General's  Office under the Ministry of Finance.  SOCSO is under the Ministry of Human
investments in 1997 at RM 61.1 billion was RM 10.4 billion higher than the market value of RM 50.7 billion
(EPF, 1998).  However, on EPF's  balance sheet (p. 77), only the loss in the market value of short term quoted
securities was taken into account, while the  loss of market value on long term quoted shares and investments
were ignored.  The Reports' reasoning is not clear, but it appears that only a permanent diminution in value of
long term shares and investments is to be recognized.  The Report states (p. 82) that as there is a government
guarantee of the contribution plus 2.5% nominal interest on members balances (except for those contributions
managed by outside Funds Management Institutions), it need not use market value for long term quoted shares
and investments.  Thus, the non-recognition  of loss of market value because of the government guarantee has
the  potential to  create an  additional  source  of  contingent  liability for the  government  if  the  current  crisis
persists.
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Resources.  Its  Board  has  12 members  (4  each  from  employers  and  insured  persons;
representative  of Ministry  of Finance;  Chairman  from the Ministry  of Human  Resources;
Director-General of SOCSO; and, a Board Secretary).  It also has an investment panel, with
representation from employers, insured persons, professionals, Bank Negara and the Ministry
of Finance.
The EPF Act of 1991, the Trustee Act of 1949, and policy guidelines and directives set by the
Investment Panel and endorsed by the Ministry of Finance all govern the EPF's  investment
avenues (Ghaffar and Bushon, 1994).  Under the EPF Act, responsibility for investment lies
with the Management Investment Committee (MIC), which is independent of the EPF board
(Tripathi, 1998).
Section 26(1) of the EPF Act of 1991 as amended (Act A914) has considerably broadened
the  scope  of  EPF  investments.  Thus,  the  guidelines  have  liberalized  the  definition  of
Malaysian Government Securities (MGS) to include loans guaranteed by the Government of
Malaysia, BNM paper with maturity of not less than three years, any negotiable commercial
instruments by state or local govermnents with not less than three years of maturity from the
date of issuance, and bonds of Cagamas Berhad, the National  Mortgage Corporation.  Even
with  this  broadening  of  the  definition  of  the  MGS,  the  EPF  has  had  to  seek  special
permission  from the Finance Minister to  waive the  requirement under the  1991 EPF Act
(Section 26) that the total amount invested in the MGS should at any given time not be less
than 70% of its total investments.
Annex 5 provides  a breakdown of EPF's  stock of investments  by type for the  1991-1997
period.  These investments are valued at cost and do not reflect current market values.  Since
1996, however, the decision on the dividend rate (i.e., interest) given to the members on their
balances  reportedly takes current market values into account,  but the authorities have not
specified exactly how.
The following observations are relevant to the analysis of investment performance:
In the initial  years EPF investment was almost exclusively in  MGS.  For example in
1960, MGS accounted for 97% of total EPF investment of RM 619.3 million.  By late
1987 the share of MGS in total investments was 89.3%.  Until recently, lending activity
was almost solely confined to small loans guaranteed by the Governnent  or by the banks.
Investment in equities was basically for long-term with no trading.
Despite the liberalization in the definition of the MGS, its share of the EPF investment
portfolio has been declining steads -. during the 1990s, from 73.6% in 1991 to only 29.4%
in  1997 (Annex  5).  This  has  been due  to  a  sharp  reduction  in  federal  government
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budgetary deficits during this period,6 in contrast to the situation of large deficits through
the late 1980s. The trend in overall average federal budget deficit as a percentage of GDP
is as follows:  1966-70, 4.8%; 1971-75, 7.7%; 1976-80, 8.9%; 1981-85, 13.3%; 1986-90,
6.9%, and  1991-95, 0.3%.  However,  due  to  the  current economic  crisis, the federal
government's budgetary deficit is expected to increase again.  This implies that the EPF
(and other similar institutions) will once again be  able to purchase MGS in significant
quantities.
*  The share of debentures and loans in total investments more than doubled between 1991
(11.0%) and  1997 (26.2%).  Significant proportions of these investments have gone to
finance projects such as the independent power plants, Light Rail Mass Transit, and the
New Kuala Lumpur International Airport.  EPF also has a 20% equity share, valued at
RM 124.2 million in the Light Rail Mass Transit.  Similarly, the EPF has a 63% equity
(valued at RM 689 million in 1997) in the Malaysia Building Society Berhad (MBSB).
*  Since 1991, the share of equities in the EPF's investment portfolio has increased by more
than nine fold, from 2.1% in 1991 to  19.0% in 1997.
*  The EPF's  direct exposure to property investment is insignificant.  However, its indirect
exposure - through MBSB and other subsidiaries and associated companies, the stock
market, and clients with investments in the property market - is considerable.
The EPF undertakes the investment function in-house, with  only a small proportion of its
funds under outside management (Koo, 1997).  In contrast, SOCSO (with assets of RM 6.0
billion  at  end-1997)  uses  nine  external  fund  managers  to  invest  a  somewhat  greater
proportion  of  its  assets  (Koo,  1997).  A comparison  of the  performance  of  the  outside
(external) fund managers with that of the in-house investments is not available.
The EPF has been traditionally mandated to invest only within Malaysia.  Recently, however,
it has secured permission to invest offshore and has taken concrete actions to select external
fund  managers  (Koo,  1997).  The  usual  argument  for  the  practice  of  not  confining  all
provident  (or  pension)  fund  investments  within  a  country  is  that  it  permits  greater  risk
diversification.  But  such  diversification  requires  a  stringent  regulatory  structure,
transparency and public accountability regarding the investment portfolio and performance.
Selection of external fund managers by itself is not sufficient to  overcome principal-agent
problems inherent in provident fund investments.  Moreover, globalization of financial and
6  Some  of  the  reduction  in  budgetary  deficit  is more  apparent  than  real  as  a  significant  proportion  of
infrastructure expenditure has been privatized in recent years.  But this has occurred in a state-directed manner
with the government providing implicit or explicit guarantees.  Unpublished estimates suggest that quasi-fiscal
operations are likely to give rise to potential contingent liabilities of between 8% to 10% of GDP. This does not
include contingent liabilities from pension benefits promised to government employees.
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capital markets implies that major stock markets move in tandem, reducing (but certainly not
eliminating) the benefits from geographic-risk diversification.
There are indications that the authorities are using public funds to attain a variety of policy
objectives.  As  a  result,  administrative  or  non-market  avenues  are increasingly  used  to
channel EPF savings into investment. In conjunction with the state management of provident
funds, a  monocentric power  structure and  lack of tradition  of open  public  debate and  of
diversity in media have adversely affected the efficiency with which  savings are translated
into investment.  This also indicates how political risk may arise in the national provident
fund method,  reflecting  a  trade-off between the  way  certain public  policy  objectives are
pursued and members'  interest in securing appropriate rates of return.
Several examples illustrate the influence of policy objectives on investment actions:
*  The EPF has been participating in government  initiated and  directed privatization and
infrastructure projects,  mainly  through  its investments  in  debentures  and loans  (Bank
Negara, 1997).  While the EPF may be able to  shift the risk of such investments to the
governnent,  provided it receives appropriate guarantees, the ultimate risk remains with
society as a  whole.  As  a general rule, investments  not justified  by  social cost-benefit
analysis criteria create inefficiencies in resource allocation, and selection of projects and
the manner of their privatization are crucial.
*  The EPF Act was amended to create a more active role for the EPF in promoting home
ownership among lower and middle-income groups as of November  1, 1996.  Besides
facilitating demand through permitting individuals to use their EPF balances to purchase
housing,  the  amendments  also  allow the  EPF  to  participate  on  the  supply  side  by
providing  financing  for  housing  construction  through  its  subsidiary,  MBSB,  which
presents some risk exposure.
*  During the initial stages of the economic crisis in 1997, the government set up a RM 60
billion  fund  to  reverse  sharp  declines  in  stock  prices  on  the  Kuala  Lumpur  Stock
Exchange (KLSE).  Half of the fund was to be financed by the EPF, other pension funds
and  Khazanah  National,  the  Malaysian  govermment's  investment  arm,  and  become
effective on  September 4,  1997.  In late September  1997 the KLSE index was around
780.  On September 16, 1998, it stood at 394, and it recovered somewhat to around 600 in
Februarv  1999.  The other half of the fund was to  be  raised through  the issuance of
government bonds.  However, the plan was quietly dropped and never implemented as
originally envisaged.  Nevertheless, whether government investment was used to support
selected stocks is not  clear.  The Malaysian state-controlled fund Permodalan Nasional
Berhad  (PNB),  with  funds  totaling  RM  30  billion,  has  invested  in  300  domestic
companies  and  acquired  shares  in  companies  with  potential  to  help  the  Msalaysian
economy recover (The Straits Times, Singapore, April 20, 1998).
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*  There  are  indications  that  the  government  is  using  the  state  funds  to  assist  in  re-
capitalization  of distressed banks  (Lopez,  1998) and to  assist certain business groups
considered nationally important.  Since October 1997 the EPF has lent RM 2 billion to
the Treasury's  investment arm Khazana Nasional, RM 1 billion to the new international
airport,  and RM  0.71 billion  to  debt-laden  steel  maker Perwaja  Trengganu  (Tripathi,
1998).  The EPF has reportedly taken an equity interest in one of the troubled local banks,
although the EPF has denied this (The Business Times, Singapore, April 20, 1998).  It
may also purchase a substantial stake in a debt-laden but well-connected unit of United
Engineers of Malaysia for RM 1.5 billion (Toh, 1998).
*  Malaysia's  imposition of currency and stock-trading curbs has essentially meant that its
currency (Ringgit) can not be traded internationally.  Conversion of Ringgit into Foreign
exchange  by  individuals  and  firms  based  in  Malaysia  requires  permission  of  the
authorities.  These measures have meant that  Malaysia is unable to borrow abroad on
conditions it considers affordable.  Thus, it has decided to fund its economic recovery
plans, estimated to cost RM 60 billion (US$  15.8 billion), domestically.  It appears that
the domestic provident and pension funds, such as the EPF and the PTF, along with cash-
rich and profitable state firms such as the national oil company, Petronas, are to be used
as major funding sources.
- At end-1997, the total number of depositors with the Pilgrims Fund Board (PFB) was 3.2
million  and total  resources mobilized  were  RM  6.1 billion,  of  which  48.7% were  in
corporate securities (more than half of which were in unquoted shares); 33% in short term
assets; and the rest in other assets (Bank Negara,  1997).  In August 1998 the PFB was
reported to be considering buying fixed assets (a significant departure from its policy of
investing in financial assets) such as factories of DRB-Hicom, a government connected
company with total borrowings of RM 2,480 million (Asian Wall Street Journal, Aug. 28-
29, 1998). The newspaper account quotes analysts as expressing skepticism that the main
motivation behind this investment was commercial.
Thus,  in  spite  of  their  legal  status,  the  pension  fund  bodies  in  Malaysia  do  not  enjoy
functional autonomy.
Annex 6 provides data concerning nominal  and real rate of return (called dividend) to the
EPF members for the period 1961 to  1997.  During that period there were only three years
(1973,  1974 and  1981), all related to energy price shocks or their aftermath, when the real
rate of return (nominal rate less the inflation rate as measured by the Consumer Price Index,
CPI) was negative.  A simple annual average of the nominal dividend rate for the period is
6.90% and of the real rate is 3.44%.  For the 1987-1997 period the annual real rate of return
is  higher  at 4.60%.  Provided the  market  basket  and  the price  samples are  an  accurate
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reflection of consumption patterns of the elderly, the real rate of return may be regarded as
satisfactory.
On the other hand, Valdes-Prieto (1998) has argued that the EPF's  returns are unsatisfactory
when compared to the alternatives.  He notes that the real rate of return credited to members
over the  1971-91 period was 2.74% per annum.  However, the real rate of return obtainable
from bank deposits plus half of the spread between bank loans and bank deposits was 4.26%
per year, and equities earned a annual real return of 5.61%.  Thus, the implicit tax was at least
1.52 percentage points per year in real terms.  Cumulatively, this would substantially reduce
the available funds for retirement.
The shift in investment patterns away from the MGS has increased the need for enhancing
the EPF investment expertise.  This is because the MGS fetched risk-free high interest rates
for the EPF.  To the extent that the MGS interest rate is higher than the economic rate of
return earned by the government, an implicit subsidy to EPF members accrues.  However, as
taxpayers, members may still bear a burden if the state-directed projects require implicit or
explicit subsidy.
Tax  Treatment
In  Malaysia  both  the  employer  and  employee  contributions,  income  accruing  from
investment of accumulated funds (or gains on pre-retirement withdrawals), and withdrawals
at the time of retirement are all exempt from personal income tax.  However, an individual
may claim a maximum  of RM 5,000 for insurance premium and contribution to  approved
pension funds.  There is no salary ceiling for the EPF contributions.  Thus, assuming no life
insurance, an individual cannot deduct the EPF contributions  on annual wages above RM
45,455.  The individual may deduct up to  a maximum of RM 2,000 for premium  paid on
education and medical insurance policies.  In 1995 (the latest year for which the data has
been  made  available),  the  deduction  for  life  insurance  premium  and  provident  fund
contributions was RM 2.34 billion, equivalent to 5.4% of assessed income.
These tax arrangements are regressive.  The individual income tax rate in Malaysia ranges
from 2% to 30% with nine income brackets.  This  implies that tax saving from  provident
fund deductions increases with wage income.  In 1995 1.46 million individuals, equivalent to
17.9% of the labor force, paid income tax.  Thus, for the vast majority of the labor force, EPF
tax  exemption  is  of  no  material  consequence.  As  a  result,  on  both  counts,  EPF  tax
arrangements are regressive.
For  employers,  the  maximum  deduction  permitted  in  Malaysia  for  the  EPF  and  other
approved funds is 19%.  As the EPF contribution rate for employers is 12%, this allows for
tax  exempt  status  for  an  additional  7.0%  of  wages  for  the  employers  to  provide
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supplementary  benefits.  Thus,  there  is  some  tax  incentive  for  private  pension  plans.
Government pensions are taxable if taken at age 50 but not at age 55.
111.  Reform  Issues  and Options
The PPF component of the contractual savings sector is the primary instrument for providing
social security in Malaysia.  While the social insurance principle is present on a very limited
scale through SOCSO, and while PAYG-type arrangements exist for government pensionable
employees, the primary reliance is on a mandatory savings pillar to provide social security.
Thus, in the Work Bank's  multi-pillar social security framework (The World Bank,  1994),
Malaysia relies primarily on the second pillar.  The first pillar  is practically non-existent,
limiting government's  ability to smoothen inter-temporal volatility, while the role of third
pillar is very limited due to high mandatory savings contribution rates and the lack of specific
tax incentives for voluntary savings and pension plans.
The role of informal social security through the family and community remains significant.
However, urbanization and industrialization, reduced fertility rates, and population aging are
rapidly  eroding  these  arrangements.  Moreover,  the  average  aged person  is  now better
educated and has obtained more lifetime exposure to the labor force.  This type of person will
likely  bring  more  individualistic  attitudes  towards  old  age  and  may  prefer  to  maintain
independence rather than live with children.
In this context, the reform agenda for the various provident and pension funds includes the
following main issues:
Benefit  levels.  The  EPF's  23%  contribution  rate,  which  is  much  higher  than  the
international norm of 10% to 15%, is unable to provide an adequate replacement rate to
members.  While no official estimates are available, the rate is unlikely to exceed 20% to
25% of the final salary, far short of the two-thirds  recommended  by pension experts.
Thus, in  1996, as compared to the per capita GNP of R-M 11,118, the average amounts
withdrawn  at age 50 (one-third of accumulated balances can be withdrawn at that age)
and at age 55 were RM 11,132 and RM 9,501 respectively.  These amounts represent the
mean, and the median amounts are likely to be lower.  This reflects both relatively low
wages and a highly unequal wage structure.  At end-1996 63% of the active contributors
had wages below RM 1,000 per month (accounting for 25.8% of the balances) while only
2.8% had wages above RM 5,000 per month (accounting for 22.1% of the total balances).
It is possible that these figures somewhat overstate the wage inequality as there may be a
tendency  by  some  firms  to  under-report  wages  subject  to  the  EPF  contributions.
Considering the low wage rates, an appropriate replacement rate in the case of Malaysia
is likely to be even higher than two-thirds.
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. Benefits  planning.  The  benefits  planning  function  involves  formulation  of  various
schemes for members (e.g., for housing, investment, post-retirement annuity, health care
financing, etc.).  It also requires analyzing the implications of alternative ways to expand
coverage.  The EPF also permnits  pre-retirement withdrawals for housing.  The terms and
conditions of the permitted withdrawals for housing need to be carefully examined and
their impact assessed.  Health care is another area for which the EPF allows withdrawals.
The feasibility  of introducing  a health  insurance  scheme for  major  illnesses could be
examined, based on appropriate actuarial calculations.  The health insurance funds need
to be managed separately, and their performance could be used  as one of the inputs in
evaluating the investment performance of the EPF as a whole.  Rationalization  of EPF's
health schemes with those of SOCSO should be undertaken.  It appears that the EPF is
providing  death  and  incapacitation  benefits  on  an  unfounded  liability  basis.  These
benefits also duplicate those of SOCSO, and their rationalization would be beneficial.
*  Risk  protection.  In  Malaysia  there  is no  requirement  that  accumulated  balances  be
converted into an annuity at the time of retirement, which has a number of disadvantages.
First,  it  negates  the  main  rationale  of  mandatory  savings,  based  on  the  idea  that
individuals  are  myopic  and  will  not  save  enough  for  old  age.  Second,  there  are
indications  that  many  EPF  members  are  spending  their  retirement  withdrawals  too
quickly  and  unproductively.  As  a  result,  there  may  be  political  pressures  for  the
government to  increase  social  expenditure on  these members.  This  implies  that the
higher fiscal burden would need to be borne by the taxpayers in general, including those
EPF members who have been prudent in their use of accumulated balances.  In turn, this
partially negates one of the advantages of the mandatory savings scheme, i.e. to minimize
the recourse to the tax-transfer  process  in retirement  provision.  Third, the  lump-sum
withdrawal  severely limits  options  for covering inflation and  longevity  risks.  This is
because it results in loss of efficiency and cost saving from risk pooling.  As a result,
individuals purchasing  annuities  must  bear the cost  of  this  loss.  High  costs in  turn
exacerbate the adverse selection problem  and  lead to  market  failure.  As  a result, the
market cannot provide adequate protection.
*  Financial market development.  Also, lack of development of  annuity products means
that there is less pressure on the Malaysian government to issue inflation-indexed bonds.
This adversely affects the development of bond markets and creation of a sovereign yield
curve reflecting varied maturity periods.  Without  such a  curve, a benchmark  for the
pricing  of other bonds cannot be  established.  Also,  without  inflation-indexed bonds,
insurance  companies  and  others  are  further  hampered  from  providing  annuities  at
reasonable cost.  Thus,  in spite of the contractual  savings  sector being  fairly large in
relation to  GDP,  its contribution to  the  financial sector and  capital markets  has  been
rather  limited.  The  main  point  emerging  from  this  discussion  is  that  efficient  but
prudentially regulated and transparent financial and capital markets, with sufficient depth
and variety  of products,  are critical  if  the potential  of the  contractual  savings  sector,
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including its primary role in social security provision, is to be realized.  It is in this sense
that the reform of the financial and capital markets, corporate governance, and provision
of pensions are inter-linked.
*  Investment performance.  Several  measures may  enable the  EPF  (and other  funds) to
improve investment performance:
The pension  schemes need to  substantially  improve their  investment  management by
acquiring necessary staff, effectively using outside advisors, and contracting out greater
proportions  of assets.  Incentive structures need to  be  introduced  which  underlie the
fiduciary responsibilities of provident  and pension  fund managers.  In negotiating with
outside fund mangers, the EPF needs to keep in mind the concentrated nature of the fund
management  industry  and  carefully  devise  asset  allocation  guidelines  and  other
regulations.  Too restrictive guidelines, along with the emphasis on comparing gross rates
of return, may provide  incentives to  fund mangers  to  behave  in  a  herd-like manner,
negating some of the benefits of diversification and contracting out.  One possibility is to
classify fund managers in risk categories according to allocation between equities, fixed
income,  and  others  and  compare  those  within  each  category.  Similarly,  schemes
permitting individual members to invest in unit trusts could also incorporate this feature.
In  evaluating the proposals  from the  fund managers,  after-fee rates  of return criteria
should be applied.
Asset  allocation  rules  should  be  reviewed  to  allow  some  allocation  overseas,  since
currently  all  accumulated  balances  must  be  invested  domestically.  This  could  help
diversify  country-risk  and  could  also  permit  insurance  companies  to  offer  annuity
products at more affordable prices.
The size of accumulated pension assets in relation to stock market assets is large, while
the in-house investment management expertise of EPF, SOCSO and others is inadequate
for this volume.  Additionally, the fund management industry in Malaysia is concentrated
and not well developed.  Therefore, there  is a  strong case for the EPF  and others to
consider passive management of at least a part of the funds, which would help mitigate
political risk.  Such passive  management can be based  on a combination  of domestic
indexes for a portion of the funds and on global indexes for the rest.  Of course, this could
only be undertaken once the current capital control regime is normalized, which would
require concomitant changes in stock markets, bond markets and others.
The EPF should reconsider its scheme of permitting investments by individual members
in unit-trusts.  At the minimum, it should provide information about the associated fees
and charges (say as a proportion of contributions).  As noted, classification of unit-trusts
by risk categories can also be publicized.  This may be one way to accommodate different
individual risk preferences.
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The authorities could  consider allowing  very  large  firrns providing  at  least the  same
benefits (in terms of contribution rates) to opt out of the EPF scheme on a case by case
basis.  Similarly, those individuals who already have accumulated certain balances with
the EPF or other provident funds (RM 300,000 in 1998 prices) could be given the option
of exemption from further contributions.  These opting out provisions  are designed to
encourage more private  sector management  of funds and thereby  provide  information
about  investment  performance  of  alternative  arrangements.  However,  tax  treatment
would need to be equivalent for the EPF and other pensions.  Group annuity policies and
other pension fund products could be explored.
The changes to improve the investrnent performance of the funds should be accompanied
by better information analysis and dissemination.  Actuarial Reviews of the provident and
pension funds should be made mandatory every three to five years, and the results should
be  made  publicly  available.  For  the  EPF  and  other  provident  funds,  not  only
contributions  and  liability  profiles  need  to  be  developed  (to  better  match  assets  and
liabilities), but the replacements rates and net annuity amounts (if accumulated balances
are be converted into annuity, taking into account administration and other fees) should
also be calculated and publicized.  As soon as feasible, all investments should be reported
on a market basis by all provident and pension funds.  This requirement should be made
mandatory for new funds from the beginning.  The EPF, SOCSO, Petronas (oil company)
Fund and others should encourage companies to improve their accounting and disclosure
practices to bring them in line with international norms.
EPF and other provident and pension funds should encourage development of indigenous
expertise in the area of social security through  funding research projects, scholarships,
conferences  and  specialized  workshops.  The  message  needs  to  be  conveyed  that
corresponding to  assets  of  the  EPF  and  others  are  liabilities,  i.e. promised  benefits.
Assets and liabilities need to be properly matched at all times.
Housekeeping function.  This  area  of  activity  invloves:  (i)  establishing  a  complete
"registry"  of  enterprises  and  individuals;  (ii)  maintaining  account  records;  (iii)
administering pre-retirement withdrawal schemes; (iv) paying benefits; and administering
penalties to those  defaulting from payment  obligations  or to those not  adhering to the
conditions of pre-retirement  withdrawals.  Inclusion  of foreign  workers  since August
1998 in the EPF scheme will add to the complexity of these tasks as turnover among the
foreign workers and their length of  stay in  the country exhibit  a very different  pattern
than the native population.  Also, the number of such schemes being administered by the
EPF has been growing.
A merger of SOCSO and the EPF has been under consideration for quite some time and
could increase the efficiency of housekeeping.  The reason for lack of any concrete steps
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in  this  direction  appears  to  be  organizational  and  political  rather  than  technical.
Therefore, such a merger should receive priority.
The EPF,  as the largest  organization,  should increase  its  use  of Internet  to not  only
provide  better  services,  and  become  closer  to  its  members,  but  also  as  a  deliberate
strategy to economize on costs.  It has the resources and the potential to be a leader in this
area.  It can use the Internet to inform and to educate the members about its schemes.
The EPF and SOCSO should adopt a bench marking strategy to  increase  compliance.
This  would  involve  working  through  unions  and  community  based  organizations to
increase awareness of the importance of retirement saving.  The current penalty rules and
practices could also be studied with a view to making them more effective.
System design.  In considering the entire retirement protection system, there are at least
two other important issues to consider:  (i) the development of fiscally more sustainable
methods of meeting pension liabilities of the government employees and (ii) encouraging
the development of occupational pension  plans  and voluntary  savings  plans to  enable
accommodation of individuals with  differing preferences, and,  similarly, creating more
options even within the mandatory savings schemes such as the EPF.
The  Malaysian  policymakers  and  social  security  institutions  face  major  challenges  in
providing an adequate and sustainable level of income security to the elderly.  Investment,
benefits planning and housekeeping all need reform.  There is also an urgent need to explore
regulation and design to enable the social security institutions to give more emphasis to their
fiduciary  responsibilities.  The  reforms  should  recognize  the  essential  linkage  between
financial and  capital  market  reforms,  corporate  governance  and pension  provision.  The
emphasis should be on making  substantial improvements in the mandatory  savings pillar,
particularly as embodied in the EPF and in addressing the contingent pension liabilities of the
government employees.
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Annex 1. Assets  of Provident  and Pension  Funds, 1995-97
All  Tund  1995  1996  199?
Total (RM billion)  114.2  135.7  154.3
As a % of GDP  52.2  54.3  55.7
As % of financial system funds  15.3  14.8  13.8
As % of market capitalization  20.2  17.5  42.31
'Pjr  ~COIRpDnents
EPF  98.8  117.3  132.4
(86.5)  (86.4)  (85.8)
PTF  6.0  7.6  9.9
(5.3)  _  (5.6)  (6.4)
SOCSO  4.5  5.2  6.0
(3.9)  (3.8)  (3.9)
AFF  3.5  4.1  4.5
(3.1)  (3.0)  (2.9)
Others  1.4  1.4  1.4
(1.2)  (1.0)  (0.9)
EPF: Employees Provident Fund;  PTF: Pensions Trust Fund for Govemment  Employees;  SOCSO: Social
Security Organization; AFF: Armed Forces Fund; "Others" includes Petronas Pension Fund.
Notes: a 1997 data are preliminary.
Sources:  Bank Negara Malaysia (1998): Annual Report  1997, (1997  breakdown of total assets supplied by
Bank  Negara);  Market  Capitalization  from  International  Financial  Corporation  (1998):  Emerging  Stock
Markets  Factbook 1998, Washington D.C, p.185.
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Annex 2.  EPF Contribution Rates (%)2
Period  Employee  Employer  Total  Total
(net of Employer's  share)  (inclusive  of Employer's  share)
1952-74  5  5  10  9.52
July 1975-79  6  7  13  12.15
Dec. 1980-92  9  11  20  18.02
1993-95  10  12  22  19.64
1996-  11  12b  23  20.54
Notes: a There  is no wage  ceiling  to which these  rates apply. b Employer's  rate for foreign  workers  (covered
since  August  1998)  is a flat rate of RM 5 per month.  The employee  rate remains  at 11%.
Source: EPF
Annex 3.  EPF: Contributions, Withdrawals, Changes in Member Balances, 1990-1997
Contributions  Withdrawals  A Members'  Balances
Year  Amount  %  %  Amount  %  Amount  %
(RM million)  GDP  GNS  (RM million)  contributions  (RM million)  GDP
1990  4,139  3.6  11.0  1,727  41.7  5,665  4.9
1991  4,866  3.7  12.9  1,995  41.0  6,659  5.0
1992  5,556  3.7  12.0  1,728  31.1  8,869  6.0
1993  7,418  4.5  13.6  2,169  .29.2  10,200  6.9
1994  8,800  4.6  14.2  2,526  28.7  12,080  6.3
1995  10,324  4.7  14.1  3,026  29.3  13,553  6.2
1996  12,383  5.0  13.5  3,873  31.3  8,510a  3.4
1997  14,515  5.2  13.8  5,636  38.8  8,879a  3.2
GDP  - Gross  Domestic  Product,  GNS  - Gross  National  Savings,  a Contributions  exceed  changes  in members' balances
Source: Bank  Negara  Malaysia,  Monthly  Statistical  Bulletin,  July 1998.
Annex 4. GDP,  GNS, EPF Members'  Balances,  Book  Value  of Investments,  1990-97  (RM, m)
Year  GDP  GNS  Members' Balances  Book Value of
Investments
1990  115,701  33,672  46,179  45,642
1991  132,381  37,662  52,838  52,036
1992  148,537  46,482  61,707  60,883
1993  165,206  54,534  71,907  71,263
1994  190,274  62,133  83,987  82,690
1995  218,726  73,324  97,540  95,635
1996  249,784  91,517  106,050a  112,820
1997  277,033  105,282  114,929a  129,576
1998*  NA  NA  120,284a  137,054
*up  to June,a  Since 1995,  book value of investments  has significantly  exceeded  members' balances.  The
reason  for this is not clear. A possible explanation  may be that members' balances  reflect market rather than
the book value of portfolio. If this is indeed  the case, EPF unrealized  losses would  be RM 16.77  billion  as of
end-June 1998.  The corresponding figures of the EPF are in close conformity with the  Bank Negara figures
given above until  1995.  But for 1996, the EPF's figures for members'  balances are RM 114.2 billion and for
book value of investments RM 115.2 billion, both substantially higher than the Bank Negara figures.  As noted,
the discrepancy has not been explained by the authorities.
Source:  Bank  Negara,  Malaysia,  Monthly  Statistical  Bulletin,  July 1998.
17 of 2200
Annex 5.  EPF Stock of Investments by Type, 1991-1997 (RM millions)
'I'ype  of  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Investmenits
Amouinit  Shar-c  Am11ount1  Share  Amilotiunt  Share  Amotiit  Share  Amilount  Share  AmouIlnt  Share  Amounit  Share




Govermeint  38,276  73.6  39,637  65.1  39,265  54.9  40,271  48.3  39,150  40.5  38,754  33.6  38,068  29.5
Secutrities
Debentures
and  Loansa  5,695  11.0  7,553  12.4  6,248  12.1  12,080  14.5  17,132  17.7  23,992  20.8  33,837  26.2
Equitiesb  1,102  2.1  1,607  2.6  2,964  4.1  8,817  10.6  11,487  1  1.9  17,930  15.6  24,574  19.0
Money






Othersc  1.60  1.60  285  0.4  336  0.4  340  0.4  371  0.3  480  0.4
Noles:  a Bank Negara's  1996 Aniutal Report (Table 3.18, p. 113) puts loans  and debentures  investments  at end-1996  at MR$L5,510 million  and
corporate  securities  (i.e., equities)  at RM 26,698  million. The share  of equities  is thus much  greater  according  to Bank Negara.  If correct,  stock market
decline  would imply greater  unrcaliz.ed  losses  by thc EPF.  h Given the decline  of 52% in Malaysian  stock  market  capitalization  value in local currency
between the beginning of  1997 and December 30, 1997, the market value is likely  to be lower. c Mainly  property investments.
Source: Calculated from the data supplied by the EPF.Annex B6: Country Profile  for  Malaysia
Annex 6.  Nominal and Real Rates of Dividends on EPF Balances, 1961-1997
Year  Nominal  Dividend  Rate  Inflation  Rate (CPI)  Real Rate of Dividend*
(%)  (%)  (%)
1961  4.00  -0.20  4.22
1962  4.00  0.10  3.89
1963  5.00  3.10  1.86
1964  5.25  -0.40  5.68
1965  5.50  0.10  5.61
1966  5.50  1.40  4.13
1967  5.50  4.20  1.34
1968  5.75  -0.20  5.95
1969  5.75  -0.40  6.16
1970  5.75  1.90  3.84
1971  5.80  1.60  4.20
1972  5.85  3.20  2.65
1973  5.85  10.50  -4.65
1974  6.60  17.40  -10.80
1975  6.60  4.50  2.10
1976  7.00  2.60  4.40
1977  7.00  4.70  2.30
1978  7.00  4.90  2.10
1979  7.25  3.60  3.65
1980  8.00  6.70  1.30
1981  8.00  9.70  -1.70
1982  8.00  5.70  2.30
1983  8.50  3.70  4.80
1984  8.50  3.60  4.90
1985  8.50  0.40  8.10
1986  8.50  0.60  7.90
1987  8.50  0.80  7.70
1988  8.00  2.50  5.50
1989  8.00  2.80  5.20
1990  8.00  3.10  4.90
1991  8.00  4.40  3.60
1992  8.00  4.70  3.30
1993  8.00  3.60  4.40
1994  8.00  3.70  4.30
1995  7.50  3.40  4.10
1996  7.70  3.50  4.20
1997  6.70  2.70  5.00
Simple average  6.90  3.46  3.44
(1961-1997)
Note:  * Defined as the difference between the nominal dividend rate and the inflation rate as measured by the
"Consumer Price Index" (CPI).
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Mongolia*
Overview  of Formal  Old-Age  Support
Like most  countries  of the  former  Soviet Union,  Mongolia  inherited  a  pay-as-you-go  (PAYGO)
public pension system providing universal coverage and generous benefits for privileged groups.  The
system  was viable  only within  the  context  of a  centrally  planned  economy  with  artificially  full
employment, a highly compressed wage structure, and no informal sector.  The collapse of the wage
base during the early  1990's,  combined with the emergence of the informal  sector and the high cost
of benefits for  current retirees, rapidly pushed the system into deep  insolvency.  Although  the old
system was reformed in 1995, it remains heavily dependent upon transfers from the general budget
equal to approximately 30% of the cost of benefits.
The current pension system, introduced  in  1995, uses a final-years  career  average, defined  benefit
formula that is overly generous relative to what can be afforded - 45% of the highest five years of
wages plus 1.5% of additional credit for each year of service over 20 years.  Coverage is voluntary
for herders and the self-employed, but is otherwise mandatory.  Career military  and the police are
covered  by a separate  scheme.  The contribution  rate is  19% (of a total  social  levy  of 29%-30%,
depending upon one's employment  status).'  Employers pay  13.5%; employees  pay 5.5%.  Women
may currently retire at 55, or 50 if they have at least four children.  The retirement age for men is 60.
The 1995 reforn  improved the existing system and eliminated many categories of special privileges,
but it failed to  restore  long term  financial  sustainability  and adequately  address  several structural
weaknesses, including irrational or inefficient labor force incentives, inequities in benefit provisions,
and the absence of a rational indexation policy.  In addition, the reform did nothing to further develop
the domestic  capital markets,  which  the coalition  government  recognizes  is necessary  to  enhance
economic growth in the medium to long term.
Recognizing these problems, the government passed legislation in early June 1999 to (i) replace the
current  benefit  formula  with  unfunded  individual  accounts  (also  referred  to  as notional  defined
contribution  accounts) and  (ii) gradually  introduce funding into the pension  system, beginning  in
2005  (when 3% of the  19% total contribution  rate will be invested) and ending  in 2020 (by when
7.5%  of the  total  contribution  rate will  be  invested).  The  legislation  stipulates  that the  pace  of
development  in the capital  markets  and  the  government's  fiscal  capacity  to  fund transition  costs
(through savings accruing within the pension system, rather than increased borrowing) will deternine
the  speed of reaching this  target.  Implementation  of this  reform  is currently  underway, with  the
introduction of unfunded accounts in January 2000.2
* Christopher Bender, Professional Education Ventures (benderc@aol.com), prepared this country profile, and
Ian W. Mac Arthur, The World Bank (imacarthur@worldbank.org) revised it.
The remaining components of the total social  levy include health  insurance (6%),  unemployment insurance
(1%), worker's compensation insurance (1% of 2%), and benefit insurance (2%).
2 The author of this report supported the  Government of Mongolia in developing the  reform and is currently
assisting the  Social Insurance organization in its  implementation as the manager  of  a project funded by the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
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1.  Background
Seventy  years  of Soviet  influence  left Mongolia  ill prepared  when the Soviet Union collapsed
in the early 1990s. Virtually overnight,  gross domestic  product shrank by a third when the
Soviet Union  ended direct  and indirect  transfers  and began demanding  hard currency  - rather
than wool and mutton - in exchange for petrol and machinery. With a small (and largely
obsolete) industrial base, little technical know-how, modest natural resources, geographic
isolation, economic  policy molded by years of central planning,  and a social order rooted in
centuries-old  nomadic  traditions,  Mongolia  found itself in crisis.
The economy  continued  to contract during the early 1990s. Many Mongolians  returned  to a
traditional  nomadic herding way of life, and livestock populations increased dramatically
with the legalization of private ownership of animals.  For each Mongolian, there are
approximately  six sheep, four goats, one and half cows, and one horse.  The agricultural
sector (including livestock) makes up approximately 33% GDP, up from 15% in  1989.
Outside  this sector, however,  economic  activity ground  to a virtual halt.  Production  dropped
off sharply for lack of hard currency to buy fuel or spare parts for aging Russian-made
machinery. Without  the benefit of captive markets,  Mongolian-made  products found fewer
buyers, and most enterprises  capable of generating  much-needed  hard currency  (such as the
national airline,  the telephone  company,  the railways, the copper and gold mines, and those
involved in  the  cashmere industry) were kept in  public hands, effectively precluding
improvements  in quality or productivity.
In  1996, after four  years  of  economic  contraction  and  two years  of  marginally  positive
growth  (driven almost  entirely by increases -in the world  price of  copper), a  coalition  of
reformist  parties  committed  to  stemming  further  economic  contraction  by  strengthening
market-based reforms replaced the governing former communist party.  Included among the
coalition's reforms are measures to impose fiscal and monetary discipline; shrink the size of
the public sector; accelerate the pace of privatization of state-owned or controlled enterprises;
restructure the banking, energy, and agricultural sectors; eliminate price controls; and reduce
barriers to trade and foreign investment.
By  and  large,  the  reforms  appear  to  have  taken  root.  By  1998 real  GDP  had  risen
approximately 10% over 1995 levels, and inflation, which had peaked at 325% in  1992, had
fallen  to  a modest  6%.  In  June  1999, the  IMF  again  endorsed  an  Enhanced  Structural
Adjustment Facility agreement that had been suspended.  Despite the improved prognosis,
however.  Mongolia  is likely  to  remain  (i) very  poor  in  the  short to  medium  term,;  (ii)
For example. Mongolia's  1998 GDP per capita was approximately SUS 365, among the lowest in the region
along with those of North Korea and the Lao PDR.
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dependent upon  commodities to  provide  it with  much-needed foreign  currency,  and  (iii)
vulnerable to price fluctuations within global markets for these commodities. 4
Mongolia has one  of the youngest populations  in East Asia.  Forty-seven  percent  of the
population are currently under the age of 20, and only 7% of the population are older than the
retirement age.  These statistics mask underlying and problematic demographic trends.  The
collapse of the Mongolian economy in the early 1990s and the elimination of cash subsidies
and other incentives for child bearing (rooted in decades of pro-natalist social policies) have
resulted in sharp reductions in fertility rates.  The total fertility rate fell from 4.6 in  1989 to
2.7 by 1995 and 2.3 by 1998. Over the ten-year period ending 1998, this represents a decline
of 50%.  Absent the reintroduction of pro-natalist policies - which seems unlikely for social,
as well as financial reasons - fertility rates are likely to remain low and  drive fundamental
change  in the  structure of the population  over  the long  term.  Holding  life  expectancies
constant,  the projected  impact of  changes in  fertility  rates on the  population  of  old-age
persons is large (Figure 1).5
Figure 1. Persons Aged 60 and Older as a % of Population
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Data on trends in life expectancy are generally unavailable or unreliable, but life expectancies
in Mongolia are very low when compared to other countries of the region.  Consistent with
patterns elsewhere within the former Soviet Union, life expectancies have fallen slightly over
the past decade, pacing a decline in the quality and availability of medical care.  However,
life expectancies in Mongolia are substantially lower than in many countries in the region
and, thus, over the long term, are likely to rise.
4A  third of GDP comes from agriculture and livestock.  Another third of GDP - and about half the country's
hard currency - comes from mining (coal, copper, molybdenum, gold, fluorspar, uranium, tungsten and zinc).
Other industries include tourism and the processing of animal products such as raw cashmere and leather into
finished goods.
5An  actuary funded by USAID made all demographic and cash flow projections cited  in this report using the
Pension Reformn  Options Simulation Toolkit (PROST model) developed by the World Bank.
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Official  figures  suggest  that  unemployment  in  Mongolia  is  modest  and  that  rates  of
unemployment have been falling (from 8.7% in 1994 to 5.8% in 1998). While the latter may
be  true  (since  1994,  economic  conditions  appear  to  have  improved),  actual  levels  of
unemployment are undoubtedly  substantially higher. 6 Some evidence for this exists  even
within the official estimates, which  show a fall in labor force participation rates across the
same period (from 73% to 68%) in the presence of a stable population of economically active
persons.  Informal estimates suggest that actual unemployment (after allowing for persons
employed outside the formal sector) ranges from 17% to 23%.
Even if better unemployment data were available, they would fail to illuminate three aspects
of the Mongolian labor market that directly affect the public pension system:
Informal sector:  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the informal sector, which in  1989
was virtually non-existent,  has  grown  substantially.  Estimates  suggest  that the  informal
sector now represents approximately 30% of GDP, a percentage that is likely to grow in the
short to medium term.
Herding  population:  A  large  percentage  of  the  population  has  returned  to  a  traditional
nomadic  herding  way of  life.  Approximately  40%  of  all working  persons  are currently
herders.  Experience  in  Mongolia,  where  participation  in  the  public  pension  system  is
currently  optional  for  herders  and  the  self  employed,  as  well  as  in  other  parts  of  the
developing world, demonstrates the difficulty in collecting pension contributions  from this
segment of the population (which is also comparatively poor).
Labor market absorption:  A very large percentage of the Mongolian population is poised to
enter the work force.  The cohorts currently between the ages of 10 and  19 and  10 and 24
constitute approximately 24% and  34% of the total population, respectively.  The entry of
these  cohorts  into  the  labor market  will  more  than  likely  result  in  (i)  higher  levels  of
unemployment,  (ii)  an  increase  in  the  size  of  the  informal  sector,  and  (iii)  dampened
productivity growth in the short to medium term.
Mongolia's  population is highly literate,'  but virtually everyone over the age of 35 entered
the workforce during the era of central planning.  The accumulation of human capital suited
to a market economy is only just beginning.
Mongolia has a total population of 2.4 million, one quarter of which live in Ulaanbaatar, the
capital city.  The remainder are spread across a land area of 1.5 million square kilometers
(about three times  the size of  France).  Mongolia  is one  of the  least  densely population
countries in the world.  Low population density, long distances between populatioT centers,
6 Official statistics for unemployment include only those persons registered with an unemployment office.
7Estimates  for literacy range from 80% to 90% of the total population.
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the poor condition (or complete absence) of roads, the lack of reliable power in most outlying
areas, and the lack of money to modernize operations within the social insurance organization
greatly increase the difficulties of administering the public pension system.
Despite strong traditions of familial support (particularly within the herding population), the
fact that a large percentage of economic activity is conducted outside the monetized economy
(and is therefore not included in official statistics), and the existence of savings in the form of
livestock, Mongolia's  informal mechanisms of support to the elderly are limited by poverty.
Estimates vary, but there is no doubt that a substantial percentage of Mongolia's  population,
perhaps between 15-25%, has difficulty meeting the basic needs of food, clothing and shelter.
Many of those poor are elderly.
II.  Analysis  of the Pension  System
The Reform
On June  10,  1999, the  Mongolian Parliament  passed  legislation  designed to  reform the
country's public pension system.  The reform will be executed in two steps.
Introduction of Individual Accounts:  In January 2000, the reform introduced a system  of
unfunded  individual accounts (also referred to  as notional  defined contribution accounts),
through  which  a  worker's  pension  will  be  determined  by  the  total  lifetime  amount  of
contributions made by the worker (and by employers on the worker's behalf).  Benefits to
current and new retirees will continue to be funded on a PAYGO basis, financed by a  19%
contribution rate, although the share paid by employees will rise from 5.5% to 7.5% and the
share paid by employers will fall from  13.5 % to  11.5%.  (The change in the contribution
rates will be accompanied by a legally mandated "gross  up" such that workers continue to
receive the same take-home pay.)  Of the  19% total contribution rate,  15% will be applied
toward  an  individual's  account.  The  remaining  4%  will  be  shown  as  a  deduction  to
contributions  used  to  fund  the  costs  of  administering  the  system  and  social  transfers,
including a minimum pension guarantee and provisions for survivor and disability pensions.
The observed three-year rolling average rate of growth in average wages will provide the rate
of return (or notional interest) applied to these accounts.  Unisex retirement tables based on
existing life expectancy will determine benefits at retirement.
Introduction  of  Partial  Funding:  The  government  views  the  introduction  of  unfunded
individual accounts as an interim step designed to manage the cost and risk of moving to a
partially  funded  system  in  the  presence  of  underdeveloped  capital  markets  and  limited
governmental resources. 8 Ultimately, contributions  from  current workers and the realized
The current balance within the general budget (current revenue minus current expenditure) was less than 2%
of GDP in 1997, the most recent year for which data was available.
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value of investments will fund pension benefits.  Starting in 2005, the government will invest
3% of the 19% total contribution rate in securities.  Over time, it will permit more funding,
with the expectation  of reaching 7.5%  investment by  the year 2020.  The timing  of this
second step of the reform will depend on developments in capital markets and in the capacity
of the fiscal envelope to pay for the cost of transition.
The use of individual pension accounts - funded in the short run on a PAYGO basis - as a
transition  mechanism  reflects  the  government's  belief  that  partial  funding  should  be
introduced  gradually in  order to  (i) minimize  investment risk,  (ii) spread  the cost  of the
transition to the general budget over time, and (iii) avoid forcing current workers to pay for
the entire cost of the transition.
The pension reform will not affect those persons who are already retired or who are close to
retirement.  Current pensioners will continue to receive their pensions under the old program
and will not be affected by the reform.  Persons born prior to  1960 will remain under the old
program.  Herders and the self-employed will participate on a voluntary basis only.
A  minimum  pension  guarantee,  set  at  20%  of  the  national  average  wage  plus  0.5% of
additional credit for each year of service  over  15 years,  will support individual accounts.
Persons with less than 15 years of service credit will not be eligible.  The reformed program
will  continue  to  provide  benefits  to  survivors  and  disabled  persons  at  levels  roughly
comparable to those provided under current law.
Fiscal Sustainability
The current pension system is not self-financing.  Transfers from the general budget finance
approximately 30% of the costs of benefits.  The decline of the wage bill brought about by
the economic crisis is the immediate cause of this situation.  However, even strong economic
growth and improvements in contribution  compliance would not result in  self-financing of
the system in the long term.  Favorable demographic trends would ease financial pressure on
the pension system for the next decade or so but would eventually reverse, causing sustained
monotonic degradation in system dependency ratios over the long term (Figure 2).  This was
one of the primary arguments cited by the coalition government for reforming the system.
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The costs of benefits under the current program expressed as a percentage of GDP are modest
by comparison with other countries but would rise over the long terrn (Figure 3).
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Contributions could be expected to  improve, but  after a short period of very modest cash
surpluses, the program would generate substantially negative cash deficits over the long term,
absent large increases in the contribution rate or other measures to curb costs (Figure 4).
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The cost of benefits expressed as a percent of taxable wages shows the same trend (Figure 5).
Figure  5.  Benefits  as  % of  Taxable  Wages  (Current  Law)
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Under the reformed system, the cost of benefits expressed as a percentage of GD:P will rise
over the long term and peak at levels substantially lower than under current law (Figure 6).
Figure  6.  Cost  of  Old Age  Pensions  as % of  GDP  (Reform)
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The system  is  expected to  generate modest  cash  surpluses after  a  period of 20-25  years
(Figure 7).
Figure  7.  Annual  Cash  Flow  Under  Reform  ($US  Millions)
2,000
1,500  _  _  __  _  _  -_  _  _
1,000  -_  _____  _____.
500
- ~  _  _  m  __  _-_ 
(500)
1997  2000  2005  2010  2015  2020  2025  2030  2035  2040  2045  205(1
Year
The cost of benefits expressed as a percentage of taxable wages illustrates the same trend and
suggests that the reformed program should be sustainable under the current 19% contribution
rate (Figure 8).
Figure  8.  Benefits  as  %  of Taxable  Wages  (Reform)
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Coverage,  Benefit-Contribution  Link  and  Distributive  Effects
In  July  1998, there  were  around  387,000  pension  fund  contributors  from  state-owned
enterprises, budgetary bodies and other enterprises with  formal labor agreements.  Private
sector  voluntary  contributors  numbered  less  than  8,000.  Overall,  this  represents  a
contributor/labor force ratio of about 50%.
The current  benefit formula provides  opportunities  for workers to  "game"  the  system  by
underreporting income until five years prior to retirement without suffering any reduction in
benefits.  In addition, the formula is difficult for many workers to understand.  This creates
incentives for the migration of the workforce  from  the formal to  the informal  economy.
Applying  a high  discount rate to  the  value  of  future pension  benefits,  workers  look  for
opportunities to negotiate informal labor agreements outside the net of the social insurance
program.  Although  Mongolia's  total  social  levy  is  quite  low,  for  many  workers  the
opportunity to increase cash income through evasion is attractive.  The lack of an obvious
connection between contributions and benefits contributes to the widespread underreporting
of income within the formal economy.  Also, the absence of an automatic mechanism for
indexing  pensions after retirement  erodes  the real  value  of pensions for  all retirees 9 and
creates  inter-generational  inequities  when  ad  hoc  measures  are  adopted  under  political
pressure from retirees.
The introduction of individual accounts under the new reforms will result in reduced benefits
for many groups in the population.  Such reductions are necessary in  order to restore the
financial  stability  of the  pension  program  over  time  and  to  depress  the  rates  of  return
currently being received by many retirees - the average benefit (expressed as a percentage of
the average wage) ranges from 30%-35%, although the benefit formula actually provides for
a replacement rate in excess of 60% with thirty years of service credit.  Such high rates of
return  are not  only unfair but,  given economic  and  demographic trends,  will necessitate
increasingly higher contribution rates or substantially lower benefits for future generations.
Given that the exact transition path to partial funding will depend upon developments in the
capital markets and on the capacity of the general budget to pay the transition costs, it is best
to conduct the distributional analysis based solely on the introduction of individual accounts.
The introduction of partial funding may result in higher than projected benefits.  The main
effects under the reformed program in comparison to current law will be the following:
*  Persons who become disabled will receive marginally higher benefits;'°
Spouses of persons who die before reaching retirement will also receive marginally
higher benefits;"
9  This was particularly true during the period 1991 to 1995, when annual inflation regularly exceeded 50%.
0 The increase in benefits is more substantial for persons with fewer years of employment.
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*  Workers eligible  for the  minimum  pension  will  receive benefits  that  are roughly
comparable to the benefits provided under current law;
*  More women will earn the minimum pension;'2
*  Workers with  full service histories (35 years or  more of employment) vwill  receive
benefits that are roughly comparable to the benefits provided under current law; and,
*  Workers with  shorter  or intermittent work histories  will receive lower benefits,  as
illustrated by Table 1.
Table 1. Replacement  Rates  Under  Current  Law and the Reform
Years of  Males  Females:  Age 60  Females:  Age 55
Service  Current  Reforrn  Current  Reform  Current  Reform
40  65.9%  59.1%  65.9%  59.1%
35  59.3%  51.7%  59.3%  51.7%  59.3%  46.0%
30  52.7%  44.3%  52.7%  44.3%  52.7%  39.5%
25  46.1%  36.9%  46.1%  36.9%  46.1%  32.9%
20  39.6%  29.5%  39.6%  29.5%  39.6%  26.3%
Administration  and Investment
The  State  Social Insurance  General  Office  (SSIGO) handles  the  operation  of  the  social
security system (e.g., collecting contributions and making payments).  The accumulation of
reserve funds under the reformed system will likely to be modest and will be used to help
finance the transition to partial funding.  It is unlikely that SSIGO will have to manage the
investment of substantial reserve funds.
The current program is, at best, neutral with respect to economic growth.  There are a number
of arguments that  can be made for the  gradual introduction of  a modest  level of funding
within the context of the public pension program,' 3 one of which is the possibility to facilitate
The increase in benefits is more substantial for spouses and dependents of workers who die with fewer years
of employment.
Approximately 24% of  women retiring  initially under the new system are  expected to be  eligible for the
minimum pension.
1I First, over the long run, aggregate  savings may be increased. Empirical evidence in support of this, of
course,  is inconclusive,  but the argument  may be more robust in Mongolia  where levels of household  savings
are among the lowest in the region.  Second, funding may mitigate the labor force and demographic  risks
resident in the financing of the current PAYGO system.  (Admittedly.,  this gain comes at the expense of
exposure  to other risks, but these new risks could, to some degree, be addressed  through legal and regulatory
oversight  and investment diversification,  particularly  if funds are invested in the financial  markets of other
countries.)  Third, funding offers, at least in theory. a more efficient mechanism for financing  retirement
income  - but  this argument  is likely  to apply only in the very long  term in Mongolia.
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development of the capital markets and improve the efficiency of capital allocation within the
economy.  Given the current state of capital market  development, however, any immediate
move to introduce funding would clearly be premature.'4
Given the state of capital market development and the limited fiscal envelope for funding
transition costs, partial funding will be introduced gradually, over a twenty-year period.  The
government  recognizes that (i) the capital markets  must be  sufficiently developed  for the
invested capital to be used efficiently to generate reasonable returns at reasonable risk,' 5 (ii)
the legal and regulatory structures required to protect  the integrity of the markets and the
interests  of  pensioners  must  be  developed  and  tested  over  time,  (iii)  the  administrative
capacity of the social insurance organization must be capable of supporting the transition to
partial funding, and (iv) the cost of transition should be spread over time in order to avoid
placing pressure on the general budget.
The total  cost  of transition is  estimated to be  approximately  90% of current  GDP.  The
government hopes to finance a substantial portion of this through cash surpluses generated by
savings in benefits achieved as a result of the reform, under the belief that transition  costs
should not be funded from increased governmental borrowing.  Preliminary estimates suggest
this may be possible, given that the introduction of partial funding will generate savings of
approximately 1.9% of GDP per year if the transition is accomplished over 20 years.
-11.  Reform  Issues  and Options
The coalition government demonstrated commendable political  resolve in passing the  1999
reform, which represents a reasonable approach to a difficutt set of issues.  The government
views the pension reform as being consistent with its stated commitments to (i) introduce
market-based economic reforms intended to encourage the development of the private capital
markets, increase economic growth and improve living standards; (ii) protect the needs of the
elderly  and  persons  close  to  retirement;  (iii) insure  that  current  workers  will  receive
reasonable  pension  benefits,  without  unreasonable  risk;  (iv)  make  the  pension  program
financially stable and eliminate its dependence on the general budget; and (v) preserve the
concepts of fairness and individual equity in how the program treats workers.
The  challenge now  before the  government  is  to  implement  the  first  step  of the  reform
successfully and carefully address the issues for the future, including:
14  The  capital  markets  in  Mongolia  are  at  the  very  earliest  stages  of  development.  The  longest-term
government securities currently have a maturity of sixty days.  There is no market for corporate bonds, and the
market for corporate equities is thin and largely illiquid.
1  Capital could, of course, be invested abroad, but the few countries have overcome the  political resistance
typically encountered by such a proposal.
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. Legal  and  regulatory  groundwork.  This  will  be  necessary  to  support  the  gradual
introduction of partial funding in 2005.
*  Administrative  capacity.  The  new  system  will  require  improvements  in  this  area,
especially regarding the introduction of partial funding and the investment function.
*  Financial market development.  The long-term fiscal health of the system, and ultimately
benefit  levels,  will  depend  on  the  maturation  of  the  financial  market  to  provide
investment options for reserve funds.
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Papua New  Guinea (PNG)*
Overview  of Formal  Old-Age  Support
The main pension  fund in the country is the National Provident  Fund (NPF), which began operation
in 1980. Under the NPF Act, participation  is obligatory for companies  with 20 or more employees
and voluntary for others.  The contribution rates are 5% of salary for employees and 7% for
employers. Eligibility  for benefits  is at age 55 (lump-sum)  or at a reduced level after six months of
unemployment. The NPF has a death/survivors benefit, a disability benefit, a housing advance
scheme, and a  voluntary school fee benefit savings scheme.  Some companies have obtained
exemptions  from the NPF and set up their own small fumds.
There are separate schemes for public sector workers and defense force personnel.  The Public
Officers Superannuation  Fund  (POSF), a mandatory  accumulation  fund scheme  for public employees
(police, civil servants  and teachers), replaced a previous defined-benefit  scheme in 1991. Member
contributions occur at a rate of 6% of salary, while the government pays its share plus accrued
accumulations  (8.4%)  only when  benefits  become available  to the  retiree. This means  that the fund is
only partially-financed  and the government bears significant deferred liabilities. The fund for the
military is known  as the Defense  Force Retirement  Benefit Fund  (DFRBF).
1.  Background
Papua New Guinea is a middle income country with a GNP per capita of US$890.  However,
most of the population - especially the 85% whose livelihood depends on agriculture, the
highest  percentage  in  the  East  Asia  and  Pacific  region  - experience  living  standards
equivalent to those in low-income countries.  In fact, poverty is widespread, with 37% of the
population living in households where the consumption level is below that needed to achieve
minimum nutritional intake and to purchase a set of minimum required nonfood items.
From  1991 to  late  1994, the  government  pursued  an  expansionary  fiscal  policy  and  an
inappropriate mix of financial and economic policies, which contributed to a steady decline
in  the  quality  and  coverage  of  basic  public  services.  A  structural  adjustment program
through  the  World  Bank's  Economic  Recovery  Program  Loan  helped  to  reestablish
macroeconomic stability.  In 1997, the East Asian financial crisis and an El Nino-induced
drought  caused a rapid drop in  PNG's  terms  of trade.  The drought  reduced agricultural
output, hindered production in some mines and decimated the food crop.  GDP declined by
4.7% during the year but rebounded to 2.5% in 1998.
The country's population of 4.8 million is still quite young, with only an estimated 7.6% over
the retirement age of 55 in 2000.  The total fertility rate remains very high  (at around  4.8
births in 1995), and life expectancy at birth is one of the lowest in the region, at 58 years in
1998.  Annual population growth is around 2.3%, and the size of the population is expected
Ian W. Mac Arthur. The World Bank  (imacarthur@worldbank.org)  prepared this  profile,  with input from
Mark C. Dorfman.
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to  double  in  30  years.  The  urban  population,  which  accounts  for  about  17% of  total
population, is growing at a rate of 4.6% per year.
11.  Analysis  of the Pension  System
Financial  Status  and  Coverage
Assets of the contractual savings sector in PNG were an estimated K 850 million (US$ 405
million) at end-1998, or 11% of GDP.  The total value of NPF's assets at end-1999 was K124
million' (US$ 47 million).  Because many of NPF's  assets are not income earning and such
income  goes  to  pay  NPF's  debt obligations,  contributions  received  during  1999 roughly
equaled the amount of benefits and withdrawals.
At end-1998 the POSF had total assets of K 528 million (US$  252 million).  The total of
contributors'  accounts was K 415 million (US$ 198 million).  Since the legislation requires
the government  to pay  its  portion of  contributions  only  when  an  employee retires,  these
amounts represent only employee accumulations plus the amount of benefits that POSF has
paid  out  and  is  awaiting  reimbursement  from  government.  The  government  has  not
undertaken a recent actuarial study to project the extent of its future liability.  However, the
amount of governnent  current arrears to  POSF for past retirees  was K 65 million at end-
1999. Finally, assets of the DFRBF were K 60 million at end-1998.
At end-1998 total membership  in the NPF  and POSF was about 160,000; in the DFRBF,
5,000.  Using the  1997 labor force estimate of 2,203,123, the total member to  labor force
ratio, or coverage,  equals 7.3%.  However, actual contributing membership is lower.  For
example, of 100,000 accounts with the NPF, only an estimated 60,000 were active in 1998.
Governance,  Administration  and Investments
The governance  structure of the NPF  and POSF places them under  government influence.
The NPF Board is government-appointed and composed of three representatives  each from
employers, trade unions and government.  The NPF Board is currently not constituted.  The
government chooses the POSF Board, consisting of three representatives each from the state
and  contributors  (police,  civil  servants  and  teachers).  In  the  case  of  the  POSF,  the
responsible government minister  may terminate the  appointment of any  board member  at
short notice.
Investment  management  decisions in  both NPF  and  POSF  have been subject to  political
influence.  Operating in a small economy with large investment concentrations, it is difficult
This figure is from the  1999 audited financial statement from the Auditor General and includes K 125 million
in  losses (primarily  due  to  revaluation)  that  have  not  been  written  to  members'  accounts  at  the  time  of
preparation of this profile.
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to  fully  divorce  such  investment  decisions  from  government  objectives  other  than
maximizing returns for members.  For example, the NPF took on a large volume of debt
obligations that compromised its liquidity position.  The POSF suffered as a result of the
Cairns  property  purchase,  which  lacked  commercial  scrutiny  according  to  the  Auditor
General's  report, and the acquisition of long-term  inscribed stock from the Bank of PNG
through the offering of repurchase options that were not invoked due to a fall in interest rates.
Partly as a result of the influences above, return on investment has generally been poor in
both  institutions. 2 Between  1992-96, annual earnings of the NPF averaged  less than 9%,
compared  to  10% inflation.  One  noted  deficiency  has  been the  lack  of  application  of
benchmarks to judge  performance against  risk  and  market alternatives.  The  Board uses
general reserves to smooth earnings rates by only apportioning a part of accumulations and
revaluation increases to members'  accounts.  At end-1999, the composition of the portfolio
was  as  follows:  equities  (mainly  PNG-based  mining  companies),  26%;  government
securities, 49%;  and properties, 24%.  Although  asset  allocation guidelines  were put into
place in 1999,3  asset allocation has shifted markedly from year to year, particularly given the
concentration in individual securities.  For example, in comparison to  1999, the June 1995
portfolio  consisted  of government  securities  (34%);  interest-bearing  deposits  (52%);  and
fiunds at  call,  equities,  loans  and  properties  (14%).  Volatility  has  resulted  due  to  high
exposure to speculative mining equities and large individual properties.
Tlhe portfolio composition of the POSF at end-1998 was 19% properties, 22% government
securities, 18% domestic interest bearing deposits, 28% quoted PNG-related shares and  13%
government development loans.  Despite the portfolio's  differences in comparison to that of
the NPF  (including the fact that POSF has no debt obligations), its performance has been
about the same, at around 9% average return during the  1990-1998.  The total return was
17% in 1998 and approximately 14% in 1999. The distributions to member accounts have in
some years been higher than investment returns, resulting in a draw down of general reserves,
while at other times (1999) they have been less than the investment returns, resulting in an
increase in the general reserves.
III.  Reform Issues and Options
The  current  government  has  recognized  the  importance  of  reforming  the  pension  and
superannuation  industry  and  has  (i)  publicly  announced  its  intent  to  undertake  reforms,
including  opening up  of  the NPF  to  competitive  management  and  drafting  and  passing
legislation regulating mandatory and  voluntary pensions  and the life insurance industry by
August, 2000; (ii) instructed the Central Bank to begin preparations to establish a pensions
2 Administration costs do not appear to be a factor in reducing return to member accounts.  The NPF expenses
amount to around 1.5% of assets under management, which is quite acceptable by international standards.  The
investment firm that manages DFRBF resources charges a fee at the same rate (i.e., 1.5%).
3These  were as  follows:  (i)  equities - 20-35%;  (ii)  government securities - 30-40%;  (iii) interest bearing
deposits - 10-20%; (iv) loans - 10-25%; (v) properties - 20-30%; and (vi) international (0%).
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and insurance oversight unit charged with carrying out the mandate in the legislation; (iii)
established a pension  reformn  working group with  broad representation  to provide input to
public policymakers as the reform process goes forward (iv) commissioned financial reviews
of the NSF and POSF; and (v) constituted a Commission of Enquiry to investigate potential
legal misconduct in the management of NPF.  The government also intends to establish an
account in the Central Bank to deposit new contributions to the NPF during an interim period
in which the institution's portfolio is restructured.
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Republic  of The Philippines*
Overview of Formal Old-Age Support
The Philippines  has a publicly managed,  defined-benefit  old-age income scheme as part of its Social
Security System (SSS), established in  1957.  Participation is compulsory for all private sector
employees and the self-employed  with monthly earnings in excess of  1,000 pesos.  The system
provides  full retirement  pension benefits  at age 60 with 120  months of contribution.  Monthly pension
benefits equal the average of a worker's most recent 60 monthly salary credits multiplied  by 2% for
each year of credited  service,  plus 300 pesos (29.47 P = US$ 1.00, 1997;  40.89 P = US$ 1.00, 1998).
Minimum  pensions  of 1,200  and 2,400 pesos are available  after at least 10 and more  than 20 years of
credited service,  respectively. A thirteenth  month pension is paid in December. Those who do not
qualify for pensions  receive  a refund  of all contributions  with interest.
Financing for the system comes from an 8.4% payroll tax on the first 12,000 pesos of monthly
earnings divided  between employees  (3.33%) and employers  (5.07%). The system is still relatively
immature,  but the level of payouts  has recently  caught up to contributions. Thus, surplus  derives  only
from investment  income. Reserves  currently  total around 5% of GDP.
In addition to the SSS, private sector workers benefit from a Mandatory Retirement Pay (MRP)
provision  that obligates  all employers  - employers  in retail, service  and agricultural  industries  with 10
or fewer employees  are exempt  - to pay retiring workers  the equivalent  of one-half  month's pay for
each year of service.  There is no pre-funding  regulation. Although no ceiling exists on earnings
levels to which the MRP mandate applies, employers  can offset occupational  pension payments or
any Home Development  Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG)  deposits that an employee  removes  at retirement
against the MRP liability.  Larger firms and those under collective bargaining contracts often
voluntarily  sponsor Tax-Qualified  Occupational  Pension  Plans (TQOPP). In fact MRP represents  a
minimum  pension  level, and the TQOPPs  act as a means  of offering  more generous  pensions.
Public sector  employees  are not members  of the SSS,  but rather, of a similar scheme,  the Government
Services  Insurance  System (GSIS). Calculation  of retirement  benefits, available at age 60, involves
multiplying  the average of a worker's most recent 36 months of salary credits by 2.5% per year of
credited service. GSIS members contribute  9% of earnings  up to 12,000  pesos a month and 2% of
their earnings above that ceiling, while the employers  pay 12% of all earnings, which includes life
insurance  (4%). The GSIS is slightly  more mature  than the SSS but has reserves of 4.2% of GDP.
A final mandatory  savings mechanism  is the Home Development  Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG),  which
covers SSS and GSIS members  - although participation  is voluntary  for those with monthly  income
less than 4,000 pesos.  Contributions  are 4% (divided by employee and employer) for monthly
earnings between 4,000 and 5,000 pesos.  Thus, the maximum total monthly contribution  is 200
pesos, but employees  may contribute  extra without the employer  matching it.  The funds primarily
finance  housing  loans, but balances  are available  at retirement  or after 20 years of contribution.
Yvonne Sin, (ysin@worldbank.org) and Ian W. Mac Arthur (imacarthur@worldbank.org), The World Bank,
HDNSP, prepared this profile, with inputs from Alberto Musalem, CMD (amusalem@worldbank.org).
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1.  Background
Up until the early 1960s the Philippines'  per capita GDP was second only to Japan's  in the
entire Asian region.  However, the country's  economic performance suffered as a result of the
political turmoil during the Marcos era, including the "People Power" revolution and various
coup attempts.'  More recently, steady economic growth has resumed (except in  1991-92),
transforming the country from the "poor man" of the region to one of Asia's fastest emerging
economies.  A  key  factor  in  this  recovery was  the  government's  renewed dedication  to
macroeconomic  stability  and  export-oriented  growth.  Government  strategies  included
improving infrastructure, overhauling the tax system to bolster revenues and moving toward
further  deregulation  and  privatization  of  the  economy.  Filipinos  experienced  tangible
benefits in the form of reduced unemployment and underemployment.
The East Asian financial crisis in 1997 did not affect the Philippines as much as some other
Asian  countries,  but  the El  Niho-induced drought  caused problems,  particularly  in  rural
areas. 2 Real GDP growth decelerated from 5.2% in 1997 and was slightly negative in  1998,
but the recovery  in  1999 brought back positive  growth of  at an  estimated rate  of 3.2%.
During the crisis, along with the unexpected plunge of the Philippine peso, the stock market
dropped, leading to  increased lending rates from private  banks and a higher inflation rate.
Through  February  1998,  layoffs  attributed  to  the  crisis  were  reportedly  under  20,000,
although the increase in unemployment may have also been associated with a slowdown in
new hiring.  The regional nature of the crisis likely reduced remittances, both from abroad
and between urban and rural areas. This likely  impaired the ability of informal safety nets to
mitigate some of the effects of the crisis, at a time when the drought conditions heightened
the need for these informal networks.
The labor force  in  1998 amounted  to  30.2 million  of a  total  population  of  around  76.1
million.  Among those employed, about 40% worked in agriculture, fishing and forestry.  Up
until the recent economic downturn, the overall level of unemployment had been decreasing
steadily - from a high of 12% in the mid-eighties to below 9%.3 The downturn did not result
in a  marked increase in the unemployment rate, which  rose marginally from 8.7%  in  July
1997 to  8.9%  a  year  later.  This  likely  relates  to  the  large  informal  economy  in  the
Philippines, whose workers are among the most  vulnerable to  falling demand, but  whose
numbers will not appear in official unemployment figures.
GDP per capita (in ppp terms) equaled about US$ 2,600  in 1996, less than that for China and significantly
below that of Thailand.
2The  impact of the crisis has probably been greatest on the poor, who are concentrated in rural areas where the
effects of the drought were strongest.  Moreover, one of the fastest rising components of the price  index has
been the  food  item category.  Because  the poor  spend  proportionately  more  on  food, they  feel the  price
increases more severely.
3Unemployment  has  always been  higher in the  two  largest regions,  National  Capital Region  and  Central
Luzon, ranging from two to twelve percentage points above the national average.
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Despite a less dramatic reduction in fertility in comparison to other countries of the region,
population aging has still resulted from lower fertility and improvements in life expectancy.
The total fertility rate decreased by nearly 45%, from 6.39 in 1970 to 3.64 in 1996, owing in
part to the wider use of contraception - the contraceptive prevalence rate rose from  15% in
1968 to 47% in 1997. A recent survey of demographic and family planning indicators found
that the vast majority of married women (81%) wanted either to space their next birth or to
limit childbearing altogether.  Given these indications, demographers anticipate that the TFR
will continue to decrease, stabilizing around 2.10 by the year 2020.
Life expectancy at birth for males and females rose from 56 and 59 years in 1970 to 65 and
71 years in 1995, respectively.  However, this improvement is not very favorable relative to
other  countries  in  the  region  at  a  similar  level  of  socioeconomic  development  (e.g.,
Thailand's  male life expectancy at birth now stands at 70).  The proportion of the population
aged 65 and over is currently 5.8% (slightly higher than in other Asian countries, around 4%)
and is expected to reach 15.6% in 2040.
A central issue in social program planning in the Philippines is significant income inequality.
The 1997 Family Income and Expenditure Survey revealed that income shares for families in
the first to the ninth deciles had declined.  Only families in the richest, i.e., the tenth, decile
experienced an  increase in their  income  share (of 4.2 percentage  points).  Moreover, the
average income of families belonging to the tenth decile is now 23.8 times higher than that of
families  in  the  first  decile  (compared  to  19 times  in  1994).  An  increase  in  the  Gini
coefficient  (from 0.4507 in  1994 to  0.4960 in  1997) for income  distribution corroborates
these findings.
Traditionally,  the  close family  ties  of  the  Filipinos  have  provided  the  primary  support
mechanism for the old, the sick and the otherwise economically dependent.  However, they
are showing signs of weakening, at least in the heavily urbanized areas.  The impact of the
economic crisis on the elderly was unclear, but unemployment, wage cuts and falling margins
in the informal sector may have strained the elderly care function of the extended family.
As a result of growing income inequality and strain on the informal  support system, apart
from focusing on economic growth, the government has also directed attention more recently
towards poverty alleviation and social protection. 4 At one level, this has taken the form of
improving access to quality education and health services.  Also, the Department of Social
Welfare  and Development and the National  Anti-Poverty  Commission  sponsor livelihood
programs and programs for the disabled and the elderly, as well as emergency assistance to
crisis victims.  The previous government called for the creation of a new provident fund to
4  Former  President Fidel Ramos  created a  Social Protection  Coordinating  Committee  (SPCC) in  1996 that
continues under the current administration of President Joseph Estrada.  The committee bears the mandate of
reviewing social protection programs in the country and making appropriate recommendations.
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further improve retirement  income provisions. 5 Existing schemes have evolved over time;
inevitably, there  are gaps  as well as  overlaps that  may affect their  overall  efficiency and
effectiveness. The government has recognized the need for reform and taken several steps to
improve the retirement income system.
11.  Analysis  of the Pension  System
Benefit  Design  and  Coverage
The benefit formulas of the SSS and GSIS schemes offer high replacement rates and allow
for the introduction of certain distortions.  The average GSIS retiree in the 1993-97 period
received a 71% replacement rate of average monthly compensation, and, because of the high
minimum pensions, the average SSS retiree in 1997 enjoyed an 89% replacement rate of final
salary.  While the SSS benefits those in  lower income brackets more than those in higher
income  brackets  - still,  all  members  eventually  receive  more  in  benefits  than  the
contributions they made - the benefits of the GSIS are purely earnings-related.
The SSS uses a retirement  benefit calculation formula - based  on the number of years of
credited service (CYS), an accrual factor (2% for each CYS), and the average of the final 60
reported monthly salary credits - that creates a weak benefit-contribution link and, therefore,
the possibility for manipulation.  Until five years prior  to retirement,  reporting more than
minimum earnings triggers payment of higher contributions without any increase in the size
of benefits.  To the extent that workers discount the possibility of needing death, disability or
sickness benefits in the near future, they will perceive no particular reason for insisting that
employers report accurately until the last five years of their career.
A further incentive to underreport comes from the definition of CYS.  Under the law, any
individual who reports 1,000 pesos in earnings for each of at least 6 calendar months receives
credit  for a  year  of service.  Once  this  occurs,  reporting  additional  months  of  earnings
increases the amount of contributions due but not the size of the future retirement pension.
Finally, the minimum pension benefit under the law is 1,200 pesos per month for at least 10
years of credits and 2,400 pesos for 20 years of credits.  This presents an attractive situation
for anyone who can control the amount of reported earnings so as to contribute the minimum
required for 10 years and then collect the minimum pension (i.e., a career contribution of
10,080 pesos 6 will yield a 2,400 pesos monthly benefit for life).
The proposal to establish a National Provident Fund System (NPFS) is patterned  after  Singapore's  Central
Provident Fund.  The proposed contribution rate is 5% of monthly salary in excess of 5,000 pesos up to four
times the ceiling of the regular SSS program, to be shared equally by the employer and employee.
6The calculation is as follows:  (1,000 pesos/mo.)(6 mo./year)(20 years)(.084) =  10,080 pesos.  A worker needs
120 months  of  contributions  (10,080  pesos)  to  be  eligible  for  any  pension.  The  same  120  months,  if
strategically placed, will qualify him/her for the 20 year pension of 2,400.
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The GSIS uses  an earnings-related  formula, based  on the last 36 months  of earnings, to
determine  benefits.  As  a  result,  it  may  experience  problems  in  terms  of  strategic
manipulation  (e.g.,  attempting  to  gain  promotion  shortly  before  retirement)  and
disproportionately high benefits for workers with steep age-earnings profiles.
In the absence of systematic methods for indexing earnings credits and benefits under both
the SSS and GSIS, workers retiring during times of high inflation can end up receiving less
adequate benefits than those retiring during periods of low inflation.  This situation is likely
to affect the lower income workers more, and in the absence of any reasonable safety net,
they would also be the most vulnerable.  Nevertheless, over the long run, ad-hoc adjustments
in benefit levels have generally keep pace with  inflation.  For example, between  1990 and
1997, the SSS raised pensions nine times, which equated to an average annual increase of
11.9%. Over the same period, the inflation rate averaged 10% per year.
In principle, the SSS and GSIS cover virtually the entire workforce, but effective coverage is
fairly low.  According to the SSS, contributing members in 1997 numbered 6.3 million out of
a  labor force  of  30.3 million, resulting  in  a  coverage ratio  of  around  21%.  Even  after
adjusting for the unemployed (2.4 million), unpaid family workers (3.7 million),  overseas
contract workers (660,000), and public  sector workers (2.2 million), there should be a total
contributing membership on the order of 22 million.  Furthermore, as of the end of 1997, the
cumulative number of workers registered  over the years with  SSS was only  19.1 million.
Clearly, some workers have never registered in the system, and as seen above, those that have
registered  may  not  report any  or all  of their  earnings in  a  given  year.  Of 2.2  million
employees working in government and state corporations, there are only around 1.6 million
GSIS members.'
Retirement  benefits  and  coverage  of the  mandatory retirement  pay  scheme, tax-qualified
occupational pension plans and Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG) vary by class
of worker and individual situations, and there is little quantitative information available on
these provisions.  The MRP applies only to workers in firms with more than 10 employees,
and the occupational plans effectively reach only the subset of relatively better-off employees
since they are a mechanism to attract and retain skilled labor - the plans offset the MRP and
pay somewhat higher benefits.  The MRP lacks portability due to long vesting periods (over
5 years) and provides  lump-sum benefits only.  Many employers bypass the regulation by
hiring workers on temporary contracts.  At this point, Pag-IBIG does not supply significant
retirement  benefits  as  around  80%  of  funds  are  invested  in  housing  and  20  years  of
compulsory  coverage  have  not  yet  accumulated  - the  time  after  which  members  may
withdraw the accumulated balance.
7  There are  separate systems for members of  the  armed forces  and the judiciary,  and  casuals,  contract and
agency workers are not eligible for membership in the GSIS.
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Fiscal  Sustainability
The short-term financial status of the SSS is quite strong.  At the end of  1997, the Social
Security Fund  held  129 billion  pesos  (5%  of  GDP).  This  is  a  result  of  the  system's
immaturity, reflected in a fairly high ratio of contributors to pensioners (9.7).  While there is
presently  a  surplus of  16 billion  pesos,  current  contribution  income  is  roughly  equal to
current payouts, so that investment income is the only source of additional surplus.
Despite this seemingly healthy position for the time being, World Bank projections indicate
that payouts will exceed income for the first time by 2019 and will deplete the reserve fund
by around 2026.  At that point, the contribution rate would have to increase from its current
level of 8.4% to 13% for the system to be able to continue on a pay-as-you-go basis, and by
2060, the contribution rate would need to be about 28%, which is clearly not viable given the
other statutory mandated savings contributions.
Options to improve the long-terrn financing of the system include lowering the benefits level,
removing the minimum pension  guarantee and increasing retirement age.  These measures
could reduce the projected required contribution rate (possibly to as low as 15%, depending
on the magnitude of the changes).  However, if the minimum benefit of  1,200 pesos were
repealed, it would be desirable  to replace it with  a comprehensive budget-financed  social
assistance program, which is currently lacking.
The situation of the GSIS is similar to that of the SSS.  The fund had accumulated 109 billion
pesos (4.2% of GDP) by the end of 1997 and bears a current surplus of  17.6 billion pesos.
The  GSIS is  slightly  maturer  than the  SSS but  still  has  a  high  ratio  of  contributors  to
pensioners (8.2).  However, payouts will exceed income for the first time by 2030, and this
will deplete the reserve fund by around 203 8.'  At that point, the contribution rate would have
to increase from the current level of 21% to 41% for the program to be able to maintain its
high replacement ratio on a pay-as-you-go basis.
The mandatory retirement pay scheme may represent a significant unfunded  liability in the
future. This is because Pag-IBIG will eventually reach the 20-year limit and members will be
able to withdraw balances before retirement.  Thus, the Pag-IBIG funds will no longer be
available as an offset to the MRP.
Investments,  Administration  and Tax Treatment
Traditionally, publicly managed contractual savings schemes in the Philippines have invested
their assets in a way that has given preference to  social goals as opposed to just  financial
8In  addition, the government is not current with its contributions to GSIS and Pag-lBIG, which is an important
source of retirement income for many.
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return, but this practice eventually compromises the fiscal health of the schemes.  From 1985
to 1995 the average inflation-deflated rate of return on SSS investments was 7.03%, while the
GSIS generally performs  more poorly  (for example,  6.6% in  1995).  These returns  were
below  market  rates  - for  example, treasury  bills  rendered  11.8%  in  1995.  The  poor
performance results  from the composition of the investment portfolios, which bear a high
percentage of investments in low-yield public projects (especially with the SSS) and loans to
the government  sector and to contributing members  (more typical of the GSIS) at below-
market interest rates (Annex 1).9  Moreover, both SSS and GSIS manage their reserves in-
house and are not totally free from political interference.  In 1997, they were authorized to
contract out their fund management, and both institutions are in the process of seeking the
services of external fund managers (local or foreign).
The passage  of new  amendments to  the  SSS  and  GSIS  laws has  resulted  in  improved
investment guidelines and policies.  For example, the adjustment in investment ceilings for
SSS now allows for greater investment in some areas (high-yield) while limiting it in others:
private securities (40%); housing (35%); real estate (30%); short- and medium-term member
loans  (10%);  GFIs  and  corporations  (30%);  infrastructure projects  (30%);  any  particular
industry  (15%);  and  foreign investments  (7.5%).  The  investment policies  for  GSIS  are
different,  for example,  it has  to  invest  a minimum  of 40%  in  member  loans,  including
housing.  Also, the SSS has reduced its interest subsidies on loans.  Still, shortfalls remain in
several  areas,  such  as  the  requirement  for  investment  grade  bonds,  minimum  yield
benchmarks, exposure limits, etc.
Since the govermment guarantees the solvency of the SSS, GSIS, and Pag-IBIG, different
laws  currently enable  it  (via the President  and  the  Congress) to  gain  access to  relevant
information.  The new SSS law requires annual public reports of activities, and an actuarial
report of SSS is due at least once every four years.  Similarly, the new GSIS law mandates an
actuarial valuation every three years, and the Insurance Commission must  also review the
GSIS  insurance business  with  the  same frequency.  Additionally,  Congress  conducts an
assessment of Pag-IBIG every three years.
Key administrative challenges for the retirement schemes involve closing the compliance gap
and reducing operating costs.  Recent initiatives by the SSS to improve collections produced
substantial results - an increase of roughly 60% between  1990 and  1997.  Nevertheless, a
huge coverage gap  still remains.  The changes to  the SSS legislation allowed  for stricter
handling  of  violators  (mainly  employers),  but  this  will  help  only  marginally,  and  low
compliance will remain as long as the underlying incentives for evasion and collusion persist
in the benefit-contribution structure.  Regarding operating expenses, the publicly  managed
schemes perform rather poorly.  The ratio of administrative expenses to contributions is high
9Such  transactions (providing subsidized loans and low reliance on capital market instruments) are one of the
reasons why capital markets in Philippines are underdeveloped.
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for both  the SSS (10.7% in  1995) and the GSIS (10.8% in  1996), especially compared to
other countries in the region, such as Malaysia (1.99% in  1989) and Singapore (0.53% in
1990).'° Ultimately, this can have an impact on the financial performance of the schemes.
The  tax  treatment  of  contractual  savings  in  the  Philippines  is  complex  and  sometimes
inefficient  because  it  taxes  more  than  once  and  gives  some  institutions  a  competitive
advantage.  In essence, SSS and GSIS provided TEE status to employees'  plan contributions
up until  April  1999, since then its  status  changed to  EEE,  which  is the  same treatment
granted  to  employers'  share  of  the  contributions." 1 Pag-IBIG  and  Tax-Qualified
Occupational Pension Plans (TQOPP) receive TTE status for employees'  contributions and
ETE for employers' contributions.  However, the complexities come from differences in the
corporate income tax treatment, the implicit tax on publicly managed schemes resulting from
restricted  investments,  and,  in  some  cases,  the  requirement  to  pay  withholding  tax  on
investments.  Ideally, it would be more equitable and much simpler if all forms of contractual
savings experienced the same tax treatment.  The two preferred  approaches are EET and
TEE.  The EET regime is more credible than TEE because the latter will always present the
uncertainty of whether the government might also decide to tax benefits.
III.  Reform  Issues  and Options
Retirement income provision in  the Philippines suffers from the lack of a coherent policy
framework.  In particular, there are unresolved questions about the desired combined level of
earnings replacement and benefit  distribution,  as well as the role  assumed by the various
mandated programs.  The government has indicated that it will appoint a special commission
to  develop  recommendations  for  a  comprehensive  reform  agenda,  which  should  address
issues such as:
*  Sustainable financing of the SSS and GSIS.  The schemes have high replacement rates of
over 70%.  The current level of contribution will not support such high benefits in the
long  run considering  demographic trends.  Thus,  fundamental  changes  in  the benefit
structure  may  be  necessary,  in  addition  to  other  measures,  to  ensure  the  schemes'
financial viability.
*  Systematic  inflation  protection  for  retirement  benefits.  Neither  the  SSS  nor  GSIS
adequately accounts for the effects of inflation on retirement benefits.  Both make only ad
hoc adjustments, a process that results  in lack of security during  intermediate periods.
10  The size of the contribution rate distorts  this ratio, making comparisons between countries more difficult.
Thus, these results should be interpreted with caution but still offer a general idea as to the relative efficiency of
the different schemes.
11 The  Bureau  of  Internal  Revenue  announced  on  January  14,  1999,  that  as  part  of  the  government's
Comprehensive Tax Reform Program (which  became law  in  1997), employees'  payments to the  SSS or the
GSIS will no longer be subject to tax starting in April 1999.  Benefit payments will remain tax exempt.
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The poor are most vulnerable under these circumstances, when the marginal difference
can affect their consumption  of necessary goods.  Even though  the current method  of
correction for inflation has maintained the value of benefits over the long run, there needs
to be a better mechanism of systematic protection.  The indexation of benefits to inflation
(i.e., adjustment on  a  regular  basis  with  an  appropriate period, considering  trends  in
inflation) is the obvious solution.
. Reduction  in  evasion  and  non-compliance.  In  order  to  attain  the  schemes'  goal  of
universality and equity, corrections should be made regarding overly generous crediting
and incentives for under-reporting (essentially improving the benefit-contribution link).
The distortions are readily identifiable and relate mainly to basing benefits on final career
salary (last  5  and 3 years for  SSS and  GSIS, respectively), the definition of years  of
credited service (i.e., 6 months  of reported earnings in the SSS) and the provision  for
minimum pensions (SSS).
The SSS has a good track record in improving collections.  It should capitalize on this
momentum to develop and fully implement a comprehensive and systematic approach for
managing the collection process.  With advances in  information technology, it will be
much easier to build automated systems for tracking employer compliance.
*  Improving administrative efficiency.  Operating expenses for the SSS and GSIS are very
high for publicly managed schemes, considering their centralized nature and the fact that
they can avoid the marketing costs that private schemes encounter.
*  Sound fund management and regulation to  improve returns, develop financial markets
and  avoid  too-high  risk.  The  recent  legislation  has  created  a  better  structure  for
maximizing investment return on contractual savings assets and stimulating the growth of
capital markets.  The financial sector is currently underdeveloped largely because of the
practice of holding assets in government loans and illiquid securities.  But as more of the
investment shifts toward  equities, the retirement  income  system  itself can serve  as a
driving force for the creation of new financial institutions through the allocation of capital
to increase future earnings and pension levels.
However, since the government guarantees the solvency of the public contractual savings
institutions, it would be advisable to establish closer supervision, given the potential risk
exposure.  An independent agency, reporting directly to the President of the Philippines
and  staffed  by  professionals  with  the  required  actuarial  expertise,  will  ensure  the
application of uniform actuarial standards to the disclosure of material by insurance and
pension providers and ongoing monitoring in a fair and consistent manner.
Uniform tax taxation treatment of retirement provisions.  Treatment under the SSS and
GSIS is essentially EEE, which creates inequity in a context  of limited coverage since
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those outside the system do not receive the tax break.  Different tax regimes govern Pag-
IBIG and the TQOPPs, which creates an overall "competitive imbalance."  It would be
best to adopt a single expenditure tax approach (TEE or EET) to all retirement provisions
in order to establish fairness and efficiency.
*  Creation of a safety net.  A basic universal safety net for the elderly poor, financed from
general  tax  revenues,  currently  does  not  exist  but  would  help  accomplish  poverty
reduction and redistribution without the distortions associated with redistributive pension
schemes.  The need for a safety net would be even more pressing if the SSS removed the
minimum pension provision in its effort to establish a stricter benefit-contribution link.
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Allocation  As of August, 1998  1997  1996
Amount (pesos, m)  % of total  Amount (pesos, m)  % of total  Amount (pesos, m)  % of total
sss
Government sector  55,594  37.7  50,289  36.0  45,512  37.7
Private sector  27,058  18.3  26,116  18.7  22,513  18.6
I-Housing  43,924  29.8  41,592  29.8  36,002  29.8
Real estate  5,105  3.5  4,950  3.5  2,772  2.3
Member loans  15,853  10.7  16,702  12.0  13,988  11.6
Fotal  147,534  100.0  139,649  100.0  120,787  100.0
GSIS
Member loans  ..  ..  ..  41.62  ..  42.62
.not  available
Soulce:  SSS Corporate Planning Department; GSIS Actuarial Services
0
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Singapore*
Overview  of Formal  Old-Age  Support
The main  component of Singapore's  social security system is the Central Provident Fund (CPF),  a
mandatory, publicly managed, defined contribution system based on individual accounts. In addition,
Singapore  has  a  stringent  means-tested  public  assistance  scheme  officially  designed  to  provide
benefits lower than the minimum subsistence level of income.!
Aside from the CPF, two other pension systems operate in Singapore.  The first is a non-contributory
scheme for government employees.  Until 1973 all govemment employees were eligible; however, in
the 1973 and  1987 conversion exercises, pensionable employees  had the choice to shift to the CPF,
which produced mixed results.  Presently, only new officers in the designated pensionable services
(administrative,  senior police and intelligence) and political appointees  are on the pension scheme.
As of January 31,  1999, there were 19,000 pensioners, but as restrictions on eligibility become fully
effective their number should decline.  In 1997-98 government expenditure on gratuities and pensions
was  S$ 569.5  million, 2 equivalent  to  3.7%  of operating  expenditure  or  17.9% of  expenditure  on
manpower.  The  pensionable  employees  may  choose  monthly  pension  until  death,  a  lump  sum
payment,  or a combination  of the two.  In 1995, the  government  set up  a  separate  Pension Fund
through  a  contribution  from  accumulated  budgetary  surpluses,  which  it  supplements  with  annual
contribution from the general budget.  As of March 31, 1998, the Pension Fund had a balance of S$
11,657 million,  slightly  less  than  the  S$  11,770 million  in  the  previous  year.  In  spite  of the
government's  creation of some funding, the  system is still based  on  a non-contributory, unfunded
principle and functions on a "pay-as-you-go" basis.  This approach is in sharp contrast to that of the
CPF scheme for the rest of the population.
The  second pension scheme  is the  provident fund scheme  for  certain  categories  of armed  forces
personnel  called  the  Savings  and  Employees  Scheme  (the  "Saver  Scheme"),  which  came  into
existence  on March  20,  1998.  A Board of Trustees appointed  by the Arned  Forces Council will
manage  the  fund  with  inputs  from  professional  fund managers  and  the  Monetary  Authority  of
Singapore, the country's  de-facto Central Bank.  Unlike pensions, the balances  in the Saver Scheme
will not be taxed; there will be no salary ceiling on contributions; and those belonging to the fund will
continue to enjoy post-retirement medical benefits as before.  This scheme is more generous than the
CPF - it is designed to encourage military officers to stay in service for 20-25 years and retire at age
40-45, with benefits similar to those of civilians retiring at age 55.  Essentially, the scheme provides
for benefits equivalent to 10-  12% (20% for super scale officers) of an officer's  gross monthly income
to be deposited into an account which can be withdrawn after serving a specified period of time.  This
is in addition to the normal CPF contribution by employers.
Mukul G. Asher, National University of Singapore (mppasher@nus.edu.sg) prepared this profile, and Ian W.
Mac Arthur, The World Bank (imacarthur@worldbank.org) revised it.
Families receive monthly assistance ranging from SS 200 for one adult person household - equivalent to only
6.1% of the 1997 per capita GDP of SS 39,310-to  a maximum of SS 570 for a 4 person household consisting
of one adult and three children.  In January 1999, there were only 2,086  beneficiaries of public assistance, of
which 1,701 were aged destitutes (Singapore, Department of Statistics, February 1999).
2 In mid-April 1999, US$ I = S$ 1.70.
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1.  Background
Singapore is an affluent city-state with a 1997 per capita income of US$ 32,940 (US$ 29,000
in ppp terms) for its resident population, the fourth highest in the world (The 'Wvorld  Bank,
*1998).  In mid-1998 its  total  population  was 3.87 million, while  its  resident population,
comprising citizens and permanent residents,  was 3.16 million (Singapore, Department  of
Statistics,  1999).  Thus, the short-term  foreign population  accounts for  18.2% of the total
population and 22.2% percent of the resident population. 3
Demographic trends in Singapore, including a declining fertility rate, have produced one of
the oldest populations in East Asia.  The growth rate of the resident population  has been
around 2.0% per annum in recent years.  This is the result of significant net immigration, as
the total fertility rate has been below the replacement level since 1975. In 1997 the TFR was
1.64 - a rate of 2.10 is needed for the population to replace itself.
The median age of the resident population  has  increased from 28.3 years  in  1987 to  32.6
years in 1997, and the dependency ratio (residents under 15 years and those 60 years and over
divided by the residents  aged 15-59 years)  rose  from 47.6 to  48.7 over  the same period
(Singapore, Department of Statistics, 1998).  The proportion of the resident population over
60 years of age increased from 8.5% of the total in 1987 to 10.1% in 1998.  As a result, the
old age dependency ratio (those 60 years and over divided by those 15-59 years of age) has
grown from 12.6% in 1987 to 15.0% in 1997.  It is estimated that by the year 2030. 29.4% of
the  resident  population  of  Singapore  will  be  above  60  years  of  age,  while  the  elderly
dependency ratio will jump to 43.9%.  Moreover, the average annual population growth rate
has begun to exceed the labor force growth rate, and this trend is expected to accelerate.
In 1998 the number of "old-old" (i.e., those above 75 years of age) was about 86,000, little
over a  quarter of those above 60 years of age.  Life expectancy at birth in  1997 was 75.0
years for males and 79.2 years for females (Singapore, Department of Statistics, 1998).  It is
well established that the "old-old" require long-term care, which is quite labor intensive and
significantly increases health care costs.  Since the current retirement age is 62 years - which
will be gradually increased to 67 - the average retiree will require retirement financing for a
considerable period of time.
The presence of foreign workers in such large numbers has enhanced the economic and tax base available to
finance  the  social  security needs of  the  resident workers.  However, it  severely constrains  soc::al security
options because the highly open economy is very much dependent on capital and professional manpower, both
of which exhibit considerable factor elasticity, requiring the tax burden on them to be kept low.  Therefore, the
individual must finance the majority of his or her social security needs.
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II.  Analysis  of  the Pension  System
The British colonial administration  set up the CPF under the Central  Provident Fund Act,
which came into force on July  1, 1955.4  A Statutory Board appointed  by the Minister of
Labor, with representatives of employers, unions, government and professional experts, runs
the  CPF.  Currently,  only  those  employees  who  are  Singapore  citizens  and  permanent
residents are required to  contribute to  the CPF.  Foreign  workers, including  professional
expatriates, are exempt, and voluntary pension contributions by them or their employers are
not  tax  deductible.  The  CPF,  being  a  provident  fund,  is  based  on  portable  individual
accounts that remain with  the employee through job  transitions. 5 The entire  accumulated
balances belong to the member's estate at death but are not subject to estate duties.
Particularly since 1968, the government has vastly expanded the role of the CPF to achieve
financing for a wide variety of social, political and other objectives.  These include home
ownership, pre-retirement investment, insurance (life, home and  health), tertiary education
within  Singapore, medical  coverage  (including  the  self-employed),  and  regular  monthly
income after age 62 (through the minimum sum scheme) (Annex 1).  Thus, the CPF is not
simply a social security scheme but also a primary socioeconomic policy making tool.
Contribution  Rates
To accommodate the ambitious goals reflected in this variety of schemes, the contribution
rates from the employers and employees and maximum monthly contribution have increased
gradually but significantly (Annex 2).  Thus, the governnent  raised the nominal contribution
rate of  10% at the inception of the CPF  in a series of steps to  50% by July  1984.  As a
measure to combat the 1985-86 recession, it reduced the rate to 35%.  Only in July 1994 did
the government achieve its then long-term rate goal of 40%, with  equal contribution rates
from the employers and the employees.  However, the East Asian crisis necessitated a sharp
reduction in the contribution rate from 40% to 30% as of January 1, 1999.  Initially the cut is
for a period of two years.  Any restoration to the 40% rate would have to be phased in slowly
because  policy  makers  regard  high  CPF  contribution  rates  as  the  main  contributor  to
Singapore's lack of cost competitiveness.
The contribution rates are applicable to a maximum monthly wage of S$ 6,000 per month,
which is 2.4 times the average monthly earnings (excluding employers'  contribution to the
CPF) in 1998 of S$ 2,549 (Republic of Singapore, Department of Statistics,  1999).  In 1997
only 5.5% of the contributors earned above $ 6,000 per month (Annex 3).
Notwithstanding the  special pension  schemes  described  in the  Overview, the  CPF  is the  most  important
scheme in Singapore and is the sole subject of analysis of this section.
5Members  of the CPF get annual account statements, and a telephone hotline and website allow members to
obtain useful information and check on their account status.
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Coverage
In  analyzing the  coverage  data  (Annex 4),  there  is  a  distinction  between  members  and
contributors.  Any individual who has contributed even once during his or her working  life
becomes a member.  In contrast, a contributor is a member who is actively contributing at
any given point in time.  The contributors to labor force ratio, after reaching a peak in 1984 at
72.3%, declined to slightly less than two-thirds by  1997.  While this ratio is sensitive to the
rate  of  unemployment,  during  the  1983-97  period,  unemployment  in  the  country  was
minimal. 6 Those excluded from the scheme, about one-third of the labor force, are foreign
workers, the self-employed, and some  low-paid contract workers.  Since even the foreign
professionals have been fully excluded since September 1998, the coverage ratio is expected
to decline slightly.
The proportion of the members who are contributors has been declining steadily during the
1983-97 period, from 5  1.5%  in  1983 to 44.0%  in  1997.  The 1997 membership  of 2.782
million was nearly 90% of the total resident population.  In  1997 the following industries
accounted for the bulk of the  1.224 million contributors to the CPF:  commerce,  297,100
(24.3%); manufacturing, 275,100 (22.5%); financial and business services 225,500 (18.4%);
other services 218,400 (17.8%); and, construction, 80,000 (6.6%).
As of December 31, 1998, the number of employers paying CPF contributions was 99,589, a
slight decline from  103,194 as of March 31,  1998 (CPF-PAL Internet website).  The self-
employed (defined as those who are not employees) numbered 242,400 in 1997, or  12.9% of
the total labor force (Republic of Singapore, Department of Statistics,  1998).  While  it is
compulsory for the self-employed to contribute to the Medisave scheme, this is not the case
for the CPF.  However, they can join voluntarily and avoid tax deductions on contributions.
Contributions  and  Withdrawals
Contributions  to  the  CPF  are  divided  into  three  accounts:  the  Ordinary  Account,  the
Medisave  Account  and  the  Special  Account.  The  Ordinary  Account  may  be  used  for
housing, investments and other such purposes.  As of January  1, 1999, those under 55 years
of age contribute between 22-24% of the applicable wage to this account depending on age.
The Medisave Account enables members to pay for perrnitted hospitalization and out patient
costs and to pay premium for health insurance for major illnesses, called Medishield.  The
premium for Medishield rises with age.  Those above age 75 years, who are most in need but
often cannot afford the medical care, are not covered.  Deductibles, co-payment, yearly and
life time limits, etc. mean that between one-third to two-thirds of the hospital bill (excluding
Except for 1987, when it was 4.0%, unemployment has hovered around 2.0% of the labor force (Republic  of
Singapore. Department of Statistics, 1998).
4 of 21Annex BI0:  Country Profilefor  Singapore
post-hospitalization care) will still need to be paid by individual members. 7 As of December
31, 1998, Medishield schemes served about two million members and dependants (CPF-PAL
Internet website),  slightly less than two-thirds  of the population.  Thus,  one-third  of the
population does not even have the basic catastrophic health  insurance.  As  of January  1,
1999, those under 55 years of age contribute between 6-8% of the applicable  wage to this
account depending upon age.
The Special Account is meant for retirement.  Before the reduction in the contribution rate on
January  1, 1999, 4.0% of the contributions  went to this  account.  However,  since the rate
reduction,  the  account  is  receiving  no  contributions.  If  this  continues  the  retirement
provision may be adversely affected.
Member  contributions  as  a  percentage  of  GDP,  after  reaching  a  peak  of  15.4%  in  the
recession year of 1985, have shown a tendency to decline, reaching 11.1% in 1997.  A similar
pattern has prevailed for the contributions as a percentage of Gross National Savings (GNS).
After reaching a peak of 36.2% in 1985, this indicator subsequently fell to 2 1.  1% in 1997.
Net contributions (contributions less withdrawals) vary annually (Annex 4), yet high rates of
withdrawal  for  various  purposes  (Annex  1) may  compromise  retirement  funding.  The
withdrawals as a percentage of contributions have ranged from a low  of 38.3% in 1983 to
105  .0% in 1993. In 1998, withdrawals were 85.1% of contributions.
In  most  years  well over  half  of  all  withdrawals  have  been  for  housing,  reflecting  the
importance  of the  CPF  in  financing  housing  from  the  demand  side. 8 Under  the  CPF
Approved Housing Scheme purchasers  may withdraw their  CPF  savings to  pay  the 20%
down payment  and to  service  monthly mortgage  installments  for purchasing  government
constructed housing (for details see Phang and Asher, 1997, 305-307).  Since March 1986,
the mortgage interest rate has been pegged at 0.1% above the CPF savings rate.  Outright
subsidies for public housing have been kept to a minimum, and expenditure on housing has
not  comprised more than 2% of total  government  expenditure in  any fiscal  year.  Public
housing prices have been affordable, mainly because the land prices, paid by the Housing and
Development  Board (HDB),  are well  below  what private  developers pay  for  their  land.
Under the Land Acquisition Act of 1966, the government and its agencies are able to acquire
land for any public, residential, commercial or industrial purpose at pegged prices generally
During the October-December 1998 period, the average Medishield claim was SS 618, while for Medishield
Plus (a more expensive version), it was S$ 1,245 (CPF-PAL internet website).  These relatively low amounts
per claim seem to point to the limited nature of the health insurance provision under the CPF.
CPF balances are not used to finance actual public housing construction.  In order to enable the government's
Housing  and  Development  Board  (HDB)  to  construct  public  housing  and  provide  mortgage  loans,  the
government has been providing it with loans at subsidized rates from its budgetary sources.  As of March  1,
1998, total outstanding government loans to the HDB amounted to S$ 55,070 million.  As the HDB has been
repaying loans over the years, gross budgetary support is even higher.
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below  the  market  rates. 9 Since  1981, it has  also  been possible  to  use  CPF  balances  to
purchase  private properties,  both  for use and  as  an  investment.  The housing policy  has
demonstrated dramatic results:  the home ownership rate increased from 29% in 1970 to 88%
in  1990, and the share of the population  living in  government constructed  flats rose from
36% to 87% over the same time period (Phang, 1997).
In addition to housing, health care and investment schemes are quite significant in terms of
withdrawals.  In  recent  years  withdrawals from  the  Medisave  Account  have constituted
between 3-5% percent of total withdrawals.
The withdrawals under Section 15 of the CPF Act (i.e., for retirement etc.) have fluctuated
over time, ranging from a low of  10.8% of total withdrawals in  1993 to a high of 33.8% in
1983.  More importantly, the average cash amount at withdrawal age continues to be quite
low.  Thus,  during  the  October-December  1998  period,  15,469  members  reaching  the
withdrawal age withdrew  S$ 301.8 million under this provision,  for a mean withdrawal of
only  S$ 19,5 10 per person  (CPF-PAL Internet website).  This  is only 64% of the average
annual  earnings of workers, not  counting employer's  CPF contributions,  which  is  clearly
inadequate in terms of old age support.
It is possible that the Minimum Sum Scheme, the amounts invested under CPF's investment
schemes,  and  the  potential  for  converting  housing  equity  into  retirement  consumption
(through reverse mortgage'" or through  implicit contract with children,  for example) could
result in more adequate retirement provision than cash balances alone may suggest.  While
this may be the case for a relatively small proportion of the CPF members, the indications are
that there will be many people who will still lack adequate financial resources in old  age.
This is revealed by the fact that the median balance for the active contributors at end-1997
was between S$ 50,000 and  S$ 60,000 (equivalent to about 2 years of mean wage),  even
when pre-retirement withdrawals for housing, property and other investments were included.
The inactive members are likely to have even lower balances.
The pegged price was the market value on November 30,  1973 from  1974 until January 12, 1988 when it was
changed to the market value on January 1, 1986.  If the market value at the date of acquisition is lower than  hie
pegged price, then the market value is used for the purposes of compensation (Phang, 1997).  The covernment
currently owns more than  85% of total land in Singapore.  It has recently  announced  its intention to move
closer to paying market prices for any additional land acquired.
'°  However,  public housing ownership rights in Singapore are incomplete or truncated, since the land on which
the flats are constructed is leased from the state rather than owned.  The lease period is usually 99 } ears.  Since
the public housing program is only three decades old, it is expected that as the remaining lease period becomes
shorter, loans to purchase such older housing and the value of such housing will decline.  Nevertheless,  the
government embarked in 1989 on a multi-billion dollar program to upgrade the public housing estates, with the
households  paying  between  10%  and  35%  of  the  upgrading  costs  (Phang,  1997).  Given  the  truncated
ownership rights, the  reverse  mortgage method  of using  housing  equity to finance  retirement  consumption
would be even less effective than is normally the case.  Indeed, the reverse mortgage transactions so far have
been fairlv small (less than 200) and have not involved public housing.
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Member  Balances
During the 1983-97  period,  member  balances increased  steadily  from S$ 19,504.7  million in
to S$ 79,657.4  million. However,  in relation  to GDP these balances  appear  to have stabilized
in recent years at around 55%, a significant  decline from the 1986 peak of 75.9%. At end-
1998,  they amounted  to S$ 85.3 billion (60.4%  of GDP).
Annex 5 provides  data concerning  average CPF balances  per member in relation to average
monthly earnings for the 1987-97  period.  While the average  balance  per member increased
from S$ 15,458  in 1987  to S$ 28,633 in 1997,  the average  balances  to average  earnings ratio
showed  a significant  decline  from 11.6 in 1987  to 9.6 in 1997. Even at its peak, the average
balance  per member  was equivalent  to less than one year's average  earnings. While it would
be more appropriate  to estimate  the balances of the active contributors  to assess the level of
retirement  financing,  the CPF Board does not publish the relevant  data.  However,  as noted
above, the average withdrawal  of those reaching the withdrawal  age during the October-
December  1998  period was equivalent  to only 64% of the average  annual earnings. Thus, in
spite of rapid economic  growth and rising contribution  rates, average balances of the CPF
member  remain  rather low.
By now policy makers accept that the CPF balances alone will be inadequate to finance
retirement. In a recent survey, only 44% of Singaporeans  with CPF accounts indicated  that
the CPF would  be sufficient  for old age support (Chan, 1998). The survey  found that females
were especially  likely  to find the CPF scheme inadequate  for retirement  financing,  with the
vast majority  relying  on their children  for financial  support. However,  both demographic  and
attitudinal  changes  are likely to reduce the prevalence  of this informal  mechanism  of old age
support.
Tax Treatment  of Pension  Funds
CPF contributions  for citizens  and permanent  residents are exempted  from the income  tax.  In
1997 CPF deductions by individual income taxpayers alone amounted to S$ 3,617 million, or
2.5% of GDP. The value of the deduction  depends  an individual's  marginal income  tax rate.
Those outside the individual income tax net, about 75% of the labor force in 1997, do not get
any tax deductibility benefits from the CPF.  For others the value of the benefit rises with the
marginal income tax rate.  Therefore, the tax deductibility feature has an inherent "upside-
down" subsidy impact. Employer contributions are also tax deductible.
In  addition  to  contributions.  accumulated  income,  capital  gains  from  pre-retirement
withdrawals,  including  from  stocks  (except  certain  types  of  property  transactions),  and
retirement withdrawals are all exempt from taxation.  This is more a liberal tax treatment than
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in other high-income countries where at least one of the three flows is taxable."  On the other
hand,  gratuities, annuities, and pensions not related to the CPF or the public sector are all
taxed (Lim and Ooi,  1998).  For annuities, premiums paid to insurance companies are not
taxable, while the sums received from the plans are taxable.  This has created a disincentive
for the development of alternative pension plans and for the annuities market.
Singapore  provides  an  extensive  set  of  tax  incentives  (mainly  in  the  form  of  reduced
company income tax rates) for approved fund managers.  For example, the 1998-99 budget
provided for tax exemption on disposal related gains  from unit-trusts to fund management
companies.
Investment  of CPF  Balances
There  are three  separate  pools  of  funds  for  investment  under  Singapore's  CPF  system:
member balances, insurance funds and pre-retirement withdrawal funds.  Each of these pools
is subject to different investment guidelines.
The largest source of funds is the members'  balances with the CPF Board.  As of December
31,  1998, members' balances amounted to S$ 85,276.8 million (CPF-PAL Internet website).
According  to  the  CPF  Act,  these  funds must  be  invested  in  government  bonds  (and  in
advanced deposit with the Monetary Authority of Singapore to be converted into government
bonds at a later date).  The bonds are floating rate bonds issued specifically to the CPF Board
to  meet  interest  and other obligations,  and they do  not have quoted market  values.  The
floating rate is exactly identical to the interest rate paid by the CPF Board to  its members.
Since 1986 the interest rate paid by the CPF Board on members'  balances has been a simple
average of the 12-month deposit and month-end savings rate of the four major local banks,
subject to a minimum nominal rate of 2.5% as spelled out in the CPF Act.  The interest is
computed monthly and compounded and credited annually by the CPF Board.  Interest paid
on  balances  in the  special  account  is  1.5 percentage  points  higher  than the rate paid  on
balances  in the  Ordinary Account.  Currently, the interest  rates on fixed deposits  and on
savings deposits are weighted equally.  However, from July 1, 1999, the fixed deposit weight
will increase to  80%, with a corresponding decline to 20% for the savings deposits.  This
administrative change can be expected to  lead to higher  rates of return to members  since
fixed deposits have normally earn better rates than the savings deposits.
The administrative arrangements for paying short-term interest rates for long-term funds and
restricting the rate to what four relatively insulated local banks pay on local currency deposits
reveals the administered, rather than market determined, nature of the interest rate paid on
CPF  balances.  Therefore,  it is not  surprising that  during  the  1987-1997 period.  the real
annual  compound  interest  rate  credited  to  the  CPF  member's  accounts  (defined  as  the
" The issue of implicit tax on CPF balances, arising from the difference between the interest actually credited to
the members' accounts and the return earned on the balances, is discussed later in the paper.
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difference between the nominal rate less inflation as measured by the GDP deflator) was
roughly zero percent.  Indeed, in several years during this period, the real interest rate was
negative.
The administrative guidelines also tend to obscure the non-transparency of the investment
portfolio and performance arising from the ultimate deployment of the members'  balances.
Given the large budget surpluses over a considerable period (Asher, 1999),12  the CPF funds
have not  been  needed to  finance  infrastructure or  other  government expenditure.  Thus,
macroeconomic analysis does not support the widespread belief that the CPF has financed
actual  construction  of  public  housing,  as  opposed  to  facilitating  housing  mortgage  for
members.  Actually,  the  government  - through  the  Singapore  Government  Investment
Corporation and other government-controlled holding companies such as Temasek Holdings
- invests  the  CPF  funds.  There is,  however,  no  transparency  or  public  accountability
concerning where these funds are invested  (it is believed that the funds are predominantly
invested abroad),' 3 the investment criteria, and performance.4
An estimate of the implicit tax on CPF member balances may be derived from a March 1996
statement  in  Parliament  by  the  Finance  Minister  indicating  that  investment  returns  on
Singapore's  reserves have averaged over 5.0% (no precise figure was given) in  Singapore
dollar terms over the last 10 years.  Subtracting the nominal rate of 3.5% in  1997 from the
5.0% rate provides a difference of 1.5%.  Multiplying this by the average member balance
that  year (calculated as the  beginning balance plus one  half of  the addition  between  the
beginning  and the end of  1997) of S$ 69.3 billion  gives  a  figure of  S$  1,039.5 million,
equivalent to 6.5% of the contributions in 1997.  It is important to recognize that so long as
the nominal rate paid to members is less than what the government eams on their balances,
the members will be paying an implicit tax, although the amount varies each year.  Moreover,
as lower income individuals have a disproportionate share of their wealth in the CPF, such
implicit tax imposes relatively heavier burden on them.  This illustrates how political risks
and non-transparency can arise even in the context of individualized accounts.
The second pool of investment funds consists of insurance funds, whose value is relatively
small,  amounting  to  only  S$  1,500 million  in  1997.  These funds are invested  in  fixed
deposits, negotiable certificates of deposit, equities, and bonds.  Out-sourcing of these funds
Despite considerable budget  surpluses, the government  has  a  large internal public  debt  amounting  to S$
102,371.9 million at end-1997, equivalent to 71.6% of GDP.  Thus, large budget surpluses  and large public
debt co-exist.  Since much of the  debt is non-marketable, there  is little activity in the  secondary market for
government bonds.
Investment of pension funds abroad is usually recommended as a way to attain diversification of country and
other risks.  However, the investment arrangements in Singapore do not permnit  an assessment of the extent to
which such diversification has occurred or its results.
1  In recent years Singapore has consciously directed a greater proportion of its resources (presumably including
the CPF funds) into investments in East Asia, yet has provided no information on the  performance of these
investments.
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for investment is believed to be much greater.  Thus, the asset allocation for the insurance
funds is much more diversified in comparison to CPF balances.  It is therefore not surprising
that  the rate of return on insurance funds is  somewhat higher  than on the CPF balances.
However, because of their negligible weight in the total investment balances, their impact on
the interest credited to members is also negligible.
The third pool  of investment funds consists of pre-retirement  withdrawal funds under the
CPF  investment schemes.  Investment  of CPF  savings by members  started in May  1996
under the Approved Investment Scheme (AIS).  The primary aim was to enable members to
invest part of their CPF savings in approved instruments so as to enhance assets for old age.
Over the years, the investment scheme has evolved to provide diverse options.  In October
1993 the AIS was liberalized into a 2-tier  scheme - the Basic and  Enhanced Investment
Schemes (BIS and EIS).  These schemes were subsequently merged in January 1997 to form
the  CPF  Investment  Scheme  (CPFIS),  which  permits  individuals  to  invest  in  the  stock
markets either directly by purchasing CPF approved stock or indirectly through mutual funds
(called  unit-trusts).  Members  can  also  invest  in  endowment  policies,  gold,  Singapore
government  bonds,  bank  deposits,  and  fund  management  accounts.  Apart  from  trustee
stocks, CPF members can invest in nine loan stocks listed on the main board." 5
As of end-June 1997, 411,235 CPF members (56.4% of those eligible, but less than a sixth of
total  members) had withdrawn  S$ 10.82 billion,  44% of the potential  amount of S$ 24.6
billion  eligible for investment and an  average of S$ 26,311 per participating member.  By
May 1998, the amount withdrawn had risen to S$12.1 billion, of which only S$400 million
(3.3% of the total) had been invested through 22 CPF approved unit-trusts out of a total of
about  120.  Thus, individuals have chosen to primarily invest on their own.  A substantial
part of the investment funds have gone to purchase shares during the partial divestment of the
state telecom monopoly, Singapore Telecom.  Indeed, the government  provided discounts
and outright subsidies to encourage CPF members to buy the Singapore Telecom shares in
1993 and 1996.
Since their introduction there has been considerable liberalization  of investment rules and
guidelines governing the unit-trusts.  As of January  1, 1998, CPF-approved unit-trusts have
been allowed to invest up to 50% of their funds in the following overseas markets:  Malaysia,
Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, U.S., U.K., and Japan.  In May of the same
year, the Singapore authorities announced further relaxation of rules.  The changes include a
more transparent way to  select CPF approved fund managers and the unit-trusts they offer,
I  Net realized profit or loss (gross realized profit plus dividends and interest less bank charges and related costs
and CPF accrued interest on the entire investment amount withdrawn) is computed on September 30 each year
and credited.  In addition to  1% of value of stocks charged by stock brokers  on purchase and sale of shares,
approved  banks  also have a  fixed dollar charge  (subject to a  maximum) per transaction  of  different types.
Additionally. approved banks levy a service or administrative charge.  The fixed nature of the fees implies a
larger proportionate burden on those with relatively small amount of investments.
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simplification in the criteria for approving unit-trusts, substantial liberalization of permitted
investment by the unit-trusts, and greatly enhanced disclosure requirements.  Moreover, for
the approved unit-trusts the government removed the 40% limit on investment in non-trustee
stocks, the  50%  limit on  foreign-currency denominated  investment,  and  specification  of
countries in which investments can be made.  Only certain prudential norms remain.  The
unit-trust management teams are to be encouraged to publicly declare the benchmark against
which their performance is to be measured.  The CPF Board has classified various approved
unit-trusts in terms of their asset diversification and risk levels.  Their performance will be
regularly published, and an extensive educational campaign to enable CPF members to invest
prudently has been launched.
The authorities hope that the removal  of previous  curbs on  asset allocation will improve
investment performance, 16 thereby encouraging CPF members to invest primarily through the
unit-trusts.  Moreover, the measures were designed to encourage the development of the fund
management industry, an area in which Singapore aims to develop a competitive advantage.
In order to help ensure that these objectives are reached, as of December 1, 1999, individuals
will be able to invest only up to 50% of investible funds directly in stocks, while they will be
able to place 100% of such funds in the unit trusts.
Some areas, including disclosure and administrative procedures, may need more attention.
Requiring  Singapore  companies  to  move  towards  internationally  compatible  corporate
disclosure rules and modes of governance could foster better asset allocation decisions.  The
Singapore authorities have taken steps in this direction, but there is still considerable room
for  improvement.  Moreover,  there  may  be  considerable  merit  in  the  proposal  for
harmonizing disclosure requirements for the ultimate investment (not just  the purchase of
government  securities as  currently  reported)  of  the  members'  CPF  balances  with  those
recently announced for the CPF approved unit-trusts.  The changes announced for the unit-
trusts  do  not  provide  for  performance  standards  or  regulation  of  the  commission,
administrative, and other charges as well as the spread between bid and offer prices.  As the
average investment per member is likely to be relatively small, transaction costs of operating
through unit-trusts are likely to be of some significance, making this an area of concern.
In sharp contrast to the CPF, which has entrusted choices regarding selection of unit-trusts
and asset allocation to the individuals, the "Saver Scheme" for the Armed Forces has opted
for the centralization of the investment function with professional fund managers identified
directly by  the Board.  This  situation  may potentially  allow the  comparison  of the  two
different  scenarios  in  order  to  reveal  information  on  their  effectiveness in  minimizing
transaction costs and maximizing returns for members.  In this regard, it would be useful to
During the third quarter of 1999,  two-thirds of approved unit-trusts made negative returns, and more than half
failed to beat their market benchmarks.  However, of the 22 approved unit-trusts with at least a three-year track
record, 90% showed positive returns; 86% beat their  benchmarks; and all those that  ,ained did considerably
better than the CPF interest rate.
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consider harmonizing the disclosure requirements of the Saver Fund with those recently put
forward for the CPF approved unit-trusts.
The expectation  that permitting individual  CPF  members to  make their  own investments
would permit higher returns was not fully realized even before the currency and stock market
crisis in Southeast Asia.  Thus, during each year in the 1994-1997 period, less than 20% of
participating members earned returns above what they would have made had they left the
money with the CPF, while in 1998, the corresponding proportion was only  10.0%o.  For the
October 1, 1995 to September 30, 1996 period, 20.7% of those investing made an aggregate
profit of S$ 179.7 million, while 79.3% percent of the members made losses aggregating S$
198.7 million (The Straits Times, Singapore, April 9, 1997). During the period October 1996
to September 1997, 11.7% of 434,802 members investing made a profit of S$ 111.4 million,
while 88.3% made losses of S$ 338 million (Business Times, Singapore, January 20,  1998).
Interestingly, during the first ten months of  1997, over half of the 174 CPF trustee stocks
underperforned  the Straits Times Industrial Index - while the Index fell by  over 30%, the
worst  falls  among  trustee  stocks  ranged  from  48-65%.  The  effects  of  the  May  1998
liberalization measures, including  removal of specification of countries where  investments
can be made by the unit-trusts (but not CPF members on their own), are yet to be reflected in
the data.1 7
III.  Reform  Issues  and Options
Singapore's  pension  system  has relied  almost solely on the  state mandated and  managed
savings pillar for its formal pension  system, and this has allowed it to incorporate multiple
objectives.  In this sense, the CPF is more than a pension scheme.  It also provides financing
for housing, health care, and tertiary education.  To accommodate these schemes, which have
evolved gradually over time, it has been necessary to significantly increase the contribution
rates, at one point reaching  50% of the wages.  In addition, the government  has used the
disposable income of nearly two-thirds of the labor force to  acheive its  sociopolitical and
economic  objectives.  The  operations  of  the  CPF  and  excellent  information  technology
infrastructure  and  skills  have provided  the  policy  makers  with  perhaps  an  unparalleled
databank conceming the socioeconomic profile of the population.  Although the svstem has
many strengths, particularly its emphasis on defined contributions  and full funding,  it also
has severe shortcomings.  Thus, reform efforts should maintain the system's  strengths while
addressing its limitations, which revolve around the following issues:
Low Replacement Rate.  High contribution rates and rapid economic and wage growth
notwithstanding, the average balances of the CPF members remain rather low.  The CPF
7  Since the CPF Board has not made the data on the composition of investments and unrealized capital gains
available, it is difficult to make a fuller analysis of this issue.  It is hoped that, along with the liberalization of
the  CPFIS sketched earlier, there  will be greater  recognition on the  part of  the  CPF Board  to regard  such
information as a public good, thereby facilitating fuller analysis of the issue and enhancing transparency.
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Board does not publish information on the fund's replacement rates or actuarial status.  In
its  1987 Annual  Report, the CPF Board  indicated that the replacement rate would be
between 20% and 40%.  However, the report did not indicate how these figures could be
obtained, and there has been no discussion of the replacement rates in subsequent reports.
Simulation studies by the actuarial firm Watson Wyatt Worldwide in 1996 showed that,
assuming  the typical use  of the  CPF,  low, middle  and  high  earner single individuals
would need to contribute an additional 18.7%, 32.6% and 46.6% of their monthly income
to meet the benchmark replacement rate equal to two-thirds of final income.  Given the
already high CPF  contribution rates, additional contributions of this magnitude are not
realistic.  Moreover,  a recent  unpublished  simulation study  by Leong and  Das-Gupta
(1998) concludes that "...the  CPF, by and large, does not adequately provide for old-age
security" (10).
The reasons for low CPF balances and replacement rates relate primarily to extensive pre-
retirement withdrawals, particularly for housing, and on extremely low real rates of return
credited to members'  accounts.  As noted in the previous section, the implicit tax on the
CPF balances is recurrent and quite high.  Meanwhile, the CPF Board is accomplishing
routine housekeeping functions such as collecting  contributions,  administering various
schemes, record keeping, administering retirement benefits, etc. at fairly low costs.8
3  Limited risk coverage and protection for the less-advantaged.  The CPF does not cover
inflation or longevity risks" 9 and does not provide survivor's  benefits.  Also, because it is
a defined contribution scheme, it does not have any forrnal mechanism for distributing
the nation's economic growth, thereby accentuating pre-retirement inequalities.
Even the policy makers widely agree that the CPF by itself will be inadequate to finance
old  age.  However, they are reluctant to  consider a shift  towards a multi-pillar social
security system, which would require the strengthening  of the tax-financed first pillar.
For example, in order to accomplish greater social protection in old age, measures such as
the liberalization of public assistance rules and substantial increases in the benefits may
need to be considered.  Another option would be for the government to supplement the
annuity available from members' own balances in order to reach a value necessary for an
IS  In  1997 the  administrative  costs  of  the  CPF  Board  to  total  contribution  ratio  was  0.62,  while  the
administrative costs to total balances ratio was 0.12.  Moreover, the administrative costs have fluctuated Within
a fairly narrow range.  Thus, the normal housekeeping costs of the CPF Board have not contributed to either the
low balances or the low rates of return credited to members.
'9  Under the  Minimum Sum scheme, there  is an  option to purchase an  annuity from an  approved insurance
company that will guarantee a regular  monthly nominal income  for life, but this option is not popular with
retirees as the cash component of the minimum sum scheme is quite small - in 1998 the cash component was
only $I 6,000 - and many retirees do not even have this amount.  In any  case, there are no inflation-indexed
annuities on the market.
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appropriately defined replacement rate  (i.e., one that is also  inflation indexed and that
covers longevity risks).
*  Benefits planning.  It would also be useful to reconsider the predominance of housing and
health  financing in the CPF  scheme.  Relying on  greater use of market  forces would
provide a way to reduce these functions.  This would necessitate a reevaluation  of the
predominant role of the HDB and other govenmental  agencies in the housing and real
estate market.  Arrangements for the health sector merit careful consideration since costs
are expected to increase significantly.
*  Investment function.  While no data are available on the transactions costs (including the
administrative costs) relating to the CPFIS, these are likely to be  substantial, given the
low average amount invested under the CPFIS, the fixed nature of many of the fees levied
by  the banks  and  unit-trusts,  and  the  lack of  competition  in  the  funds management
industry.  As noted, it would be desirable to require the fund managers to publish rates of
return net of fees and charges on their portfolios.
The recent reforms of the CPFIS have generally been in the right direction in terms of
diversification  of  investment  portfolio  and  asset  allocation  rules.  Under  the  CPFIS
individuals  make  investment choices  according to  their risk  preferences  and  investor
sophistication.  But because of the high transaction costs, the CPF Board may want to
consider the approach used by the "Saver  Scheme" of the Armed Forces under which
investment allocation among different fund managers and asset classes is undertaken at
the central level, thereby minimizing  transaction costs  and ensuring  the use  of expert
advice.  This would also permit the CPF Board to  move away from  investing only  in
government bonds  at administratively  determined interest rates.  The CPFIS could be
continued,  yet  in  a  form  that  provides  members  options  in  investment  portfolios
encompassing different risk-return profiles selected in a centralized manner.
*  Implicit tax.  Another important measure to enhance the rate of return for members would
be to eliminate the existing implicit tax.  This would require the CPF Board to follow the
same disclosure rules required of the unit-trusts under the CPFIS  and credit  members
with  all returns  earned on  the investment of CPF balances.  In addition  to  improving
efficiency  and  equity,  this  would  also  substantially  increase  the  transparency  of  the
pension system and reduce its political risks.
The Singapore experience demonstrates both the strengths and the limitations of government
mandated  and  managed  defined  contribution,  fully  funded  old  age  protection  system.
Singapore's  financial and human resources and proven record in responding to the material
needs of its population suggest that reform is well within its implementation capacity.
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Annex 1. Various  Schemes  Under  The CPF System
Type  Scheme  Year Introduced
Home ownership  Approved Housing Scheme  1968
Approved Residential Property Scheme  1981
Investment  Singapore Bus Services (1978) Ltd. Share Scheme  1978
Approved Investment Scheme  1986a
Approved Non-Residential Properties Scheme
(ANRPS)  1986
CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS)  1  997b
Share-Ownership Top-Up Scheme (SOTUS)  1993
Insurance  Home Protection Insurance Scheme  1982
Dependents'  Protection Insurance Scheme  1989
Medishield Scheme  1990
Others  Company Welfarism through Employers'
Contribution (COWEC) Scheme'  1984
Medisave Scheme  1984d
Minimum Sum Scheme  1987
Topping-up of the Minimum Sum Scheme  1987
Financing of Tertiary Education in Singapore  1989
CPF Top-up Scheme  1995
a  As of October, 1993, this was divided into the Basic and Enhanced Investment Schemes.
b  As of January 1, 1997, CPFIS replaced the Approved Investment Scheme, thus eliminating distinction
between the Basic and Enhanced Investment Schemes.
c  As of January 1, 1999, there will be no more new contributions to the COWEC fund.  The scheme is
therefore effectively discontinued.
d  As of 1993, self-employed persons must contribute to the Medisave scheme.
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Annex  2. CPF Contribution  Rates
Nominal  Contribution  Rates (%)a  Effective  Contribution  Maximum  Monthly
Effective  Date  Rates  (%)b  ContributionC
Employer  Employee  Total  Total  S$)
July 1955  5.0  5.0  10.0  9.5  50
September  1968  6.5  6.5  13.0  12.2  300
January 1970  8.0  8.0  16.0  14.8  300
January  1971  10.0  10.0  20.0  18.2  300
January  1972  14.0  10.0  24.0  21.1  360
January 1973  15.0  11.0  26.0  22.6  390
January  1974  15.0  15.0  30.0  26.1  450
January  1975  15.0  15.0  30.0  26.1  600
January  1977  15.5  15.5  31.0  26.8  620
January 1978  16.5  16.5  33.0  28.2  990
January  1979  20.5  16.5  37.0  31.0  1.110
January 1980  20.5  18.0  38.5  32.0  1.155
January 1981  20.5  22.0  42.5  35.3  1.275
Januaryv1982  22.0  23.0  45.0  36.9  1,350
January 1983  23.0  23.0  46.0  37.4  1,380
November  1983  23.0  23.0  46.0  37.4  1,840
July 1984  25.0  25.0  50.0  40.0  2.500
July 1985  25.0  25.0  50.0  40.0  3.000
April 1986  10.0  25.0  35.0  31.8  2,100
July 1988  12.0  24.0  36.0  32.1  2,160
July 1989  15.0  23.0  38.0  33.0  2.280
July 1990  16.5  23.0  39.5  33.9  2.535
July 1991  17.5  22.5  40.0  34.0  2,400
July 1992  18.0  22.0  40.0  33.9  2.400
July 1993  18.5  21.5  40.0  33.8  2,400
July 1994  20.0  20.0  40.0  33.3  2,400
January  1999  d  10.0  20.0  30.0  27.3  N.A
Notes:
N.A: Not Available
a:  The contribution rates apply to monthly wages exceeding $363 per month.  For those earning below this
level, the rates are lower.  Since July 1988, the rates have also been lower for those above 55 years of age.
The pensionable employees in the public sector also contribute at a lower rate.
b:  Contributions as a share of total gross wage including employers CPF contribution, i.e.:
r,  F  re  where  r;  =  nominal employee rate
reff,,tive  I  . re  re  =  nominal employer rate
c:  The maximum amount in this column applies to those below 55 years of age.  The maximum contribution
is lower for those above 55 years of age.  Moreover, the maximum applies only to ordinary wages.  For
additional wages, such as bonuses, statutory contribution  rates apply without limits.  Thus, actual CPF
contribution may exceed the maximum specified in the column.
d:  The cut is initially planned for two years.  For those  between  ages 55 and 60. the  contribution rate  is
16.5% percent (4% by the employer and  12.5% by the employee).  For those between 60 and 65 years of
age, the contribution rate is 9.5% (2% by the employer and 7.5% by the employee).  For those above 65
years, the contribution rate is 7% (2% by employer and 5% by the employee).
Source:  Central Provident Fund, Annual Report, various years; The Straits Times (Singapore), Nov. 25, 1998.
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Annex 3.  CPF Contributors By Monthly Wage Level, 1987 and 1997
Wage Level (S$)  1987  1997
Number  %  Number  %
All contributors  935,330  100.0  1,224,195  100.0
Below 1,000  574,332  61.4  215,587  17.7
1,000- 1,999  232,486  24.8  443,066  36.2
2,000 - 4,999  105,388  11.3  455,946  37.2
5,000-5,999  7,126  0.8  34,539  2.8
6,000 and above  12,896  1.4  67,877  5.5
Unspecified  3,112  0.3  7,180  0.6
Source:  Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Manpower,  Singapore Year Book of Manpower Statistics, 1997,




Annex 4.  Selected Indicators of Singapore's Central Provident Fund, 1983-1997 (All currency amounts in million S$)
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
(Cosvcrage
Metittbes(tltousarids)  1778.9  1352.5  1891.7  1933.8  1988.5  2063.4  2126.9  2195.2  2255.7  2322.8  2456.4  2521.8  2683.0  2741.8  2782.0
Coiitribibtors  (thousands)  917.9  943.0  889.6  912.0  935.3  963.8  988.6  1021.7  1052.4  1074.0  1107.1  1138.9  1174.8  1193.9  1224.2
0o(tttributors/l1abotir  Force  (%)  70.9  72.3  69.1  70.2  70.4  69.9  69.4  65.4  67.7  66.3  67.7  67.3  67.2  66.3  65.3
Contlibltols/Meinlieis (%)  51.5  50.9  47.0  47.2  47.0  46.7  46.5  46.5  46.7  46.2  45.1  45.2  43.8  43.5  44.0
Excess  of Contributions
Ovei  Wiithlieawals  (During l'erio(l)  2772.6  1874.5  2633.5  935.5  149.3  974.6  2444.0  3170.7  3436.5  3609.9  (522.2)  3987.0  6283.4  4093.4  4398.3
Meto\bers  Cottriboitiotts  4491.0  5385.2  5393.4  4777.8  4446.8  4985.1  6107.5  7174.2  8101.4  9208.2  10427.0  11279.0  13536.1  14623.0  15873.8
(Giss  Nattional  Savinigs  ((iNS)  16306.1  18596.4  16543.4  15588.5  16304.8  20224.0  25381.1  29930.0  34497.5  39370.4  42363.2  52625.5  60720.1  66455.5  75144.7
Contributionsas%ofGNS  27.5  29.0  36.2  30.6  27.3  24.6  24.3  24.0  23.5  23.4  24.6  21.4  22.3  22.0  21.1
Con(tibutions  as  %  D(i[)  12.2  13.4  15.4  12.4  10.4  10.0  10.9  10.6  10.8  11.4  11.1  10.4  11.2  13.0  11.1
Witlidiawals  Amount  1718.4  3510.7  3359.9  2824.3  4297.5  4010.5  3663.5  4003.5  4664.9  5418.3  10949.2  7292.0  7252.7  10529.6  11475.5
As % of coitit  ibtutiouis  38.3  65.2  62.3  59.1  96.6  80.4  59.9  55.8  57.6  58.8  105.0  64.6  53.6  72.0  72.3
S's  of total wvithdrasvals  for:
Approved  I lotisiiig  Scemtces  (at)  65.3  76.7  76.4  69.2  61.6  69.2  65.9  56.4  64.3  66.7  32.1  48.0  64.1  48.0  50.1
Under  Sectioni  15  (b)  33.8  21.2  20.9  22.9  17.4  19.6  22.9  25.5  20.5  18.7  10.8  18.7  20.0  15.5  13.5
Medicall  Sheiemes  (c)  n.a  0.5  1.3  2.7  3.3  4.2  4.9  5.9  5.7  5.1  2.7  3.8  5.0  3.7  3.7
Others  (d)  0.9  1.6  1.5  5.1  17.7  7.0  6.3  12.1  9.4  9.5  54.4  (e)  30.0  10.9  32.8  (e)  32.4 (e)
NIenbers Balances (Enid Period)  19504.7  22670.4  26834.1  29341.4  30607.8  32529.3  36051.6  40646.4  46049.0  51526.9  52334.3  57649.0  66035.4  72566.6  79657.4
As % otlGDP  53.1  56.6  68.9  75.9  71.7  65.5  64.3  59.9  61.1I  63.6  55.5  53.3  54.7  54.7  55.7
Public  Diebt  250)31.5  28077.3  32164.4  33793.1  38274.3  41830.7  46209.7  51425.6  59041.1  67252.5  69882.0  75344.4  86507.6  94474.8  102371.9
As%(GD1)  68.1  70.1  82.6  87.4  89.7  84.2  82.2  75.8  78.4  83.0  74.1  69.6  71.7  71.2  71.6
Rate  of Retuz  in to  Miembers
Imttptlicit  initerest  rate  (1)  6.1  6.1  6.2  5.5  3.7  3.0  3.1  3.7  4.5  3.8  2.6  2.4  3.4  3.5  3.5
litllatiott Ratle  (5'o  cliatgc)
Colusiltiner  Price tId(lex  1.2  2.6  0.5  (1.4)  0.5  3.5  2.4  3.4  3.4  2.3  2.4  3.1  1.7  1.4  2.0
(GD11  Deflalor  3.9  0.7  (3.2)  (1.4)  1.2  6.2  4.8  4.9  3.7  1.0  5.5  3.8  2.6  1.4  1.4
Real Rate  of Rtettilt  (g)  2.2  5.4  7.4  6.9  2.5  (3.2)  (1.7)  (3.2)  0.8  2.8  (2.9)  (3.4)  0.8  2.1  2.1
Rate  of rcltin  lhtstiraince  Ifiutdls
Implicit ititeiest  sate  N.A  N.A  4.7  6.4  5.3  6.2  7.6  4.1  6.6  5.1  9.4  3.6  3.8  4.3  1.3
Real  sate  of  rcttiiir  N.A  N.A  5.9  7.8  3.9  0.0  2.8  (0.8)  2.9  4,1  3.9  (0.2)  1.2  2.9  (0 1)
Note: N.A: No( Availablc.  (a) The housling schetnes  are:  Approved  ltousing schemne  introduced  in 1968,  and Approved  Residential  P'roperty  Scheme,  introduced  in 1981. (b) Under  Section
15,  the main  withdrawals arc  for retirciiment,  dcati, disability, and leaving  Singapore  and  West  Malaysia  permanently. (c) The Medical Schemes  are: Medisave  Scheme  introduced  in 1984,
and the Medishield  Scheme  intro(itced in 1990. (d) I'he  "others"  category  mainly inctl(les various  pre-retircmcctt  investment  schemes,  aid loans  for fiitaticing tertiary  education  in Singapore.
(e) 'Ihe higih  proportioni  ol xwilhdrawals  for this category  was  (tile  to tile partial  divestment  of Singapore  Telecom,  a government  telephone  monopoly. (f) TIhe  implicit interest  rate is calculated
as lollows: Total  interest  amounit  credited  to memihbers  as  shown  in the CPF Board's Annual Reports,  divided by the average  of the beginning and the ending balances  of the CPF members
during thc year. (g) 'Ihe real rate  of returin  is estimated  as  the difference  bctween  the implicit interest  rate  and  the  GDP  deflator.
.Sotrces : Calculated  from CPIF  Anuial reports;  Republic  of Singapore,  Dept.  of Statistics,  Yearbook of Statistics; Monetary  Authority of Singapore,  Annual Report - various  years.
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Annex 5.  Average Balances Per Member and Average Monthly Earnings, 1987-97
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)=(4)/(3)
Year  Average  Monthly  Earnings  Average  Monthly  Earnings  Average  Balance  Per  Average  Balance  Per
(excluding  Employer's  CPF  (including  Employer's  CPF  Member  Member/Average  Monthly
Contributions)a  Contribution)b  Earnings  (including
employer's  contribution)
1987  1176  1335  15458  11.6
1988  1273  1426  15790  11.1
1989  1398  1608  16313  10.1
1990  1528  1773  18504  10.4
1991  1669  1969  20421  10.3
1992  1804  2129  22191  10.4
1993  1918  2282  21361  9.4
1994  2086  2503  23059  9.2
1995  2219  2663  24640  9.3
1996  2347  2816  29503  10.5
1997  2480  2976  28633  9.6
Notes:
a  Includes all remuneration received before deduction of the employee's  CPF contributions and individual
income tax, which includes basic wage, overtime payments, commissions, allowances and other monetary
payments, annual wage supplement, and variable bonus.
b  This  is  calculated  as  the  amount  in  column  (2)  +  Employer's  CPF  contribution.  This  is  only  an
approximation due to wage ceiling for employer's  contribution.
Source:  Average Monthly Earnings from Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Manpower, Singapore Year Book
of Manpower Statistics, 1997, Table 2.2, p.1 8.  Average Balance per Member from  data in Tables I
and 5 of this paper.
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Thailand*
Overview of Formal Old-Age Support
After passage of the  Social Security Act  and establishment  of the  Social Security Office (SSO) in
1990,  Thailand  introduced  a  comprehensive  social  security  program  with  the  following
implementation  schedule:  (i)  introduction of sickness,  invalidity,  maternity  and  death benefits  to
employees  of enterprises  with 20  or more  workers  (March  1991);l (ii)  extension  of coverage  to
enterprises with  10 or more workers (September 1993); (iii) initiation of voluntary insurance service
(September 1994); (iv) provision of old-age pension insurance and child allowance schemes (January
1999); (v) expansion of coverage to employees  of non-agricultural enterprises  with more than one
worker (January 2001); and, (vi) organization of unemployment benefits.
The  old age  pension  system  intends  to  guarantee  a  replacement  rate  of  15%  after  15 years  of
contribution (with an additional 1% for every extra year), starting from as early as age 55.  Financing
comes from equal contributions by employers and employees starting at  1% of the employee wages
(not exceeding  15,000 bahtlmonth)  in  1999 and  increasing by an additional  1% each in 2000 and
2001.  Govermnent will contribute a fixed 1% for all years. 2
In 1996 the government ordered all state agencies to set up provident funds, and in 1997 it introduced
a  national  pension fund for  civil  servants  and military  personnel, the  Government  Pension  Fund
(GPF), which is replacing  a defined benefit plan.  As for the private sector, all companies approved
by the Board  of Investment or listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand, all  financial institutions,
plus all government  concessionaires  (e.g., in the telecommunications,  oil, gas and mining sectors)  had
to set up their respective  provident  funds by June 1998. New companies  that apply to belong  to any
of these groups  have  to agree  to create  their own  provident  fund within 12  months of establishment.
In order to provide some type of safety net for the poor, the government  has gradually  put a number
of programs  in place. These include  national  health insurance  for the poor and nearly poor and small
scale indigent and elderly grant programs.  In 1993 the Department of Public Welfare began to
provide 'Monthly  subsistence  allowances  to indigent  elderly in rural areas, and the program  expanded
to cover 318,000  persons  by 1997. Despite  the fact that these public assistance  programs (estimated
at about  0.2%  of GDP) target the most  needy segments  of the population,  their benefits  are very small
when compared  to private informal  assistance.
Yvonne Sin (ysin@worldbank.org) and Ian W. Mac Arthur (imacarthur@worldbank.org),  The World Bank,
HDNSP prepared this profile.
The  scheme  excludes  government  officials  and  regular  employees  of  the  central,  provincial  and  local
administrations, employees of foreign governments and international organizations, and employees of schools,
universities or hospitals.
2  As of  2001,  the  contribution rate  is expected to remain  at  7%  (1% from  the  government,  3%  from the
employer and 3% from the employee).  In  1996, before the crisis, BS 25.34  equaled US$  1.00.  In  1997 the
government devalued the currency, and by 1998, BS 41.36 equaled US$ 1.00.
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1.  Background
Thailand's economy  performed  remarkably  well during the three decades prior to the mid-
1990s. From 1965  to 1980  real growth averaged  4.6%, and for the last 15 years real growth
has averaged over 6.5%. Real per capita growth quadrupled  between 1965 and 1995,3  and
households  living in extreme poverty (those living on less than $1 a day) represented less
than 1% of the population  in 1995.
Thailand's labor force in 1998 numbered 32.1 million of a total population of 60.6 million
(end-1997). During the past decade, there has been a structural  shift in employment  pattems
from the agriculture  sector to the manufacturing  and service  sectors. Nearly 80% of the adult
workforce,  or approximately  26 million  people, are unskilled  and comprised  of unpaid  family
workers  in agriculture,  self-employed  urban workers,  and workers in very small enterprises. 4
Although  Thailand has demonstrated  high overall primary school enrolment, enrolments  at
the secondary,  vocational  and university levels remain very low.5  As such, there is a current
shortage of skilled technicians and professionals,  and demand for skilled workers should
reach almost six million  in the next five years. The government  has recognized  the need for
training and educational  reforms and has set the goal of improving the resource base of
skilled professionals. At the same time, most multinationals  seek to overcome the skill
shortage  by providing  extensive  training on-the-job  or overseas. Since multinationals  invest
heavily in human capital,  these companies  tend to provide more comprehensive  and valuable
benefits  to attract  and retain  their personnel.
Demographic  trends, specifically  declining  fertility  and increased  life expectancy,  are driving
population  aging. The total fertility  rate decreased  from 5.50 in 1970  to 1.78 in 1996,  a level
comparable  to those in developed  economies  such as Finland and Australia.  Wider use of
contraception  (now at 75.2% compared to 57.9% just a decade ago), better education and
higher labor force participation explain this  trend.  The reduction in  age-sex-specific
mortality  rates led to a rise in male life expectancy  at birth from 60 years in 1975  to nearly 70
in 1995; female life expectancy increased from 64 to 75 during the same period.  However,
due to the surge in incidence of HIV-AIDS, average life expectancy will likely experience a
modest set back over the  next ten years  before resuming  an  upward trend.  O  erall, the
proportion of those aged 65 and over currently stands at 5% (slightly higher than the roughly
4% in other Asian countries) and is expected to exceed 25% in 2040.
3GDP  per capita (in ppp terms) equals about USS 6,000, which is less than the GDP per person in HIong  Kong.
Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia, but more than in Indonesia, China and the Philippines.
4More  than 50% of the workforce are employed as farmners  and fishermen (Kakwani, 1998).
' Seventy-one and two-tenths percent of the workforce have some elementary education or none at all; 15.9%,
secondary schooling; 3. 1  %, vocational schooling; 7.4%, university education; and 2.3%, teacher training.
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The Seventh National Economic and Development Plan recognizes large income disparities
and the much higher incidence of poverty among households in the rural and urban informal
sectors as major social problems. Nearly 85% of the population inhabit rural areas, including
the northeastern region, which is the poorest, and the northern region, which has the oldest
population  (with a median age 2.3 years higher than the rest of the country).  These rural
inhabitants are much poorer and have greater need for social protection of various kinds.  In
contrast, a small number of individuals - business entrepreneurs, professionals, or employees
of large, affluent and mostly international companies - enjoy income levels that approach
international standards.  It is generally believed that the recent economic crisis hit urban areas
more severely than rural areas, but high labor force mobility may have helped ameliorate the
effects.
In mid-1997 massive capital outflows obliged Thailand to devalue its currency and set high
short-term interest rates of 18% per annum, which resulted in a severe economic crisis.  In
1998 the official unemployment rate climbed to around 5%, inflation rose to a high of nearly
11% and real GDP contracted by over 10%.  Evidence suggests that the incidence of poverty
rose from  11% to  16%, representing an  increase in  the number of poor people  from  6.8
million to 9.6 million.  This resulted more from a drop in real income than from the rise  in
unemployment, considering its initially very low level.  The value of real wages fell between
10% and 22%, depending on the region of the country and type of employment.
Although  the  economy  has  exhibited  a  strong  recovery,  its  benefits  have  not  reached
everyone.  Restoring  lost income  to the poor  will  depend partly on  continued  economic
expansion.  The crisis has also left a legacy of greater household insecurity.
II.  Analysis  of the Pension  System
The old age income support system in Thailand consists of several components highlighted in
the overview:  (i) the social security scheme for private sector workers, (ii) the Government
Pension  Fund  for public  sector workers, and  (iii) provident  funds for  state  agencies  and
certain types of private companies. 6 The analysis of the system in this  section focuses on
issues  of  varying  relevance  for  the  different  schemes:  benefit  design,  coverage,  fiscal
sustainability, administration, investment policy and tax treatment.
Benefit  Design  and  Coverage
The benefit  design  of the  old-age pension  of the  social security  system  presents  several
distortions.  The use of the last five years of earnings as the wage base for determining old-
age benefits for the pension  delinks benefits from contributions  and may lead to  strategic
manipulations,  effectively  reduces  coverage  by  encouraging  evasion,  and  results  in
6This  section does not directly address public safety net programs for the indigent elderly.
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disproportionately high benefits to workers with steep age-earnings profiles.  For instance,
one  may  decide  to  work  double  time  for  the  last  five  years  to  double  pensions;  or
alternatively, one could avoid contributing for extended periods but make sure that the final
five years of earnings count towards the wage base and the required 15 years of contributory
service.
After expansion to  enterprises  with  more  than one  worker in  2001,  the old-age  pension
scheme should cover around 30% of the labor force - current coverage stands at about 18%.
Thus, even if the ambitious  objective  of expanding coverage to all workers in the formal
labor force (including the self-employed) were to be achieved, a large portion of the labor
force (i.e., those in the informal sector) would still be excluded.'  In addition, current non-
compliance or evasion in the social security system is estimated at around 25% and could be
as high as 40%.8  The people who are most likely to evade contributions  belong to lower-
income groups with the greatest need to maximize current cash income.  But workers in the
informal sector and workers who evade pension contributions comprise the largest segment
of the population that will be subject to income risk in old age.
Labor  force  coverage  under  the  provident  funds  is  rather  limited.  The  GPF  has
approximately 1.3 million members (4% of the labor force), while 54 state-owned enterprises
have provident funds covering about 211,000 employees (less than  1% of the labor force).
Provident funds for around 4,000 private  sector companies number almost  1,000 and reach
approximately 1 million workers (3% of the labor force).  Therefore, on the whole, provident
funds cover less than 10% of the total labor force and less than 50% of formal sector workers.
Fiscal Sustainability
Simulations performed  by IMF  and  World Bank  specialists  indicate that  very  substantial
increases in the contribution rate would be needed to assure financial equilibrium of the Old
Age Pension Fund of the Social Security Office in the first half of the next century.  The
equilibrium contribution rate is estimated at 13%, while the required contribution rate to keep
current balance from going negative could reach as high as 23% before the end of the next
7At  the end of 1997. the social security system covered about 6 million workers in 90,000 workplaces, which
left close to 80% of  workers, the  poor  and the  unemployed  without coverage and  dependent on traditional,
informal safety nets.
8 The economic contraction triggered by the Asian financial crisis caused increased unemployment  and risina
contribution rates for the social security system represent a growing tax on labor.  Since the proposed pension
system requires a contribution history of at least  15 years, it cannot protect the current generation of retirees,
and it has little to offer workers 40 years and  older over in the short term.  More importantly., th.  proposed
design. which uses the limited earnings record to calculate initial pension, is likely to deter participation in the
formal market and encourage evasion.
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century. 9 Under the proposed contribution/benefit structure, the government is assuming an
implicit pension  debt on the order  of 39% of  GDP by the year 2030, which  will soar to
around 72% of GDP a century later.  Furthermore, cash  flow financing  will no  longer be
feasible when the current balance begins to turn negative in 2027.  By 2048, all accumulated
reserves will be exhausted.  If contribution rates cannot be raised, any resulting deficits will
have  to  be  passed  onto  the  government  budget,  to  be  paid  for  by  future  generations.
Alternatively,  benefits will  have to  be  cut.  In view  of  the  systematic  intergenerational
transfer implicit to  pay-as-you-go systems, it is critical for the government to  address the
system's long-term financial problems.
It is the government's  intention to invest the excess cashflow generated as a result of the time
delay between the immediate accumulation of contributions  and the beginning of old-age
benefit payments in 2014.  Preliminary actuarial analyses show that the pension fund will
grow to about 375 million baht (5% of GDP) within 10 years of inception.  With the accrual
of pension assets and the accompanying requirement for optimal portfolio allocation (i.e., to
attain the highest possible return for a given level of risk), there will be an increased demand
for innovative, long-term assets that are priced fairly by the market.  These developments will
prove to be beneficial for the financial market in terns  of the supply of appropriate debt and
equity  instruments,  which  will  help  to  render  the  market  deeper,  more  liquid  and
sophisticated.  Still, despite improved returns with financial market  development, the long-
term unsustainability of the system cannot be avoided.
In  order  to  ease  the  fiscal  impact  of  pension  arrangements  for  public  employees,  the
government is substituting the defined benefit, pay-as-you-go system that it financed through
general revenues  with  a  partially  funded  system  (the Government  Pension  Fund,  GPF).
Membership in the GPF is compulsory for those joining governrment service as of March 27,
1997 - others  can choose between joining  the fund or remaining in  the previous  scheme.
Contributions to the fund amount to 3% each for employees and the government as employer.
Administration, Investments and Tax Treatment
The SSO, formally established under Article 19 of the Social Security Act, is now one of the
departments under  the Ministry  of  Labor and  Welfare.  Its  main  responsibilities  are to
monitor  and  manage  the  operations  of  the  Social  Security  Fund  and  the  Workmen's
Compensation  Fund  and  perform  the  administrative  functions  of  the  Social  Security
Committee.  These include collection, compilation and analysis of data pertinent to social
security;  organization  and  registration  of  employers  and  insured  persons;  provision  of
9These  calculations assumed that the pension reserve will accrue at market rates of return and will be higher
than average wage growth.  In case these assumptions do not materialize, either because of non-performance of
the portfolio or a hioher than expected growth in the age-earnings profile, the deficit situation could be worse.
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recommendations for social security policies when needed, etc.  The chief executive  of the
Office is the Secretary General, who is assisted by three deputies (all civil servants).
Since  1991 SSO  has  been administering  a  program  that  offers  sickness,  disability,  and
maternity  benefits  and  has  shown  some  weaknesses.  Among  its  responsibilities  are
collecting contributions, maintaining records and paying benefits.  While there has been some
improvement in administration, a number of problems are still prevalent within the system,
including  large  numbers  of  unverifiable  records  in  the  data  base,  incorrect  employee
information, and coding error in contribution records  (an error rate of as high  as 20% has
been estimated).  SSO is charged with  executing many functions for which its  employees
have  not  been  specifically  trained,  and  while  it  has  managed  to  become  sufficiently
operational,  staff capacity has  been taxed  beyond  its  limits.  Introduction  of  the old-age
pension scheme will undoubtedly exert further demands on the already over-stretched staff.
For  example,  as  the  reserve  fund  grows,  there  will  be  increased  need  for  expertise  in
investment  management.  However,  budget  constraints  and  the  noncompetitive  salary
structure will continue to render the hiring and retention of qualified staff very difficult.
The Social Security Fund, provident funds and Government Pension Fund all have similar
investment regulations,  which  has  contributed  to  the development  of  similar  investment
portfolios (see Asher, 1999).  At least 60% of the Social Security Fund balances must be in
safe  assets  such  as  govermment bonds,  including  state  enterprise  bonds  and  treasury
debenture, and debt instruments of commercial banks, while 30% must be in assets with little
risk, such as finance and security company debt instruments and projects generating indirect
benefits for insured persons.  The Government Pension Fund also has to place at least 60% of
balances in cash, goverriment  bonds, treasury bills, etc. and may not diversify internationally.
A board of 22 members (10 ex-oficio, 9 government representatives and 3 outside experts)
governs the GPF, and, while it manages  some of the funds in-house, it has sub-contracted
part of the investment function to  5  external fund managers and the tasks  of membership
registration and record keeping to an outside firm.  As for the provident funds of the private
sector companies'" - handled by around 40 authorized fund managers - and state enterprises,
almost the  same  investment rules  apply,  although  up to  40%  of private  provident  fund
resources may be invested in the stock market or in corporate bonds.
These investment policies have resulted in rather passive portfolios, likely with low rates of
return."  Total household savings in provident and pension funds at the end of 1998 were 314
billion  Baht,  equivalent  to  6.7%  of  GDP.  Provident  funds  accounted  for  50%;  the
government  pension  fund,  31%;  and  the  Social  Security  Fund,  19%.  Provident  fund
resources at end- 1996 were distributed among cash and deposits (49%), corporate debentures
The private provident funds have experienced  loose regulation under the Ministry  of Finance, but recently,
the government proposed a series of amendments to the Provident Fund Act that would refine regulation and
transfer authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
"  Little consistent informnation  is available on rates of return (see Asher,  1999).
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(28%), bank dept instruments (10%), stocks (8%), and other investments (5%).  Similarly,
Social Security Fund assets at end-1998  were invested  in fixed deposits  (47.4% in  State
Enterprise  Banks  and  41.4%  in  commercial  banks)  and  bonds  and  debentures  (11.2%)
(Asher, 1999; see Figure 1 for aggregate portfolio).
Figure 1. Aggregate Investment Portfolio (Provident Funds and Social Security Fund)
G  Cash  and  deposits
38%
inCorporate  and  bank
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Thailand adheres to  the "exempt-exempt-exempt"  taxation regime  for its  old-age pension
schemes, except  for  benefit  distributions  prior  to  retirement  age due  to  separation  from
service, in which case the benefits are subject to tax.  As is the case in other countries in the
region, such a tax regime is generous.  In any case, the benefit/contribution link for the OAP
is weak, which could imply a distorted tax structure for some income groups.
III.  Reform  Issues  and Options
Since the Fourth National Economic and Social Development Plan, the Thai government has
targeted the reduction of income inequity as a major goal.  Despite its efforts, there is clear
evidence that inequality has been on the rise.) 2 Consequently, the Seventh National Plan
(1992-96)  proposed  specific  actions  to  narrow  gaps  in  income  distribution  and  reduce
regional disparities in living standards through a major expansion of the Social Security Act.
Added benefits would include the old-age pension insurance and child allowance schemes
scheduled to take effect as of January 1, 1999.  The old-age pension insurance scheme is the
first formal public retirement protection system in Thailand.  However, in the long run the
system may not  be  fiscally  sustainable,  depending not  only  on the  current government's
ability to levy taxes, but also on whether future govermnents will have the political will to
honor the commitments.  Furthermore, as an employment-related pension scheme, it faces
certain limitations.  It lacks the poverty alleviation component necessary in a public system to
assist the lifetime poor, and it does not firmly address the widening income gap between rich
12  The per capita income-based Gini was 42.6% in 1975 and 54.6% in 1992 (Atinc and Walton, 1998).
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and  poor,  or between  urban  and  rural  populations.  But  to  improve the  system  as  it  is
currently planned, the government should focus on the following issues:'3
*  Financial  sustainability.  The interim  solution  of  lowering the contribution  rates is  a
temporary measure to help the government keep to its pension implementation schedule
during an economically depressed period.  Clearly, it will compound the deficit problem,
and at some point, the government must revisit the task of designing a more sustainable
system, taking into consideration the social, labor, and financial factors.
*  Administrative  autonomy.  The current business operations  of the SSO  are diverse in
their range and specialized in their nature - from data processing to policy  advice, from
revenue  collection  to  fund  management.  To  ensure  the  security  and  the  effective
operation  of the  SSO, it is  necessary to  safeguard  a  certain degree of  administrative
autonomy.  Thus, it is  important that the  SSO be  conferred  status as an  independent
government  agency,  empowered  with  the  authority  to  create  and  implement  proper
collection  policies.  In addition, each individual fund within the social security system
should be set up as a separate legal entity segregated  from the budget and  governance
structure.
*  Administrative capacity.  The SSO has  achieved a great deal since its establishment in
1990.  However, with the enactment of the old-age pension insurance and child allowance
scheme, and with contributions likely  to quadruple in three years, the workload  of the
SSO will experience an exponential increase.  In view of the fact that the present staff is
already taxed beyond its capabilities, immediate and extensive technical assistance should
be procured.  It is critical that professionals  involved with pension reform be given the
necessary  assistance  and  training  in  actuarial  methods,  computerization,  infornatics,
quality  control, as well as other areas essential to the successful operation of a modern
social security system.
*  Investment  management.  Although  reserves  are currently  low,  their  investment  will
produce  important revenue  for  the  system,  implying  that  the  SSO needs  to  prepare
appropriately for this function.  To  ensure optimal performance of the Social Security
Fund, it is essential to develop investment policies designed to maximize return in a well
diversified portfolio, properly manage risk, and engage the expertise of world-class fund
managers  through  competitive  bidding  - the  Government  Pension  Fund  has  already
successfully contracted out part of its investment function.
3  This  section  focuses  on  the  Old-Age  Pension  program  of  the  Social  Security  Office,  but  some  of  the
observations apply equally  to the provident  fund  schemes,  especially  regarding  governance  and  investment
management.
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There is also need to set policies for investing accumulated social security reserves.  The
lack of  a clear  govemance structure regarding fund management  could easily  lead to
misallocation,  especially  if  assets  are  not  segregated  and  money  is  fungible  in  the
government budget.  This is particularly the case in Thailand because the system is very
young, which means there will initially be large accumulations of contributions.  With the
recent  economic crisis  and the decline in  budgetary revenue,  the government may be
under pressure to utilize the current surplus to finance or subsidize public/social projects.
To  safeguard  funds  from  usage  for  infrastructure  investment  and  to  help  meet  ever
mounting social needs, accrued reserves should be managed as separate trust funds, with
clearly defined governance structures.  In principle, partially or fully funded plans have
the potential to increase household savings and capital formation.  But this potential can
only  be  realized  if  pension  funds are  insulated  from  government  manipulation  and
channeled  through  the  capital  markets  where  incentives  exist  to  select  productive
investments on a competitive basis.
As it seeks to build a pension system that can provide a social safety net, stimulate financial
market development and be sustainable over time, the government needs to be mindful of its
obligation to make fundamental changes when the appropriate opportunity arises.  In the long
run, it will be in Thailand's  best interest to develop an integrated, savings-based, social risk
management strategy, which would include encouraging the expansion of private provident
funds.  With this approach, individual savings accounts can be used to manage limited losses
associated with retirement, unemployment, sickness/disability and other risk situations.  The
government's  role would therefore be limited to providing backup support for catastrophic
events that may exhaust the lifetime savings of ordinary citizens.  This support would be at
subsistence  level  and  would  be  financed  from  general  revenue,  similar  to  current
arrangements under the means-tested social pension.
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Vietnam*
Overview  of Formal  Old-Age  Support
Since 1962, Vietnam has operated a social insurance-style  system for old-age income support.
Participation  is mandatory  for state employees  and non-state employees  in enterprises  with more  than
10  workers. There are also separate  special schemes  for civil servants  and military personnel. Private
occupational  schemes  are extremely  limited.
The main system has defined  benefits and functions  on a pay-as-you-go  basis. The benefits formula
consists  of the wage base multiplied  by a service factor (3% for the first 15 years and 2% thereafter),
with a maximum pension of 75% of average wage in the last 10 years before retirement and a
minimum pension equal to  minimum wage.  Pension benefits are available after 20 years of
contributions  at the normal retirement age of 60 for men and 55 for women!  Certain groups -
employees  in hazardous  occupations,  those living in designated  areas and war veterans  - qualify five
years earlier,  with only 15 years of service. Benefits  are indexed  to the minimum  wage, which during
the past few years has increased less than the average wage.  System revenue comes through
contributions  of 20% of basic  wages, divided  between  the employee  (5%) and the employer  (15%).
Similar  to other  transition  economies,  Vietnam  bad few formal safety  nets in the past as a result of the
government's  approach  to welfare provision for workers (involving  employment  in state enterprises
in urban areas or collective  agriculture in rural areas and free or subsidized  goods and services).
Currently,  the policy objective  of social assistance  is to enable certain  groups to produce  and provide
only for the most vulnerable, a reflection of the general aversion to income transfers in Asian
societies.  Despite this general approach,  the government makes payments to around 1.4 million
persons with "revolutionary  merit" affected  by the war of reunification  (certain veterans, widows,
elderly parents,  and children of the killed or disabled). These  transfers, through the Social Guarantee
Fund for War Affected Groups, relate to previous service as opposed to household  economic  level,
and upper  and middle income  groups  receive  most of the benefits.
The critically vulnerable  groups derive categorical  program benefits through a different source, the
Social Guarantee  Fund for Regular  Relief, which assists  (i) old people without  other support  (60,000),
(ii) orphans  (37,000),  (iii) street children (2,000),  and (iv) invalids (63,000). Other social assistance
measures include institutional  care for those who cannot live in the community (20,000), disaster
relief and food aid (Contingency  Fund for Pre-Harvest  Starvation  and Disaster Relief), and a child
protection  program. In 1993  Vietnam created  a scheme  for the distribution  of land formerly  held by
cooperatives  in which the elderly received 50-80% of the land allocated to the non-elderly. This
served as an important  welfare benefit since the able elderly, their families  or tenants could farm  the
land,  which was capable  of producing  at the subsistence  level.
' Ian  W. Mac Arthur, HDNSP, The World Bank (imacarthur@worldbank.org) prepared this profile.  Pat Wiese
provided initial background material.
'Old-age  grants (lump sum) apply to individuals with less than 20 years of contributions at retirement.
I of 12Pension Systems in East Asia and the Pacific
1.  Background
After years under a socialist planned economy, Vietnam officially  began a series of market
reform policies in 1986.  The government still maintains a heavy hand in the transition
process through regulations and direct interventions  - an apparent policy goal is to avoid
large increases in  income inequality, including rural/urban disparities.  The continued
predominance of  the  Party  in  the  decision process and  institutions has  led  to  some
inefficiencies  and the interference of political favoritism in micro-decisions  (such as bank
lending).
Despite these limitations, the country has demonstrated an impressive economic growth
record over the past decade and was only moderately  affected by the recent regional crisis.
This favorable  performance  will likely drop off since past growth owed largely to efficiency
effects in the agricultural  sector that are currently exhausted. The nascent private sector in
agriculture,  industry and services will require large efforts to  mainstream in the formal
sector. Otherwise,  rising informalization  and lower growth rates will create great challenges
for social protection  (including  old age provisions)  and the budget.
The dismantling  of the collective system and reduction of central subsidies required the
government  to shift its strategy of welfare provision and procure new partners (e.g., local
government,  the family, the evolving private sector, etc.).  As these actors assume more
responsibility,  the state intends to focus its attention  on the most vulnerable  groups. In any
case, the family has always played a critical role in the care of the elderly, even during the
period of strict socialist  government.  A cultural  heritage  favoring  family support for the aged
- based on ancestor worship, patrilineal descent and patrilocal co-residence, which fostered
strong clan and village ties - has shown great resiliency to this day.
Vietnam is one of the Asian countries that has pursued a strong policy of population growth
control.  The total fertility rate fell from around 6 in the early 1960s to under 3 in the mid-
1990s.  The speed of this decline is impressive  considering that Vietnam remains a rather
poor and agricultural society.  Fertility will likely fall below the replacement level in the near
future.
Although decreased fertility  contributes to population  aging, a present shortage of persons
approaching their elderly years will postpone the pace of population aging for at least another
decade.  This is a result of a relative scarcity of persons at ages 45-60, a cohort born between
1935 and 1954. The cohort was depleted by (i) a famine in the Red River Delta around 1945
that caused a temporary decline in fertility and a sharp rise in mortality among infants and (ii)
the protracted war of reunification (1954-75) in which mortality was highest among those of
age for military service (exactly the cohort in question).  Thus, the additional numbers of
persons aged 60+ will actually fall over the next decade.  However, after 2020, the rate of
population aging will increase rapidly.
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11.  Analysis  of the Pension  System
Benefits  and  Coverage
Actual  monthly  old-age pension  benefits  amount to  approximately  US$  23,  providing  a
replacement rate of 69% of average covered wage.  However, the replacement rate drops
when compared to the total compensation.  This is because the basic taxable wage accounts
for perhaps  only  50% of the total  wage.  Additionally, until recently state-sector workers
have received a large portion of their payment in-kind (e.g., housing subsidies), and although
these payments have declined over the past 10 years, they are still significant.
Participation in the pension system is legally mandated for employees of state agencies, party
and  people's  organizations,  enterprises  belonging  to  the  army  or  police,  state-owned.
enterprises (SOEs), private  firms with  10 or more employees and enterprises with foreign
market affiliation (i.e., financed by direct foreign investment, in export processing zones or
industrial  parks, foreign  agencies  and  international organizations).  In  practice, coverage
under the pension system is very low since it is essentially limited to the state sector - while
coverage is almost universal for civil servants and over 90% for SOEs, it is less than one-
third for private sector employees - which amounts to about 3.3 million employees out of
34.6 million employed and a labor force of 36.1 million (see Table  1).  Thus, contributors
comprise  only  around  9.1%  of  the  labor  force.  There  are  nearly  1.2 million  old-age
pensioners (of all ages), amounting to about 18% of the population aged 60 and over.  Due to
the low level of taxable wages in the state sector and evasion, the covered wage bill as a
portion of GDP is also small (5.1%).
Table 1.  Social Security System in Vietnam - Basic Indicators
Group  1995  1996  1997  1998
Old Age Retirees  1,201,493  1,184,110  1,176,341  1,196,069
Work Injury  402,081  395,026  380,132  389,130
Survivors  174,438  178,970  171,872  225,766
Sickness, Maternity, Empl. Injury  6,157  11,315  13,542  15,710
Total  1,784,169  1,769,421  1,741,887  1,826,675
Contributors  2,280,000  2,820,000  3,160,000  3,290,536
Contributors/Old Age Retirees  1.9  2.4  2.7  2.8
Contributors/All Retirees  1.3  1.6  1.8  1.8
Source:  MOLISA
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Contribution  Requirements,  Financing  and Fiscal Sustainability
Employers are responsible for contributing 15% of base salary to the social security system
(10% for pension and death benefits and 5% for sickness, maternity and work injury benefits)
while employees contribute 5% of wages for pension  and death benefits.  Employers remit
the  contributions  collected  from  employees.  Contribution  rates  to  the  health  insurance
system are 2% for the employer and 1% for the employee, making an overall rate of 23% of
wages for social security and health.
In 1998 pension expenditures were 6,122 billion Dong while income was 9,384 billion Dong,
leaving a balance of 3,262 billion Dong that went to a reserve fund (Table 2).2 This surplus
results from an (accounting) reform in 1995 under which the government makes payment for
all retirees (and disabled) prior to January  1, 1995.  Contributions to the system pay benefits
for retirees and other beneficiaries of rights accrued since this date and form a separate fund
under the management of the Vietnam  Social Insurance Organization (VSI).  This reform
results, in principle, in repayment of the implicit debt accrued until 1995 and the full funding
of new  entitlements.  In order to accomplish this,  however, requires that  the benefits  and
take-up age are in line with the contribution effort and that the accumulated fund receives
sufficient and market-based real rates of return - this is, however, not the case.  Reserves in
this fund have accumulated since the beginning of  1995, averaging excess inflows of over
2,000 billion Dong per year (see next section regarding investment policy and performance).
The value of the reserve fund  at end-1998  was 8,887 billion Dong, representing 2.6%  of
GDP.  Projected contributions should exceed benefits awarded after 1995 until around 2015,
when the system will be compelled to begin drawing down the reserve fund (see Annex l).
The long-term fiscal sustainability of the system is threatened by several factors.  First, the
system  has  reached  a  fairly  high  level  of  maturation,  with  the  ratio  of  pensioners  to
contributors (the system dependency ratio) at 36%.  Second, it offers very generous benefits
that are in some ways wage-indexed.  With 30 years of service, an individual is entitled to a
replacement rate of 75% of his or her  average wage  during the last five years.  Third, the
normal  retirement  age (at 60  for men  and  55 for  women)  is  low  in  comparison  to  life
expectancy at birth and retirement age.  Furthermore, actual age at retirement, at age 53 on
average, is about 5 years lower than that foreseen in legislation for both men and women.
This implies a long average retirement period of about 16 years.  Fourth, as seen earlier, even
though the contribution rate appears fairly high (at 20% of wages), it applies only to the basic
wage,  which  accounts  for  a  small  portion  of  total  compensation.  Finally,  there  are
2 In 1998 VND 13,441.25 = USS 1.00.
This excludes disability and survivors'  pensioners, who number 389,000 and 227,000, respective]y.  If they
enter the calculation, the ratio rises to 55%.  However, their benefits are smaller.
4  The  difference  between  the  "basic  wage,"  which  applies  to  pension  benefit  calculation,  and  the  actual
compensation package varies among SOEs, workers in the Civil Service and those in private companies.  This
variance can materially affect the actual replacement rate based on the entire pre-retirement income.  A survey
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considerable problems in contribution arrears from weak  SOEs and  former SOEs that are
confronting the challenges of adapting to a greater market orientation.
Table 2.  Financial Operations of the Vietnam Social Insurance Scheme, billion VND
1995  1996  1997  1998
Income  1,978  7,026  8,804  9,384
From the VSI  788  2,588  3,706  4,370
Contribution  (20%)  788  2,570  3,614  3,897
Investment  income  - 18  192  473
From  the State  budget  1,190  4,438  5,098  5,014
Pensions  1,149  4,287  5,047  4,996
Administrative  expenses  41  118  - -
Other  0  33  51  18
Expenditures  1,191  4,937  5,932  5,122
From  the VSI  42  398  706  975
Pensions  13  224  372  486
Short-term  benefits  29  157  216  257
Health insurance  contrib.  - 1  3  5
Other (delivery,  adm., exp on buildings)  0.1  18  115  227
From the State  budget  1,149  4,539  5,227  5,147
Pensions  1,079  4,248  4,996  4,966
Health insurance  contrib.  27  117  142  137
Other (delivery,  adm.,  exp on buildings)  43  173  89  44
Balance  (to reserves)  787  2,089  2,872  3,262
Reserves  (at year end)  790  2,900  5,700  8,887
Source: VSI, 1999.
The loose early retirement provisions pose a special threat to the fiscal sustainability of the
system because the government is considering using them as a mechanism to reduce surplus
labor in SOEs. Although this may appear to be a relatively low cost means of reducing staff,
it is important to bear in mind some of the implications of such a strategy:  (i) this type of
early retirement increases current fiscal cost in the sense that pension fund reserves must be
conducted  in late 1998,  however,  suggests  that  the  actual  variance  between  basic  wages  and  total  compensation
(from  one  job) is only  some  15%.
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used to pay current benefits, thereby reducing the potential to pay  future benefit promises;5
(ii) men and women over age 50 and 55 respectively may individually be highly productive
so that choosing them exclusively by age may result in a productivity loss; (iii) early retirees
may be attracted to return to the SOE labor force while still collecting pensions, resulting in
additional fiscal costs and no net employment generation or efficiency gain.  An additional
vehicle for facilitating early retirement is through the certification by medical examiners of
disability attributed to work injury.  To the extent that this  devise is employed,  the cost is
considerably greater than the early retirement provision  for the following reasons:  (i) the
additional cost and reduction of contributions received may extend for up to 10 years instead
of just  five; (ii) as above, older individuals of high productivity may be lost; and (iii) the
credibility of the work injury scheme is lost.
Administration,  Management  and Regulation
Up until 1995 the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) and the Vietnam
General  Confederation of  Labor  (VGCL)  shared  responsibility  for  administering  social
security.  MOLISA handled long-term benefits (pensions and survivors benefits)  while the
VGCL managed short-term benefits (sickness, maternity, employment injury and recreation).
In February of 1995, the govermnent established the VSI, under direct authority of the Prime
Minister, which assumed the long-term and short-term functions formerly divided between
MOLISA and the VGCL, administration of the Social Insurance Fund, and implementation
of policies and the social security schemes.
The VSI has a hierarchical structure that reaches to the lowest district levels.  It has three
principal departments at the head office as well as at the provincial and local  offices:  (i)
Collections Department; (ii) Expenditure (Disbursements) Department; and (iii) Planning and
Finance Department.  There is also an Inspections Department charged with internal review,
audit and oversight down to the local level. 6 The VSI has 5,700 employees, with 230 in the
Head Office and around 6 each in offices at the provincial and local levels - nearly all of
Vietnam's  598 districts have at least one VSI  office.  The vertical management  structure
helps avoid the difficulties noted in some countries whereby the national, provincial and local
interests may vary and  employees may not  carry out  a central mandate  because  of their
reporting relationships.  On the other hand, local agents of the VSI effectuate both collections
and disbursement, and the dispersion of responsibility for transferring significant amounts of
money  gives  rise  to  risks  of  corruption  or  fraud.  The  disbursement  process  is  fully
automated, although automation of the collections and account management process  is not
expected to be completed until 2001.
s There are two principal sources of increased expenditure or revenue loss associated with the early retirement
regime:  (i) benefits have to be paid for an additional  1-5 years depending upon the age of the individual, and
(ii) approximately 23% of base salary is lost because revenues are not received for social security and health
insurance contributions.
6 The VSI is subject to external audit and review by the Ministry of Finance.
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According to Decision #20 of January,  1998, the VSI may retain 6% of total collections for
the  purposes of covering  administrative  costs and  utilize  50% of the  accrued  returns  on
reserves to  invest in the construction  of the material base  of the social insurance system,
including all fixed costs.  So far, actual administrative costs have been less than the 6%
amount.  In comparison  to  other countries  of  the  region, this  performance  is  relatively
efficient (i.e., somewhat lower than Indonesia and the Philippines) but worse than that of the
leaders (i.e., Singapore and Malaysia).
In addition  to its  functions in  collecting  contributions  and  disbursing benefits,  the VSI's
mandate includes management of the Social Insurance Fund.  It can invest the reserves in:  (i)
interest bearing bonds or securities issued by the government or commercial banks; (ii) direct
loans to the national budget, national investment fund and State commercial banks; and (iii)
pubic development projects  and enterprises subject to the approval of the Prime Minister.
The current  composition  of  the  investment portfolio  is  estimated  to  be  roughly  40%  in
deposits in public banks, 10% in Treasury Bills, and 50% lent to the government's  General
Department of Investment  or deposited in  the Bank  of Development and Investment  (see
Annex 2).
Given the lack of financial instruments and assets in the Vietnamese financial sector and the
predominance of public sector investments - due to the fact that funds are basically hostage
of the public sector - the returns  have been poor.  Since late  1995 (when VSI  was fully
fumctional), returns have trailed those of comparitors such as time deposits on commercial
banks.  A weighted average  return calculation  undertaken  by  the ILO  suggests that  the
average rate of return in 1998 was 6.6%, which is at least four percent less than equivalent
market  instruments  (see  Dorfman,  1999).  This  indicates  that  the  State  effectively
decapitalized the fund (or deferred the fiscal costs of liabilities) through  the interest  rates
applied to portfolio assets.  Moreover, although the VSI does seek to maximize the return to
reserves, there is no explicit  strategy towards risk management nor matching the tenure of
assets  and  liabilities  (except  for  the  short-term  liabilities,  i.e.,  sickness  and  maternity
benefits).
In  general  the tax regime  for  contractual  savings instruments  is  fairly  liberal.  Personal
income tax in Vietnam is only applicable to individuals whose incomes are over 2 million
Dong (US$143) per month, who represent  a very  small proportion of total workers.  The
individual  income tax  rate  varies  from  10% to  60%  depending  on  total  income.  The
corporate income tax rate is 32%.  Employer contributions to the mandatory Social Security
scheme and to health insurance are deductible as expenses for purposes of corporate income
tax, and employee contributions are deductible from individual income taxes.  Accruals to
life insurance and pension funds are tax exempt, and all social security benefit distributions
are exempt from individual income tax, resulting  in an "exempt-exempt-exempt"  scenario
(exempt on all three taxable flows).  Meanwhile, contributions to pension annuity plans are
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neither  deductible from  corporate nor personal  income  for tax purposes, but  distributions
from life  insurance policies and pension plans  are tax exempt. 7 The inequality in  the tax
treatment between the Social Security system and other contractual savings instruments may
pose problems for the growth potential of the latter.
III.  Reform  Issues  and Options
As seen above, the fundamental issue in pension reform for Vietnam concerns the long-terrn
financial viability of the system.  Some parametric reform may help in the short term, but it
would be prudent for the government to consider more comprehensive reforms before the
problems become overwhelming.
In principle, one possibility to alleviate the financing  situation, at least in the short term, is
through  expansion  of  coverage  in  the private  sector  that  would  increase  the  number  of
contributors and thereby reduce  the system  dependency  ratio.  Potential for expansion  is
large, given the  current  low coverage  (almost  non-existent)  in the  private  sector, which
accounts for 91% of the employed labor force, and favorable demographic conditions.  It is
unclear if this is viable, however, since private sector firms may resist participation due to the
contribution burden.  Moreover, expansion has significant institutional implications  for the
VSI and MOLISA and may present unattractive administrative cost levels.  For example, VSI
has expressed its disinterest in extending an old age insurance scheme to farmers and those
involved in other rural activities due to cost reasons - administrative costs for these groups
would likely approximate 20%, in comparison to  5% for current contributors.  Under these
circumstances,  it  may  be  most  appropriate  for  government  to  strengthen  incentives  for
participation  among  current  evaders  and  develop  stronger  institutional  structures  before
considering expansion in coverage.
Other  aspects  of  (parametric  and  operational)  reform  include  the  following  actions  to
improve  financial  sustainability,  increase  actuarial  fairness  and  reduce  moral  hazards
embodied in the current system:
. carefully  regulating the  granting  of  disability  and  survivors pensions  that  are  under
pressure to  reduce surplus labor and that  incite abuse  and high incidence due  to very
generous benefit levels (disability);
. raising  the  actual  retirement  age  at  least  to  the  legislated  level  (i.e.,  reduce  early
retirement),  or higher, considering  the current  average  lengthy retirement  period,  and
bringing the retirement age for women up to that for men;
7 This is something of an academic concept since life insurance policies are only two years old and annuities
only a month old.  The Ministry of Finance is currently reviewing the tax treatment of these distributions.
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*  adequating benefits to  bring  them  in  line with  the whole  compensation picture  (i.e.,
subsidized goods and services, previous in-kind pay, etc.); and,
•  considering reduction in  benefit  levels, which  are very  generous  considering previous
contributions.
The reform effort should place high  emphasis on trying to improve the returns to pension
reserves  by  investing in  high yielding  assets while at the  same time  managing  risk  and
matching the tenure of the reserves to the maturity of the liability outflows.  In the short term
it will likely be difficult to pursue this objective given the limited development of contractual
savings and term financial instruments in Vietnam.  Rather, increasing the returns to pension
assets will have to involve rethinking the strategy for asset allocation and marrying it to the
medium-term development of the financial markets.
On a more ambitious level, the govenment  may want to consider additional steps, including:
*  implementing notional accounts to improve the benefit-contribution link, thus helping to
diminish significant evasion, and approximate a DC structure;
*  eventually attempting a shift to partial prefunding through a multi-pillar structure; and,
*  encouraging the development of financial markets through simultaneous reform, which
will also allow for the creation of private savings and investment mechanisms.
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Annex 1.  Long-Term Financial Operations of VSI, 1999-2020 (rough estimates)
(in billion VND)
Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2010  2015  2020
Income  9,5(0  11,300  12,300  13,300  14,400  15,600  16,100  19,200  22,200  24,100
Contri!'i tion  3,400  3,600  4,000  4,300  4,600  5,000  5,200  7,100  9,800  13,400
Investment Income  500  620  750  890  1,000  1,170  1,310  1,850  1,900  730
Transfer fi-om  State  i3udget  5,600  7,000  7,600  8,100  8,700  9,400  9,600  10,200  10,500  10,000
Expendituire  7,000  8,700  9,500  10,500  11,500  12,700  13,400  17,600  23,900  32,800
Benefit  6,500  8,200  8,900  9,800  10,800  12,000  12,600  16,600  22,600  31,000
I'ension pre-1995 (State budget)  5,400  6,800  7,300  7,800  8,400  9,000  9,200  9,600  10,100  9,600
P'ension post-1995  810  1,000  1,220  1,550  1,880  2,320  2,650  5,540  10,960  19,310
Shor-t-term  benefit  340  360  440  490  560  650  710  1,460  1,480  2,040
Other  250  260  280  310  330  370  390  500  680  930
Statc budget  205  235  250  270  290  320  320  340  350  340
VSI  17  17  27  37  48  60  72  190  320  590
Adminiistrative  and othel-  expenses  250  270  290  310  340  360  370  460  640  880
Balance (w/out investment incomie)  2,000  2,000  2,000  1,900  1,800  1,700  1,400  -300  -3,600  -9,300
Balance (with investment income)  2,500  2,600  2,800  2,800  2,900  2,900  2,700  1,600  -1,700  -8,600
Reserve (year-end)  11,400  14,000  16,700  19,600  22,400  25,300  28,000  35,500  37,800  10,200
Soursce:  VSI, 1999
Note:  some values are rounidedAnnex B12: Country Profilefor  Vietnam
Annex 2.  Investment Portfolio of the Social Insurance Fund Reserves
VND  Percentage  Interest Rate
(billion)
1. Bank deposits  1,218  13.7%
2. Vietnam Bank of Agriculture  and Rural  650  7.3%  0.9%/month
Development
3. Lang Ha Branch  of the Bank of Agriculture  and  250  2.8%  0.85%/month
Rural Development
4. Vietnam bank of Investment  and Development  1,250  14.1%  0.65%/month
5. Hanoi Bank of Investment  and Development  100  1.1%  0.60%/month
6. The National  Assistance  Fund of Investment  500  5.6%  0.55  - 0.58%/month
7. General Department  of Investment  and  2,700  30.4%  0.55/month
Development
8. Hoan Kiem  Branch  of the Industrial  and  875  9.8%  0.75%  -
Commercial  Bank  0.85%/month
9. Ministry  of Finance  1,079  12.1%  0.3  - 0.45%/month
10. Treasury  Bonds  90  1.0%  9%-  l1%/year
11. Other  175  2.0%
Total  8,887  100.00%
Source:  VSI, 1999
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With the  recovery  from  the  recent  crisis,  countries  of  the East  Asia  and  Pacific  region  are  rethinking
their  financial  and social  policy,  including  old-age  protection. Population  aging,  in combination
with ongoing  urbanization  and economic  transformation,  will place  increasing  pressure  on
traditional  family care  arrangements.  Coverage  under  formal  pension  systems  is  generally  low,
and the  absence  of  social  safety  nets  for  the needy  elderly  poses  risks  in the  face  of breaks  in the
economic  growth  path. In  addition  to common  systemic  challenges,  formal  old-age  income
support  systems  confront  issues  specific  to their  design  type: (i)  The  national  provident  fund and
social  security-style  systems  with reserve  funds  have  demonstrated  problems  with investment
policy  and  performance,  governance  and  management.  (ii) In  the  established  market  economies,
social  security-type  systems  are  fiscally  unsustainable  in the long  run and often  have  a weak
benefit-contribution  link. (iii)  These  types  of systems  encounter  additional  problems  in transition
economies,  including  low  contribution  collection  from previously  socialized  enterprises  and  rising
benefit  take-up,  partly  as  a consequence  of the  policy response  to labor  market  disequilibria.
Despite  the  formidable  reform  agenda,  countries  have  abundant  opportunities  to address  these
issues,  and  the low level  of coverage,  predominance  of retirement  schemes  still in evolution  and
existence  of funded  provisions  in many  countries  provide  an environment  conducive  to reform.
Options  involve  (i)  avoiding  mistakes  (adopting  an integrated  view on retirement  income  provision,
balancing  individual  equity  and social  equity  with efficiency  considerations,  averting  fiscal
unsustainability  and integrating  public  and private  sector  pensions);  (ii)  being  innovative  (moving
toward  a multipillar  structure,  prudently  extending  coverage,  trying  new  approaches  to reduce
administrative  costs  and  extending  social  risk  management  through  informal  support  and  safety
nets);  and  (iii) fostering  financial  markets  (decentralizing  pension  fund management;  reviewing
governance,  regulation  and  supervision;  and  creating  or supporting  the  provision  of new  instruments).
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About this series...
The  World Bank  Pension  Reform  Primer  aims  to provide  a  timely and  comprehensive  resource  for  those
engaged  in the design  and implementation  of pension  reforms  around  the world. Policymakers  and
those  who advise  them  will find useful  information  on other  reform  experiences,  the current  thinking
of pension  specialists  and  a vast  array  of cross-country  evidence.  A flexible  and  dynamic  format  ensure
that  key  developments  are  updated  as  they-occur.
The  World  Bank  set  out a conceptual  framework  for  fundamental  pension  reform  in Averting  the Old
Age  Crisis:  Policies  to Protect  the  Old and  Promote  Growth,  This  study,  published  in 1994,  helped  shape
the  global  debate  about  the impact  of  population  ageing  on pension  systems,  The  Pension  Reform  Primer
builds  on this  pioneering  work and  on the experience  of the  World Bank  and  other  international
institutions  in the last  five  years.  It focuses  on practical  questions.
For  more  information,  please  contact  Social  Protection,  Human  Development  Network,  World Bank,
1818  1Ht  Street  NW,  Washington,  D.C.  20433;  telephone  +1  202  458 5267,  fax  +1 202 614  0471;  e-mail
socialprotection@worldbank.org.  All Pension  Reform  Primer  material  is  available  on the internet  at
www.worldbank.org/pensions